Wrapping up in something long: Intimidation and violence by right‐wing groups in postwar Japan

Political organizations enjoy considerable legal protection under Japan's postwar constitution, and right‐wing organizations acquired additional political protection during four decades of uninterrupted rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party. These circumstances facilitated the development or re‐emergence of (1) complex links and overlapping memberships between right‐wing political groups, organized crime groups (yakuza), and professional corporate extortionists (sōkaiya); (2) tolerance and encouragement by state authorities of the use of violence by such groups as forms of private policing; and (3) the formation of bogus right‐wing groups to facilitate extortion, intimidation, and political corruption under cover of legal protections afforded to political organizations. This situation is reassessed in light of new legislation, current changes in the Japanese political situation and a recent influx of foreign workers.     

Radical right parties in Europe and anti‐foreign violence: A comparative essay

This is a comparative survey of contemporary patterns of anti‐foreign violence in Europe and some historical antecedents, such as pogroms and individual and small group attacks on visible foreigners. It considers the perpetrators and the long list of different categories of victims, many of them not foreigners at all. Against the background of general youth violence in schools and neighborhoods and waves of asylum‐seekers, the motives of anti‐foreign violence are examined and attributed to the under‐educated, ‘no‐future’ youth or underclass ‘losers’ of the ‘communications revolution’ of the 1980s. The skinhead and soccer hooligan anti‐foreign violence is, on the whole, not remotely as political as the fascist blackshirts and Nazi stormtroopers of the inter‐war period were. A look at the evidence from different European countries reveals on the one hand recruitment attempts by extreme right‐wing organizations among the skinhead and hooligan groups ‐ but rather limited success. On the other hand, most of the violent actions appear to be uncoordinated and responsive to community panic and media hype regarding the ‘floods’ of asylum‐seekers and illegal immigrants in the offing. By making themselves the executors of the community panic, the otherwise despised skinheads are grasping at personal acceptance and legitimacy.     

Right‐wing terrorism in South Africa

This article reviews the background to the rise of the right wing in South Africa and argues that there has always been a strand in Afrikaner politics with a proclivity to violence. The transformation in South Africa began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, alienating conservatives and those in the security forces who were still in the grip of the militarist doctrines espoused during the P.W. Botha era. Hit squads, dirty tricks and efforts to destabilise neighbouring governments were part of the state's response to the rise of black militance in the 1980s. Terrorism was also practised by paramilitary right‐wing groups, the biggest of which was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Eventually the right‐wing counterrevolution failed, in large measure because potentially the most effective of the paramilitary forces, led by retired General Constand Viljoen, rejected the option of violence and sought instead a negotiated accommodation     

Right‐wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization

The purpose of this article is to identify the distinctive features of right‐wing terrorism and to develop an analytical typology of particularistic terrorist organizations. The article is based on the conceptual framework of the process of delegitimization developed earlier by this author. It argues that right‐wing radicals usually reach terrorism through a trajectory of split delegitimization, which implies a primary conflict with an ‘inferior’ community and a secondary conflict with the government. Six sub‐types of right‐wing terrorism are identified: revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth counterculture terrorism.     

American perceptions of terrorism: A Q‐methodological analysis of types

The literature on terrorism makes a number of significant predictions of the effects of media coverage of terrorism on audiences, public policy, and terrorism itself. Many of these predictions are contradictory, and little or no empirical social‐scientific research has been done to determine public perceptions of international terrorism. Q‐methodology offers a means of identifying groups or “types” of persons who share similar attitudes toward a phenomenon. Use of Q‐methodology here revealed four types of respondents sharing similar views of international terrorism. These distinctive types helped shed light on the many diverse and contradictory predictions of the effects of terrorism coverage on American public opinion and public policy.     

The United Nations and the right to self‐determination: A response to Mahalingam's reply

France has had a long history of struggle with various forms of terrorism and over the past decade has achieved particular success against Algerian Islamic terrorist groups – the GIA and GSPC – with close links to Al-Qaeda. This article reviews France's experience of terrorism since the end of the Second World War and details the evolving state responses to these challenges and the sophisticated anti-terrorist apparatus that now serves the French state. It then considers the role of France in the post-11 September ‘war on terrorism’ and argues that France remains in the front-line of the struggle against Al-Qaeda and that the French experience has much to contribute to the international war against Islamic terrorism.     

Greece in the new Balkans: A neo‐realist approach

Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by far‐reaching defence cuts, conversion of military‐related chemicals capabilities and government support for international nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that a large‐scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the Russian security establishment. Concern also persists about the transparency of chemical demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a Soviet/Russian binary CW programme, the existence of which is suggested by published archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

Murder in Mexico: are journalists victims of general violence or targeted political violence?

Journalists in Mexico face hundreds of attacks each year, ranging from online harassment and physical intimidation to outright murder. The official narrative typically claims that murdered journalists are the victims of general criminal violence. This article finds that despite the rampant violence in Mexico, the murder of journalists cannot be attributed to the country’s general criminal violence problem alone. Instead, the evidence points to the targeting, and even political targeting of journalists. First, journalists are at a much higher risk of being murdered than the general population. Second, the divergence between homicide rates among the general population and among journalists varies considerably between Mexican states. While recent scholarship has shown that subnational governments can successfully remain authoritarian despite democratization at the central or federal level, this literature has largely ignored the use of political killings in subnational undemocratic regimes. This article attempts to understand the murder of journalists not just as a problem of criminal violence, but also of political violence, and thereby connects the findings to the existing scholarship on subnational authoritarianism.     

Fighting your friends? A study of intra-party violence in sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on a less visible and less studied type of political violence, namely violence that occurs within political parties. We use new, district-level data to compare the temporal and spatial dynamics of intra-party violence to those of general election violence across selected sub-Saharan African countries, including both democracies and autocracies, from 1998 to 2016. Relying on cross-national and sub-national analyses, we show that intra-party violence follows a unique pattern. First, unlike general election violence, intra-party violence peaks prior to election day as it is often sparked by individual parties’ candidate nomination processes. Second, low levels of competitiveness – typically theorized to reduce the risk of election violence – increase the risk of intra-party violence on the sub-national level. Thus, dominant party elections do not necessarily see less election-related violence than hotly contested elections. Rather, violence may be pushed from election day to intra-party competitions. If we neglect the study of violence within political parties, we thus risk underestimating the threat of election violence and misdiagnosing its causes.