Pipelines,crisis and capital: understanding the contested regionalism of Southeast Asia

Abstract

Via an analysis of the trans-ASEAN gas pipeline project (TAGP), in this article we argue for a reconceptualising of the regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and the forces shaping them. For this task, we propose an analytical framework based upon social conflict theory that delves within and beyond the state, and which places emphasis upon the roles of both material and ideological factors operating across time in the reordering of particular geographical spaces. The framework reveals that the tensions acting within and upon ASEAN and the TAGP influence regionalism in such a way that the gas pipeline project – much like other ‘regional’ projects – is unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief of enhancing regional security and cohesion. What is more probable is that the project's form will continue to be conditioned by entrenched politico-economic realities and the influence of dominant ideologies – factors which have the capacity to exacerbate existing regional animosities and disparities.     

Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither ‘unipolar’ nor ‘multipolar’ designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role.     

Japan’s strategic contrast: continuing influence despite relative power decline in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Since 2008 the Japanese government has become more responsive to the exercise of Chinese economic, diplomatic and military power in Southeast Asia, suggesting an intensifying rivalry. The Japanese government has thrown off any reticence about self-promotion by more forcefully positioning Japan as a sensitive and sustainable strategic partner for Southeast Asian nations in a strategic contrast with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than trying to contain China, Tokyo is seeking to mediate how China turns its material resources into influence. Despite an increasing asymmetry in material resources between China and Japan, this article argues that Japan maintains a surprising ability to influence the preferences of Southeast Asian nations and responses to exercises of PRC power, which in turn has allowed Japan to influence China’s regional strategy.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

Local actors and international regionalism: The case of the Sea of Japan zone

The Sea of Japan Zone (SJZ) is an area that has been shaped essentially by transnational relations between the localities of western Japan, northeastern China and the Russian Far East. The emergence of this new type of space, based on interlocal cooperation, is a significant aspect of what could be called the ‘new’ regionalism, i.e. the polymorphous and multicen‐tred movement that is affecting international relations today as opposed to its more rigid version of the late 1950s. The shape of the new regionalism reflects the transformation of international relations in general: this particular regionalization process, that gave shape to the SJZ, is linked to the transnationalization of local actors. The idea of creating the SJZ, in the late 1960s, was first an external answer (interlocal cooperation) to an internal problem (uneven development in Japan). It became a reality some twenty years later as Russian and Chinese localism eventually converged with Japanese localism. Despite important domestic differences the need for local actors around the Sea of Japan to look outside for better development conditions made the synergy possible. It produced a new regional entity that needs to be defined and, for that purpose, that could be compared to other transnational zones in East Asia or even in Europe. Their common characteristic appears to be a functional approach to regional cooperation.     

Chinese and Japanese investment in Southeast and South Asia: case studies of the electronics and automobile industries

Abstract

This article uses extensive fieldwork data to focus on the question of how Chinese and Japanese companies are competing in neighboring countries of Asia, and what economic forces will shape their future growth in the region. It begins by briefly discussing the history of Chinese and Japanese investment in the South and Southeast Asian regions. It traces the development of Japanese overseas investment policies, as well as China's more recent ‘Going Out’ government program to encourage overseas flows of capital. It then builds on prior political economy work as it uses case study focuses, with primary data based on the author's fieldwork research in several nations of Southeast Asia and in India, of the two key sectors of automobiles and electronics. It compares and contrasts the investment strategies of companies from each country, as well as the successes and failures of investments in the industries. It finds that Japanese companies’ advantages lie in industries utilizing advanced technology and management skills. Though the Japanese continue to lead in many areas, including automobiles, they have begun to face competition and potentially reduced profits in vital manufacturing areas. Meanwhile, Chinese overseas companies have made significant advances in the consumer electronics sector, using low prices and good quality, though overseas automobile investments have gained little traction. The article concludes that, if the Chinese can improve their product quality, capitalize on improving managerial skills and a deeper level of experience in the region, and establish brands they can sell with reliable distribution networks, Japanese companies could face losses to their Asian neighbor in these important parts of the continent they have dominated for decades.     

Multilateralising regionalism: what role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific region is home to a large and rapidly growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements differ widely in design, scope and purpose. The “noodle bowl” that has resulted runs the risk of distorting investment and trade. Neither global institutions (the WTO) nor regional institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping have successfully addressed these issues. Amidst this increasingly messy situation, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement stands out for a range of important economic and political reasons, not least of which is its potential to take existing PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in a new direction. The aim of the TPP negotiators is to produce a comprehensive, high quality, multi-party agreement to tame the tangle of PTAs and be a potential stepping stone to achieving the goal of liberalizing regional trade on a non-discriminatory basis. The economic gains from removing border barriers among the countries involved in the initial TPP negotiations are likely to be limited, however, given the small size of many of the economies and the existing PTAs among them. To date, the US has been unwilling to offer a single set of arrangements for all TPP partners, preferring to build on existing bilateral agreements. Pessimism about the immediate results from the TPP should be tempered, however, by considerations of the dynamics that it might set in train; on the other hand, it has the potential to divide the region and exacerbate China's concerns about “containment”.     

Japan’s approach toward Asian regional security: from ‘hub-and-spoke’ bilateralism to ‘multi-tiered’

This article argues that Japan’s growing activism in promoting multilateral regional security arrangements since the early 1990s stems from the country’s adoption of the ‘multi-tiered approach’; a new policy perspective that packages different types of coordination among region states, including bilateral, multilateral, and minilateral or subregional, in a layered, hierarchical manner. The significance of the approach explains why Japan has retained its enthusiasm for promoting multilateral arrangements, despite continuous criticism of their effectiveness and significance, as well as the marked decline in Japan’s economic power to support financially the country’s activism in regional institution-building. Meanwhile, the multi-tiered approach also explains Japan’s effort to maintain and strengthen its bilateral security relationship with the United States during the last decade. Four factors – a perceived change in the regional security order, growing self-recognition of major-power status, the legacy of history, and constitutional constraints – worked essentially to lead Japanese policy-makers to settle on a multi-tiered approach as a desirable policy choice in shaping the country’s security policy in post-Cold WarAsia.     

Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: The rise and decline of a region

Three features stand out from the literature on Southeast Asia's international relations, written over the last fifty years: the dominance of extra‐regional scholarship; an overwhelming emphasis on regional security, and a related preponderance of realist perspectives; and the appearance, consolidation, and ebbing of the perceived utility of Southeast Asia as a useful analytical region. During the 1990s, there has been a questioning of the realist assumptions which have underlain international relations writing on the region, and there has been increased emphasis on economic issues. Southeast Asians are making an increasingly important contribution to the study of their own region's international relations, though mainly in terms of policy‐oriented research. The most important recent development has been the questioning of Southeast Asia's usefulness as an analytical region, in view of the growing intensity of economic and security relations between Northeast and Southeast Asia.     

Seeds of an Asian European Union? Regionalism as a hedge against the United States on telecommunications technology in Japan and Germany

Abstract

Germany and Japan have both used regionalism as a hedge against American power in the area of telecommunications, but this strategy has taken very different forms. Germany's regionalism is within the European Union. Since 2002 Japan has developed an ad hoc technology alliance in telecommunications with China and South Korea. Both the European Union and Northeast Asian countries have used industrial policy to promote telecommunications technology and both regional organizations have expressed concern about American dominance in telecommunications. Both Germany and Japan have looked to their lower income neighboring countries for investment opportunities in telecommunications, but each has taken a different approach. Japanese telecommunications firms have not been very successful in investing in other countries or in exporting Japan's very sophisticated and expensive telecommunications equipment. The Japanese government and business organizations have taken the lead in trying to promote joint research and pursue development of joint standards. Germany's Deutsche Telekom has been much more active than Japanese firms in international investment. The European Union differs from the Northeast Asian group in that it has pressed Germany to keep its domestic telecommunications market open and to make Deutsche Telekom compete internationally. It is surprising that China, Japan and South Korea have reached out to each other to cooperate on technology and standards development despite longstanding mutual antagonisms. The Northeast Asian agreements on telecommunications recall the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952, an initiative that also sought to link economically states divided by deep resentments. Like the ECSC, the current Asian initiative targets some of the most important economic sectors of the day. However, strong market pressures tend to undermine cooperation, and it is uncertain how much impact the agreements on telecommunications will really have.     

Asia's competing multilateral initiatives: quality versus quantity

East Asia has many distinctive features that set it apart from other comparable regions, not least attitudes to regional development and cooperation. Despite a growing number of regional initiatives in East Asia, however, they are generally distinguished by their ineffectiveness. It is entirely possible that ‘institutional balancing’, like its more well-known power balancing counterpart, is designed not to facilitate but to prevent something from happening. The sort of ‘multilateralism 1.0’ developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a lot to answer for in this regard: having established its own pattern of institutional effectiveness ASEAN's ‘leadership’ has caused it to be replicated under the new wave of ‘multilateralism 2.0’. Consequently, I suggest that not only is China very comfortable with the idea of a rather feeble and ineffective institutional architecture, but the USA is also unlikely to do anything to change this picture, especially under a Trump administration that is highly skeptical about the efficacy of multilateral institutions at the best of times.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

Stretching a third of the way around the globe, the Asia Pacific is the world's most populous region. Yet, it remains the sole region without a human rights court or commission, and without a human rights treaty. The notable absence there of a human rights mechanism based on such institutions is often explained away by reference to the region's size and heterogeneity, the constituent states’ reluctance to interfere in the affairs of others, and the existence of rivalries. Whilst agreeing that there is no inter-governmental initiative that looks set to change the present state of affairs in the Asia Pacific, this article places the spotlight on another model of creating a regional human rights mechanism, that is, the unique and burgeoning Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Specifically, it assesses the prospects for Japan, Taiwan and China – three key regional players whose membership of the Forum is still outstanding – to create domestic human rights bodies that eventually join.     

Regionalism in the Asia‐Pacific — a response to Kanishka Jayasuriya

This paper is a response to the debate generated in the special issue of The Pacific Review on ‘Ideas, policy networks and international policy coordination in the Asia‐Pacific’. It suggests that an understanding of the discourses and practices of regionalism in the Asia‐Pacific has to be based on a broader account of societal discourses and a sharper delineation of the policy process specific to the region.     

Dangerous dynamics: activists,militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia

This article critiques the view that Southeast Asia has emerged as a key theatre for terrorist activity. While accepting that al-Qaeda and the indigenous Southeast Asian group Jemaah Islamiyah have emerged as a potent threat to regional security, it interrogates the view that this renders Southeast Asia more dangerous than many other parts of the world. The article suggests that this exaggerated sense of threat rests largely on a failure to account for nuanced differences in the nature of Islamist politics in the region. As a small step towards redressing this problem the article outlines a typology of Islamist organizations. It also suggests that a person’s location within this typology is more than a function of religiosity but reflects instead relative degrees of social and political alienation.     

War and other insecurities in East Asia: what the security studies field does and does not tell us

Abstract

Terrorism has become a challenge to which Southeast Asian studies need to respond. This article scrutinizes political and economic developments in regard to democracy and poverty in Southeast Asia, in particular the degree of change, and studies their influence on terrorism. The main question being asked here is whether external support for political and economic development could contribute to the Southeast Asian battle against terrorism. At the same time, this article seeks ways in which the international community, especially Europe, could support and participate in Southeast Asian efforts to address the root causes of terrorism. Finally, a global quantitative analysis of relevant factors is undertaken, and global conclusions are related to the developments and processes observed in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. On the basis of the analysis, it can be established that some of the root causes of terrorism are indeed related to poverty and the lack of democracy. While it is clear that terrorist strategies to address these grievances by targeting innocent civilians are unacceptable, grievances related to poverty and the lack of democracy are perfectly legitimate. It seems that in order to inhibit individual terrorist motivations, democratization of political systems would do some good. However, the main economic and political grievances that are associated with the growth of terrorism are related to transnational communities. Thus, while Southeast Asian countries should continue to develop and democratize, they should also work together with the international community to democratize the international structures of governance.     

Supermarkets,iron buffalos and agrarian myths: exploring the drivers and impediments to food systems modernisation in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Southeast Asian food systems are changing rapidly. Populations are growing and urbanising, production and consumption choices are shifting, and food value chains are experiencing a myriad of ripple effects from rural hinterlands to city marketplaces. These systemic changes are inconsistent, however, and variable challenges define key sectors. Distribution chains, wholesaling, food processing, retail and supermarkets, and other midstream and downstream segments of regional food systems are undergoing transformative and largely unhindered change. On-farm modernisation and trade liberalisation are occurring more haltingly. Previous advances in food production technology and methods have lost momentum, and much of the region faces confronting questions about how to produce adequate and appropriate food in light of shifting demographics, environmental stress, land scarcities, market manipulations and other defining regional characteristics. This paper juxtaposes these challenges with remarkable distribution chain evolutions, and focuses upon three impediments to further shifts in regional food systems: (1) the perpetuation of agrarian mythologies, (2) push-back against rice market integration, and (3) regulatory barriers to the adoption of genetically modified (GM) plants. These seemingly disparate dynamics actually have points of convergence, and are unified in their negative overall impacts on regional food security. This paper explores reasons behind the pervasiveness of these impediments and argues for supply-oriented improvements in the regional food systems.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

Between bilateralism and regionalism in East Asia: the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Abstract

This paper examines economic regionalism in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements. The ASEAN+1 free trade agreements with China, South Korea and Japan represent the first attempts to structure cooperation in trade across Southeast and Northeast Asia. It is therefore important to examine the coverage of these agreements and the extent to which they actually liberalize trade. This study focuses on major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the ways in which these choices help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. The results achieved in the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement are limited at best. The agreement does establish some new areas of cooperation among the signatories but fails to address important issues for regionalism such as labor mobility. It also makes limited progress in harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin. The ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement applies product-specific rules to fewer categories of goods than most of Japan's bilateral agreements with ASEAN members but those rules in place are still very restrictive. Moreover, the parties to the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement have the option of applying the rules of their bilateral agreement if it provides more favorable treatment. Thus, there is no guarantee the more liberal terms of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement will be applied.     

South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle

Abstract

South Korea is a middle power in a region where its scope of action can rise and fall quickly and diplomatic flexibility is needed. Neither realist responses to threats nor idealist trust in integration meet its needs for adjusting triangular ties with China and Japan, as their relations become the principal great power divide in Northeast Asia. Its optimal choice is as a facilitator biding its time when tensions over both security and national identity clashes are intense, while preparing for opportunities. Four conditions would give it a favorable environment: forward-looking foreign leadership; security challenges brought under some control; subsiding preoccupation with national identities; and its own strategic planning with care not to overreach. Multiple possibilities emerge if it can rebuild ties with Japan as part of a triangle with China as well as one with the United States and also synchronize ties with China to other ties. Even amidst recurrent tensions, the core East Asian triangle offers Seoul a chance to take advantage of changing dynamics in the world's most ascendant region.