CBRN Incidents: Political Regimes,Perpetrators, and Targets

This article investigates the relationship between regime characteristics and the likelihood of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents. Odds ratios establish that democratic ideals—democratic rule, strong rule of law, and honest regimes—are associated with more CBRN incidents. Failed states may be where some terrorist groups form or take refuge, but these states have not been the venue of choice for CBRN incidents. Religious (cults and fundamentalists) and nationalist/separatist groups are not more likely than others to engage in CBRN attacks. To date, indiscriminate CBRN attacks are as likely as discriminate attacks to cause casualties. Transnational terrorist groups are less adept than others in concealing their acquisition of CBRN substances. For some regressions, democratic rule and strong rule of law are positive determinants of CBRN incidents.     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

Islamic terrorist activities in turkey in the 1990s

This article focuses on Islamic terrorism in the framework of overall Islamic activity in Turkey. It argues that Islamic terrorist organizations active in Turkey during the 1990s strived to establish an Islamic shari ’a‐based state on the Iranian example, profited from deeper social and political trends in Turkish society and, at the same time, strengthened those trends by their violence. These groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local and regional, political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist activity was limited, and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue escalating violence, hoping it would bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey.     

Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis

During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.     

Why Target the “Good Guys”? The Determinants of Terrorism Against NGOs

Why would a terrorist group target nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? We theorize that certain types of NGOs, namely those using mainly nonviolent pressure to advocate for changes in government human rights practices, influence the behaviors of potential terrorist group supporters in ways not liked by terrorist organizations. These advocacy-based human rights NGOs make terrorism attacks against the whole NGO sector more likely by changing the dynamics of terrorist-domestic audience relations in ways that threaten to limit audience support of terrorist groups. Other types of NGOs, especially those that do not have an advocacy focus, are less likely to directly challenge the terrorist organization or the state and can provide resources utilized by terrorist groups and potential sympathizers. Thus, their presence would not increase the likelihood of any NGO-targeted terrorist attacks. A global test of these dynamics supports our basic hypotheses.     

Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims

Most observers believe that the 'democratic rules of the game' provide a peaceful means for resolving political conflicts. This may be true but not all groups or even single individuals in democratic societies need play by these rules. This analysis uses two data sets: one that classifies most countries of the world based on how they were ruled in the mid-1980s, and the other on the frequency with which their nationals either perpetrated or were victimized by terrorists attacks, to investigate the relationship between terrorism and democracy. The findings suggest that stable democracy and terrorism go together. An analysis of the data reveal that terrorist attacks occur most often in the world's most stable democracies, and that, further, both the perpetrators and victims of those attacks are citizens of the same democracies.     

On the relationship between democracy and terrorism

This article raises some methodological issues concerning the Eubank and Weinberg analysis of democracy and terrorism. A case is made for the use of events data rather than the presence of terrorist groups. Eubank and Weinberg's classification of countries, as having or not having terrorist groups, is questioned. Further details of their criteria of classification are requested. Some alternative tests are indicated, which can be done when data become available.     

Terrorist crisis management in Japan: Historical development and changing response (1970–1997)

As Japan plays a more significant role in international society, it has become a more attractive target for international terrorists. Under these circumstances, Japan has mostly taken a conciliatory response, as used to deal with the JRA, Aum, MRTA terrorist incidents, in contrast to the hard line response in most Western nations. However, there has been a recent increase in support in Japan for more punitive methods. The aim of this study is to examine how Japan can develop its effective counter and anti‐terrorist capabilities based on the understanding of Japanese cultural and social norms. It surveys the acceptability and effectiveness of policies for combating terrorism in a democratic society such as Japan. A flexible Japanese counter‐terrorist response, which is influenced by characteristics of each terrorist incident could be the most effective strategy.     

The unlikely terrorist: women and Islamic resistance in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories

Islamic resistance groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have been accused of using terrorist tactics to achieve their aims. Although some critics suggest that such groups may also have hijacked the democratic agenda in ways that disadvantage women, their supporters claim that they are promoting a model of modernity that is empowering women. This article examines the reasons why some Lebanese Shi'i and Palestinian women support the resistance against Israeli invasion and occupation that is justified in terms of religion. Far from seeing the actions of Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories as acts of terrorism, many women welcome the resistance as it brings dignity and meaning to their lives and enhances feelings of national identification.     

The Discursive Construction of Terrorist Group Identity

The media coverage of terrorist acts has been the subject of numerous scientific studies. However, the terrorist groups’ own communication perspectives have not been thoroughly researched. The following article deals with terrorist groups and their use of websites for identity building. We examine the discursive construction of terrorist group identity through critical discourse analysis (CDA). The CDA of online texts from websites of terrorist groups is based on a five macro-strategy scheme. Our sample consists of six terrorist groups, with each group of two sharing different motivations: social-revolutionary, ethno-nationalist, or religious. All the groups analyzed are listed as terrorist organizations by the European Union. The CDA of 27 terrorist websites, purposively sampled, was conducted using two coders per site. Through this analysis, the researchers draw conclusions on strategies employed by terrorist organizations in building identity and how to counter their unregulated propaganda.     

Weak States,State Failure,and Terrorism

It is common to hear the assertion that weak or failed states are fertile ground for terrorism. Yet terrorist groups have emerged from, and operated within, countries which have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of government. Terrorist organizations operate in weak and failed states but it is not necessarily the condition of weak or failed statehood which explains their presence. Moreover, it is not necessarily the weakest states which do host such groups. Therefore, this condition is not a sufficient explanation for their presence. While weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of terrorist groups to operate, additional explanatory variables need to be identified.     

Destabilizing Effects of Terrorism on Party System Stability

In democracies with stable party systems, voters can more easily trace policy decisions from parties and representatives within the government to specific policy outcomes. Consequently, party system stability (PSS) has been reportedly linked to a variety of factors including economic conditions, democratic performance, political institutions, and socioeconomic cleavages. While informative, these lessons offer precious little insight into other factors that can destabilize a party system. In this work, we surmise that terrorist attacks have important implications for two commonly used measures of PSS. The results of a pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis confirm our hypothesis: deadly attacks proximate to elections destabilize party systems, even when controlling for multiple standard controls. In addition, the level of democratic consolidation within states also influences the degree that fatal terrorist attacks affect party system stability. These findings are based on terrorism data collected from the Global Terrorism Database and from PSS data compiled by the authors.     

EU counter‐terrorism,the Maastricht third pillar and liberal democratic acceptability

The article examines the effectiveness of the Maastricht Third Pillar's internal security provisions with respect to the fight against terrorism. An assessment of EU internal security cooperation is made from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational anti‐terrorist proficiency and democratic acceptability. Police and security forces throughout the European Union (EU) have strongly endorsed the Third Pillar as providing an efficient response to serious criminality. However, from a liberal democratic point of view the Maastricht provisions raise extremely serious questions concerning the lack of critical public debate and systems of accountability within the EU. Close coordination between member states is definitely necessary if terrorism is to be effectively countered in the region. However, it is vital that in the headlong rush to provide for an enhanced international operational capacity critical considerations of democratic control are not lost. One cannot expect to gain the type of public consent that is crucial for democratic acceptability if fundamental fears exist over the legitimacy and desirability of ever closer law enforcement and judicial cooperation.     

Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments

Previous research has indicated that democracy decreases the risk of armed conflict, while increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks, but we know little about the effect of democracy on violence against civilians in ongoing civil conflicts. This study seeks to fill this empirical gap in the research on democracy and political violence, by examining all rebel groups involved in an armed conflict 1989–2004. Using different measures of democracy, the results demonstrate that rebels target more civilians when facing a democratic (or semi-democratic) government. Democracies are perceived as particularly vulnerable to attacks on the population, since civilians can hold the government accountable for failures to provide security, and this provides incentives for rebels to target civilians. At the same time, the openness of democratic societies provides opportunities for carrying out violent attacks. Thus, the strength of democracy—its accountability and openness—can become an Achilles heel during an internal armed conflict.     

How Al Qaeda Innovates

Innovative terrorist organizations pose exceptionally dangerous threats because of their potential to surprise declared enemies, inflict heavy costs upon them, and set new trends that other militant groups seek to emulate. Despite this importance, researchers have shed little light on where terrorist innovation originates. Although military innovation scholars have emphasized the importance of both top-down and bottom-up innovation, the few existing studies on terrorist innovation have acknowledged the importance of the terrorist leadership but largely ignored the role played by middle- or lower-ranking operatives in the innovation process. This study examines the planning of the September 11, 2001 attacks and finds that, contrary to the predominant claims on terrorist innovation, the 9/11 attacks featured both top-down and bottom-up processes of innovation, with the latter including a critical role played by an independent terrorist entrepreneur. Theoretically, the findings suggest that the conventional wisdom of the predominance of top-down innovation in terrorism is dependent on a problematic assumption, namely that terrorist groups are centralized, hierarchical, and localized entities. As more terrorist groups adopt decentralized structures, they are increasingly likely to display multi-directional processes of innovation. The study has important implications for counterterrorism policy. It suggests that thwarting the most innovative terrorist groups requires targeting senior- and middle-management operatives of the group itself and expending greater effort at apprehending independent terrorist innovators with fluid organizational affiliations. A mix of offensive and defensive counterterrorism strategies, coupled with greater international cooperation, is critical to achieving this goal.     

Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm

ABSTRACT

This article questions the current narrative paradigm and argues that al-Shabaab attacks Kenya for strategic and highly rational reasons, beyond sharing a border and having bases in southern Somalia closer to major population centres than Ethiopia or Uganda. Al-Shabaab targets Kenya more than other frontline states because of the opportunity spaces linked to Kenya’s international status and visibility, its relatively free and independent media that widely publicizes terrorist attacks, a highly developed and lucrative tourist sector that provides soft targets, the comparatively high number of Kenyan foreign fighters within the group’s ranks, the presence of terror cells in Kenya, expanding democratic space, and high levels of corruption. These variables play into al-Shabaab’s motivations and aid planning and execution of terrorist acts that aim to fulfil the group’s quest to survive by maintaining relevance. In order to address this predictable menace, we offer a number of measures that Kenya needs to take, including reducing corruption in order to properly invest in intelligence efforts and relevant homeland security measures, thereby making it possible for Kenya to sustainably and effectively combat al-Shabaab.     

The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement

Anders Behring Breivik, a lone wolf terrorist, killed 77 people in two terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011. This study uses framing theory from social movement studies to compare his Manifesto with the rhetoric of the anti-Islamic movement that inspired him. The anti-Islamic movement has a dual, and sometimes inconsistent, collective action framing. On the one hand, they portray Islam as an existential threat to the West and a warlike enemy; on the other, they promote peaceful and democratic opposition. The potential for radicalization is thus immanent. This case study reveals the importance of seeing lone wolf terrorists as acting from rhetoric embedded in larger social movements. It further demonstrates, in detail, the subtle and complex ways in which political narratives rejecting terrorism and political violence still end up inspiring such acts.     

The Electoral Terrorist: Terror Groups and Democratic Participation

Why do some terrorist groups participate in the electoral process but not others? If elections provide some strategic or tactical benefit then we would expect other groups to emulate that strategy. However, we see variation in the adoption of an electoral strategy by terrorist groups. I argue that involvement in territorial disputes and group competition determine whether terrorist groups embrace an electoral strategy. Conflicts involving territorial disputes are more likely to see terrorist groups contest elections because electoral participation may aid in the creation of the independent or autonomous territory they desire. Increased group competition changes the number of actors, which impacts the level and distribution of resources (supporters, finance, and arms) involved in the conflict. When multiple terrorist groups compete, groups are motivated to participate in elections in response to new competitive pressures. This argument is tested using a large-n dataset of 89 terrorist groups in existence during the years 1968–2006 and a case study of Hamas's decision to contest elections.     

Preserving liberty in a society under siege: The media and the ‘Guildford Four’

In the aftermath of the TWA hijacking, the American electronic media were strongly criticized for their ethical practices and for abusing First Amendment rights. Many Americans think of Great Britain as providing appropriate examples for how to deal with abusive media. There, prior restraint and internal broadcasting codes exist, and the First Amendment does not. Yet, those who believe that capping the lens provides a simple solution to a complex problem have forgotten the functional role the media play in a society undergoing a terrorist siege. The case of the ‘Guildford Four’ shows how terrorist violence can adversely affect the responses of even a strong stable democracy and how responsible, vigilant and free media provide an independent, institutional base of power that can help reunite democratic aspirations and practice. The case of the ‘Guildford Four’ is the belated triumph of justice in a free society, but it is also a triumph of free media.     

Terrorism and democracy: What recent events disclose

This paper is the second in a series of analyses which explore relationships between terrorism and democracy. In this instance, the authors use the Rand‐St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism for 1994, as well as the US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism collection of events for 1995. The authors use these data sets to determine if there is a linkage between the occurrence of terrorist attacks and the type of incumbent political regime in the countries where they are perpetrated. The two classifications of political regimes were drawn from Robert Wesson's 1987 study Democracy: a Worldwide Survey and the Freedom House Publication Freedom in the World for 1984–85 and 1994–95, in order to evaluate the impact of regime change on the incidence of terrorist events. Our principal finding, consistent with earlier work, is that terrorist events are substantially more likely to occur in free and democratic settings than in any of the alternatives. We do discover, though, that change in and of itself makes a difference. Countries which underwent regime change in the period under consideration were more likely to experience terrorism than countries which did not.