Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan

Pakistan has a long history of patronizing militant proxies, and in recent years it has become a victim as well as a supporter of terrorism. The evolution of the jihadist insurgency in Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pashtun militants leading it, efforts to counter the insurgency, and the overall strategic threats to the state have merited significant study. With some notable exceptions, less attention has been paid to the role Punjabi militant organizations and their splinters have played in bringing the insurgency to Pakistan's heartland. The involvement of these actors in the revolutionary jihad against the state gives the FATA-based actors leading this insurgency power projection capabilities throughout the country. This article helps to fill that knowledge gap by bringing a more detailed level of analysis to the understanding of how anti-state Punjabi militant networks function at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. In doing so, it illustrates that the introduction of new loci of jihad at the macro-level, simultaneous integration and atomization among militant groups at the meso-level, and greater portability of fighters at the micro-level impedes covert control by Pakistani intelligence services and decreases the utility of even sincere counterterrorism efforts by the Pakistani state.     

Change and continuity across the 9/11 fault line: rethinking twenty-first-century responses to terrorism

This article asks the following questions. Which terrorism threats, challenges and responses did key players consider to have been decisively changed by 9/11? On close inspection now, nearly two decades after those attacks, how are we to assess such claims? What did 9/11 really change regarding terrorism and counterterrorism? And what remained unaltered? The article’s central argument is this: some western states exaggerated the extent to which terrorist threats and challenges had been changed by 9/11 and, as a consequence, they did significantly alter some of their responses to terrorism; but at the heart of this ironic process was the tragic reality that, had there been a more serious-minded and historically sensitive recognition of how little had necessarily been changed by 9/11 in terms of terrorist threats and challenges, then the twenty-first-century experience of non-state terrorism would have been much less painful than has been the case in practice.     

Towards an Acceptable Level of Violence: Institutional Lessons From Northern Ireland

Institutional and economic development has recently returned to the forefront of economic analysis. The use of case studies (both historical and contemporary) has been important in this revival. Likewise, it has been argued recently by economic methodologists that historical context provides a kind of “laboratory” for the researcher interested in real world economic phenomena. Counterterrorism economics, in contrast with much of the rest of the literature on terrorism, has all too rarely drawn upon detailed contextual case studies. This article seeks to help remedy this problem. Archival evidence, including previously unpublished material on the DeLorean case, is an important feature of this article. The article examines how an inter-related strategy, which traded-off economic, security, and political considerations, operated during the Troubles. Economic repercussions of this strategy are discussed. An economic analysis of technical and organizational change within paramilitarism is also presented. A number of institutional lessons are discussed including: the optimal balance between carrot versus stick, centralization relative to decentralization, the economics of intelligence operations, and tit-for-tat violence. While existing economic models are arguably correct in identifying benefits from politico-economic decentralization, they downplay the element highlighted by institutional analysis.     

Effective but inefficient: understanding the costs of counterterrorism

This article analyses state counterterrorism (CT) policy on two dimensions: its effectiveness and its efficiency. It points out that CT is likely to be effective but inefficient. The material weakness of terrorist groups in relation to their state opponents, and different organisational dilemmas, increases the probability of an effective CT policy. However, states frequently overreact to terrorist attacks, which are valued in normative instead of strategic terms. Hence, they spend more resources on CT than justified by the threat posed by the terrorist groups. The article concludes that CT should be framed as an allocation of scarce resources that could be used in other important contexts.     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid

This article attempts to measure the direct costs that the terrorist attacks of 3/11 had on the economy of the region of Madrid. The evaluation has been made applying conservative criteria, and the results obtained have to be considered as minimum. The result indicates that the terrorist attacks caused a loss of nearly 212 million euros to the regional economy of Madrid, equivalent to 0.16 percent of the regional GDP (0.03 of the national GDP). This confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist attack such as the one of 3/11—apart from human catastrophic consequences—is relatively low.     

Transitional justice in settled democracies: Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in comparative perspective

This article explores the concept of transitional justice in democratic states dealing with political violence. Although transitional justice was designed for paradigmatic transitions (from war to peace and from dictatorship to democracy), conflicted democracies such as Northern Ireland and the Basque Country could also benefit from this framework which brings a comprehensive human rights approach to the past and promotes the principles of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. The article compares the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. It explores some of the specific features which characterise processes of transitional justice within settled democracies, such as the blurred break with the past, the fragmentation of initiatives aimed at dealing with violence and the mixture of ordinary and transitional justice. As well as contributing to the conceptualisation of the field of transitional justice, the study proposes that the conflict vs. terrorism divide and the clash of narratives associated with it are the key to understanding these types of transitions.     

The PIRA,D-Company,and the Crime-Terror Nexus

This article compares and contrasts the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and D-Company, two seemingly dissimilar organisations that nonetheless share some striking commonalities, especially in regards to the use of tactics that contradict their declared ideology in pursuit of a larger goal. First, the growing relationship between organised criminal syndicates and terror groups is discussed and Makarenko's well-known “Crime-Terror Continuum” introduced. Following this, a historical overview and an analysis of the organisational structure of the PIRA is provided and organisational models proposed. Further, the founding and development of D-Company is addressed in addition to the syndicate's intricate involvement in the 1993 Bombay Blasts. Similarly, organisational models are offered and conclusions drawn. This work then moves to a comparative analysis of the organisational and operating structure of the PIRA and D-Company and finishes with a brief conclusion. This article argues that although criminal syndicates and militant groups may have different organisation structures, the line that distinguishes their activities has begun to blur and the space between Makarenko's graduated levels is becoming smaller and less discernible, thus rendering her model obsolete.     

Terrorists going transnational: rethinking the role of states in the case of AQIM and Boko Haram

This study moves beyond theories emphasising “state failure” as the cause for terrorist “spill-over”. The aim is to offer new theoretical and empirical considerations concerning the determinants of terrorist groups’ geographical strategies. The main argument this article presents is that transnationality for nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. This is the case due to the mobility, social and strategic costs of operating beyond controlled territories. Hence, the article proposes an interpretation of these decisions as being mainly generated by states’ counterterrorism strategies. Using data gathered from the GTD Dataset and secondary sources such as specialised reports and strategic documents, the article explores the argument by presenting observations and empirical findings on two groups, AQIM and Boko Haram.     

Security Versus Liberty in the Context of Counterterrorism: An Experimental Approach

A critical question in counterterrorism studies concerns the extent to which governments adequately balance the continual provision of individual rights and freedoms with the appropriate level of national security when faced with a terrorist attack. We experimentally assess this tradeoff utilizing a 2 × 2 × 2 between-groups factorial design, manipulating (a) the extent of terror-related threats, (b) the level of invasiveness of subsequent counterterrorism policies, as well as (c) the terror context: transnational and domestic. The results provide evidence that the public is more willing to accept greater reductions in civil liberties under a greater threat of terrorism only when the perceived effectiveness of those policies to prevent future acts of terrorism is high. Furthermore, we find these results to be specific to the context of a transnational terror threat. This suggests that the public will be unwilling to accept reductions in civil liberties when the source of the attack is domestic, regardless of the level of threat or how effective subsequent policies may be in preventing future attacks.     

The Poets of Marj al-Zuhur: Poetry as the Psychological,Political, and Ideological Weapon of the Hamas Members Deported to Lebanon in 1992

In December 1992, after the kidnapping and murder of a policeman, Israel deported 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Lebanon. Most were affiliated with the Hamas political apparatus and had not been involved in terrorism. The deportees decided to stay together and set up a camp in Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Here they engaged in study and various cultural pursuits—including poetry writing. Roughly a dozen of the deportees wrote poetry. The poems were read aloud at gatherings in the camp and published in the Arab press. Their main function was to raise the residents’ spirits and keep their plight in the public eye. They incorporate the expected political messages: anger at Israel and criticism of the international community, the Palestinian leadership, and the Arab states, which were prodded to work harder for the deportees’ return. The poetry was part of a successful media and information campaign, which annoyed Israel so much that it allowed all the deportees to return home by December 1993. Some of the poems were later published and helped cultivate the myth of the Marj al-Zuhur deportation, which Hamas viewed as a victory and symbol of steadfast resistance to Israel.     

Support for Terrorism: The Role of Beliefs in Jihad and Institutional Responses to Terrorism

ABSTRACT

Passive support for terrorism refers to expressions of sympathy for acts of terrorism and/or the justifications (ideology) used by terrorist groups to legitimise their beliefs and actions. One form of passive support is whether Muslims feel terrorists have valid grievances. Appealing to a sense of grievance is a key way that violent Islamists attempt to recruit fellow Muslims to their cause. Using survey data collected from 800 Muslims living in Australia, this paper examines factors that lead Muslims to believe that terrorists have valid grievances. Factors examined include beliefs in jihad and attitudes towards counterterrorism policing and laws. Other variables included in the analysis are social identity, age, gender, income, religious denomination (Sunni vs. Shia), religious commitment, i.e., Mosque attendance, and recent contact with police. The most significant predictor of passive support for terrorism was found to be particular beliefs in jihad. The perceived legitimacy of counterterrorism laws and trust in police were also important. Implications for countering extremist ideology and generating community cooperation in counterterrorism will be considered.     

The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety,the Search for Meaning,and Terrorist Ideologies

Drawing from the work of political theorists, theologians, anthropologists, journalists, philosophers, and contemporary psychologists studying Terror Management Theory (TMT), it becomes possible to see that the concepts of existentialism and ideology may be useful for modern thinkers attempting to understand a problem such as terrorism. Integrating work from these fields makes it possible to see that terrorism may be driven by an existential-terroristic feedback loop: a cycle in which people support or engage in terrorism to alleviate existential anxiety but ultimately find this anxiety exacerbated in the wake of the violence they create or sanction. The loop is closed when this exacerbated anxiety compels them to reaffirm their support of, or participation in, terrorist violence. If this model is valid, then effectively addressing the problem of terrorism requires joining existing U.S. policies with policies that address ideologies. Specifically, policies must aspire to a) mitigate existential anxiety, b) provide a compelling counter-narrative, c) address environmental factors conducive to radicalization, d) prevent the formation of radicalized groups, and e) deradicalize existing ideologues.     

Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland

The British experience in Northern Ireland, particularly the fight against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is an oft-cited case study in the counter-insurgency (COIN) spectrum and tome of counter-terrorism studies. It is the totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, with its successes and challenges, which make it such a valuable case study from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence-based operations. As the conflict was both prolonged and intensified, a multitude of intelligence units from military and law enforcement evolved specifically to counter the effectiveness of PIRA; and to satisfy the desire of the security establishment to intensify information-gathering activities. This article examines the evolution and development of this security intelligence-driven effort that ultimately had the cumulative effect to wear down PIRA’s military capability through the focused application of a prolonged and lavishly resourced linked intelligence apparatus as an adjunct of a heavy military and police footprint. Nevertheless, despite Northern Ireland being a relatively small geographical area, the eventual containment of PIRA took years to achieve, demonstrating just how difficult it is to address a committed and determined insurgency. This highlights that a successful COIN strategy is arguably best predicated on the need for “patient” as opposed to “decisive” operations.     

Issues in teaching terrorism as cultural artefact

From a humanities course on terrorism that focuses on how terrorist ideology and acts are transformed into cultural artefacts, several pedagogical–theoretical issues have emerged: the incongruity of viewing terrorist violence as art; 9/11 as an ahistorical event; the impossibility of defining terrorism; the infiltration (trivialisation?) of terrorism into popular culture; subgenres of terrorist works, each with its own paradigm; and the iconoclastic potential of many terrorist texts and films. These issues have implications for the curricular design of terrorism courses and for the role of instructors – in academia and in the larger community.     

“Night fell on a different world”: experiencing,constructing and remembering 9/11

This article explores the endurance of the pervasive framing of “9/11” as a moment of temporal rupture within the United States. It argues that this has persisted despite the existence of plausible competitor narratives for two reasons: first, because it resonated with public experiences of the events predating this construction’s discursive sedimentation and; second, because of its vigorous defence by successive US administrations. In making these arguments this article seeks to extend relevant contemporary research in three ways: first, by reflecting on new empirical material drawn from the Library of Congress Witness and Response Collection, thus offering additional insight into public understandings of 11 September 2011 in the immediacy of the events; second, by drawing on insights from social memory studies to explore the persistence of specific constructions of 9/11 and; third, by outlining the importance of categories of experience and endurance for constructivist international relations more broadly.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.     

The “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya: the case of refoulement

Kenya’s state discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism securitises Somali refugees and refugee camps. Using the securitisation theory, a perspective of social constructivism as a theoretical framework, the article attempts to establish the relationship between the securitisation of Somali refugees and refugee camps and refoulement as a measure to counter the securitisation. The arguments raised are the speech acts of Kenya’s securitising actors expressed in the terrorism discourse present Somali refugees and refugee camps as existential threats to peace and security in the country. Consequently, their speech acts expressed in the counterterrorism discourse present non-refoulement of the refugees as an existential threat to national security so as to justify, to the targeted audience, the adoption of refoulement, a norm-violating measure, to counter the fear of the threat of terrorism from Somali refugees and refugee camps. Terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya have, therefore, been “Somalinised”. The conclusion offers ways of preventing the “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya.