Conceptualizing the effects of mass‐mediated terrorism

Abstract

In summer 1985, a TWA plane was hijacked by Shiite terrorists to Beirut creating what turned to be one of the most impressive spectacles of the mass‐mediated “theater of terror.” After the event the American media were blamed for fanning the crisis atmosphere, giving the terrorists the publicity they craved, abetting the terrorists by reporting U.S. military movements, holding a brutal competition among themselves to get exclusive footage or interviews, harassing the hostages’ families, negotiating directly with the terrorists, milking the hostages still held by the terrorists for political and ideological declarations, and propagandizing the terrorists’ anti‐U.S. and anti‐Israel messages. The resulting debate that followed these accusations, illustrates the lingering argument regarding media and terrorism. While some claim that “the media are the terrorists’ best friends. The terrorist act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all”,¹ others argue that the media are avoiding the “real terror” for ideological reasons, averting Western public opinion from U.S. terrorism by underreporting its share in Third World Terrorism.² The ideological loadings of definitions and arguments are combined with confused interpretations of media effects and public opinion to yield an endless, futile debate. The purpose of the paper is to conceptualize basic effects of mass‐mediated terrorism by relating media effects studies to the case of terrorism and public opinion.     

Terrorism and public opinion: A five country comparison

This article examines public attitudes towards terrorism in five countries: Uruguay, Spain, Italy, Germany and Northern Ireland. It analyzes public concern over terrorism, images of the terrorists, support for the terrorists' goals, and public approval of anti‐terrorist measures. There are significant differences between nationalist and revolutionary terrorism. Nationalist terrorists have a high degree of support from an ethnic constituency, while revolutionary terrorists attract a much smaller degree of support primarily from the educated young. It is concluded that public opinion towards terrorism is a product of complex historical situations, and that public attitudes are unaffected by the terrorist campaign itself.     

On the victims of terrorism and their innocence

Contrary to common usage, neither ‘victims’ nor their ‘innocence’ are necessary to the definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Though the primary targets ‐ as distinguished from audiences ‐ of most terrorist actions are people, and if the aim of the terrorists is to sow unreasoning fear, then symbolically important non‐human targets such as unmanned power sources, unoccupied government buildings and the like may serve the same purpose. Moreover, given that ‘victims’ are chosen for the shock value their death or injury may have, their ‘innocence’ (or even ‘guilt') may be incidental or even irrelevant to the violence visited upon them. A definition of ‘terrorism’ that focuses, generically, on its targets rather than on their qualities offers a more normatively neutral approach to the problem.     

Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency

This essay describes terrorism as a mode of warfare and examines its unique characteristics, by comparing this method of struggle to other forms of violent conflict. It further emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgence and delineates the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to achieve their political objectives. The study evaluates terrorists’ success in obtaining political goals and the conditions which affect their ability to materialize their objectives.

The author concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.     

Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalisation of the terrorism industry

The “terrorism industry” that has been constructed by the war on terror has become institutionalised in the past decade, contributing in part to a significant increase in the overall public perception of terrorism and a dilution in meaning of the term “terrorist.” A linear regression analysis of the relationship of poll data collected from American citizens and frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks shows that this increased awareness has occurred despite the fact that terrorist attacks on American soil have decreased over the past decade. Considering the often-stated purpose of terrorists is to inspire fear, a central goal of the industry and the government should be to diminish these effects. However, the frequent and offhand use of the term “terrorist” fails to contextualise and counter the varied dispositions and motivations of terrorists and other non-state actors. To reduce public worry while working within the boundaries of the institutionalised terrorism industry, the study of terrorism should be conducted, and counterterrorist policies designed, using a new interdisciplinary framework that would allow the terrorism industry and the government to move beyond the binary designation of “terrorist” and “non-terrorist” to a greater spectrum of classification, from terrorists and violent non-state actors, to guerrillas, insurgents or criminals. A more nuanced framework could reduce public fear of terrorism and increase the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies.     

Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism

This article examines the nature of religious terrorism, principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the immediate objectives of ‘religious’ terrorists, and that while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. This distinction is illustrated with reference to such pre-modern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots. Immediate objectives, are for many purposes more important than ultimate aims.

Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on 9/11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly probably that the intention was to provoke a response from the US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda's constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective, familiar to historians of terrorism from at least the time of Errico Malatesta and the ‘propaganda of the deed’ in the 1870s. While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists, al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied them.

Even though its immediate objectives are political rather than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but al-Qaeda also uses—and when necessary adapts—well-known Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion. This is demonstrated with reference to the ‘Last Night’ document of 9/11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be understood in political terms is susceptible to political remedies.     

The phenomenon of conservative terrorism

In his studies of loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland, Steve Bruce introduces the concept of ‘pro‐state’ terrorism, whereby terrorists carry out attacks in order to eliminate threats which they believe should have been eliminated by the state's security forces. This article argues that whilst the actions of loyalist terrorists may have a pro‐state element, they can more properly be seen in the wider context of conservative terrorism.     

Greece: Twenty years of political terrorism

From the mid‐1970s to the present, Greece has been suffering a systematic terrorist assault on her political and socieo‐economic institutions‐mainly at the hands of the 17 November and ELA, intransigent communist organizations. During these two decades, the Greek state has failed to make a correct diagnosis of the problem. This article traces the long history of terrorism during this period and enables the reader to understand how the phenomenon was allowed to grow so uncontrollably that it has now become a permenant feature of contemporary Greek political culture. The author concludes that the Greek terrorists will continue their violent campaign attacking the people and institutions they despise for several years to come‐at least until Greece's established political clas takes a clear‐cut stand and effective measures to oppose and resolve this seemingly intractable problem     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Information terrorism: Political violence in the information age

Information warfare represents a threat to American national security and defense. There are two general methods in which a terrorist might employ an information terrorist attack: (1) when information technology (IT) is a target, and/or (2) when IT is the tool of a larger operation. The first method would target an information system for sabotage, either electronic or physical, thus destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any information infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependent upon it. The second would manipulate and exploit an information system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function for which it was not meant (such as spoofing air traffic control). A perennial dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security. The special problems associated with IT are examined. The US national security establishment needs to use a flexible, integrated response to counter information terrorists ‐ one which employs information warfare tactics tailored to counter gray‐area phenomena, but which also pools resources from ‘conventional’ counter‐terrorism and law enforcement authorities.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

Egyptian Cinema as a Tool in the Struggle Against Islamic Terrorism

The cinema has been used by Egyptian regimes, from the monarchy until Mubarak, to resist the political agenda of Islamic radicals and terrorists. Edward Said and others describe Islamic terrorists’ images in the Western media as “Western fantasies.” Nevertheless, for Egyptian intellectuals, terrorists were and remain a stark reality. In Egypt, the entire state apparatus was set in motion to fight Islamic terrorism. The state was unprepared for the massive popular uprising of 2011. While the direction that Egyptian culture will follow after Mubarak remains unclear, an important objective is to study pre-revolutionary Egyptian cinema and to understand its ideological tendencies.     

Canada's counter‐terrorism experience

This article traces Canada's experience with modern terrorism from its beginnings in 1963 to the present, with particular emphasis on the policies and crisis management techniques which have evolved over those 30 years. A brief review of the Canadian system of government and constitutional framework is provided to assist with understanding Canada's response to the terrorist threat. While Canadians have largely escaped the tragedies of domestic and international terrorism which have plagued other parts of the world since 1968, it is also true that Canada had an early experience of modern terrorism when the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began its campaign of politically motivated violence in Montreal on the night of 7 March 1963. Canada has been applauded for the firm and expeditious manner in which it dealt with the FLQ threat, and for the security provided for major international events held on Canadian soil (e.g., 1976 Olympic Games, 1981 Economic Summit). Beginning in 1982, however, a series of terrorist incidents brought about a fundamental reassessment which led to the introduction of major policies and measures ‐ based on the ‘lead Minister’ concept ‐ that continue to form the basis of Canada's approach to counter‐terrorism.     

The dual myths of ‘narco‐terrorism’: How myths drive policy

When held up to the reality and complexity of the relationships between drug traffickers and insurgents, the concept of ‘narco‐terrorism’ falls short of serving as a useful explanatory device. Properly analyzed, ‘narco‐terrorism’ emerges as a political myth based on a stereotypic view of the Andean drug trade, peasant insurgency and the relationships between them. The myth of ‘narco‐terrorism’ coincided with the Latin American policy interests of the Reagan and the Bush administrations. Ironically, the myth's transparency served the policy interests of the opponents of these administrations, who used it to further their own politicized agendas ‐ creating yet another myth. This research traces the evolution and politicization of this concept and shows how it has hindered both scholarship and policy making. The research confirms, in part, earlier work of Australian criminologist Grant Wardlaw and American expert on the Andean drug trade, Rensselaer Lee.     

Desperate times and desperate measures: false-representation and distortion of terrorism in post-9/11 superhero films

In the wake of 9/11 there has been a marked increase in depictions of terrorism in Hollywood film. This shift has been particularly significant in superhero films. This genre of films has not historically relied upon terrorist narratives, but this article highlights contemporary ideological overlaps between terrorist and superhero narratives that explain why they have been more frequently presented together in contemporary film. In particular, both rely upon what Giorgio Agamben and other scholars refer to as a “state of exceptionality” and they feature ideological categories, such as those delineated in the work of Teun Van Dijk. This article analyses these themes using the methods of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. The article finds the growing number of depictions of terrorists in superhero films problematic because they deny terrorists rationality or political consciousness. The article analyses the binarism that this creates, finding that the proliferation of terrorist narratives in superhero films ultimately is detrimental because it proliferates a shallow and misleading understanding of terrorism which can undermine popular understanding of terrorism.     

The Palestinian intifada: An analysis of a popular uprising after seven months∗

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that the Internet is a reliable source of operational knowledge for terrorists, allowing them to train for terrorist attacks without access to real-world training camps and practical experience. The article distinguishes between abstract technical knowledge (what the Greeks called techne) and practical, experiential knowledge (mētis), investigating how each helps terrorists prepare for attacks. This distinction offers insight into how terrorists acquire the practical know-how they need to perform their activities as opposed to abstract know-what contained in bomb-making manuals. It also underscores the Internet's limitations as a source of operational knowledge for terrorists. While the Internet allows militants to share substantial techne, along with religious and ideological information, it is not particularly useful for disseminating the experiential and situational knowledge terrorists use to engage in acts of political violence. One likely reason why Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists have not made better use of the Internet's training potential to date is that its value as a source of operational knowledge of terrorism is limited.     

Terrorism and the blind men's elephant

Terrorism is best understood as a form of warfare. Considerable division exists among researchers on the issue of defining terrorism. A minority propose that terrorism is a form of warfare, possibly identical to guerrilla warfare. However, the majority disagree with this position, instead viewing terrorism as a distinct and separate phenomenon. This divergence has been fuelled by the distinctive questions of morality which cloak any consideration of terrorism. The impact of this special morality dimension to the problem is examined, with the focus being directed to biases arising from the moral standpoint which has been adopted by most. It is argued that many of the so‐called distinctions between terrorism and warfare are illusionary. The article concludes that while there are solutions to the current conceptual deadlock these are unlikely to be realised in the near future.     

Targets and Tactics: Testing for a Duality within Al Qaeda’s Network

One prevailing view treats Al Qaeda as a monolithic entity with a global network of affiliates. Yet, certain affiliates appear more committed to local political and territorial goals – parochial, not global, terrorists. We construct a classification scheme to differentiate affiliates conceptually and empirically, and then track their types over time. We sort Al Qaeda’s network of affiliates using a principal components analysis of terrorist attacks from 1988 to 2012. We show that this aids in identifying latent affiliate types, and interpreting shifts in behavior. We find that despite Al Qaeda’s anti-western rhetoric, there exists a global-parochial divide in which most affiliates are parochial – with anti-Western groups pursuing local political goals even when Western targets remain. By providing an empirical strategy to identify which affiliates are more or less aligned with global terrorism, this research holds implications for the literatures on terrorism and civil war, terrorism and democracy, and the effects of counterterrorism.     

Political terrorism in South‐East Asia

This article will provide an overview of one specific non‐military threat that is beginning to assume greater prominence on south‐east Asia's broadened security agenda: political terrorism.¹ Although by no means new to the south‐east Asian environment, for much of the twentieth century its importance was sidelined and, in a sense ‘contained’, by the more pressing concern over US‐Soviet nuclear rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, however, the ‘bottle has been uncorked’ on a variety of lower‐level threats, with issues such as terrorism now taking on greater prominence and relevance in their own right as significant regional and national security concerns.²