The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s influence in Southeast Asia

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since its inception in late 2013, has drawn tremendous global attention. The views of political leaders, business people, the media, and analysts on the prospect of the BRI are ostensibly polarized. One group asserts that the BRI will dramatically increase Beijing’s global influence, particularly in China’s neighborhood. Another group surmises that the BRI is expected to fail because of insurmountable challenges and is expected to fail. This article joins the debate by exploring the impact of the BRI on Southeast Asia’s regional order. The author holds a middle-ground position and argues that the actual impact of the BRI should neither be easily dismissed nor overestimated. More likely, through the BRI, China’s influence in Southeast Asia will increase but not to the extent of forging a Sinocentric order in the region. This can be explained by three major factors: (a) the responses of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states toward the BRI, (b) the effects of alternative infrastructure initiatives proposed by other major powers in Southeast Asia, and (c) China’s questionable ability to deliver its BRI promises.     

Democratic Transition and Economic Transition： The Case of Tunisia

This paper develops the issue of economic transition linked to a democratic transition that a developing country, Tunisia, is living following the revolution of 2011. Tunisia has made a profound change, it is currently developing new institutions, however, it is not an annuitant country, its activities and economic performances depend on political stability and the choice of the implemented politico-economic system. The question is whether the operating political forces will affect the direction of structural changes, thus toward a transition of breakage or the direction of adaptive transition. Neo-liberalism, practiced for 30 years, has developed an entrepreneurship structured as small and medium enterprises, whose performances are variable according to the sector and the state role. With the revolution, the country entered in a phase of political, social, and economic instability. A new constitution is passed, the political system installs the multiparty system, the country has a tradition of openness to the rest of the world, the challenges are numerous and the question of the role of the state in the economic sphere is very acute. The analysis is based on the observation of facts and the review and analysis of data relating to politics and economy, observed in the period before the revolution and after the revolution.     

Subregional economic zones,politics and development: The Philippine involvement in the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA)

In Southeast and East Asia there has been a recent trend towards setting up subregional economic zones often known as ‘growth triangles’. This article examines the concept of subregional economic zones and then focuses on the history of the recently established East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) locating it in the wider Philippine policy context. The article also assesses the likely contribution of EAGA to Mindanao's future development, paying particular attention to the political issues which could impinge on the attainment of economic prosperity.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

Trading with the enemy? The futility of US commercial countermeasures against the Chinese challenge

This paper examines whether the US is in a position to adopt restrictive commercial measures against China in order to complement military balancing. It focuses on the necessary condition for serious economic measures against an adversary: the state needs to be sure that it can effectively diminish the adversary's economic performance more than its own. This essay suggests that Washington cannot ascertain that this necessary condition is met in its relations with China. Thus, it might be better for the US to avoid restricting trade with China in any meaningful way, even though bilateral security rivalry intensifies.     

Michael Leifer and the balance of power

Abstract

In the work of the late Professor Michael Leifer few concepts are invoked more often than the balance of power. It was due to his reliance on this concept that Michael Leifer came to be widely regarded as an exponent of realism and an advocate of countervailing balance of power practices. By reviewing Leifer's own writings, this article not only re-examines the now almost standard interpretation of his work, but also investigates the significance of the balance of power in his scholarship in new ways. The first section identifies the two key meanings Leifer explicitly imputed to the balance of power. It also examines Leifer's arguments relative to what he perceived as changes in the balance of power. This will be done with reference to his analyses of the international politics of Southeast and East Asia in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. The second section extends the discussion on the particularities of Leifer's writings on the balance of power, but relates it specifically to the question of what Leifer's writings suggest about his theoretical home. His ability to demonstrate the significance of the balance of power as a political factor in the foreign policies of individual Southeast Asian states is the focus of the third section. Finally, the article builds on Leifer's empirical writings on the importance of psychological factors in relation to the balance of power as policy to take up theoretically important questions that he himself did not pursue, particularly about the extent to which the balance of power is the product of struggles for security and recognition. The article draws three conclusions. First, Leifer should be thought of not as a diehard advocate of conventional balance of power practices, but rather as a scholar broadly working within English School parameters who was deeply wedded to the idea that the balance of power is necessary to uphold regional order in international society in the context of the rise of a potentially hegemonic power. Second, one of the finest aspects of Leifer's scholarly legacy is to be found in his discussion of the balance of power factor in the foreign policies of Southeast Asian states. Third, Leifer should also be an inspiration to those interested in empirical work underlining the importance of struggles for recognition in the formation and practice of the balance of power.     

Emerging trends in Asia‐Pacific security: The role of Japan

A multi‐faceted approach, including the efforts (a) to maintain existing security arrangements, (b) to enhance security at the sub‐regional level in Northeast and Southeast Asia, (c) to enhance mutual reassurance among the countries in the region and (d) to deepen region‐wide economic cooperation, is vital for Asia‐Pacific security. Trends in these directions are emerging in the post‐cold war conditions. Japan‐US cooperation will continue to be the key element for the success of this approach. Changes in Japan will have positive implications for it.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

The non-traditional security concept and the EU-ASEAN relationship against the backdrop of China's rise

The rise of China raises questions about international order and whether traditional power structures will be transformed peacefully or confrontationally. Actively engaged in trade and investment activities with its Southeast Asian neighbourhood, China has been exerting political influence on many Southeast Asian states, cleaving regional cohesion and raising levels of tensity in the region. This article presupposes that within so-called non-traditional security (NTS) areas, there is room for China and Southeast Asian countries to circumvent the political tensions, to some extent. It presumes that NTS issues facilitate greater interaction with/on China for Southeast Asian states, including enhanced European Union (EU)-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement on China. Recognising the increasing and rather underexplored importance of the NTS perspective on the official and scholarly levels, this article delves into the rhetoric of NTS from a European perspective with particular view towards the South China Sea issue to demonstrate the use and utility of the NTS concept in the EU-ASEAN context against the backdrop of China's rise.     

State sovereignty,political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific

Abstract

Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have been of limited efficacy. Asian members of organizations such as ASEAN and APEC have insisted that these institutions not infringe upon their sovereign rights. The basic norms, rules, structures and practices supporting these organizations have, to varying degrees, reflected this concern. A number of factors contribute to explaining this regional reluctance to create effective multilateral institutions. This paper argues that the single most important factor is the concern of most East Asian states with domestic political legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Muthiah Alagappa and Mohammed Ayoob, the paper demonstrates that a significant majority of the states of East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coherent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within the state. As a result, these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors. Indeed, the regional attitude towards multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereignty of their members. As an exceptional case, Japan has encouraged regional institutionalism, but it has also been sensitive to the weaknesses of its neighbours, and has found non-institutional ways to promote its regional interests. The incentives to create effective regional structures increased after the Asian economic crisis, but Asian attempts to reform existing institutions or create new ones have been undermined by the issues connected to sovereignty. East Asian states recognize that they can best manage globalization and protect their sovereignty by creating and cooperating within effective regional institutions. However, their ability to create such structures is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy. In the emerging international environment, being a legitimate sovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite to participating in successful regional organizations.     

Southeast Asia and conflict prevention. Is ASEAN running out of steam?

Abstract

If the assessment of ASEAN's success in the past is difficult, speculations on whether ASEAN will be a success will be close to impossibility. Yet this is what is intended in this article. However, this is done by first defining robust criteria of success of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is successful if conflicts and battle deaths can be avoided, either by means of conflict resolution or transformation, or simply by means of conflict avoidance. By starting with this criterion the article will argue that ASEAN peacefulness cannot be explained by durable objective conditions. Instead, it is built on imagined realities. The imagined realities of the ASEAN Way are getting more difficult to sustain due to their interaction with material and normative/institutional developments. Many of the constructed foundations of the ASEAN Way are unsustainable in the new realities where communication has become easy and uncontrollable, and societies have become wealthier and more democratized. However, the article will show that evidence of existing conflict violence suggests that ASEAN has started to reformulate its approach to conflict prevention and that this has largely been successful.     

Re-conceptualizing China's rise as a global power: a neo-tributary perspective

Two analytical perspectives – conventional wisdom derived from warlordism and European colonialism, and soft-power concepts drawn from post-Cold-War American international relations – are prevalent lenses for analysing China's global rise. However, neither considers the role of the past in shaping China's contemporary diplomacy. This paper fills the gap of this under-researched area by providing an alternative perspective featuring analytic categories rooted in China's tributary tradition. It proposes a neo-tributary framework for systematically interpreting historical Chinese mentalities and strategies embedded in China's contemporary power strategy.