The Politics of Restitution: The 1964-66 Labour Government's Policy Towards Ireland

This article analyzes Harold Wilson's policy towards the Republic of Ireland during the first eighteen months of his government. This article will demonstrate that the Labour government embarked upon a concerted effort to improve Anglo-Irish relations. In particular, the Labour government acceded to the Irish government's time-honoured request to repatriate the remains of Roger Casement, and returned the flag that had flown over the General Post Office during the 1916 Rising. How successful these gestures were is a moot point. In the short-term it almost certainly did create a climate of goodwill between the British and Irish governments. In the longer-term, however, it could be argued these gestures served to stimulate republican sentiment in Ireland, and perhaps contributed to heightening the tensions within Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.     

Northern Ireland ‐ a British isles security complex

This article, drawing on the work of Barry Buzan, creates a British Isles security complex. Six patterns of enmity and amity are identified as making up this complex: Northern Ireland Protestants and Catholics; Northern Ireland Protestants and mainland Britain; Northern Ireland Catholics and mainland Britain; Northern Ireland Protestants and the Republic of Ireland; Northern Ireland Catholics and the Republic of Ireland; and mainland Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Applying the notion of a security complex to Anglo‐Irish Agreement not only reveals issues and areas that create or exacerbate conflict, but also that amity in one area of the complex can produce enmity in another area. A security complex approach allows for the systematic analysis of change and demonstrates the multidimensional and interdependent nature of conflict in Northern Ireland.     

The Politics of Restitution: The 1964–66 Labour Government’s Policy Towards Ireland

This article analyzes Harold Wilson’s policy towards the Republic of Ireland during the first eighteen months of his government. This article will demonstrate that the Labour government embarked upon a concerted effort to improve Anglo-Irish relations. In particular, the Labour government acceded to the Irish government’s time-honoured request to repatriate the remains of Roger Casement, and returned the flag that had flown over the General Post Office during the 1916 Rising. How successful these gestures were is a moot point. In the short-term it almost certainly did create a climate of goodwill between the British and Irish governments. In the longer-term, however, it could be argued these gestures served to stimulate republican sentiment in Ireland, and perhaps contributed to heightening the tensions within Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.     

Victimisation and Attitudes Towards Former Political Prisoners in Northern Ireland

The release of ex-combatants and the mechanisms for their re-integration within society has become an increasingly controversial issue in peace settlements. Yet to date, the view of victims concerning such arrangements in post-conflict societies remains unexplored. Mindful of this omission and using Northern Ireland as a case study, this article investigates the relationship between victimisation and attitudes towards the treatment of former political prisoners. Based on the 2011 Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, the results suggest that individual victims—those who directly and/or indirectly experienced violent incidents—are notably less supportive of a punitive approach towards the treatment of former political prisoners than non-victims. Moreover, this is particularly the case when victims from within the Catholic community are considered. The Northern Ireland evidence suggests that victims can act as a positive and inclusive force in terms of the rehabilitation and re-integration of former combatants in societies emerging from conflict.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

“Us” and “Them”: Ulster Loyalist Perspectives on the IRA and Irish Republicanism

This article draws on data from one-to-one interviews with members and former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association, Red Hand Commando, Ulster Political Research Group, and the Progressive Unionist Party to explore the dynamic and fluid perceptions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin among Ulster loyalists. The article will explore how attitudes and perceptions are influenced by the shifting political landscape in Northern Ireland as Ulster loyalists come to terms with the new realities created by the peace process, security normalization, decommissioning, and the rise in the threat of dissident republican violence. The article will also demonstrate that these perceptions are not purely antagonistic and based on the creation of negative, stereotypical “enemy images” fuelled by decades of conflict, but pragmatic, bound to societal and local events, and influenced by intragroup attitudes and divisions, in addition to the expected conflictual ingroup vs. outgroup relationships. Finally, the article will explore how loyalists employ republicanism and the transformation of the Provisional IRA in particular, as a mirror or benchmark to reflect on their own progress since 1994.     

‘THEY HAVEN'T GONE AWAY,YOU KNOW’. IRISH REPUBLICAN ‘DISSIDENTS’ AND ‘ARMED STRUGGLE’

The shift by the provisional Republican movement towards constitutional politics in Northern Ireland has caused splits among Republicans. The formation of the Continuity and Real Irish Republican Armies, pledged to continue ‘armed struggle’ against British rule in Northern Ireland, was predictable, given the historical propensity of Republicans to divide amid claims of ‘betrayal’ by the leadership. The odds against militarist Republican ‘dissidents’ appear overwhelming, as they lack weapons, members and support. Sinn Féin has carried most of the Nationalist constituency on its transition towards constitutionalism and the Irish Republic has abandoned its claim to Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, continued political uncertainty over the province's political future has contributed to the maintenance of a long-standing militaristic tradition within Irish republicanism.     

Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

This article challenges traditional interpretations of political violence in Northern Ireland. Based on a series of ethnographic studies undertaken in republican and loyalist communities in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I argue that it is the question of state legitimacy, not materialism, culture or religion, that is core to understanding the underpinnings and history of political violence in Northern Ireland. Research findings suggest that communal support for and tolerance of paramilitary groups and their tactics are underpinned by security‐related concerns and a crisis of legitimacy which renders the state unable to claim a monopoly on the use of force. In contradistinction to counter‐insurgency theorists, I argue that the basis for paramilitarism is not created by fear of reprisal or intimidation. Rather, intra‐communal fears of identity loss and threats (both perceived and real) from the outgroup have created a space for republicanism and loyalism in both its political and paramilitary forms.     

Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland

The British experience in Northern Ireland, particularly the fight against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is an oft-cited case study in the counter-insurgency (COIN) spectrum and tome of counter-terrorism studies. It is the totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, with its successes and challenges, which make it such a valuable case study from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence-based operations. As the conflict was both prolonged and intensified, a multitude of intelligence units from military and law enforcement evolved specifically to counter the effectiveness of PIRA; and to satisfy the desire of the security establishment to intensify information-gathering activities. This article examines the evolution and development of this security intelligence-driven effort that ultimately had the cumulative effect to wear down PIRA’s military capability through the focused application of a prolonged and lavishly resourced linked intelligence apparatus as an adjunct of a heavy military and police footprint. Nevertheless, despite Northern Ireland being a relatively small geographical area, the eventual containment of PIRA took years to achieve, demonstrating just how difficult it is to address a committed and determined insurgency. This highlights that a successful COIN strategy is arguably best predicated on the need for “patient” as opposed to “decisive” operations.     

Conflict regulation or conflict resolution: Third‐party intervention in the Northern Ireland conflict – prospects for peace

This article evaluates previous third‐party efforts to broker a consociational power‐sharing solution on the peoples of Northern Ireland. Instead, an original and dynamic community‐based problem‐solving linkage system proposes co‐operation between Northern Ireland's grassroots constituents, paramilitary groups and political elites. The process would be facilitated by a quasi‐mediator comprising the three Northern Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and four MEPs – two each from the Netherlands and Belgium. This is a vision of how to create a mutually beneficial process linking psychocultural and structural dimensions by promoting dialogue, understanding, tolerance and the sharing of commonalities in beliefs, identity, and behaviors among groups involved in intercommunal conflict situations.     

A reply to white's non‐sectarian thesis of PIRA targeting

James Dingley responds to Robert White's article on sectarianism and republican violence in Northern Ireland. A rejoinder from Robert White will appear in a future issue.     

Loyalist Women Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland: Beginning a Feminist Conversation about Conflict Resolution

Research on war, conflict, and terrorism has traditionally focused on the motivations of male combatants to participate in political violence. Such a focus has largely ignored the role of women who wield political violence. This article revisits one of feminist International Relations (IR) most basic questions, “Where are the women?” and encourages an expanded view of security and conflict resolution that asks how combatant women might contribute to current scholarly understanding of conflict and conflict resolution processes. I argue that the thirty-year conflict remained intractable in part because of the exclusion of those Loyalist women who wielded political violence, seriously limiting the British and Irish governments' ability to understand and resolve the conflict. Included in the analysis is interview data collected in an eight-month empirical study conducted by the author in 2006 with thirty women who identify as past or present members or supporters of Loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. The unique perceptions of Loyalist women combatants of four cross-border agreements between 1974 and 2006 are used to illustrate how a feminist approach to conflict resolution can serve as an innovating starting point in theorizing about and attempting to resolve conflict.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

Fighting Talk: The Statements of “The IRA/New IRA”

With the advent of the new violent dissident merger, “The IRA/New IRA,” the group and its affiliates have had to legitimise their new existence. They have utilised the maintenance of paramilitary activity to achieve this. However, they have also produced a number of organisational statements, justifying their position, tactics, and strategies. This article analyses the evolution of these statements, both pre and post-merger from 2007 to 2015. 126 individual statements and four magazines are analysed using grounded theory. This analysis found that the statements have a dual strategy, aiming to foster trust in the movement and distrust in their perceived enemies. One of the dominant ways in which the group aims to foster trust is by proposing their possession of an historical mandate from the republican forefathers of 1916, as well as the internally lauded paramilitaries from The Troubles-era Provisional Irish Republican Army. The focus of the distrust narrative has been on the “constitutional nationalism” of Sinn Féin. However, it also pours scorn on the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and capitalism, across the island of Ireland. The analysis of these statements can provide us with an understanding of the future direction of the group, as well as giving us insight, which can inform the development of any counter-narrative.     

The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism

Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been active for more than 25 years, interpretations of the motivation of the IRA are varied. For some, it is a sectarian organization engaged in a tit‐for‐tat campaign with Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. For others, it is a guerrilla army waging a military campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland. This article assesses the degree to which the IRA was or was not engaged in sectarian activity between July 1969 and December 1993. Although the Irish Republican Army killed more than 340 Protestant civilians in this time period, this examination suggests that the IRA, in general, was not a sectarian organization.     

Terrorist Skin,Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA

The article analyses the political communication strategy adopted by Sinn Féin in order to legitimize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) terrorist campaign during their transition from violence into mainstream politics. Their endeavours to portray a triumphant republican movement in spite of the huge gap between strategic aims and achievements are examined. The political and social rehabilitation of violent Republicanism, and how their leaders have evolved from pariahs to celebrities, is also assessed. The role of the media and political elites, as well as the political discourse of the PIRA and Sinn Féin, is analysed in order to examine how the republican movement has tried to rewrite its past in an attempt to gain political and social legitimacy. Consequently, the myths reproduced by republicans to disguise their failures as historical compromises, reproducing a more benign interpretation of history which distorts the causes and consequences of terrorism, are critically assessed. The article will focus on the struggle for the legitimacy of the terrorist campaign and the propaganda system which, in the words of Garret FitzGerald (Irish Prime Minister between 1981 and 1987), has managed to turn the republican movement into the “peace party” despite murdering thousands of human beings.     

Congressional Hearings on Northern Ireland and the “Special Relationship,” 1971–1981

In 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy co-sponsored a resolution in Congress calling for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland. The House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Europe held hearings on this resolution in February 1972 in the immediate aftermath of the deaths in Londonderry of “Bloody Sunday.” These hearings represented the first time that several high profile American political figures had spoken out on the developing conflict in Northern Ireland and, whilst the hearings did not lead to a significant change in American policy towards the conflict, the threat of further ones persisted from the Richard Nixon to the Ronald Reagan administrations. This analysis examines the impact of the 1972 Congressional hearings and the threat posed by the possibility of future ones in the wider context of United States policy towards the Northern Ireland conflict until 1981.     

Great effort,little help? Peace and conflict resolution organisations in Northern Ireland and Turkey

This article offers a comparative analysis of the role played by peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) in Northern Ireland and Turkey in negotiating solutions to ethno-nationalist conflicts in these countries. It argues that P/CROs have been instrumental in de-escalating violence and encouraging conflicting parties to resolve conflict peacefully. Examining both the elite and grass-roots levels, the article assesses P/CROs that have advanced middle-range approaches and track-two dialogue towards peace. Drawing on data from multiple sources, including semi-structured interviews, archival material and official documents, the analysis indicates that P/CROs have a range of tools at their disposal to influence political decision-makers. These include public (and closed) conferences, forums and events attended by current or former politicians, representatives of the conflicting parties and prominent figures and intellectuals in the conflict-affected society, as well as other grass-roots initiatives. The article finds that P/CROs provided help shaping and promoting non-violent processes of conflict resolution between the British Government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).     

DEVOLUTION,GOVERNANCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance—a power-sharing Executive, elected assembly, cross-border bodies, a reformed system of public administration and civic engagement —are a part of the wider mosaic of peace-building. Their implementation is an attempt to institutionalize stability and copper-fasten a political settlement. This article outlines the changing governmental arrangements existing within Northern Ireland, as it has shifted tentatively away from direct rule. It maps the wider public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration (chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic of nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public agencies that, together with local government, form a complex, multi-layered, subregional governance. Our contention is that the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has been conducted yields fruitful insights into issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted by intractable constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of governance is integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or at least stability) and, in the case of Northern Ireland, was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterized by a power-sharing Executive.