Peace processes and Northern Ireland: Squaring circles?

The aim of this article is to review some of the issues involved in the current ‘peace process/talks’ in Northern Ireland. Despite the current euphoria over the talks, Good Friday Agreement and the Nobel Prizes there are still many serious issues to be resolved that leave the whole process in doubt. These are substantive issues that can often appear as trivial detail in the rhetoric and hyperbole of peace. Three issues particularly stand out: decommissioning of weapons, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the role of terrorist activists. These, I argue, are key concerns that go to the heart of the Troubles, yet have not been resolved. And it is around these concerns that much of the current talks revolve. They also reflect seriously on the extent to which democratic government can engage in deals with terrorists, trading peace for integrity at what price?     

The rule of law ‐ meaning and significance for security policy and reform

Given Russia's history of legal expediency and the emphasis of Western policy on economic liberalization, it is not surprising that Russian reforms have yet to produce a functioning market economy and effective political institutions, including civil‐military control. A Western‐style economic and military model is fundamentally built on the rule of law as a supreme and impartial tool of conflict resolution and distribution of rights and power. Without it, government action cannot be predicted, destroying trust in the institutions and denying private and public activity a basis for long‐term planning which is based on trust and predictability. Without long‐term planning neither companies nor armies can be successful, giving rise to a pseudo‐legal state of de facto laws. For its economic, political and military reforms to be successful Russia needs to emphasize the building of the institutions for developing and predictably enforcing a set of laws, an effort that needs to receive priority support from Western partners.     

Eisenhower,the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953–60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British‐American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

Congressional Hearings on Northern Ireland and the “Special Relationship,” 1971–1981

In 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy co-sponsored a resolution in Congress calling for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland. The House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Europe held hearings on this resolution in February 1972 in the immediate aftermath of the deaths in Londonderry of “Bloody Sunday.” These hearings represented the first time that several high profile American political figures had spoken out on the developing conflict in Northern Ireland and, whilst the hearings did not lead to a significant change in American policy towards the conflict, the threat of further ones persisted from the Richard Nixon to the Ronald Reagan administrations. This analysis examines the impact of the 1972 Congressional hearings and the threat posed by the possibility of future ones in the wider context of United States policy towards the Northern Ireland conflict until 1981.     

The problems of ‘pro‐state’ terrorism: Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

The essay briefly outlines the careers of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the two largest Protestant, unionist and loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. It argues that a range of apparently unconnected characteristics of the UDA and UVF can be explained by reference to the notion of ‘pro‐state terrorism’. When the state is perceived to be unable or unwilling to defend itself against its enemies, there is space for ‘prostate’ private initiatives in violence. If the state is not seen to be terminally weak or treacherous, the ‘pro‐state’ group is competing with the state itself. That competition explains many features of the history of the UDA and UVF.     

The primacy of national security? American responses to the British financial crisis of 1949

The financial crisis of 1949 threatened to bankrupt Britain and destroy the American economic and political system constructed after 1945. The US government was unable to respond effectively to this challenge. Truman's administration was split, as the Treasury and State Departments advocated diametrically opposing responses. Only the secret British decision to devalue sterling, a judgement not shared with the Americans until much later, stopped Washington from offering aid packages to London that would have totally changed US postwar foreign, economic and strategic policies. Therefore, this episode questions the assertion that national security concerns dominated the American government in the early Cold War.     

Great effort,little help? Peace and conflict resolution organisations in Northern Ireland and Turkey

This article offers a comparative analysis of the role played by peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) in Northern Ireland and Turkey in negotiating solutions to ethno-nationalist conflicts in these countries. It argues that P/CROs have been instrumental in de-escalating violence and encouraging conflicting parties to resolve conflict peacefully. Examining both the elite and grass-roots levels, the article assesses P/CROs that have advanced middle-range approaches and track-two dialogue towards peace. Drawing on data from multiple sources, including semi-structured interviews, archival material and official documents, the analysis indicates that P/CROs have a range of tools at their disposal to influence political decision-makers. These include public (and closed) conferences, forums and events attended by current or former politicians, representatives of the conflicting parties and prominent figures and intellectuals in the conflict-affected society, as well as other grass-roots initiatives. The article finds that P/CROs provided help shaping and promoting non-violent processes of conflict resolution between the British Government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).     

Sport,Empire, and Diplomacy: “Ireland” at the 1930 British Empire Games

ABSTRACT

International sport, as Geoffrey Pigman has correctly observed, emerged “as a quintessential case study demonstrating the part that public diplomacy plays in contemporary diplomacy.” The British Empire Games/Commonwealth Games [BEG/CG] are one such example, being the second largest multi-national multi-sport event today. Their origins lie in the interwar era when members of sporting organisations, many of whom were active in other formal aspects of public life, considered the organisation of specific Imperial events through international networking. Described as lacking a “thoroughly analytical and interpretive account of their history,” questions of identity politics, public diplomacy and statecraft are at their core because the BEG, inaugurated in 1930, represented qualities and values that appealed to governments, civil society, and sportspeople alike. In the waning of the British Empire, the BEG was one attempt to maintain Imperial prestige and cement cultural bonds. Yet, not only is there an absence of analytical accounts of their history, but the inter-relationships between the BEG and diplomacy, and among global sport and diplomacy more broadly, have been similarly under-investigated. This absence is striking, representing a missed opportunity in understanding the development of global sport and international relations more generally.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

“The Movement Moves Against you”: Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.     

Can the EU be a serious security actor in Asia?

Following the US “pivot” to Asia, the European Union (EU) announced its own pivot to Asia in 2012 with stepped-up engagement. A flurry of high-level visits to Asia, and in particular, Southeast Asia, by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy followed. The EU is looking for a much more comprehensive engagement of Asia, but at the same time, within Asia; there is always this nagging doubt as to whether the EU can be a serious security actor in Asia. This short brief surveys the constructive role that the EU can play in Asia and argues that the EU should stop fretting about whether it is seen as a serious security actor in Asia and instead focus on what it can do best and do its best in Asia.     

Norway and a major international crisis: Suez ‐ the very difficult case

This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision‐making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could be viewed as in conflict with the protection of Norway's NATO membership and vital economic interests, represented by the powerful shipowners. In the end, Norway's Suez policy is put in the context of the change in Norwegian foreign and security policy in general, a shift in emphasis from being Britain's close ally and friend to being under the protective umbrella of the US, the new superpower.     

Conflict regulation or conflict resolution: Third‐party intervention in the Northern Ireland conflict – prospects for peace

This article evaluates previous third‐party efforts to broker a consociational power‐sharing solution on the peoples of Northern Ireland. Instead, an original and dynamic community‐based problem‐solving linkage system proposes co‐operation between Northern Ireland's grassroots constituents, paramilitary groups and political elites. The process would be facilitated by a quasi‐mediator comprising the three Northern Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and four MEPs – two each from the Netherlands and Belgium. This is a vision of how to create a mutually beneficial process linking psychocultural and structural dimensions by promoting dialogue, understanding, tolerance and the sharing of commonalities in beliefs, identity, and behaviors among groups involved in intercommunal conflict situations.     

Rebel's dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA,Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland

The 40‐month period which has followed the introduction of the IRA's 1994 cease‐fire has witnessed the most intensive vigilante campaign ever carried out by the movement. A commitment to vigilantism has profoundly affected the evolution of both the policy and structure of Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, vigilantism bears costs for the two organizations and several serious attempts have been made by senior figures to end the practice. This article sets out to understand and describe the dynamics of militant republicanism's fluctuating commitment to vigilante violence, and in particular to understand the complex issues vigilantism has raised within Sinn Féin and the IRA in the past three decades. The article concludes that the two organizations are now irretrievably committed to vigilantism, and short of major RUC reform, they will be unable to end what has become a politically‐damaging policy.     

The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence and the Conflict-Repression Nexus in the Northern Ireland “Troubles”

After 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent. In fact, to date, every possible relationship, including no influence, has been found. We argue that part of the problem concerns the current practice of treating every repressive event as if it were substantively equivalent, differentiated only by scope (large/small) or type (violent/nonviolent). We advance existing work by arguing that the influence of repression is contingent on when it occurs within the temporal sequences of political conflict. Using new events data on the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1974, results show that when dissent has been decreasing in the recent past, repressive action inspires an increase in dissident action. When dissent has been increasing, however, repression has the opposite effect, decreasing challenging activity. These results provide important insights into resolving a recurrent puzzle within the conflict-repression nexus as well as understanding the interaction between government and dissident behavior.