Foreign policy in the Muslim world: A dialogue between state and society

In the wake of the demise of communism and the advent of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there is concern among some Western elites about a possible Islamic challenge to the prevailing international order. This paper explores the validity of that concern by looking at patterns of interaction and the notion of foreign‐policy change in four countries in the Muslim world—Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and Indonesia, as well as some developments in the larger Muslim world. Juxtaposing social change on foreign policy, the article postulates that economic realism is the definitive force in the international relations of these states; “militant Islam” is more a tool of radical diplomacy than a manifestation of transnationalism; and ties between states in the Muslim world display a regional regime‐style orientation. Domestic Islamization is found to be a force, which, overall, is contributing to accountability and, therefore, rationalization in the foreign‐policy realm.     

Insurgency theory and the conflict in Algeria: A theoretical analysis

In the early nineties it was widely feared that Algeria was on the verge of an Islamic revolution. These fears proved to be unfounded. This article seeks to explain the failure of the insurgency to topple the current government through the use of three models of successful insurgency movements: urban insurrection, peasant‐based guerrilla warfare and focoism. Analysis shows that the first two of these models cannot be applied to the situation in Algeria because of the nature of the Algerian topography, the lack of foreign sanctuaries for the insurgents and the authoritarian nature of the Algerian regime. The single success of the third model is a historical anomaly, unlikely to lead to the overthrow of the current Algerian government, but leading to a fourth and final model; urban terror. It is the clandestine nature of this fourth model which provides for the longevity of the current insurgency, yet because of its inability to meaningfully challenge the state, gain recruits, and maintain centralized control over the movement, the insurgency degenerates, perpetrating the seemingly senseless acts of violence currently occurring in Algeria today, the natural aftermath of a failed insurgency.     

Modeling alliance membership in a three‐dimensional space

Both Altfeld (1984) and Morrow (1991) offer theoretical foundations that explain why alliances form. Security concerns and autonomy desires are the driving force for the pursuit of allies. While this response explains why states become allies, it does not address which do. To explain with which potential allies states choose to share alliance membership, I construct a three‐dimensional space in which security, autonomy, and political system structure are each represented as one of the three dimensions of ally choice. Every state that shared alliance membership with any other given state from 1946–1992, on a yearly basis, is assigned a unique, tri‐component point in the three‐dimensional space. The distances in the space between each state and all other states’ tri‐component points are calculated, and this distance is then incorporated into a probit estimation of ally choice. By examining the role that security and autonomy trade‐offs and level of political system structure similarity play in determining ally choice, I conclude that two states are more likely to share alliance membership the more symmetrical they are in security and autonomy considerations and the more similar they are in political system structure.     

Can oil-reliant countries democratize? An assessment of the role of civil society in Algeria

A cursory look around the world shows that few oil-reliant countries can be categorized as democracies, particularly those in the Middle East. In fact, many studies have suggested that oil wealth hinders democratization. The recent “Arab Spring” and subsequent political instability in oil-producing states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria gives rise to questions regarding the prospects for democracy in these types of countries. This article provides an analysis of the possible role that civil society may play in democratization in oil-reliant states by looking at the case of Algeria. I argue that the seemingly meaningless and artificial acts of “liberalization” initiated by the Algerian government in the late 1980s, which initially allowed civic associations to form, have provided an opening for some civic associations to organize and oppose the government. This process of liberalization, regardless of how empty it may have seemed at first, has “opened floodgates” that now cannot be closed. Thus, the recent protests in Algeria, and continued opposition to the government, can be seen as directly facilitated by the government's prior liberalization and opening of the system to civic associations.     

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict: Implications for democratization,internal peace and anti-American violence

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict has been based on the stringent assumption that a choice must be made between a secular government that is prowestern (although corrupt and repressive) and an Islamist regime that is anti-western (although equally repressive if allowed to govern). The article shows that this approach not only works to sustain authoritarianism in Algeria and reinforce a vicious cycle of poverry and civil violence, but also ignores the causal links between the practice of dictatorship in the country and the rise of anti-American violence. In this sense, America's foreign policy towards Algeria is a contributory factor to transnational terrorism. An alternative approach that is based on economic development and democracy promotion is proposed here to achieve sustainable democracy and internal peace in Algeria and weaken the forces that give rise to antiAmerican violence.     

Stalled democratization of an authoritarian regime: The case of Algeria

Algeria has experienced important transformations since the bloody riots of October 1988. Numerous political reforms have been initiated, due to the pressure exerted by an emerging civil society; also the regime has been subject to fragmentation, thus exacerbating the power struggle among various political clans. The now‐banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), emerging as the most powerful party, eclipsed the old ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). Algerian society today is completely polarized while the intensification of violence since the interruption of the political process, in January 1992, has prolonged the political stalemate. This article deals with the reasons why the authoritarian rulers initiated a process of democratization in the first place: the principal political reforms; the contending parties in the political arena; the reasons for the initial popularity of the FIS and the tactics used by factions of the FLN‐State to prolong the life of the old regime. Also the role of the military in the democratization process and its attitude towards the Islamists; the reasons for the failure of the process; and the nature of the current impasse. This study highlights the difficulty of modernizing a neo‐patrimonial society where the influence of religion is dominant, which has little or no democratic tradition, and where clientelism is all‐pervasive. Our thesis is that democratization failed mainly because it was initiated in an undemocratic manner ‐ and in the absence of prior (negotiated) agreement on the basic rules of the political (and electoral) game.     

Editors' Note

Examining the relationship between regime type and defense effort provides evidence for reformulating theories of democratic peace. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has substantively and statistically significant effects. In times of peace, democracies bear lower defense burdens than other states and keep proportionately fewer soldiers under arms. During times of war, however, democracies try harder and exert greater defense effort than non-democracies. Contrary to the results of some recent studies, all other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy appears to out-gun its opponents when it counts. Examining three components of democracy separately indicates that a largely overlooked factor, political competition, tends to drive these outcomes. Executive constraints are also associated with increased defense effort during war. But there is little evidence that wide participation or large winning coalitions have the predicted effects on defense effort. The results point to the flexible quality of defense effort in democracies, which is theoretically and empirically accounted for by the competitive political environment rather than institutional factors favored by existing theories.     

An elusive transition: The slow motion demise of authoritarian dominant party rule in Mexico

Mexico's authoritarian dominant party regime is a curious hybrid.¹ The 1917 Constitution is an advanced liberal charter and some basic rules of political procedure ‐ such as the fixed timetable for federal elections and the no re‐election rule ‐ are strongly institutionalised. Yet for over 60 years the regime was also clearly authoritarian, deriving its legitimacy from the revolution rather than the electorate. This article analyses the sui generis nature of the Mexican authoritarian regime, tracing the way formal constitutional rules were supplemented (or displaced) by a coherent and relatively flexible set of informal understandings perpetuating one party dominance. It counterposes these country‐specific characteristics to comparative accounts of how authoritarian regimes ‘break down’, or introduce a ‘political liberalization’ which perhaps opens the way to a ‘transition’ to democracy. Under each of these headings Mexican reality demands significant adaptations to the standard account. During 1994 Mexico underwent severe upheavals without a ‘breakdown’ of the regime. Instead the 1994 presidential election provided a reasonably authentic electoral mandate to the current administration ‐ and yet the process of ‘transition’ to democracy in Mexico remains elusive. This article uses the current Mexican process to probe the scope and limitations of the comparative democratization literature.     

Using civil society as an authoritarian legitimation strategy: Algeria and Mozambique in comparative perspective

Recent research on civil society in authoritarian regimes shows that civil society can contribute to legitimating authoritarian rule. This finding has not, however, been connected with the nascent literature on authoritarian regime legitimation. This article seeks to bridge this gap by synthesizing the relevant theoretical literature and presenting an in-depth comparative analysis of Algeria and Mozambique. We argue that in both cases the ruling authoritarian regime has used civil society as a legitimation tool. The article identifies five patterns according to which authoritarian regimes can use civil society for legitimation purposes.     

Democratic consolidation and convergence in Southern Europe: The Italian case

In the analysis of democratic consolidation(s) in Southern Europe the emphasis has been on three main factors: the relevance of institutional rules, the scope and activities of parties (and party elites), and the establishment of certain relationships between institutions, parties and interests, connected to the size of the public sector of the economy. From the varied combinations of these factors different consolidations result: an elite‐based consolidation (Spain), a party‐based one (Italy), a state‐based one (Greece), and also a mixed party‐state model (Portugal). Our analysis also suggests the emergence of different types of democratic regime, mainly characterized by (i) either a ‘chancellor’ democracy or a parliamentary arrangement; (ii) either a pivotal or a secondary role for parties; and (iii) either a large or small public economic sector.

Recently the economic crisis, the resulting problems, and discontent arising from other causes, have brought about change in these democracies. The main transformations include the weakening of parties vis‐à‐vis other actors, the shrinking of both the public economic sector and the welfare institutions and, as a result, the prospect of greater autonomy for civil society. Thus, partially new regimes emerge, while the analysis also suggests the possibility of building a new typology of democratic regimes. Alongside the process of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe, there has also been an accompanying trend towards convergence: in the direction of majoritarianism, confirmed by the most recent national elections.     

Women and the extreme right: A comment

Reza Shah‐Kazemi (ed.), Algeria: Revolution Revisited. London: Islamic World Report, 1997, distributed by I. B. Tauris and St. Martin's Press. Pp.193. $19.95. ISBN 1–8606–4368‐X.

Danny O. Coulson and Elaine Shannon, No Heroes: Inside the FBI's Secret Counter‐Terror Force. New York: Pocket Books, 1999.

Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999. Pp.214. $22.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–674–61790–8.

Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination. New York: The Free Press, 1999. Pp.366. US$27.50, Can.$41.00. ISBN 0–684–85344–2.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

Defending democracy with international law: preventing coup attempts with democracy clauses

In recent decades many regional inter-governmental organizations have adopted agreements committing all member states to maintain democratic governments, and specifying punishments to be levied against member states that revert to authoritarianism. These treaties have a surprisingly high enforcement rate – nearly all states subject to them that have experienced governmental succession by coup have been suspended by the relevant IGO(s). However, relatively little is known about whether these treaties are deterring coups. This article offers an original theory of how these international agreements could deter coups d’état, focusing on the way that a predictably adverse international reaction complicates the incentives of potential coup participants. An analysis of the likelihood of coups for the period of 1991–2008 shows that states subject to democracy were on average less likely to experience coups, but that this finding was not statistically significant in most models. However, when restricting the analysis to democracies, middle-income states with democracy clauses were significantly less likely to experience coup attempts. Moreover, the African democracy regime appears to be particularly effective, significantly reducing the likelihood of coup attempts for middle-income states regardless of regime type.     

Transnationalizing democracy promotion: The role of Western political foundations and think‐tanks

Promoting democracy has developed into a common activity performed by a variety of actors in the post‐cold war world. While it is states and international institutions that receive most of the attention devoted to this increasingly important issue‐area, other non‐state actors also engage in democracy promotion. This article examines the activities of two such actors: political foundations ‐ quasi‐governmental organizations established in a number of advanced states ‐ and think‐tanks ‐ private institutions traditionally engaged in research and policy advocacy. It argues that the role and impact of these actors deepen the transnationalization of democracy promotion, which has important consequences for the international politics of democratization and international relations more generally.     

The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.     

The structure of the international telecommunications regime in transition: A network analysis of international organizations 1

This paper examines the structure of the international telecommunications regime in terms of networks of social interaction and institutional affiliation among international actors. Social interaction and overlapping membership data of 69 international telecommunications organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995 are analyzed to describe the social structure of the international telecommunications system through network analysis. The analysis reveals a center‐periphery structure with the Western industrial countries at the center and the less developed countries at the periphery. The international telecommunications system is also regionally structured suggesting influence by geopolitical and cultural proximity. The results indicate that inter‐governmental global organizations such as the ITU and UNESCO play intermediate and coordinating roles at the central linking‐pin positions (or cut‐points) in the international telecommunications regime. In summary, this research shows that transitional trends in international telecommunications have affected the interaction patterns of international actors.     

Expert intervention: knowledge,violence and identity during the Algerian crisis, 1997–1998

Civil wars and humanitarian intervention became two of the most dominant security concerns of the 1990s and Algeria was one of the many sites where these discourses were played out, especially during the wave of massacres that claimed the lives of hundreds (if not thousands) of Algerian civilians between mid-1997 and early 1998. The internationalization of the Algerian Civil War was driven as much by the horrific violence as by a lack of certainty as to the identity of those perpetrating the massacres. The indeterminacy of violence in Algeria provided the warrant for experts to fill the void. Yet interpretations of the violence in Algeria, coupled with the generic logics of intra-national armed conflicts and the use of international coercive force for the protection of human rights, produced divergent problematizations of the crisis. This paper thus examines the ways in which Algeria was, and often was not, produced as a civil war and a humanitarian crisis by expert and scholarly knowledge and practice. Through an analysis of the exclusionary effects of the dominant understandings of political violence in Algeria, we are able to understand the conceptual impasse that faced international action against the massacres.     

Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace proposition

Democracies may not fight each other, but do they fight themselves? Despite the need to better understand internal wars, empirical investigations of the democratic peace have focused on international war between democracies. We test the effect of regime type on civil wars, a class of events that is widely overlooked in the study of conflict. We find that regime type strongly affects civil war participation.     

Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states

Prior to 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a number of states took advantage of GATT Article XXVI:5(c), which allowed them—as former colonies or component territories of existing GATT members—to quickly and simply join the multilateral trade regime. The speed with which these post-colonial accessions took place, however, varied widely: some states joined immediately upon independence, while others joined much later. Still other post-colonial states passed on this opportunity, only to subsequently begin the longer, more onerous accession process required of other GATT/WTO applicants. Our paper seeks to explain this variation in the timing of post-colonial states’ accession to the GATT/WTO. We argue that three key variables explain the timing of accession decisions: 1) a country’s trade ties with existing member-states; 2) its existing preferential trade agreement (PTA) commitments; and 3) its domestic political institutions—specifically, the country’s level of democracy. Furthermore, we argue that the effects of these variables are conditional upon each other: post-colonial countries with more extensive trade ties to existing member-states were more likely to accede rapidly under Article XXVI:5(c), but only under specific conditions—namely, when they had not already locked in ties with key trading partners through bilateral or regional PTAs, and when they were governed by a more democratic regime. We test this argument empirically using an original dataset of 61 post-colonial states from 1951 to 2004. Our results strongly support this explanation of GATT/WTO accession and help to clarify the pattern of participation in the multilateral trading system that we have observed over the last half-century.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.