Make Hegel great again: on Hegel’s epistemological contribution to critical terrorism studies

ABSTRACT

Despite the contribution of Foucaultian inspired approaches to Critical Terrorism Studies, this article invites us to consider Hegel’s epistemological insights. Foucault’s power-knowledge nexus is an invaluable intellectual tool which reveals how terrorism can be a “social fact”, yet it rests on a genealogical account of history and a passive notion of subjectivity determined by power (regimes). Hegelian philosophy maintains some of the benefits met in Foucault’s approach (sociality and contingency of knowledge) while providing a richer epistemological account. This article introduces Hegel’s epistemological insights to: i) challenge the portrayal of terrorism as a major external threat against the western liberal democratic states in the vein of “New Terrorism” or the “Clash of Civilizations”; and ii) domestically explore how the concept of liberal democratic rights, equality, freedom affect the interpretation of counter-terrorist bills, the threat perception of terrorism and domestic polarisation. Hegel’s insights critically interrogate the notions of “liberal rights”, “equality” and “freedom”, revealing how their ambiguous definition accommodates inherent contradictions which can fuel a controversial interpretation of counter-terrorist bills, leading to domestic polarisation and (reciprocal) radicalisation. Therefore, Hegel’s epistemological insights reveal how the defective definition of human rights, equality and liberty can amplify the effects of Terrorism and radicalisation.     

“The War Will Come to Your Street”: Explaining Geographic Variation in Terrorism by Rebel Groups

Geographic variation in rebels’ use of terrorism is not well understood. This article explains the use of terrorism in civil conflict through examining geographic variation in terrorist attacks across first–level administrative regions. Two explanations are tested using data on 47 groups in 21 countries: that terrorism is intended to punish supporters of counterinsurgency efforts or to destabilize regions of the country that are both outside of rebels’ military reach and have substantial grievances against the regime. Results show that terrorism is most prevalent in national capitals and regions that are more deprived. The findings suggest that rebel groups face multiple incentives for violence beyond zones of direct military confrontation with the government, using both highly visible attacks against the center of power and attacks intended to geographically expand the rebellion. The findings imply maximizing public service provision and minimizing economic inequality may reduce the breadth of rebels’ potential expansion.     

Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare

Academic studies of terrorism and mass political violence have developed largely independently of one another. Insurgents, in contrast, have tended to incorporate terrorism tactics along with other types of unconventional warfare in their repertoire of action. This tendency has become more apparent among insurgents engaging in armed confrontations in the twenty-first century. In order to take account of this development, scholars and others interested in contemporary warfare need to incorporate terrorism studies within the broader subject of insurgencies and “small wars”—political violence, in other words.     

Why Target the “Good Guys”? The Determinants of Terrorism Against NGOs

Why would a terrorist group target nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? We theorize that certain types of NGOs, namely those using mainly nonviolent pressure to advocate for changes in government human rights practices, influence the behaviors of potential terrorist group supporters in ways not liked by terrorist organizations. These advocacy-based human rights NGOs make terrorism attacks against the whole NGO sector more likely by changing the dynamics of terrorist-domestic audience relations in ways that threaten to limit audience support of terrorist groups. Other types of NGOs, especially those that do not have an advocacy focus, are less likely to directly challenge the terrorist organization or the state and can provide resources utilized by terrorist groups and potential sympathizers. Thus, their presence would not increase the likelihood of any NGO-targeted terrorist attacks. A global test of these dynamics supports our basic hypotheses.     

Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

This research investigates the dramatic expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria in the last few years. Militant activity has expanded in terms of frequency and severity of attacks, geographic scope, target selection, and strategies used. The evolution of the group and the trajectory of violence are best explained through four overlapping theoretical strands. These include the growing fragmentation of the movement, development of strategic ties with Al Qaeda affiliates, strong-armed counterterrorism operations that further radicalized the movement, and exploitation of the porous border area that separates Nigeria from its northern neighbors.     

A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States

ABSTRACT

Drawing on Rapoport’s four waves thesis, this study asks whether the emergence of terrorist semi-states (TSS) in the 21st-century MENA region and Pakistan mean that we are seeing the beginning of a new (fifth) wave. We define a TSS as a rebel group that a) has control over portions of a weak state’s territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launches terrorist attacks against third-party states. To be considered a fifth wave, the new terrorism phenomenon at hand must both fit Rapoport’s criteria of a wave (be global, have the same driving force) and also be significantly different from the prior wave. Clearly, the TSSs are different from the religious terror groups of the fourth wave in key respects: they prioritize territorial control, they engage in a much wider array of governance activities (not just social services), most of their victims have been members of the same religion—namely, Muslims (which suggests that they are driven more by the pursuit of power than by Jihad); and finally, their behavior (though not their statements) shows they have a local rather than a universal agenda. The main counter-argument is that TSSs are all Islamic and have so far not been exported globally.     

暴力方式与民心向背：寻找治理族群叛乱的条件组合

治理族群叛乱的目标既包括土地的控制,也包括人的控制,这是治理族群叛乱区别于其他形式叛乱的特点之一。人的控制实际包含两个内容,既包括人心向背,也包括人员数量的控制。人心向背关乎民众支持,而争取民众支持的必要性在于,虽然拥有民众支持并不必然导致叛乱的平息,但是没有民众支持是不能平息叛乱的。在族群叛乱已经发生的情况下,国家政府只有赢得更多当地民众的支持,才能成功治理叛乱。根据冲突各方的暴力行为方式及其对当地民众支持的影响,成功平息叛乱应具备国家政府有区别使用暴力、叛乱组织无区别使用暴力、当地温和派主导平叛行动等三个必要条件,以争取更多民众支持。这三个条件构成的条件组合,可以有效控制和减少叛乱组织能够招募到的人员数量,只要国家政府的平叛战略能够有效控制叛乱组织所招募的叛乱人员数量,叛乱组织就将走向衰败并最终消亡,也就是说这一条件组合能够成为国家政府成功平叛的一个充分条件。通过对结合俄罗斯、印度和西班牙等国家治理族群叛乱的经验和教训的分析,进一步证实了以上观点。     

Terrorist profiling: human rights concerns

Post-9/11, law-enforcement agencies have expanded the processing of personal data for terrorist profiles; this is actually among the very reasons why personal data are processed in the first place. De facto terrorist profiles tend to be based predominantly on the use of such criteria as ‘race’, colour, religion, or ethnic and national origin to single out persons for enhanced scrutiny. Terrorist-profiling practices, therefore, raise the question as to their conformity with the right to privacy, the protection of personal data, and the principle of non-discrimination. This article critically examines to what extent, if any, terrorist-profiling practices may be regarded as compatible with the principle of non-discrimination and the fundamental rules pertaining to the protection of personal data. For this purpose, it looks at various approaches to defining profiling in the context of countering terrorism, as well as describing de facto manifestations of terrorist-profiling practices. The conclusion is that terrorist-profiling practices all too often fail to comply with the fundamental requirement that any restrictions on the right to privacy and the protection of personal data are adequately regulated, necessary and proportionate. The so-called ethnic profiling gives rise to particularly serious problems. It tends to assume the nature of ‘racial’ profiling and, accordingly, entail discriminatory effects that can result in feelings of humiliation and stigmatisation among the targeted groups. Since the risk of further marginalisation and even radicalisation within those groups also appears to be a very real consideration, the whole necessity of ethnic profiling in the name of countering terrorism must be called into question in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures.     

Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?

This article presents results of a survey of 141 Pakistani families of slain militants. This survey collected data about the militants and their households. While derived from a convenience sample, these data are unprecedented and offer a glimpse into the backgrounds of militants and the families who (mostly) supported their decision to join the jihad. Most militants served and died in Kashmir and seem to be “high quality” militants in that they, like their heads of household, are well educated and not predominantly coming from seminaries, as is often claimed. This analysis suggests that while the militants merit attention, so do the families that produce militants.     

The right to commemoration and “ideal victims”: the puzzle of victim dissatisfaction with State-led commemoration after 9/11 and 3/11

This article explores the puzzle of victim dissatisfaction with State-led commemoration following 9/11 and 3/11 by offering a cross-national case study through which to view key areas of theoretical debate in the sociology of human rights, cultural trauma and collective memory, and the politics of victimhood. Although State-led commemorative processes are often highly contested, we would expect them to be less so in the cases of 9/11 and 3/11, given broad social consensus about the victims’ right to commemoration and the traumatic nature of the events, and especially the “ideal nature” of the victims who as symbolic representatives of the State are conferred with great moral authority. Drawing on primary and secondary data on the commemoration of the attacks of 11th September 2001 and 11th March 2004 we find that despite sharp differences between commemorative processes, three common key areas of contestation and dissatisfaction for victims emerge: political instrumentalisation, hierarchies of worth and exclusion. We show how the status of ideal victimhood for victims of transnational terrorism carries within it an inherent paradox which provides the key to their dissatisfaction, namely the moral authority conferred on them as representatives of the State simultaneously depersonalises them, excluding them as individuals with rights and needs.