从美苏之间到美欧俄之间——1989年后中东欧国家的外交战略与大国关系的互动

在中东欧国家由苏联"卫星国"向北约和欧盟成员的转变中,苏联、美国、北约、欧盟及俄罗斯对中东欧国家的政策及它们之间的关系起到了至关重要、有时甚至是决定性的作用。正是在美苏对峙格局崩溃,美国成为世界唯一的超级大国,美、欧、俄的博弈渐次展开但远未构成三足鼎立的情况下,中东欧国家以加入北约与欧盟为主要内容的"回归欧洲"战略得以确立和实施。中东欧国家加入北约和欧盟对美、欧、俄关系产生了一定的影响,但不会从根本上改变与美、欧、俄之间现有的关系格局。     

Will Black Lives Matter to the Police? African Americans’ Concerns about Trump’s Presidency

ABSTRACT

Based on a 2017 national survey of 1,000 Black Americans, perceptions regarding the implications of Donald Trump’s election as President on race relations, police-minority relations, and police treatment of Black citizens in the United States were examined. Findings suggest the existence of a “Trump Effect.” With minor variation across demographic groups, the survey respondents expressed overall negative perceptions concerning the effects of President Trump’s election. In particular, they expressed the belief that his presidency shows that the United States is a racist society, will strain police-minority relationships, and will create a climate in which African Americans are more likely to be arrested or subjected to police violence. At issue is not just African Americans’ distrust of President Trump but, importantly, whether his emphasis on “law and order” and dismissal of minority-group concerns attenuates the legitimacy of law enforcement in the eyes of African Americans.     

美国国家安全战略的思想根源

战略观念与战略思维是影响国家战略行为的深层因素。美国在成长为超级大国的历史进程中,逐步形成了自身独特的战略安全观念与战略思维方式。综合考察战后以来尤其是冷战期间美国国家安全战略的缔造与实施过程,可以看出,美国战略安全观念与战略思维方式有几个近乎一以贯之的显著特点:立足"最坏假设",强调实力地位,保持技术优势,偏重军事手段,追求绝对安全,维持全球霸权,秉持道德普遍主义和意识形态优越论。其中,物质与精神并重,权力尤其武力手段与道德、意识形态旗帜并举,是最具美国特色的战略思想。这些思想特征构成美国安全战略的深层脉络,在战略实践中起起落落但从未销声匿迹。这些思想观念所塑造的全球战略既成就了美国的超强地位,也造成了美国霸权的困境,是理解当前和未来美国国家安全战略的重要历史与思想线索。     

当前国际局势特点及中国外部环境的新挑战

当前国际局势具有国际秩序加速变革过程中鲜明的阶段性和过渡性特征。国际力量格局的多极化、均衡化势头不减,但总体上仍属于美国一超之下的三元（美国、欧盟、新兴大国）基本格局。国际体系的深度变革以及全球治理需求加大与国际治理机制供应不足之间的矛盾仍是当前国际关系的主要矛盾。在上述基本格局和主要矛盾的推动下,当前国际局势呈现特有的复杂、多变、胶着的态势,国际关系中的一系列矛盾凸显,反映了国际体系大变革时代的众多格局性和趋势性重要变化。中国外交因此而面临着空前机遇和空前挑战并存的局面,两者互动、转化的频率和可能性增强,从而对我们的战略规划、环境塑造以及机遇创造能力提出了更高的要求。     

The Russia-NATO mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain “the Russian Bear”

This paper argues that Russian-Western mistrust persists due to historical and cultural developments with roots in the Cold War. The post-Cold War imbalance of power served to exacerbate the problem. The United States emerged as the world's superpower acting on perceived fears of Russia, whereas Russia's undermined capabilities dictated a defensive, rather than a hegemonic response. The paper analyzes the decision to expand NATO by excluding Russia from the process. It also asks why the process suddenly stopped in 2008. What changed the West's mind about the expansion was not a revised perception of Russia, but rather concern with its growing power and assertiveness as revealed by the Kremlin's use of force during the Caucasus' war.     

On Being Black,Muslim, and a Refugee: Stories of Somalis in Chicago

Abstract

Somali refugees are considered one of the largest African refugee populations in the United States and the fourth largest refugee population globally. Yet, there is limited scholarship on their overall migration paths and the ways in which their intersectional identities may impact their resettlement and integration in the United States. Study findings are from a qualitative study on the migration and integration experiences of 15 Somali Americans in Chicago. Findings illustrate the complexities associated with the Somali refugee narrative and how this population is often positioned at the intersections of anti-Black, anti-Muslim, and anti-refugee racism and discrimination in the United States.     

Problems in applying counterterrorism to prevent terrorism: Two decades of violence in Northern Ireland reconsidered

The terrorism of 9/11 elicited a range of different reactions from around the world, including the sentiment that 9/11 was just deserts for America's presence abroad as an unwelcome, overweening world policeman. To help determine the prevalence of this perspective, the authors surveyed a sample of 335 well-educated, English speaking Sri Lankans. Most respondents (73%) thought that the United States brought the 9/11 attack on itself. Reasons for this view included the United States's unilateralism as the only superpower, its involvement in other countries' affairs for its own benefit, and its support for Jews in Israel at the expense of Muslims. Yet the sample's overwhelming sympathy for the U.S. after 9/11 (83%) and to a lesser extent, its anger (52%), as well as agreement regarding the need to punish those who planned and carried out the attack (91%) indicate ambivalence towards the U.S. Implications for how the U.S. should address anti-American attitudes are discussed.‐     

Freedom,Hate, and Violence on the American Right

Most studies on Middle East security focus on traditional threats such as military aggression and terrorism. This draft report examines the scope and dimensions of a broadened regional security agenda. It focuses on three specific issues: the opium trade in Central and Southwest Asia; unregulated population movements from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and North Africa; and maritime piracy around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. Although Washington is not directly affected by any of these "soft" or "grey area" challenges, they are relevant for the United States in at least five respects. First, they represent a subset of the transnational problems that both the Clinton and Bush administrations have emphasized as a growing threat to national and international stability (such as international organized crime, corruption and generalized non-state violence and chaos). Second, they have, in varying degrees, undermined and distorted institutional state capacity, trade and (legitimate) economic growth in a region that is of geostrategic importance to Washington. Third, all carry significant implications for the lives, welfare and safety of ordinary citizens, including Americans. Fourth, in certain instances they have interacted with other sources of political tension to act as an additional catalyst for inter-state hostility and rivalry. Finally, because these challenges cannot be readily deterred by established mechanisms of border security, they necessarily require innovative and novel countermeasures--something that the United States is well placed to facilitate, both by virtue of its resources and global leadership role.     

Chapter 9. Counseling South American Immigrants

Abstract

The Hispanic population in the United States is growing exponentially. There are a total of 1,506,654 South Americans in the United States who have come from Spanish-speaking countries. Most immigrants, if not all, experience difficulties triggered by migration, discrimination, acculturation, and second language acquisition. In this chapter, we briefly discuss major issues associated with migration and present literature and research on the construct of social support. We propose that integrating and utilizing social support during treatment will facilitate the adjustment process for the individual. We present interventions that allow the therapist to provide support while encouraging the client to seek support within him/herself and from other sources in the environment.     

The Rise of the Rest Warms the Planet

tokyo —America's post‐World War II commitment to universal rules of openness has spread economic gains far and wide, enabling new prosperity on a global scale. It is this American‐forged stable world order that has led to what Fareed Zakaria refers to as “the third great powershift” in the last 500 years: the “rise of the rest,” which follows on the rise of the West and the rise of the United States as the dominant Western power. It is indeed a remarkable legacy of American hegemony that China, India and others are rising, or arising anew, without the pillage, plunder and war associated with the emergent great power experiences of the past.     

The Dotbuster Effect on Indo-American Immigrants

Abstract

Immigrants today make up 14 percent of the U.S. workforce (Closing the Immigrant Skills Gap, n.d.), and, of these, a good proportion have arrived from Africa. Although Africans started coming to United States predominantly as students after the 1960s post-colonial era, their numbers have dramatically increased since the beginning of the 1990s. The influx of African immigrants to the United States in the last two decades especially after the end of the Cold War era of the early 1990s has been phenomenal. According to figures from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS-now the Office of Homeland Security), the number of African immigrants to the United States has more than quadrupled in the last two decades, from 109,733 between 1961 and 1980 to 531,832 between 1981 and 2000 (Takougang, n.d.).     

Disinvesting in America? the legacy of consumption policy in the 1980s

This article traces patterns of consumption, low productivity, debt accumulation and slow economic growth. Rather than calling for an increased emphasis on market and corporate incentives, the author calls for increased public investment. He favors particularly increases in scientific research and development and technology, in public works to rebuild the infrastructure, and calls for a public administration associated with increased investment in government.

The New Deal and the Great Society established the foundations of the public policy and administration of consumption—income transfer, entitlement, loan, loan guarantee, credit, subsidy, tax expenditure, and related programs designed to maintain or improve the income levels and social and economic well being of many elements of the United States population. Such programs now constitute approximately 50 percent of the federal budget. In the late 1980s, the United States entered into a new international economic, technological, and demographic order in which the public administration of investment will be increasingly important. The “public administration of investment” is defined as the administration of policies designed to produce future benefits for the nation through investment in people, knowledge and technology, the environment and public infrastructure, and public systems and public service.

Several trends in the 1980s contributed to the increasing importance of the public administration of investment. The first trend was the continuation of the low rate of productivity growth in the United States, a condition that has persisted since the early 1970s. ⁽¹⁾

Despite low productivity growth, the United States as a nation continues to spend as if productivity were increasing at pre-1973 rates and to borrow from other nations to make up the difference. The result has been large public and private debt. Increased productivity growth will require additional public as well as private investment if the United States is to maintain its standard of living and capacity to pursue social justice and other values into the next century.

The second trend has been the globalization of technology and the economy. The United States has been losing the comparative advantage it once enjoyed in many scientific and technological fields, as technological know-how has spread throughout the world. The United States fell further behind in the 1980s in the development of new production processes and in the commercialization of new processes and products in consumer electronics, semiconductors, and other fields.⁽²⁾ There is compelling evidence that both the private and public sectors underinvested in developing the scientific and technical workforce that will be essential in the global technological competition of the future.⁽³⁾ More generally, by many measures the education system of the United States has not been producing a well-educated workforce or well-educated citizens.⁽⁴⁾

The third trend of the ’80s was the maturation of the baby boom generation. This generation is now in the high consumption stage of its life cycle—homes, cars, and other consumer goods. The aging of the baby boom generation in the early decades of the twenty-first century will pose a complex challenge to public policy and administration. Early in the twenty-first century, the baby boomers will enter a stage of life usually marked by reduced consumption and higher saving.⁽⁵⁾ At the same time, increased longevity suggests growing demands on both public and private systems for income maintenance, health care, and social services. New technologies will compound health care costs. Unless saving and investment are increased now to partially support the baby boom generation in retirement, the “baby bust” generation that followed the baby boom will face a heavy burden of support.⁽⁶⁾ Currently, the Social Security Trust Fund does not have a single penny in it because the Treasury is borrowing the funds to reduce the federal deficit. Substantially increased productivity or substantially higher taxes will be necessary to replenish the fund in the early twenty-first century.

To compound the problem, by the year 2050, for the first time in American history (according to the middle series of Census projections), there will be more old than young Americans. The age cohort 60 and older will make up 28 percent of the population, while the age cohort 1-19 years will make up about 23 percent of the population.⁽⁷⁾ This is in stark contrast to the 16 percent of the population 60 and over, and the 32 percent of the population 1-19 years, in 1980. Greatly increased saving, increased productivity, substantially lower standards of living for working people, extended working years, or an influx of immigrant workers will be needed to produce the benefits that are promised in the entitlement programs of the federal government and expected by the American people.

Finally, many observers perceived an increase in private greed during the last decade in the United States and a growing indifference to common concerns—eroding public infrastructure, the highest infant mortality rate among industrialized nations, the highest rate of child poverty, and similar social conditions. They see a preoccupation with current pleasure at the expense of future benefits, and a decline in social discipline and civic virtue. To some observers, the United States has been in a temporary cycle of preoccupation with private needs.⁽⁸⁾ To others, civic virtue in the United States has been in decline.⁽⁹⁾

In any event, diminishing growth may intensify each individual's desire to protect his or her interests. In this context, redistribution in the pursuit of social equity will become increasingly difficult.     

美国重返亚洲态势下的中日关系前瞻

美国战略重心东移亚太,经济上与中国争夺主导权,军事上围堵遏制中国,以图维持"一超"霸主地位;在此国际背景下,中国面临周边复杂形势和压力增大,处理好中日关系在整个亚太格局中尤为重要。文章分析了中日共同利益和结构性矛盾,提出了从战略上如何把握中关、中日两对矛盾。中日友好合作、战略互惠符合中国最大国家利益,以及加强中日关系须要经济互联、政治互信、民间交往、地方外事、防卫互动、立足内政等观点。     

America's Trajectory in the Long War1: Redirecting Our Efforts Toward Strategic Effects Versus Simply Tactical Gains

After 9/11 the United States has a significant disconnect between its strategic and tactical efforts against violent global jihadists. Some American leaders and commanders are confusing effectiveness and success, improperly associating tactical disruption of enemy elements with strategic effect. While the country has won some important tactical victories, it is not clear that they are amounting to a strategic impact, or that the gains will last. The situation is complex, with various dynamics influencing America's prosecution of the Long War and its ability to be successful in the long term. This article looks at what those factors are and provides policy makers with tangible recommendations that, if implemented, will place America's counterterrorism efforts on a more strategic trajectory and hold greater promise of lasting impact.     

欧盟在中美之间的艰难选择——基于“蛋糕主义”视角的分析

在中美战略竞争的背景下,美国要求欧盟国家与其联手遏制中国,抵制中国在欧洲的基础设施建设和投资。欧盟陷入两难境地,一边是为欧洲诸国提供安全保障的传统盟友美国,另一边是给欧洲带来经济利益的合作伙伴中国。大多数欧洲国家和欧盟实际上在实施一种“蛋糕主义”的平衡策略,即在中美之间“不选边站队”,保持一种矛盾和摇摆的立场,同时它们也希望能够避免因得罪任何一方而遭受重大利益损失。欧盟国家非常清楚这种策略只是一种权宜之计,只有进一步加强战略自主,从根本上提升欧盟的防务能力和外交自主权,才能拯救欧洲,并在此基础上发展欧洲。中国需要认识到欧盟目前的骑墙状态无法长期持续,因为美国如果加大对欧盟的施压力度或者对欧盟作出更有利的安全承诺,欧盟国家大概率会回归美国的怀抱,进而联手应对中国。对中国来说,应该鼓励欧盟“不选边站队”,因为总体上让欧盟偏向中国是不现实的,欧盟能够保持中立对中国来说在理论上是一种次优选择,在现实中也可能是最优选择。今后的中美欧三边关系存在较大不确定性,欧盟的战略空间可能会缩小,需要在中、美两强之间艰难地维持平衡。     

America First? Trump,Crime, and Justice Internationally

ABSTRACT

“America First,” as presented by President Trump, argues for an international strategy that persistently places America’s interests above those of anyone or anything else. Consequently, Trump has reshaped the international perceptions of the United States and has created more difficulties for the U.S. in coordinating of global leaders in resolving complex issues in the world. This essay reflects on how Trump and the United States are viewed internationally, the impacts of Trump’s anti-immigrant and pro-White nationalist rhetoric, Trump’s responses to humanitarian crises around the globe, and the potential impact of Trump’s stance on global climate change. Given these considerations, it is questionable whether “America First” policy has made “America Great Again” in the eyes of the world.     

Intersectoral Police Collaboration: An Exploratory View from the States

Modern policing in the United States is best conceived as a joint undertaking between public and private sectors. Over the last several decades there has been a gradual movement away from monopolistic state provision of police services toward a greater reliance on the private sector for protection and security. While the current activities of public and private police are well chronicled in the research literature, little is actually known about the coordination of policing activities across sectors. The purpose of this article is to describe the range of public-private police partnerships that have developed recently in the United States.     

Trendsetters,Trend Followers,and Individual Players: Obtaining Global Counterterror Actor Types from Proscribed Terror Lists

This article seeks to conceptualize global counterterror actor types by examining the designated terrorist organizations lists of six countries; the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia, and China. It is argued that these countries should be placed into one of three distinct categories: Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players. Being able to classify countries according to these categories is important for global policymakers. It raises awareness of the differences between countries, and emphasizes that “one-fits-all” policies are inappropriate and have little chance of achieving global endorsement.     

The Great Convergence and the Logic of One World

A great historical transition is underway from American‐led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0—the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G‐20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO—have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies—the United States and China—are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self‐interest that will unravel the rules‐based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs.     

China and America in a Post‐Hegemonic Age

A great historical transition is underway from American‐led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0—the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G‐20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO—have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies—the United States and China—are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self‐interest that will unravel the rules‐based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs.