Track 1/Track 2 symbiosis in Asia-Pacific regionalism

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how Track 2 international policy networks contribute to economic security. If we accept a neoclassical economic interpretation that economic security is best achieved by trade and capital liberalization, then Track 2, or non-formal research and policy networks, are able to help enhance economic security by providing Track 1 or the formal, inter-governmental organizations with novel ideas and approaches on how best to advance regional economic liberalization. As well as providing institutional memories for regional cooperation, Track 2 networks also serve as test-beds for new ideas in emerging issue areas. This was clear in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis when a number of Track 2 networks grappled with the inter-linkages between economics and security as well as provided expertise on how states can best cope with globalised financial markets and the free flow of capital. By discussing each of the Track 2 networks and how they respectively interact with Track 1 processes, the paper provides a detailed account of the regional governance architecture in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly, and its contribution to economic security.     

Naming the Pacific

Abstract

A conventional explanation for the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) holds that it was an attempt on the part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to maintain US military engagement in Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China in the post-Cold War era. This line of argument is associated with realism and neoliberalism. This article maintains that such an explanation is unsatisfactory, and seeks to offer a sounder explanation by employing a constructivist perspective. It argues that the interests and policies of the ASEAN countries which had led them to initiate the ARF were defined by what can be regarded as a norm of security cooperation in Asia. This norm contains two sets of ideational elements. The first is common security thinking fostered in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Such thinking emphasizes efforts to achieve the security of the whole region through multilateral security cooperation, on the basis of the view that regional security is indivisible. The second element is a set of diplomatic norms associated with the ASEAN Way of diplomacy, which underline the Southeast Asian countries' commitment to the habit of dialogue and consultation. Today, the nature of the ARF may be disputed. Critics of the ARF assert that it is a mere ‘talking shop’ in which no significant measure to achieve security has been carried out. Yet only by understanding thoroughly the establishment process of the forum can a fair assessment be made of its significance. The research in this article concludes that the ARF should be seen as an arena for the development and practice of norms – in other words, a ‘norm brewery’.     

The Internet and Asia-Pacific security: Old conflicts and new behaviour

The positive uses of the Internet by civil society groups, research ­institutes, governments and other entities interested in promoting Asia-Pacific community building and cooperative security regimes have been studied and ­appreciated. The paper begins with a discussion of regional Internet diffusion patterns and the associated increase in Internet incidents. In the wake of 11 September 2001 and recent analysis of the 'dark side' of the Internet and networks, it then examines some of the destructive ways Internet technologies are being used by actors in the Asia-Pacific region. It provides examples from the patterns of Internet conflict involving a quadral relationship among four nodes, uncivil society, civil society, government and business as well as the pattern of conflict within each of the nodes. Finally, it looks at three topic areas - national security agendas, the making of security policy and the regional security dialogue process - that deserve further attention.     

Great powers,ASEAN, and security: reason for optimism?

Abstract

The positive role that external powers can play in the creation and maintenance of security in regions has long been ignored; external interference is generally perceived as detrimental to the ability of a group of states to function as a community. However, this paper argues that in the case of ASEAN, the presence of external actors allows the group to function as a community that also provides and ensures security. This paper furthers the debate regarding ASEAN's security functions. With international attention focused on the Asia-Pacific, there is a need to understand the context in which security is maintained in Southeast Asia.     

Neither skepticism nor romanticism: the ASEAN Regional Forum as a solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game

Abstract

This article fills the void left by the existing literature that has failed to capture the utilities of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to the member states. From a rational institutionalist perspective, this article argues that the ARF is an institutional solution for a particular type of collective-action problem – the Assurance Game – that emerged in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. In the Assurance Game, a weak and loose institution is sufficient because cooperation only requires efficient information transmission among players. This conception of the ARF finds empirical support in various features as well as the birth process of the multilateral institution. Thus, neither structural realists' skepticism nor constructivists' romanticism toward the ARF is warranted.     

All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security

Strategic situations create motivational biases that help to predict the type of errors intelligence communities are more likely to commit (Type I errors predict behavior never observed, while Type II errors fail to predict behavior later observed). When the dangers of inaction are low and the cost of action high, the intelligence community is more likely to fail to predict threats (Type II error). If the dangers of inaction are high and the costs of military action low, it is more likely to predict mistakenly threats never observed (Type I error). Studies of US and Israeli decision-making and analyses of two new experimental studies support this theory. The key is to recognize the incentives for error and to develop systems that, at worst, lead to intelligence errors (mistakes consistent with a state's national security needs) and not intelligence failures (errors contrary to national security requirements).     

The evolution of an Asia‐Pacific policy community in Australia

Australian Labor governments have, in recent times, become particularly active in shaping the form and content of regional forums where outstanding economic and security issues can be semi‐publicly aired. An increasing number of analysts have characterized this activist role with APEC and CSCAP as a manifestation of ‘intellectual leadership’, and have explained this evident concern with the promotion of common understandings (and hence the possibility of rules) as the natural stance of ‘middle powers’. This paper surveys the means by which Australia's Labor governments came to engage in these regional dialogues; the arguments that have facilitated that engagement; and the individuals who have played leading roles in articulating those arguments. It concludes with brief observations about the possible trajectory of these two regional dialogues, and reference to some of the obstacles they might pose for future Australian governments.     

中国特色大国外交的传承与创新:命运共同体的视角

新中国成立70年来,中国外交经历了革命外交、经济外交、和谐世界外交到命运共同体外交等不同时期,这一过程同时也显示了从道义共同体、利益共同体、区域发展共同体到人类命运共同体的逻辑发展。党的十八大以来,中国特色大国外交全面铺开,构建人类命运共同体成为新时代中国外交的新旗帜、新任务和新目标。构建人类命运共同体既是对前几任领导人外交思想的传承和延续,更是新一代领导人奋发有为的开拓与创新:开启了大国外交新时代,开垦了全域外交新空间,开发了主场外交新形式,开辟了“一带一路”外交新平台,标志着中国外交的跨越性升华,彰显了新时代大国外交的中国特色、中国风格和中国气派。     

Epistemic stance in orchestral interaction

An interactional participant's epistemic status relies on their access to “epistemic domains” which exist beyond the unfolding interaction in which they are expressed. Heritage argues that comparative access and epistemic status can be described along an “epistemic gradient” and that it is the expression of this status which, in the interaction, exists as the taking, aligning to, and challenging of epistemic stance. This paper describes some of the resources musicians use in interaction to encode the epistemic domains from which knowledge comes during orchestral rehearsal. As “sound-hearing” and “instrument-playing” are central to the work of musicians, the discussion will focus on how perceptions of auditory and corporeal experience are deployed as part of musicians' epistemic stance taking. I will argue that these epistemic stances, as expressions of graded and differential access to epistemic domains, form part of the construction of authority in orchestral rehearsal.     

The Political Environment and Ballot Proposition Awareness

Studies that examine whether voters make informed decisions on direct legislation and whether direct legislation enhances civic engagement presume a basic awareness of ballot propositions, yet little is known about why some ballot propositions are more widely known than others. Despite the fact that research on awareness of ballot propositions and political awareness focus on individual factors, the political environment plays a vital role. This study seeks to advance our understanding of environmental factors in explaining awareness of ballot propositions. Using data on California ballot elections between the years 1956 and 2000, I find that the political environment has a substantial effect on voter awareness. Specifically, I find that the electoral cycle, media coverage, campaign spending, voter fatigue, the number of days before an election, and issues that concern morality, civil liberties, and civil rights contribute to ballot proposition awareness.     

Between realism and idealism in Japanese security policy: The case of the ASEAN regional forum

Abstract

While ASEAN played the leadership role for erecting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Japan generated positive impact on the historical trajectory leading to the birth of the ARF. This paper asks the following question: On what ideational foundation was Japan's support for the ARF based? Utilizing a conceptual framework based on the theoretical literature of multilateralism, the paper analyzes three major Japanese perspectives on the ARF in the inception years (1991–95) — Idealism, Realism, and Liberalism — while paying special attention to Liberalism, the perspective underlying Japan's actual policy. Liberalism, while leaning toward Realism, still incorporated some elements of Idealism. For Liberals, centering around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ARF was a vehicle to foster a sense of trust, however fragile, on the basis of providing and sharing quality information about China, Japan, and the United States, without undermining the existing security arrangements including the US‐Japanese alliance.     

The energy factor in China’s foreign policy

This paper argues that China’s foreign policy behavior has been influenced by growing energy dependence. As a major importer, China can pursue energy security through strategies that result in conflict; alternatively, energy vulnerability might lead it toward cooperation with rival oil consuming nations through participation in multilateral organizations and other forums. After outlining the argument for the strategic nature of energy, China’s increasing energy dependence is assessed, as are Beijing’s efforts to shift China’s energy balance. China’s energy diplomacy with the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America are examined, and Beijing’s efforts toward greater energy security through multilateral organizations are discussed. The evidence supports the liberal hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes international cooperation. Energy demands have accelerated China’s rise to global prominence, and appear to moderate conflictual aspects of Chinese foreign policy. He is co-editor of and contributor toRussia’s Far East: A Region at Risk (University of Washington Press, 2002), and author ofThe History of Russia (Greenwood, 1999),Foreign Policy and East Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1993), andEnvironmental Policy in the USSR (University of Massachusetts Press, 1987). His articles have appeared inProblems of Post-Communism, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs, Comparative Politics, Political Science Quarterly, British Journal of Political Science, and many other journals and edited books. The author would like to thank Igor Danchenko for his able research assistance on this project.     

Environmental protection and US–Asia relations: a policy of disconnect

Despite the post-September 11 focus on regional security and the continued emphasis on regional economic cooperation, environmental degradation should not be overlooked as an important issue for US policy in and relationship with the Asia-Pacific. It is an important issue in its own right, presenting the countries of the region with ecological, economic and social (human security) challenges. There are both ethical and instrumental impulses for the United States, as a rich indus­trialised country and as a disproportionate consumer of resources and polluter of global waste, to provide environmental assistance to the Asia-Pacific. Despite global demands that the ‘new’ new world (environmental) order should be based on solidarity and collective responsibility, neither US environmental policy towards the region nor the regional consequences of its international environmental policy more generally meet this test. The US is fundamentally self-regarding rather than other-regarding in the various dimensions of its environmental relationship with the region. The consequences for both the region and for the US may be substantial. Continued environmental degradation in the region has the potential to undermine other US policy goals, in terms of its reputation, it economic objectives and even its more orthodox geopolitical security objectives.     

Examining the immanent dilemma of small states in the Asia-Pacific: the strategic triangle between New Zealand,the US and China

ABSTRACT

Small states throughout the Asia-Pacific are confronted by a growing dilemma over how to balance their traditional security ties with the US and rapidly growing trade with China. This gives Washington and Beijing potential leverage over small states to use within their competition with one another. This article explores the implications of this for New Zealand – a small South Pacific state that prides itself on maintaining an independent foreign policy. Situated within the small state literature, it utilises a material-based strategic triangle to illustrate the fundamental facets of New Zealand's position. Relatedly, the article examines how Wellington has managed its burgeoning relations with China and the US over the past decade and critically considers New Zealand's independent foreign policy. It finds that New Zealand has adopted a mixed set of strategies to manage its position between the US and China, closely aligning itself with Washington while remaining nonaligned on some key security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand has certainly not opted for neutrality. The article concludes that New Zealand and other small states must remain vigilant, may want to consider alternative strategies of alignment, and outlines a number of areas where additional research could prove fruitful.     

Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System

Post-World War II Western foreign policies are often based on the claim that the spread of democracy will result in global peace. Our understanding of how this propagation can bring about peace is limited, and we have little reason to believe that the causal arrow points only in one direction. We tackle these issues by modeling the linkages between states' regime types, interstate conflict, and the strength of the democratic community relative to the autocratic community. Analysis of our model suggests initial increases in the strength of the democratic community increase the level of conflict in a system. Beyond a threshold of democratic strength, however, conflict wanes as the democratic community waxes. Our model also suggests that the survival rate of democracies increases as the material strength of the democratic community increases and decreases as systemic conflict rises. Empirical analyses offer support for the survival propositions.     

Full circle? Ideas and ordeals of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific

Abstract

In 2004 and 2006, proposals were made at APEC summits to establish a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). This was an essentially a reworking of an idea first raised in the mid-1960s to create a Pacific Free Trade Area, or PAFTA. Although the PAFTA initiative never advanced, it helped lay the first organizational foundations for regional economic community building in the Asia-Pacific. The recent FTAAP proposal thus brings us full circle to the antecedent origins of APEC itself. If realized, an FTAAP would also create a free trade zone that would encircle the Pacific Rim economy and thereby subsume the region's now large number of bilateral and sub-regional free trade agreements (FTAs) into one unified agreement. Yet there are many inherent problems with establishing an FTAAP. These broadly relate to deconstructing the preferentialism of existing bilateral and sub-regional FTAs, achieving a consensus on the technical policy content and ideational principles on which an FTAAP would be based, and addressing various geopolitical issues such as reconciling the formation of a pan-regional Asia-Pacific FTA with an already fragile multilateral trading system. Growing interest in a ‘rival’ East Asia Free Trade Area project presents another geopolitical challenge. In considering these and other questions, it is concluded that many obstacles will remain in the path to realizing an FTAAP, and that this may not actually be a desirable objective to pursue for some time yet.     

The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy

This paper analyses the development of the US approach to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 1991 onwards. It examines theories of why a superpower would participate in a multilateral security institution, and investigates the motivations for the attitudes and extent of participation of the George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations towards the ARF. It argues that, in the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, US East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the US has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centred upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfil this supplementary aim. Because it cannot deal with the key regional security issues, the ARF is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. But the paper concludes that US participation in the ARF may nevertheless be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard US preponderance.     

Emerging regional security co‐operation in Europe and the Asia Pacific

European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas.

In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.     

When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their Impact on Turnout

Evidence for whether direct democracy positively affects turnout is mixed, which can be attributed to a theoretical ambiguity about the proper way to measure the institution. The most common measure, a count of the number of initiatives on the ballot, is incomplete, because it unrealistically assumes that all propositions have an equal impact on turnout and focuses exclusively on initiatives. These deficiencies are addressed by looking at the issue content of all ballot measures. I find that the number of social issues on the ballot, because they are highly salient, tap into existing social cleavages, help to overcome barriers to voting, and fit within a framework of expressive choice, had a positive impact on turnout for all midterm and some presidential elections since 1992. In contrast to previous findings, however, the total number of propositions on the ballot was rarely associated with an increase in turnout. I discuss the implications of these findings in the conclusion.     

Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy

ABSTRACT

In this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversial ‘best judge’ principle, according to which each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Second, I suggest that epistemic arguments against epistocracy are currently insensitive to the nature of the groups that would be excluded on the grounds of incompetence. Such arguments would remain unchanged were epistocracy to disenfranchise privileged persons rather than already disadvantaged persons. I argue that a stronger critique of epistocracy ought to focus on distinctive epistemic obstacles faced by socially privileged persons. Third, I argue that current epistemic critics of epistocracy ignore how its basis for exclusion entails consequences that are relevant to our assessment of its justifiability. Their criticisms would, for instance, remain the same had this exclusion been brought about in a random manner. Instead, I emphasise the deliberative costs that follow from the exclusion of disadvantaged groups qua incompetent.