Friendly neighbor or Trojan Horse? Assessing the interaction of soft law initiatives and the UN climate regime

Current global climate governance is characterized by increasing institutional proliferation. Within the last 5 years several non-legally binding initiatives have emerged, including (i) the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and various other public–private partnerships working on the policy implementation level and (ii) the Group of Eight Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, and Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change as high-level political processes. As a first step toward analyzing the relationship between these parallel initiatives and the UN climate regime, this article looks at the negotiations of four UN-hosted climate meetings in 2007–2008, providing an examination of the interaction of ‘soft law’ climate initiatives and the ‘hard law’ UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol process. The methodology of the study is based on participatory observations in the negotiations and document analysis of country and stakeholder positions. The analysis shows that the current multitude of processes in global climate governance entails potential institutional interaction. Deliberations of the key actors give some support to the claims of non-UN soft law being used to exert influence on the negotiations on a future climate regime within the UN context.

The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

To be effective, a post-Kyoto climate agreement must secure significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions by all (key) emitters. Potent participation and compliance enforcement will be required to make it in every key emitter’s best interest to participate in, and comply with, an agreement which specifies deep emissions reductions for all its signatories. This article considers the conditions under which potent enforcement would likely be politically feasible. Based on assessments of the current political landscape, and on the sets of constraints that characterize negotiations over enforcement systems, the article firstly finds that neither type of enforcement would be politically feasible if agreement is sought among all key emitters. Secondly, because participation enforcement is perceived as less legitimate than compliance enforcement, the coalition of countries prepared to accept the former is likely smaller than the coalition prepared to accept the latter. Thirdly, participation enforcement likely places stricter requirements on the coalition’s membership and size. Thus, while compliance enforcement should in principle always be politically feasible among some coalition, reaching agreement on participation enforcement is less likely. To the extent that participation enforcement is politically feasible, however, an agreement which enforces the cooperation of all key emitters may be attainable.     

The role of the Asia Pacific Partnership in discursive contestation of the international climate regime

After withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, the US Bush Administration and the Australian Howard Government pursued an international climate change policy focussed on voluntary international agreements outside the UN climate negotiations. This strategy included the formation of several climate agreements directed at technology development, including the 2005 Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP provides a model for international climate change policy directed at voluntary national greenhouse gas intensity targets, technology development through sectoral public–private partnerships and technology diffusion through trade. This article situates the APP within these US and Australian inspired climate agreements formed outside the UN negotiations. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (in M. Pettenger (ed.) The social construction of climate change: power knowledge norms discourses, 2007) discourse analysis in relation to the international climate negotiations is used to explore differences between the APP and UN climate treaties. We find the APP embodies a discourse of what we call ‘deregulatory ecological modernisation’ that promotes limited public funding to ease informational failures in markets for cleaner technologies and management practices. The deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse is a deeply intensive market liberal approach to international climate change policy, which contests binding emission reduction targets and the development of a global carbon market. The USA, Australia, Japan and Canada represented a core group of countries that used the APP to promote the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse and thereby contest any deepening of developed nations' emission reduction targets for the post-2012 period. However, with changes of leadership and new parties in power in the USA and Australia, it appears that the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse has lost ground compared to a reengagement with discourses supportive of developed country emission reduction targets and equity-based adaptation and technology transfer assistance for developing nations.     

The Group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent developments and future directions

First, we describe and analyze the main set of G77 positions in the climate negotiations and the dynamics behind the emergence of these positions. While it is puzzling that the G77 has managed to maintain itself as a group in spite of internal differences along variables as prosperity, emissions and vulnerability to climate change, we claim that a core element behind this cohesion is that these countries share domestic governance problems as much as poverty and economic underdevelopment. Second, we discuss how recent trends of economic and political development in the third world influence the climate policy strategies of the G77 group in the future. The main factor here is the economicand social progress in states like China, India and Brazil, which separates them from the poorer and less powerful G77 states. Increasing heterogeneity along variables like governance, growth, and importance for the international economy is creating an increasing drive among the most successful G77 states towards bilateral agreements with industrialised powers. We do not foresee a departure from traditional G77 positions and membership by these states in the official climate negotiations or a departure from the Kyoto process, but an increasing reliance on bilateral agreements with industrialized countries that link considerations for energy security and the environment. The ability to gain these advantages without commitments may make these states less interested in adopting commitments for the post-Kyoto period. This is unfortunate for the LDCs and the AOSIS groups within the G77, who probably are most vulnerable to climate change.

Introduction: exploring and explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

This introduction lays the groundwork for this Special Issue by providing an overview of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and by introducing three main analytical themes. The first theme concerns the emergence and continuation of the APP. The contributions show that the emergence of the APP can be attributed to international factors, including the United States’ rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, and its search for an alternative arena for global climate governance, and other countries’ wish to maintain good relations with the US; as well as domestic factors, such as the presence of bureaucratic actors in favour of the Partnership, alignment with domestic priorities, and the potential for reaping economic benefits through participation. The second theme examines the nature of the Partnership, concluding that it falls on the very soft side of the hard–soft law continuum and that while being branded as a public–private partnership, governments remain in charge. Under the third theme, the influence which the APP exerts on the post-2012 United Nations (UN) climate change negotiations is scrutinised. The contributions show that at the very least, the APP is exerting some cognitive influence on the UN discussions through its promotion of a sectoral approach. The introduction concludes with outlining areas for future research.

UNFCCC negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9): what the process says about the politics of CDM-sinks

One of the most contentious issues in the negotiations aimed at operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol was the treatment of sinks and, particularly, the eligibility of sinks projects in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This paper attempts to analyse the politics underlying these negotiations, drawing on methods of process tracing, key informant interviews, negotiating texts and secondary literature. Tracing the sinks debate and highlighting key lessons about the nature of global environmental agreements and their institutional arrangements is the first step to recounting the history of the politics of one of the major contemporary international environmental debates. The paper shows that the Kyoto Protocol negotiations on sinks and CDM-sinks were multilaterally supported as a practical solution, but went ‘off track’ due to actors’ interests and tradeoffs. As regards future negotiations on forest sinks in developing countries under the framework of the UNFCCC, the paper argues that these are likely to be influenced by similar constraints, and also by the conservation and development agenda of its supporters; as well as the experience gathered on the CDM and the interests and concerns of developing countries. We broadly frame the paper within the literature on global environmental politics.

发展中国家应对美国碳关税策略分析

美国众议院2009年6月底通过了《美国清洁能源安全法案》。法案允许美国对来自没有采取与美国相当的温室气体减排措施国家的高能耗、初级进口产品征收"碳关税"。这对于经济技术水平明显落后于发达国家的发展中国家而言,无疑又是一种新的贸易壁垒。对此,发展中国家应该积极行动,通过建立南北自由贸易区、推动在联合国框架内的气候谈判以及积极参与碳标准制定等方式积极寻求对美国"碳关税"壁垒的突破。在减排与贸易、环保与经济增长间寻得平衡发展。     

China in the Asia–Pacific Partnership: consequences for UN climate change mitigation efforts?

This article discusses China’s motives for participation in the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and whether this has or will have consequences for its participation and efforts in the UN track of international climate governance. In order to discuss these issues, it also provides an outline of key national priorities and explains the nature of China’s involvement in both the UN track and the APP. It suggests that the APP is a complement to the UN process, not a competitor, in the case of China. APP participation represents a win–win situation in terms of the transfer of technology and know-how for solving challenges related to energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. For the Chinese leadership, this seems preferable to taking on UN commitments which it fears would impede economic development. The APP’s projects also seem to complement the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism project in China. This article argues that there is little indication that China would make less of an effort under the UN track.

Open or closed meetings? Explaining nonstate actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations

When do states allow nonstate actors (NSAs) to observe negotiations at intergovernmental meetings? Previous studies have identified the need for states to close negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive. This paper argues that sensitivity alone cannot adequately explain the dynamic of closing down negotiations to observers. Questions that have received little attention in the literature include which issues are considered sensitive and how the decision is made to move the negotiations behind closed doors. This paper examines the practices of NSA involvement in climate diplomacy from three analytical perspectives: functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical institutionalism. Based on interviews and UNFCCC documents, this paper suggests that to understand the issue of openness in negotiations, institutional factors and the politics of NSA involvement need to be better scrutinized. The paper shows that each perspective has particular advantages when analyzing different dimensions of the negotiations, with implications of how we understand the role of NSAs in global environmental governance.     

Orchestra of Treaties: A Future Climate Regime Scenario with Multiple Treaties among Like-minded Countries

The Orchestra of Treaties scenario emerges if countries share the following principles for re-building the climate regime (1) recognize the sovereignty concerns attending energy policies; (2) build upon national interests in technology and development; (3) avoid conflicts and enhance cooperation by appropriately framing core issues; and (4) address not only short-term emission cuts but also long-term technological change.In this scenario, countries will share these principles by drawing on the hard lessons of past UNFCCC negotiations. The framing of the climate change problem as the allocation of emission quota created an adversarial style of negotiation that resulted in distrust among countries. Moreover, the negotiations have been characterized by unpredictable outcomes. Since energy policies were deemed as sovereignty concerns, countries did not want to put such issues on the agenda to avoid a potentially intrusive outcome. This negotiation style brought about shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol and may lead to a stalemate in future negotiations.The scenario captures the dynamics that emerge when multiple efforts are pursued by flexible coordination of actors motivated through diverse incentives. The emerging regime, the Orchestra of Treaties, will consist of four building blocks, of which three grow outside of UNFCCC.

Australian climate policy and the Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate (APP). From Howard to Rudd: continuity or change?

This article explains, first, why Australia’s government under John Howard, together with the United States Bush administration initiated the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and, second, why the succeeding Rudd government continued to support this initiative. Climate policy under the conservative Howard government (1995–2007) in Australia was largely dictated by fossil fuel and mineral sector interests, and reflected a close alliance with the Bush administration. The Howard government shunned the Kyoto Protocol, refused to set national binding greenhouse gas reduction targets and preferred voluntary cooperative measures with industry. The APP was part of the Howard government’s strategy to demonstrate some policy movement on climate change while postponing serious action. Climate change was a key issue in the election of the Rudd Labor government in Australia in December 2007. The Rudd government quickly ratified Kyoto, adopted emission reduction targets, and moved to introduce emissions trading. The Rudd government’s decision to continue involvement with the APP, albeit with diminished funding, was a pragmatic one. The APP was supported by industry and provided bridges to China and India—both key countries in the post-2012 UNFCCC negotiations. Finally, in order to assess the long-term outlook of the APP, the article provides a preliminary assessment as to whether the APP advances technology transfer.

Africa in the global climate change negotiations

The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) has become a much more significant bargaining coalition in the global climate change negotiations. It has been participating more proactively and on a much more significant scale, and, as a result, it has had a greater impact on bargaining outcomes, notably in Nairobi, Copenhagen and Durban. Yet, at present, the group remains poorly understood by both scholars and policymakers. Compared to other groups in the climate negotiations, such as the Group of 77 and Alliance of Small Island States, it has received relatively little attention. This paper fills this gap by tracking the evolution of the AGN over the course of the climate change negotiations. In the early years after the Earth Summit, it shows that the AGN faced tremendous difficulties pursing regional objectives effectively, largely due to a number of “internal” barriers to participation, which compounded the structural barriers that the continent faced by making it difficult to use “low-power” negotiating strategies such as coalition building, agenda-setting and persuasion. However, in recent years, the group has become much more proactive as a result of greater access to material, ideational and institutional resources. These have relieved, somewhat, the internal barriers that the group faced, making it possible for the AGN to negotiate much more confidently and effectively than before.     

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Marrakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.     

The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

We construct a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with utility transfers to model the formation process of an international environmental agreement. Our results show that in the first stage of low degree of consensus, engaging in utility transfers by asymmetric countries will accomplish little. In contrast, in the second stage of higher degree of consensus, it is more likely for asymmetric countries to engage in monetary transfers to form the grand coalition, particularly if a small stable coalition has already been formed in the first stage. This article therefore provides a theoretical perspective to explain why it is more likely for some developed countries to initiate an IEA formation process by forming a small stable coalition first before engaging in monetary transfers to form the grand coalition with all the other countries. Such a perspective is consistent with the historical development of the Montreal Protocol and may also explain the difficulty for asymmetric countries to form the grand coalition at the beginning of the IEA formation process of the Kyoto Protocol.

An agenda for change in U.S. climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional powers

The U.S. membership in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) constituted an important element in the Bush administration’s voluntary and non-committing ‘soft-law’ approach to climate change. With the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the U.S. has embarked on a shift in its climate policy towards a legislative, ‘hard-law’ strategy. Obama’s approach implies that the distribution of interests in Congress becomes more significant. In this article, we assess the rules and procedures governing the relationship between the president and the Congress embedded in the U.S. Constitution and explore implications of a stronger congressional involvement in U.S. climate policies for President Obama’s ability to realise his climate policy ambitions at both the domestic and the international levels. We argue that the strong relationship between natural resource dependence (coal and oil) and opposition to climate policies is a constant feature of the U.S. climate policy debate. In order to succeed, Obama must break the enduring gridlock characterising congressional debate in this policy area by designing policies that, through compromise and compensation, can mobilise the support of oil- and coal-state representatives in Congress. The acceptability of an international climate treaty in Congress, moreover, depends inter alia on the resolution of the difficult issue of developing country participation. Success may be enhanced by using the APP and the Major Economies Initiative as informal arenas for negotiation and sector-based cooperation, thus providing a much-needed supplement to the UN-based negotiation process.

Industrialists hand in hand with environmentalists: how eco-labeling schemes can help firms to raise rivals’ costs

Industrialists may promote eco-labeling schemes in order to gain the support of environmentalists and ultimately gain market protection. Beyond the environmental effects of such coalitions, these schemes can provide industrialists a legitimate way to disadvantage rivals, frequently foreign rivals, by raising their costs. We consider a Stackelberg model that determines the conditions under which a domestic firm has incentive to impose an eco-label in order to raise the costs of its foreign rivals. The effects of eco-labeling on domestic social welfare are ambiguous. Policy recommendations are drawn. Notably, factors that may help policy makers to identify situations more vulnerable to undesirable outcomes from a welfare viewpoint are developed.      

An Evaluation of Displacement and Diffusion Effects on Eco-Terrorist Activities After Police Interventions

Objectives

Eco-terrorist activities have caused much property damage and are considered one of the leading domestic terrorism threats. However, despite the threat posed by these activities, the possibility of spatial displacement of eco-terrorism as a result of police crackdowns has not previously been empirically examined. The current study focuses on addressing this knowledge gap by examining the displacement of radical environmental and animal rights movement terrorist activities after a successful police crackdown (i.e. Operation Backfire).

Methods

The study uses data collected from two sources: The Global Terrorism Database and the Eco-Incidents Database. To measure the extent of spatial displacement, two types of displacement statistics were used: weighted displacement quotient (WDQ) and Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) statistics.

Results

Results from WDQ analysis and LISA statistics show that the key intervention of Operation Backfire did not displace the attacks of the eco-terrorist groups. On the contrary, the law enforcement intervention effectively resulted in diffusion of benefits in adjacent areas.

Conclusions

Overall, the results show that traditional police tactics may be a useful way to counter eco-terrorism without leading to spatial displacement. This is important as it shows that radical environmentalists and animal rights activists may be deterred, like regular criminals, by conventional law enforcement.

     

Japan’s position in international climate policy: navigating between Kyoto and the APP

The emergence of technology-oriented agreements such as the 2005 Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) may have significant implications for the future of global climate governance, as these agreements could be perceived as an alternative for the existing international climate regime. It is, therefore, important to examine what has moved countries to be involved in these agreements alongside the UN climate regime. This article seeks to identify possible factors contributing to Japan’s participation in both the UN climate regime and the APP, looking at the position of domestic interest groups, the distribution of climate policy-making at the government level and varying international pressures. It concludes that Japan’s participation in both the APP and the UN climate regime flows from a policy-making process that tries to accommodate conflicting viewpoints at the domestic and international levels. To what extent Japan’s participation in both fora can be regarded as constructive will depend on the partnership’s ability to support the implementation of a future climate regime.

Converging Markets

The crucible in this scenario for the international climate regime is the emergence of an effective and liquid international carbon market with participation of private entities. In order to make the carbon market effective a bilateral negotiation track will develop, operating in parallel with the multilateral track under the UNFCCC. The purpose of the bilateral track is to integrate the various emissions trading schemes involving private actors. This bilateral track feeds into the UNFCCC negotiations, which still represents the main arena for the international climate negotiations. Through the bilateral, bottom-up negotiations, a multistage system develops, with differentiated rights and duties, complemented by a package of coordinated support mechanisms. The advantages of such a bottom-up approach prove to be, inter alia, fewer negotiating parties, new negotiation arenas, and a new set of selective incentives. The result is a continuously evolving agreement with the potential to gradually broaden participation and deepen the reduction commitments of the international climate regime. Moreover, the bilateral agreements for linking schemes with private actors also represent a fallback in the event of a collapse in the multilateral negotiations.The article has been written by funding from the Central Research Institute for the Electric Power Industry in Tokyo and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also represents an output of research financed by the Research Council of Norway, project no. 144768/520. The authors thank all three institutions for the funding, as well as the many participants at the workshops where the ideas in the paper have been presented. Their criticism and suggestions have been very stimulating, indeed.     

Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties

We analyze important forces that hamper the formation of successful self-enforcing agreements to mitigate global warming from an economic point of view. The analysis combines two modules: (a) an integrated assessment model that captures the feedback between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system and (b) a game theoretic model that determines stable coalitions in the presence of free-riding incentives. We consider two types of measures to enhance the success of international environmental treaty-making: (a) transfers, aiming at balancing asymmetric gains from cooperation; (b) institutional changes, aiming at making it more difficult to upset stability of a treaty. We find that institutional changes may be as important as transfers and should therefore receive more attention in future international negotiations.