The Sino–Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception in power transition

A territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has gained a high profile in Sino–Japanese relations. Since the 2012 escalation of the territorial dispute, there is no sign of any de-escalation despite economic interdependence, which previously helped ease the tension. Drawing on the constructivist understanding of threat perception and power transition theory, this article analyzes the way in which the deepening of threat perceptions associated with a perceived regional power transition prevents Japan and China from working beyond their subjective conceptions of justice associated with boarders and history. Since 2012, the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute has increasingly fitted into a larger picture of power-political conflict taking place in a power transition in which both Japan and China aim to return to ‘normality’ by propagating their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities, and strategic realignment. To that end, this article first introduces a theoretical framework on the centrality of threat perceptions in power transition. Second, it traces the ways in which Japan and China have developed a threat perception of each other since 1972. The third section deals with the escalation of the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute since 2010 and highlights the deepening of mutual suspicion and threat perception exemplified at the bilateral and multilateral levels. I conclude that the Sino–Japanese territorial debate entered a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims in the East China Sea.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

Rivalry in the Middle East? Japan’s CEAPAD initiative and China’s rise

Abstract

Ever since the so-called rise of China has started, Sino-Japanese relations have been increasingly described as a rivalry between both states. For the most part, this assumed rivalry has been analyzed on the global level or within the boundaries of the East Asian region, while the consequences of this rivalry for other world regions, such as the Middle East, have been largely neglected in the literature. In order to fill this gap, this article investigates how China’s growing presence in the Middle East, and in particular regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, influences Japan’s own foreign policy in this troubled region. It utilizes a modified concept of the strategic rivalry approach, called ‘asymmetric rivalry’, which challenges the widespread notion that rivalry needs to be mutually perceived by both sides and thus analyzes the assumed Sino-Japanese rivalry in the Middle East from a Japanese perspective. By focusing on the case of Japan’s CEAPAD initiative, which aims at coordinating East Asian countries’ developmental assistance towards the Palestinian Authority while deliberately excluding China, the present article shows that the perception of Japan’s foreign policy elite of China as a rival decisively influences how Japan’s foreign policy is shaped in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

Shimane Prefecture,Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national identities in Japan

Abstract

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se.     

Globalization and the Korean electronics industry

Abstract

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved.     

China–Japan interaction in the Middle East: a battleground of Japan's remilitarization

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations.     

Asymmetrical rivalry between China and Japan in Africa: to what extent has Sino-Japan rivalry become a global phenomenon?

Abstract

To what extent is China–Japan rivalry a global phenomenon, and what is the nature of the rivalry they engage in outside their own region? Literature on Sino-Japanese rivalry abounds, but it pays scant attention to the relevance of the rivalry outside East Asia. This article argues that Sino-Japanese rivalry has indeed become a global phenomenon, that various forms of the rivalry are evident in Africa, and that they are mostly of an asymmetrical nature. Quantitatively, China’s contribution to Africa is far greater than that of Japan, with the exception of foreign direct investment (FDI). Qualitatively, though, Japan has a stronger sense of the rivalry than China has, revealing a psychological aspect to the asymmetry as well. Contextually, the types of activity that Chinese and Japanese actors carry out in Africa are not necessarily the same, which makes the rivalry all the more asymmetrical. The rivalry has become more apparent recently, not only because of the rise of China but also because of a change in the meaning of ‘Africa’ – from a region of ‘poverty’ and ‘hunger’ to a region of ‘economic opportunities’. That said, Africa – to a greater or lesser degree in each of its countries – still suffers from conflict and instability. As a result, the ability of Japan and China to exert power and influence throughout Africa is somewhat restricted.     

The 2012 United States election and the implications for East Asia

Abstract

The 2012 election resulted in a major victory for President Obama and while his Democratic Party improved its Congressional strength, the House of Representatives remains under Republican control. The election revealed the depth of America's political and voter divisions with each party showing dramatically different areas of strength and weakness. Yet the election did not hinge on foreign policy leaving the Obama administration likely to continue most of its earlier policies toward East Asia as marked by the multilayered ‘pivot’ toward Asia. Relations with China and North Korea are likely to remain difficult to manage while US–ROK links should be far smoother. Of particular concern is the economic sluggishness and rising nationalism in Japan which could well cause bilateral problems with the US and regional problems with Japan's neighbors, including US ally, South Korea. And at home the bipolar divisions over how best to deal with America's economic revitalization could well impede US abilities to exert a convincing multi-dimensional role in the region.     

The South Korean–Japanese security relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute

Abstract

The metaphor of Asia is frequently used nowadays as a concept for regional identity, but it is very problematical because geographic Asia contains such a large piece of humanity in all cultural, political and economic forms. Historically Asia also has negative connotations, and at times other regional concepts have been preferred over it. Pan‐Asianism, Greater East Asia, Asian‐African cooperation, Asian Socialism, Southeast Asia, Western Pacific, Asia Pacific, and East Asia are some of the regionalist permutations of the metaphor of Asia during this century, but thus far no strong institutional structures have emerged to fill the concepts with lasting and effective political power.     

The more the merrier? Sino-Japanese security relations in the context of complex interstate rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region

Abstract

This paper analyses the evolution of Sino-Japanese rivalry in the security sphere concentrating on the Chinese perspective, and placing it within the wider context of complex interstate rivalry between China, Japan and the United States. From a theoretical viewpoint, this research contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry from multiparty perspective, which has been overlooked in existing research. China–Japan–US complex interstate rivalry includes elements of positional, spatial and ideological rivalry simultaneously. When rivalries mix two or more rivalry types, they become more difficult to resolve. The two broad trends of China’s military build-up and deepening US–Japan alliance evolve in tandem intensifying rivalry dynamics and increasing positional elements of rivalry. There are many indications on various levels that for China, controlling Japan’s international ambitions has become less important and more attention is paid to ways in which Japan helps the United States in reaching its objectives in Asia through their alliance agreement. The cases analysed to display complex interstate rivalry include the Taiwan question, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the North Korean nuclear issue.     

Competition and cooperative practices in Sino-Japanese energy and environmental relations: towards an energy security ‘risk community’?

Abstract

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May–June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security ‘risk community’ as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection.     

Chinese migration: still the major focus of Russian Far East/Chinese North East relations?

Abstract

In contrast to Sino-Russian relations at the state-level, regional cooperation between the contiguous Russian Far East and Chinese North East has been difficult to achieve, despite the existence of seemingly natural economic complementarities. This article asks why this is the case and argues that one important stumbling block, i.e. negative reactions to Chinese labour migration, has become less problematic. Situating Russian Far East/Chinese North East relations in a regionalist framework the article compares the salience and framing of major issues in regional relations in Chinese and Russian media at the national and regional levels. Contrary to earlier research, the findings suggest that economic and regional development issues, and not Chinese migration into the Russian Far East, are by far the most salient sets of issues on both sides. However, significant differences in the framing of these issues suggest that a convergence of opinion on the desirability of regional cooperation masks contradictory expectations for the direction of regional development.     

Economic cooperation in Northeast Asia: The proposed Tumen River scheme

Abstract

This paper examines a relatively unexplored aspect of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: the involvement of subnational actors. It focuses in particular on the sustained campaign of domestic lobbying and paradiplomacy by elites from the Far East region of Sakhalin aimed at preventing the Russian central government from transferring the South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories to Japan during the 1990s. It explores the various responses to the ‘Sakhalin factor’ from federal authorities in Russia, as well as private and public bodies in Japan, highlighting the subsequent localization and pluralization of diplomatic channels. The paper also considers why the ‘Sakhalin factor’ became so prominent, pointing to a synergy of factors that include the high-profile anti-concessionary campaigns of the Sakhalin political elite, the fallout from Russia's troubled attempts at state building and a possible convergence of interests between Boris Yeltsin and regional authorities. The paper concludes with an analysis of how Vladimir Putin's federal reforms, launched in 2000, have diminished Sakhalin's authority over the South Kuril Islands.     

Harmonious World and China’s Foreign Economic Policy: Features,Implications, and Challenges

Analysts oddly have neglected the foreign economic implications of China’s harmonious world and harmonious society doctrines. This article specifies the foreign economic policy effects of both, collectively termed harmonious world plus (HWP). It shows that HWP implies China’s continued integration into the global economic system, acceptance of the extant international economic order, and backing for increased cooperation and exchange, provided it is mutually beneficial. It further demonstrates that HWP implies support for global development, self-reliance, and multilateralism. Beyond this, the study reveals that HWP is likely to influence China’s interactions with international economic institutions, foreign investors, and its international resource dealings. Generally speaking, this article shows that China is making progress adhering to most of the tenets of HWP, though there are some areas for concern. It also reveals that convergences and divergences between HWP and China’s actual policies are attributable to national interests, China’s limited capabilities, and domestic politics. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard is associate director of the Center for U.S.-China Policy Studies and associate professor in the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University (SFSU). He also is a Board Member of and Research Director for the Association of Chinese Political Studies. Dr. Blanchard’s research interests include China’s integration into the global economic system, China’s interactions with multinational corporations, Chinese multinational corporations, Sino-Japanese relations, and Chinese territorial and maritime issues. He is a co-editor of Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), a co-editor of and contributor to Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London: Frank Cass, 2000), and the author of 20 book chapters and refereed journal articles.     

Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis

Although territorial disputes have been much studied, the application of “two-level game” analysis in peace research and conflict resolution is still relatively unexplored. In this essay, I seek to use the analytical propositions derived from this “two-level game” bargaining framework to explain the success, failure, or partial resolution of sovereignty negotiations over China’s island claims to the disputed islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Amur/Ussuri rivers, and South China Sea. This essay will focus on the interaction between governments and domestic nationalist groups, the role of institutions, and the strategies of negotiators to explain the development of the territorial disputes. I will evaluate how different political and social preferences, historical memories, economic priorities, side payments, and institutional constraints affect inter-state bargaining behavior and relations between the government and different segments of society. Basically, I am interested in finding out what significant roles national, sub-national and transnational actors can and do play in aggravating, minimizing, terminating or preventing conflicts over island claims involving China. Dr. Chien-peng Chung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Sociology of Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (London & New York: Routledge, 2004).     

Bringing Law to the Table: Legal Claims,Focal Points,and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945

In this article, we argue that international law can help state leaders reach a settlement in territorial disputes by suggesting a focal point for negotiations. International law is more likely to serve as a focal point when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are clear and well established and when one of the states in the dispute has a stronger legal claim to disputed territory. When these two conditions are present, we expect the state with a legal advantage to push for and receive favorable terms of settlement. In our analysis of all negotiated settlements in territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000, we find strong support for the importance of international law in influencing the terms of settlements. States with a strong legal advantage are more likely to secure favorable terms, whereas states lacking a strong legal claim are more likely to receive unfavorable terms.     

Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have brought China and Japan into a bitter dispute for many decades. With regard to the real question of who owns sovereignty over the islands, the two claimants can not come to terms on several critical issues, such as whether the islands were terra nullius when Japan claimed sovereignty in 1895, whether Japan returned the islands to China after the Japanese defeat in WWII, and how their maritime boundary in the East China Sea should be demarcated according to international law. There is no ready solution to the longstanding stalemate, but the pending dispute could be shelved and managed from escalating into a military conflict. Dr. Zhongqi PAN is an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs in Fudan University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Fudan University in 1999. He was a visiting scholar to Lund University (2006), the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University (2004), the Henry L. Stimson Center (2001), and University of Tokyo (1999–2000).     

Discursive Construction of territorial disputes: foreign newspaper reporting on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute

Most studies of the news discourse surrounding territorial disputes focus on the domestic newspapers of the conflicting countries from the perspective of “us” and “them”. This study examines how the newspapers of foreign countries discursively construct a territorial dispute within the framework of an intergroup conflict schema. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of articles on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute published online in five newspapers of record (the New York Times, the Guardian, the Sydney Morning Herald, Le Monde, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) reveals two main points: First, the articles published by these newspapers share a similar intergroup conflict schema that is based on competition and the pursuit of national interests as interpreted in conformance with the national interests of the respective countries (USA, UK, Australia, France, and Germany). Second, in terms of how news discourse is framed, there are noticeable differences between the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the other four which may reflect the influence of Germany’s socio-historical context on domestic public opinion.     

Societal Transformation and the Creation of a Regional Party: The PDS as a Regional Actor in Eastern Germany

This paper examines the position of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) within unified Germany. The transformation of the GDR's political, economic and societal structures, coupled with the legacy of 40 years of state socialism, has created space for a regional party to establish itself on the territory of the former East Germany. The manner and means that the transformation has taken have enabled a process of separate identity-creation to begin in eastern Germany, and the PDS has mobilised territorial difference in order to carve a new niche as an eastern German interest party. The PDS, the heir to the SED dictatorship, has moulded itself into a strong regional actor on the basis of a reinvigorated societal cleavage along the former border ? and appears to have successfully secured a place in the German political landscape for at least the next generation.