Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

The militant palestinian organizations and the Arab‐Israeli peace process

The current Arab‐Israeli peace negotiations have normalized frequent and open contacts between Israel and its neighbors. This new situation is primarily the result of Operation ‘Desert Storm’ and the Soviet Union's dissolution. Both events forced the Middle Eastern states and sub‐national organizations to re‐evaluate their perceptions of one another, as well as of the degree of support they might expect from their superpower patrons. This article begins by examining the ways in which these events have affected those countries and organizations which chose to participate in the peace process and finally focuses on the policies of the Palestinian national movement ‐ specifically the groups which are opposed to the negotiations and have vowed to undermine them. It argues that these groups seek to subvert any peace treaty which the talks may produce and that the moderate Palestinian leadership has proven incapable of controlling them. It concludes that unless this occurs, it will be impossible to implement any agreement.     

The Poets of Marj al-Zuhur: Poetry as the Psychological,Political, and Ideological Weapon of the Hamas Members Deported to Lebanon in 1992

In December 1992, after the kidnapping and murder of a policeman, Israel deported 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Lebanon. Most were affiliated with the Hamas political apparatus and had not been involved in terrorism. The deportees decided to stay together and set up a camp in Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Here they engaged in study and various cultural pursuits—including poetry writing. Roughly a dozen of the deportees wrote poetry. The poems were read aloud at gatherings in the camp and published in the Arab press. Their main function was to raise the residents’ spirits and keep their plight in the public eye. They incorporate the expected political messages: anger at Israel and criticism of the international community, the Palestinian leadership, and the Arab states, which were prodded to work harder for the deportees’ return. The poetry was part of a successful media and information campaign, which annoyed Israel so much that it allowed all the deportees to return home by December 1993. Some of the poems were later published and helped cultivate the myth of the Marj al-Zuhur deportation, which Hamas viewed as a victory and symbol of steadfast resistance to Israel.     

Muslim fundamentalists as social revolutionaries: The case of Israel

The Muslim movement in Israel has been growing in leaps and bounds since the 1980s and has deeply affected the socio‐political fabric of the Arab minority in Israel.

These Arabs, who are leaning more and more towards the Islamic movement, are thus protesting both against Israeli society and politics, and against the Socialist propensities of the Communist Party which has reflected their concerns since Israel was founded in 1948.

The Islamic movement, which has taken over so far, six mayorships in Arab‐Israeli villages and townships, has revolutionized society in those localities mobilizing the masses, instilling in them a new sense of identity and purpose and uniting them behind Islamic and national goals.     

The nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel

This article focuses on the nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel. The interplay of Islamic fundamentalism's attitude toward the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict and the extent of the movement's integration into Israeli political life is explored. In addressing these themes, the history of Israeli Islamic fundamentalism is reviewed from the pre‐state period through the present, as are effects of both internal and external factors on the movement's development. In general, the movement has followed a pragmatic line, although its future endeavors and nature will undoubtedly be influenced by the continuing peace process.     

Muted criticism in Egypt (part 1)

Egypt, the heart of the Arab world, is the dominant player in Arab‐Israeli and inter‐Arab affairs. Close scrutiny of political and intellectual trends in Egypt tells us much about these trends throughout the Arab world. Reporting from a country such as Egypt, which has an authoritarian form of government, presents problems for journalists and researchers. There is much criticism of the government, but it is muted, often lying just below the surface. One must try to discern the underlying political reality without seeming to criticize the government. Journalists who are considered pro‐Israel are viewed with suspicion. Journalists who ask probing questions may be classified as pro‐Israel. This study examines the complex fabric of Egyptian political reality through interviews with prominent intellectuals and government leaders. The interviews focus on crucial areas of foreign policy.     

Muted criticism in Egypt (Part 2)

Egypt, the heart of the Arab world, is the dominant player in Arab‐Israeli and inter‐Arab affairs. Close scrutiny of political and intellectual trends in Egypt tells us much about these trends throughout the Arab world. Reporting from a country such as Egypt, which has an authoritarian form of government, presents problems for journalists and researchers. There is much criticism of the government, but it is muted, often lying just below the surface. One must try to discern the underlying political reality without seeming to criticize the government. Journalists who are considered pro‐Israel are viewed with suspicion. Journalists who ask probing questions may be classified as pro‐Israel. This study examines the complex fabric of Egyptian political reality through interviews with prominent intellectuals and government leaders. The interviews focus on crucial areas of foreign policy.     

De-terrorising the Palestinian national struggle: the roadmap to peace

This article follows the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism. This representation was produced in the Israeli media and academia, and broadcast by the state's political elite in international arenas. In the West, this image was accepted in many circles and affected the chances of the Palestinians having a fair hearing in the peace negotiations which began after the 1967 war. The article follows the construction of the equation of Palestinian nationalism with terrorism, assesses its impact on the peace process, and suggests the deconstruction of this narrative as the best way forward in future negotiations.     

Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank

In the early morning of July 31, 2015, masked attackers threw firebombs into two Palestinian homes in the West Bank village of Duma, south of Nablus, killing three Palestinian civilians. Contrary to claims by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, this attack was neither an isolated anomaly nor just another incident of settler violence. Instead, it was the latest attack in an important but largely unknown phenomenon called “price-tag,” in which a loosely connected group of young Israelis called “hilltop youth” burn Palestinian mosques and destroy property in hundreds of attacks accompanied by threatening graffiti that references Israeli settlers, outposts, and anti-Arab slogans. Using an original dataset of price-tag incidents and interviews with key actors, we demonstrate that the perpetrators, targets, and strategies of price-tag are different than previous patterns of settler violence. Whereas previous settlers saw the Israeli state as legitimate and largely decided to cooperate with it, the hilltop youth have decided to confront it by using price-tag attacks to deter settlement withdrawals and chain-gang the state into a conflict with the Palestinians. This analysis of the strategic logic of price-tag reveals its potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.     

Competing brothers: The web of Hamas‐PLO relations

This article deals with Hamas’ ideological and political dilemmas between the years 1988 and 1995, which include the contradiction between Hamas particularism as a Palestinian national movement and the universalism of its Islamic message; the divergence between its perception of itself as a political movement and the lack of political flexibility in its Charter; and the nature of its relationship with the PLO. The article analyzes three modes of political action developed by Hamas: competing with the PLO, preventing the outbreak of Arab civil war and opening formal communication channels with the PLO in order to discuss basic disagreements. Finally, the author shows how the implementation of the PLO‐Israeli accords altered Hamas‐PLO relations. No longer a competition among ostensible equals, their relationship became one of a ruling authority versus an opposition group.     

Israel and the Palestinians in a Changing Neighbourhood

The political and strategic landscape of the Middle East and North African region has changed dramatically since late 2010 and the events now loosely defined as the ‘Arab Spring’. The dust has yet to settle in many Arab capitals and 2013 is set to be another defining year for the greater Middle East as regional actors, particularly new Islamist-led governments, take on more direct roles in influencing political, military and social developments in the Arab world. Israel and the Palestinian factions of Hamas and Fatah are not immune to these developments and while progress towards peace has been all but non-existent, change in the region must not necessarily lead to more tensions and conflict. The EU and US should work to establish greater Arab ownership of the diplomatic process, convince Israel that its security is best served by assuming a proactive approach to its changing neighbourhood and strive to harness the new realities in the region to modify the incentive calculus of the major domestic players in the conflict.     

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.     

Negotiated transitions to democracy: Israel and the Palestinians as a case study

This article applies the Huntingtonian framework used by Jung and Shapiro to study South Africa's democratic transition to the Israeli‐Palestinian case. While leaders’ incentives pushed negotiators towards a highly inclusive constitutional order in South Africa, in the Israeli‐Palestinian case they pushed negotiators towards a highly exclusive order, crafted by means of a unique and bizarre but as yet unstudied electoral system. While the Palestinian entity may develop into a full‐fledged democracy in the long run, in the medium term it will not be truly democratic because political life affords no room for legitimate opposition. The findings suggest that transplacements in which the outgoing power does not plan to participate in the new political system may generally lead to highly exclusive political orders.     

The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Examining the Role of Political Pragmatism in State Building and Activism

Of the two major Palestinian factions, Hamas has demonstrated that it is more radical and willing to use acts of terrorism than Fatah. While some arguments have made the case that Hamas has become more moderate in light of efforts to develop stable institutions of government and societal organizations, there has not been conclusive evidence of this ideological shift. In fact, the continued adherence to the Muqawama (resistance) Doctrine represents a decisive facet of the movement's enduring pledge to nullify the state of Israel through a prolonged war of attrition. This article examines the role of political pragmatism in the evolution of Hamas. First, it discusses why the moderation argument alone does not provide an adequate understanding of the movement's evolution, especially since it continues to embrace the use of terrorism and violence as facets of Islamism and as an extension of the Muqawama Doctrine. Second, rather than solely using the moderation argument, this article offers an alternative approach which considers how the combination of strategic policy approaches implemented by Hamas has reflected the role of pragmatism in pursuing its domestic and foreign policy agendas, which are intertwined with the values of the Muqawama Doctrine.     

The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror

ABSTRACT

Israel has had a long tradition of fighting international and Palestinian terror. This article looks at how Israel counterterrorism strategy and tactics have developed since the establishment of the State in 1948. By initially providing a working definition of terrorism, the article then goes to show how Israel has sought to defend itself from different Palestinian terror tactics. This article shows how Israeli security forces have struggled safeguarding, and sometimes disregarded Palestinian human rights. This article concludes by arguing that given the responsibility of democratic governments of defending their citizens from imminent terror attacks, such governments often find themselves paradoxically violating human rights. Despite attempts to reduce such human rights abuses, governments will never do so at the expense of their own security.     

The Arabs in Israel: Identity,criminality and the peace process

The basic datum that criminality among the Palestinian Arabs of Israel is nearly double the average among the population in general begs some hard questions and answers. It is suggested here that, besides the regular crimes endemic in Israeli society of which Arabs and Jews alike partake, there is a category of criminal activity that is peculiar to the Arabs, under the heading of ‘ideological’, namely nationalistically and/or religiously induced. It is suggested here that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians does not necessarily reduce the rate of criminality among Israeli Arabs. Quite the contrary, in some cases it might increase criminal partnerships between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line divide even when the peace process is alive and kicking; and when it is not, things might even get worse with the Israeli Arabs increasingly identifying with their brethren across the border in their struggle against the right‐wing government of Israel from which they are totally alienated.     

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.     

Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?

The percentage of Israelis killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy. The article analyzes the threats Israel has faced, the impact terrorism has had on Israel, and the counter-terrorism policies Israel has adopted. Terrorism has had a decisive effect on Israeli elections and national security decisions, but not the economy. Israeli counter-terrorism has often been conducted without a coherent overall policy, has failed to reflect and conflicted with broader objectives, and has greatly undermined Israel's international standing. Conversely, it has enabled Israel to live in relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue various policies, including peace, should they wish to do so.     

Who is a Terrorist? Ethnicity,Group Affiliation,and Understandings of Political Violence

What does the American public label as “terrorism?” How do people think about the factors motivating violence, and in turn, the policies that are favored? Using ingroup and outgroup dynamics, we argue that the terrorist label is more readily applied to Arab-Americans than Whites, and to members of militant groups. Moreover, people attribute different motives to violence committed by Arabs versus Whites, and favor different policies in response. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned one of six stories about a failed armed attack, each with a different combination of ethnicity and group affiliation. We find that an Arab ethnicity and Islamist group affiliation increase the likelihood of labeling an act as terrorism. Attacks by Whites and members of a White supremacist group are less likely to be labeled terrorism. Rather, Whites are more likely to be called “mass shooters.” Despite never discussing motive, Arab-American attackers are more likely to be ascribed political or religious motives, while White suspects are more likely to be seen as mentally ill. Lastly, an Arab ethnicity increases support for counterterrorism policies and decreases support for mental health care.