The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism

Does religion lead to greater destructiveness from suicide terrorism? And if so, how does it influence this form of political violence? Recent analyses of terrorism point to the significance of religion, but are divided as to whether religion itself matters, or certain types of religious terrorist groups are actually driving suicide terrorist violence. This article draws on social movement theory and recent work in the study of suicide terrorism to argue that religion influences the severity of suicide terrorist attacks as an ideology groups use to justify their struggle and gain public support. This effect occurs regardless of a group's goals or organizational nature. The theory is tested using a generalized estimating equation to account for multiple attacks by several groups. The study finds that the religious ideology of a group greatly increases the number of deaths from a suicide attack, even if varying group motivations and structural factors are taken into account. The article helps to clarify the effect of religion on contemporary terrorism, contributing to the study of both terrorism and religion and politics.     

Strategist or Pragmatist: A Challenging Look at Ocalan's Retrospective Classification and Definition of PKK's Strategic Periods Between 1973 and 2012

The PKK, a violent group seeking secession in southeastern Turkey through the use of terror and guerilla methods, has evolved through different strategic and pragmatic phases in pursuing its goal. Ocalan, the incarcerated leader, classified the PKK's objectives into four deliberate strategic periods and commenced the final period of Strategic Lunge in March 2010 (for establishing de-facto autonomy). To compare these periods to PKK's real evolution, this article reviewed the entire process of the PKK (1973–2012) through analysis of resolutions from PKK congresses/conferences and the characteristics of PKK violence (e.g., target status, incident type/location, form, and purpose). This study argues that as opposed to Ocalan's assessment, PKK moves—particularly after 1994—are based on emergent (ex-post) pragmatic shifts rather than predetermined (ex-ante) strategic plans, as verified by analysis of the nature/form of PKK violence. It also argues that the PKK's pragmatic moves permeated even into its ideology and declared goal. Contrary to Ocalan's four-stage strategic periods, the PKK's initial manifesto indicates a three-stage Maoist strategy for reaching its goal. However, the PKK's military attempt to reach the third stage in 1991 failed due to conditions that were not sufficient for realization of the third stage of Maoist strategy. As a result, the PKK quit pursuing military victory after acknowledging its defeat in 1994; instead, since it still possessed the ability to initiate violence, it strategically employed (and ceased) violence to supplement its campaign of political compromise and negotiation.     

Mental discipline,punishment and recidivism: reading Foucault against de-radicalisation programmes in the War on Terror

This article uses Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish to examine how de-radicalisation programmes in the War on Terror transform power–knowledge relations, mental discipline and punishment by attempting to instil self-governance through non-violence. Foucault’s theories on the evolution of discipline and punishment can be applied to de-radicalisation programmes, but only after considerable revision. By asking questions on the nature of knowledge, practice, state involvement and recidivism of de-radicalisation, I contend that many programmes may be ultimately limited by a disproportionate focus on religious rehabilitation rather than political dialogue regarding the motivations for such violence.     

Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements,Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors

Numerous scholars have investigated religiously motivated violence, particularly in the wake of September 11, including discussions on the role of modernity in triggering religious violence, the increasing presence of religion in politics, the violence-prone nature of certain religions, and religion's correlation with ethnicity and other conflict-intensifying variables. However, religious activism and violence are not new phenomena. Few theories have been advanced that move across time and space and, broadly, seek to explain the conditions under which religion becomes involved in activism and violence. This article argues that three broad causal arguments for religious activism—social movements, fundamentalism, and apocalyptic warriors—help explain the conditions under which religiously motivated violence occurs across time and space. These three causal arguments offer a spectrum of goals within religious activism, ranging from challenging social practices and government policies, to defending specific interpretations and practices of the faith, to hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, each of these theories proposes different ways that religion becomes involved in social, political, and religious activism and the conditions under which groups use violence to further their goals. The article concludes by suggesting countermeasures for each type of religious activism.     

Ideology after the end of ideology. China and the quest for autocratic legitimation

In political science literature on contemporary China, ideology is mostly regarded as a dogmatic straitjacket to market reforms that has been worn out over the years of economic success, an obsolete legacy of the past waiting to be cast off in the course of the country's transition toward capitalism. This article posits, however, that ideology still plays an indispensable role in the quest to legitimize authoritarian rule in contemporary China, and that it does so precisely due to its high degree of adaptability. Based on David Beetham's theoretical model of political legitimacy, three legitimating functions of ideology that demand the constant adaptation of party theory and official language are introduced. Presenting various examples of reformulations of party theory and official language from the beginning of the reform period up to the present, the article demonstrates how the party regime relies on ideology to constantly reproduce its legitimacy, as well as the pitfalls of this reliance. It argues that ideology in contemporary China should be analysed not as a matter of belief but of playing by the rules of the official language game, and it shows how ideology is deployed as a set of practices and incentives for the proper performance of the political elite.     

Assessing the Risk Posed by Terrorist Groups: Identifying Motivating Factors and Threats

While terrorist organizations have been analyzed for their motivations and tactics, little has been done to develop a systematic understanding of what makes some groups more dangerous than others. Knowing what makes some groups more threatening than others, or what conditions can influence a single group to become more or less of a threat, would help governments to prioritize resources during counterterrorism efforts. Using an approach similar to Ted Robert Gurr's assignment of a risk score to identify impending minority group rebellion, this article develops and tests a set of terrorist organizational characteristics. A two-phased approach is used. First, the authors identify key characteristics that could be anticipated to drive groups to be more active or deadly. The characteristics were identified and measured for terrorist groups for 1990–1994. The authors test group characteristics against subsequent group violence intensity from 1995 to 1999. Findings indicate that some group characteristics, such as religious ideology and group size, are important to understanding a group's relative level of violence. Though the study focused on a relatively short period of time, the findings indicate that a more comprehensive study of the impact that group characteristics have on violence levels would be a worthwhile undertaking.     

Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism

This article examines the nature of religious terrorism, principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the immediate objectives of ‘religious’ terrorists, and that while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. This distinction is illustrated with reference to such pre-modern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots. Immediate objectives, are for many purposes more important than ultimate aims.

Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on 9/11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly probably that the intention was to provoke a response from the US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda's constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective, familiar to historians of terrorism from at least the time of Errico Malatesta and the ‘propaganda of the deed’ in the 1870s. While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists, al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied them.

Even though its immediate objectives are political rather than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but al-Qaeda also uses—and when necessary adapts—well-known Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion. This is demonstrated with reference to the ‘Last Night’ document of 9/11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be understood in political terms is susceptible to political remedies.     

Minority Religions and the Context of Violence: A Conflict/Interactionist Perspective

Violence (broadly defined to include collective as well as individual violence) associated with the recent rise of newer religious groups or 'cults', as well as longer-term minority religions, is examined, using a conflict orientation. The interactional nature of such violence is discussed, with accusations of violence concerning minority and newer religions placed in a conflict perspective that stresses the interdependency of religious groups and their opponents. Special attention is given to allegations of: (1) violence derived from group teachings and practices, with a focus on major recent tragic events involving religious groups; and (2) violence directed against members and groups by others, including private individuals and organization, as well as governmental entities.     

Nicaragua's Sandinista project: Ideology,power building,and social manipulation

This paper examines the ideology of the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through an evaluation of official declarations, published objectives and analyses, stated objectives, and programs pursued. Since its seizure of power in 1979, the FSLN's efforts to “Leninize” the country have occurred gradually and often have been camouflaged. For example, the FSLN has promoted a ‘'people's church” to capitalize on the strong Nicaraguan religious sentiment while extending countrol over public life and undermining the official church. The paper describes the Sandinistas’ use of “magnet” and “salami” tactics to attract useful collaborators and restrict the influence of rival political organizations. While the FSLN ostensibly has tolerated other parties’ participation in the National Assembly, the Sandinistas in reality have required support for FSLN programs and have increased their own numbers in the assembly and gained control of the top positions in all state institutions, ministries, and the executive and legislative branches of government. Organizational changes have been geared toward centralization and hierarchization. As a result, the Nicaraguan state has been fully subordinated to the FSLN. Although the Sandinistas officially espouse a “mixed” economy with some room for a private agricultural sector as well as token political opposition, the author concludes that they are likely to continue on their course of increasing centralized control of virtually all aspects of public life, Leninizing of political structures, extending and consolidating the party's powers, and creating socialized economic patterns.     

Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities

There is a widespread sense amongst theorists of genocide and other violent atrocities that ideology matters. But in spite of this agreement all is not well with actual efforts to theorise ideology's role. Theoretical and empirical coverage has been uneven, and there has been little if any effort to incorporate theories and research from the actual specialist field of contemporary ideology studies. As a result, overarching theoretical accounts of the role ideology plays in violent atrocities remain limited and problematic. This article aims to encourage theorists to think about ideology in a more systematic and productive fashion by analysing four questions: (a) what do we mean by ideology?; (b) who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology?; (c) how do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying ideologies?; and (d) how might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, mass violence? In discussing these four questions, I aim to clear up a number of misconceptions or vagaries that frequent current analyses of ideology in works on atrocity and political violence. I ultimately offer a suggestive account of six recurring “justificatory mechanisms” which collectively describe some of the common features of ideology's role across cases of mass atrocity.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

Displaced children's participation in political violence: Towards greater understanding of mobilisation

Within the burgeoning literature, children's participation in political violence is overwhelmingly considered in terms of coercion. Displacement camps are seen as locations in which the young are particularly vulnerable to the predations of recruiters. This article questions assumptions of incompetence that underwrite much of the discourse on child recruitment. As I argue, the experience of growing up in situations where profoundly asymmetrical power relations give rise to systematic oppression may lead to the early development of ‘political’ understanding. Three specific dimensions of displaced children's experience that may account for their engagement in political violence are discussed: life in the socio-historical space of a displacement camp; frustrated transition to adult status; the embeddedness of ‘politics’ within everyday life. Discussion draws particularly on fieldwork amongst young Palestinian refugees. In conclusion, I argue that curtailing children's involvement in political violence may require consideration of this phenomenon far less through the lens of humanitarian policy, as is the tendency at present, and far more in relation to the political-economic processes that shape and constrain the lives of young displacees.     

Violence in Lenin's thought and practice: The spark and the conflagration

Drawing on Lenin's writings, the commentary of Soviet specialists, and the work of those who focus on the special character of violence, this article discusses Lenin's views on violence over his lifetime, his distinction among different types of violence, his policies and their results, and finally the doubts about his practices that he ultimately expressed near the end of his life. Beginning in the tsarist era with Lenin's campaign among his fellow revolutionaries to reject individual terror in favor of mass violence, it follows him into power as he put his tenets into practice and finally into his introspective retirement. It discusses how, oblivious to developing danger he unleashed mass violence and prodded it to action in the service of the revolutionary state; why he refused to incorporate safeguards against runaway violence; and how, as its deleterious effects became manifest, he continued to employ violence as both instrument of choice and substitute for legitimate authority. It shows that Lenin evinced an addiction to violence that caused him to overlook or foreclose other, less radical, political methods for accomplishing his goals. We see that Lenin's evident belief in the efficacy and controllability of violence blinded him to its potentially counterproductive and even disastrous effects. The state that resulted from Lenin's policies was not what he had envisaged, and not the result of a preconceived plan. But equally it did not emerge as the simple product of ineluctable circumstances defeating a hapless Lenin. Lenin made a series of policy choices ‐ none foreordained by circumstance ‐ which yielded an authoritarian state grounded in violence. These choices were explicitly contested by prominent contemporaries within and outside of the Bolshevik government, who correctly and vocally predicted the results which were becoming clearly visible during Lenin's tenure. Lenin chose to ignore the results, reject the alternatives and silence the critics, decisions he himself came to regret.     

Why this institute

Turkish democracy passed its “maturity” test in 2007. The massive shift of power from the Kemalist establishment to the rising, mostly provincial elites and their allies culminated in the landslide victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the summer, which increased and consolidated its electorate after its first electoral victory in 2002. One of the main fault lines of the Turkish social and political order, secularism, took centre stage in the military's interference in the presidential election debacle, the ensuing massive demonstrations and the parliamentary and presidential elections that followed. At the same time, xenophobic nationalism, the dark side of democracy, raised its ugly head, fed further by the exacerbation of PKK violence. With the AKP's monopolisation of power, Turkey's politics are in uncharted waters and many of the givens of the republican era are being questioned. Unable to cope with the profound economic and social transformations and changing composition of the population due to massive migration, the old political structures are crumbling, yet the new political leadership, so adept at municipal government and so pragmatic in its approach to problem solving, has yet to offer the country a comprehensive vision of its politics.     

Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann,eds. Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat

This article examines the transformation of the Chechen conflict from a predominately nationalist to jihadist struggle, and compares the similar changes that took place in the Kashmiri insurgency. Using global jihadist strategy and ideology, and the accompanying influence of Al Qaida, both conflicts are shown to have taken on a new ideology and to have expanded beyond previous areas of operation. In both instances, the political leadership wrapped themselves in the mantle of political Islam (Islamism) as ensuing violence led to rapid socioeconomic transformation and social breakdown, thus allowing foreign jihadists to exert power and take up/divert the cause. In the past few years, two main groups originating in Chechnya and Kashmir have taken on Western targets and become more indoctrinated in Al Qaida's global jihadist ideology: the Caucasus Emirate (CE) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The opportunist franchising strategy of Al Qaida could come to play a role in the future of both groups, especially if the CE is able to coalesce into a more unified front. More importantly, the global jihadist attributes of the CE must begin to garner the same attention in the Western world as that of LeT.     

Violent Monks in Myanmar: Scapegoating and the Contest for Power

This article seeks to understand why monks played a central role in anti-Muslim violence in transitional Myanmar (2013–2014). We argue that scapegoating is one of many strategies used by monks to gain visibility, to strengthen their autonomous networks, and to increase their social credentials. By analyzing two episodes of monks' participation in religious violence (1930s and 2013–2014), we identify two factors that make scapegoating strategies more likely: (a) decentralized religions foster a multiplicity of organizations and provide incentives for leaders to be entrepreneurial and compete for followers; while (b) the rapid pluralization of the public sphere explains the timing, because it intensifies competition among religious leaders and between religious and secular leaders for social ascendency and power.     

Islamic radicalisation and violence in Ghana

This article examines the incidences of Islamic radicalisation and violence in Ghana. It explores socio-economic and political dynamics, doctrinal and interpretational differences as sources of Islamic radicalisation and violence among the three major religious groups, namely, Al-tijaniyya Movement, Ahlussunna Waljama'a and Ahmadiyya Movement. The paper further explores how diverse factors such as preaching methodologies, external financial support, the presence of a youth bulge and different doctrinal and interpretational approaches to the concept of jihad serve as drivers of radicalisation and possible mutation into violence. Based on extensive empirical research, it argues that, while identified trends, intensity and frequency of incidences of radicalisation and violence among the three religious groups are, first and foremost, motivated by a struggle for doctrinal pre-eminence, they also have the tendency to undermine national peace and security.     

Political violence in Sri Lanka: A diagnostic approach

The main objective of this article is to examine the causes and pattern of political violence waged by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. It is the argument of the article that the origin and development of the JVP and the LTTE relate more closely to the social expansion and the lack of economic and political development in Sri Lanka since the beginning of the 1960s. Basically, both groups are more action‐oriented than ideology‐oriented and dominated by youth with a similar socio‐economic background. Their ideology is a mixture of ethno‐nationalism and various interpretations of Marxism. The strategy of the JVP was based on an objective of launching a short‐term armed insurrection. The LTTE's aim is to overthrow the forces of the Sri Lankan government through a protracted armed struggle. Although the left‐wing insurrection of the JVP was crushed by the government security forces, it is evident that there is a possibility of its re‐emergence in its violent form. The on‐going separatist guerrilla warfare by the LTTE seems to be an unwinnable war. In the presence of youth insurrections in Sri Lanka, the utmost requirement is a sound counter‐insurgency policy accompanied by political reforms.     

Imperial re-bordering of Europe: the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Debates on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) pivot on questions about what kind of political community the EU is becoming and what are the limits of its power projections in the EU's Neighbourhood. Indeed, with this new ambitious and ambiguous policy the EU's external relations are expanding from purely economic to cultural, political and security functions. The EU's desire and need to export its values and norms beyond its borders raises a set of ontological questions about the nature of the EU.     

Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt

During the 1990s, Egypt fought a bitter campaign against militant Islamist groups in which over a thousand people died. Since the end of the insurgency in 1997, Egypt's two fiercest Islamic terrorist groups, first the Islamic Group (Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya) and then Islamic Jihad, not only ceased their violent activities but also produced and published texts revising their religious beliefs on the use of violence. Based on the counterterrorism experience of Egypt, this paper defines and describes a counterterrorism strategy of ideological reorientation. We define ideological reorientation as a counterterrorism approach that seeks to change core ideological or religious beliefs of the terrorist group, thus bringing the beliefs of group members in line with societal norms. While we cannot causally attribute the groups' decisions to lay down arms to ideological reorientation versus other regime actions (like repression), the Egyptian experience is highly suggestive. First, it indicates that the ideology of religiously-based groups is not exogenous and fixed, as is often assumed, but rather endogenous and flexible. Second, the Egyptian experience suggests that ideological reorientation may be more effective at stemming militancy in the long run compared to rival approaches.