Canada's counter‐terrorism experience

This article traces Canada's experience with modern terrorism from its beginnings in 1963 to the present, with particular emphasis on the policies and crisis management techniques which have evolved over those 30 years. A brief review of the Canadian system of government and constitutional framework is provided to assist with understanding Canada's response to the terrorist threat. While Canadians have largely escaped the tragedies of domestic and international terrorism which have plagued other parts of the world since 1968, it is also true that Canada had an early experience of modern terrorism when the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began its campaign of politically motivated violence in Montreal on the night of 7 March 1963. Canada has been applauded for the firm and expeditious manner in which it dealt with the FLQ threat, and for the security provided for major international events held on Canadian soil (e.g., 1976 Olympic Games, 1981 Economic Summit). Beginning in 1982, however, a series of terrorist incidents brought about a fundamental reassessment which led to the introduction of major policies and measures ‐ based on the ‘lead Minister’ concept ‐ that continue to form the basis of Canada's approach to counter‐terrorism.     

EU counter‐terrorism,the Maastricht third pillar and liberal democratic acceptability

The article examines the effectiveness of the Maastricht Third Pillar's internal security provisions with respect to the fight against terrorism. An assessment of EU internal security cooperation is made from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational anti‐terrorist proficiency and democratic acceptability. Police and security forces throughout the European Union (EU) have strongly endorsed the Third Pillar as providing an efficient response to serious criminality. However, from a liberal democratic point of view the Maastricht provisions raise extremely serious questions concerning the lack of critical public debate and systems of accountability within the EU. Close coordination between member states is definitely necessary if terrorism is to be effectively countered in the region. However, it is vital that in the headlong rush to provide for an enhanced international operational capacity critical considerations of democratic control are not lost. One cannot expect to gain the type of public consent that is crucial for democratic acceptability if fundamental fears exist over the legitimacy and desirability of ever closer law enforcement and judicial cooperation.     

Terrorism,counter‐terrorism and democracy: The assessment of national security threats

The development of radical Islamist strategic thinking and the impact of post-modern, Western styles of thought upon the ideology that informs that strategy is often overlooked in conventional discussions of homegrown threats from jihadist militants. The propensity to discount the ideology informing both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements with an analogous political philosophy like Hizb ut-Tahrir neglects the influence that critical Western modes of thought exercise upon their strategic thinking especially in the context of homegrown radicalization. Drawing selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the Western ideological canon has, in fact, endowed Khilaafaism (caliphism) with both a distinctive theoretical style and strategic practice. In particular, it derives intellectual sustenance from a post-Marxist Frankfurt School of critical thinking that in combination with an “English” School of international relations idealism holds that epistemological claims are socially determined, subjective, and serve the interests of dominant power relations. This critical, normative, and constructivist approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also to transcend it. This transformative agenda bears comparison with radical Islamist critiques of Western ontology and is of interest to Islamism's political and strategic thinking. In this regard, the relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s not only reflect a loss of faith in Western values in a way that undermines the prospects for a liberal and pluralist polity, but also, through a critical process facilitated by much international relations orthodoxy, promotes the strategic and ideological agenda of radical Islam. It is this curious strategic and ideological evolution that this paper explores.     

Cruise‐ship terrorism and the media

Abstract

An attempt is made to analyze physical differences between the Achille Lauro incident and seizure of hostages on board aircraft, for their impact on terrorist use of the news media. Among the important differences considered are the following: the number of hostages, the range and endurance of the transportation vehicle, the possibilities of disappearing into the unknown, the degree of “de facto torture” in the physical situation of the hostages, the ease of media (especially television) access, the general accessibility of the vehicle for rescue efforts, and the sheer novelty of this mode of terrorist attack. Some analogies are drawn with terrorist seizures of railroad trains and buses, including comparisons of media behavior.     

Moral panics and anti‐cult terrorism in Western Europe

Religious minorities in Western Europe today are often perceived as threatening. After Solar Temple suicides and homicides, parliamentary and other official commissions investigated the dangers of ‘cults’ or ‘sects’. The article reviews reports published between 1996–1999 and argues that they may be classified into two categories. ‘Type I’ reports (more prevalent throughout French‐speaking Europe) rely on anti‐cult models and stereotypes, and may perpetuate moral panics by seeing all unfamiliar religious minorities as uniformly dangerous. ‘Type II’ reports, while still maintaining elements of the anti‐cult models, appear to be more balanced and concentrate more attention on academic findings. ‘Type I’ reports, and anti‐cult models in general, generated ‘anti‐cult terrorism’ (an expression first used in one of the Swiss ‘Type II’ reports) in the form of both verbal and actual violence, with extremist groups acting as self‐appointed anti‐cult vigilantes. While there are actually and potentially dangerous religious minorities, anti‐cult rhetoric in official documents may incite and provoke violence both against the assaulted movements and by the movements threatened. Law enforcement, the article concludes, should focus on the minority of violent religious and millenialist movements and the small extreme anti‐cult fringes.     

Television and terrorism: Implications for crisis management and policy‐making

Because few of us experience terrorism firsthand, the media play an important role in informing us when major incidents occur. Because of its instantaneity and its ability to reach many audiences at once, the electronic media and particularly television can have a significant impact on the various players who become involved in a particular crisis. This article examines the kinds of effects that television can have on four sets of actors most commonly involved in terrorist crises or major incidents: politicians, police, the public and the print media. While some of these effects can be negative, others can be positive. As a whole, however, television tends to diminish the quality of political discourse, with its emphasis on simplification and dramatization. In time of crisis, this can have serious consequences on decision‐makers who depend upon an informed public to understand the issues at stake and the limits on government action. The article ends by examining briefly how these effects relate to the increasing role of the private sector in public safety and security.     

Counter‐terrorism and commercial interests: Do they conflict?

This paper concentrates on whether there is an inherent conflict between commercial interests and the fight against state‐sponsored terrorism.¹ It examines the differences between US and EU policy, particularly in relation to Iran; the roles of Russia and China and the wider impact of international responses. The author concludes that symbolic sanctions and sporadic dialogue are completely inadequate instruments, but that genuine international sanctions and critical dialogue should not be viewed as mutually exclusive policy instruments.     

Political terrorism in South‐East Asia

This article will provide an overview of one specific non‐military threat that is beginning to assume greater prominence on south‐east Asia's broadened security agenda: political terrorism.¹ Although by no means new to the south‐east Asian environment, for much of the twentieth century its importance was sidelined and, in a sense ‘contained’, by the more pressing concern over US‐Soviet nuclear rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, however, the ‘bottle has been uncorked’ on a variety of lower‐level threats, with issues such as terrorism now taking on greater prominence and relevance in their own right as significant regional and national security concerns.²     

Right‐wing terrorism in South Africa

This article reviews the background to the rise of the right wing in South Africa and argues that there has always been a strand in Afrikaner politics with a proclivity to violence. The transformation in South Africa began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, alienating conservatives and those in the security forces who were still in the grip of the militarist doctrines espoused during the P.W. Botha era. Hit squads, dirty tricks and efforts to destabilise neighbouring governments were part of the state's response to the rise of black militance in the 1980s. Terrorism was also practised by paramilitary right‐wing groups, the biggest of which was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Eventually the right‐wing counterrevolution failed, in large measure because potentially the most effective of the paramilitary forces, led by retired General Constand Viljoen, rejected the option of violence and sought instead a negotiated accommodation     

Conceptualizing the effects of mass‐mediated terrorism

Abstract

In summer 1985, a TWA plane was hijacked by Shiite terrorists to Beirut creating what turned to be one of the most impressive spectacles of the mass‐mediated “theater of terror.” After the event the American media were blamed for fanning the crisis atmosphere, giving the terrorists the publicity they craved, abetting the terrorists by reporting U.S. military movements, holding a brutal competition among themselves to get exclusive footage or interviews, harassing the hostages’ families, negotiating directly with the terrorists, milking the hostages still held by the terrorists for political and ideological declarations, and propagandizing the terrorists’ anti‐U.S. and anti‐Israel messages. The resulting debate that followed these accusations, illustrates the lingering argument regarding media and terrorism. While some claim that “the media are the terrorists’ best friends. The terrorist act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all”,¹ others argue that the media are avoiding the “real terror” for ideological reasons, averting Western public opinion from U.S. terrorism by underreporting its share in Third World Terrorism.² The ideological loadings of definitions and arguments are combined with confused interpretations of media effects and public opinion to yield an endless, futile debate. The purpose of the paper is to conceptualize basic effects of mass‐mediated terrorism by relating media effects studies to the case of terrorism and public opinion.     

Video games,terrorism, and ISIS’s Jihad 3.0

This study discusses different media strategies followed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In particular, the study attempts to understand the way ISIS’s video game that is called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The Clanging of the Swords) has been received by the online Arab public. The article argues that the goal behind making and releasing the video game was to gain publicity and attract attention to the group, and the general target was young people. The main technique used by ISIS is what I call “troll, flame, and engage.” The results indicate that the majority of comments are against ISIS and its game, though most of the top ten videos are favorable towards the group. The sectarian dimension between Sunnis and Shiites is highly emphasized in the online exchanges, and YouTube remains an active social networking site that is used by ISIS followers and sympathizers to promote the group and recruit others.     

Italian neo‐fascist terrorism: A comparative perspective

Right‐wing violence in Italy has displayed characteristics that set it apart from the violent operations of rightist groups active in the other Western democracies. In the Italian case the violence has been protracted, stretching from the immediate postwar period to our own time. For the most part, it has been aimed at Communists and other leftists rather than racial or ethnic minorities. And it has appeared in a variety of forms, ranging from street‐corner brawling to terrorist bombing campaigns to schemes designed to achieve a coup d'état. In addition to offering a detailed account of neo‐Fascist violence in Italy over the past four decades, this study places the phenomenon in the general context of Italian politics and seeks to explain the violence by reference to the Cold War‐based objectives of various anti‐communist organizations.     

State terrorism research and critical terrorism studies: an assessment†

This article explores the value of scholarship on state terrorism for the critical study of terrorist violences. The article begins by identifying four primary contributions of this scholarship: first, a rethinking of the status and significance of terrorism; second, an unsettling of broader assumptions within International Relations (IR) and terrorism research; third, an ability to locate state violences within pertinent, but potentially camouflaged, contexts; and, fourth, a prioritisation of critique as a responsibility of scholarship. The article’s second section then argues that the purchase of this work could be further extended by greater conceptual engagement with the state itself. In particular, we point to the value of contemporary approaches to the state as a terrain and outcome of social and political struggle, rather than as a singular actor of unitary purpose. Rethinking the state in this way has value, we argue, first, for moving research beyond the identification and typologising of state terrorisms; and, second, for circumventing the perennial problem of identifying intentionality in efforts to designate violences as (state) terrorism.     

Alias ‘GBGPGS’: Action directe internationale's transition from revolutionary terrorism to euro‐terrorism

This article discusses terrorism as a ritual act or series of acts that expresses a message. The case of GBGPGS illustrates how complex such messages are by referring them to their French and global contexts. The group's violent struggle against political rules has a ‘sacrificial’ dimension and was justified as a response to ‘crisis’. Through attempting to re‐interpret French extreme‐left traditions, the GBGPGS campaign foreshadowed Euro‐terrorism. The most salient evidence of this shift was the group's concentration on economic globalization and the weakening of traditional state and great power structures.