The problems of ‘pro‐state’ terrorism: Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

The essay briefly outlines the careers of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the two largest Protestant, unionist and loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. It argues that a range of apparently unconnected characteristics of the UDA and UVF can be explained by reference to the notion of ‘pro‐state terrorism’. When the state is perceived to be unable or unwilling to defend itself against its enemies, there is space for ‘prostate’ private initiatives in violence. If the state is not seen to be terminally weak or treacherous, the ‘pro‐state’ group is competing with the state itself. That competition explains many features of the history of the UDA and UVF.     

Alias ‘GBGPGS’: Action directe internationale's transition from revolutionary terrorism to euro‐terrorism

This article discusses terrorism as a ritual act or series of acts that expresses a message. The case of GBGPGS illustrates how complex such messages are by referring them to their French and global contexts. The group's violent struggle against political rules has a ‘sacrificial’ dimension and was justified as a response to ‘crisis’. Through attempting to re‐interpret French extreme‐left traditions, the GBGPGS campaign foreshadowed Euro‐terrorism. The most salient evidence of this shift was the group's concentration on economic globalization and the weakening of traditional state and great power structures.     

How ‘terrorism’ does not end: the case of the Official Irish Republican Army

This paper is the first critical analysis of terrorism disengagement by the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA). This process was conducted in instalments over nearly three decades. It has not been theoretically assessed as far as studies on ‘how terrorism ends’ are concerned, and it does not fit into any existing models of terrorism disengagement. The end of terrorism in relation to the OIRA is not only the story of a terrorist organisation ending its armed activities, but also a case study of terrorism disengagement with important policy implications for decision-makers faced with the threat of terrorism.     

‘In the mirror of the past’: The use of history in the justification of terrorism

This article takes the form of a content analysis of the propaganda of Lehi ‐ the smallest and most extreme of the underground movements that fought against the British in Palestine. It suggests that the propaganda was based on a number of projective narratives, namely, stories that are not only designed to recall the past, but also to show how to behave in the present. Particular emphasis was placed on the lessons to be learnt from Jewish history in general and past examples of Jewish valor in particular. Attention was also paid, however, to other struggles for national liberation. In both cases, the struggle for legitimacy took place on two fronts ‐ the reconstruction of the past and its reenactment in the present. Only Lehi, it was argued, understood history and acted in accordance with it. And therein lay the terrorists’ claim to legitimacy. They, and they alone, are the true heirs of the past.     

Television and terrorism: Implications for crisis management and policy‐making

Because few of us experience terrorism firsthand, the media play an important role in informing us when major incidents occur. Because of its instantaneity and its ability to reach many audiences at once, the electronic media and particularly television can have a significant impact on the various players who become involved in a particular crisis. This article examines the kinds of effects that television can have on four sets of actors most commonly involved in terrorist crises or major incidents: politicians, police, the public and the print media. While some of these effects can be negative, others can be positive. As a whole, however, television tends to diminish the quality of political discourse, with its emphasis on simplification and dramatization. In time of crisis, this can have serious consequences on decision‐makers who depend upon an informed public to understand the issues at stake and the limits on government action. The article ends by examining briefly how these effects relate to the increasing role of the private sector in public safety and security.     

The common European security and defence policy and the ‘third‐country’ issue

The Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union (EU) was launched in 1999 and has been perceived as a landmark step toward European security cooperation, particularly in the field of crisis management. Still in its early stages, some difficult issues have become apparent. Of these, the so‐called ‘third‐country’ issue may prove to be among the most significant. This problem refers to the necessity of associating states outside the EU with CESDP. In this regard, three states stand out — the United States, Turkey and Russia — and this article considers their concerns and the European response in detail. This is prefaced by a general overview of how the third‐country problem emerged and what the EU has done to address it. It concludes by suggesting that third‐country considerations could well determine where and how EU‐led missions operating under the auspices of CESDP are deployed.     

Excerpts from research study ‘weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: Proliferation by non‐state actors’

In the wake of the Cold War, a new world disorder seems to be emerging wherein the legitimacy of many states is being challenged from within by increasing non‐state calls for self‐determination from the likes of religious cults, hate groups, isolationist movements, ethnic groups and revivalist movements. These movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, offering to fill psychological, sociological, political or religious security needs of those who would join them. Religious oriented groups appear to share a common ideological thread that rejects existing social, economic and political structure demanding a structural revision of the world, a world where they become the authoritarian, dominant influence. Emanating from these movements will be the ‘Post Modern Terrorists’ who possess a ‘ripeness’ to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction.

This article concerns asymmetric warfare: terrorism, specifically Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism. It argues that the terrorist WMD threat will emanate from non‐state groups operating under a veneer of religion and ethnic‐racist hate. These groups, plus the occasional cult, are the most likely candidates to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction in a mass casualty causing ‘super‐terrorist act’.     

Terrorism,counter‐terrorism and democracy: The assessment of national security threats

The development of radical Islamist strategic thinking and the impact of post-modern, Western styles of thought upon the ideology that informs that strategy is often overlooked in conventional discussions of homegrown threats from jihadist militants. The propensity to discount the ideology informing both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements with an analogous political philosophy like Hizb ut-Tahrir neglects the influence that critical Western modes of thought exercise upon their strategic thinking especially in the context of homegrown radicalization. Drawing selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the Western ideological canon has, in fact, endowed Khilaafaism (caliphism) with both a distinctive theoretical style and strategic practice. In particular, it derives intellectual sustenance from a post-Marxist Frankfurt School of critical thinking that in combination with an “English” School of international relations idealism holds that epistemological claims are socially determined, subjective, and serve the interests of dominant power relations. This critical, normative, and constructivist approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also to transcend it. This transformative agenda bears comparison with radical Islamist critiques of Western ontology and is of interest to Islamism's political and strategic thinking. In this regard, the relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s not only reflect a loss of faith in Western values in a way that undermines the prospects for a liberal and pluralist polity, but also, through a critical process facilitated by much international relations orthodoxy, promotes the strategic and ideological agenda of radical Islam. It is this curious strategic and ideological evolution that this paper explores.     

Right‐wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization

The purpose of this article is to identify the distinctive features of right‐wing terrorism and to develop an analytical typology of particularistic terrorist organizations. The article is based on the conceptual framework of the process of delegitimization developed earlier by this author. It argues that right‐wing radicals usually reach terrorism through a trajectory of split delegitimization, which implies a primary conflict with an ‘inferior’ community and a secondary conflict with the government. Six sub‐types of right‐wing terrorism are identified: revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth counterculture terrorism.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

Comment on ‘terrorism and democracy’

The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 raises an important legal problem for decision‐makers contemplating retaliation against such acts of terrorism. Conceivably, retaliation could conflict with and help erode international norms of self‐defense. Counter‐terrorist experts and government officials espousing the use of force have minimized, if not ignored, this potential conflict and its negative impact on world order. On the other hand, the 1986 US raid on Libya and the 1985 Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia reveal that under limited circumstances force would be deemed appropriate. The informal adjudication of these incidents by relevant international actors suggests a tolerance for the resort to force in the US case and ambivalence in the Israeli case. The US and Israeli cases guide a subsequent discussion of the conditions under which the use of force against terrorist bases in response to terrorist attacks could be legitimated. The resort to force against such activity, it is argued, would have to meet the test of necessity, including: (1) a previous and ongoing series of terrorist attacks, and demonstrated responsibility for those attacks by the actor, state or non‐state, against whom force is used; (2) immediately expected or imminent terrorist attacks endangering human life; and (3) the absence of non‐forcible remedies effective in terminating the terrorist threat. In addition the amount of force would have to be proportional, limited to targets responsible for specific terrorist activity and limited by the objective of terminating that threat.     

‘Something old,something New’: The politics of recognition in post‐cold‐War Europe

In 1945, as a final settlement of the Palestine question drew near, the Arab states established the Arab Office, Washington, as part of their unprecedented effort to influence public and elite opinion on this matter in the United States. It was staffed by many of the leading young Arab intellectuals of the era. This article charts the Arab Office's attempt to reduce American support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In particular, it examines the accusations, made at the time, that the Arab Office, in pursuing its anti-Zionist agenda had co-operated with leading American anti-Semites and was under the control of the notorious former Mufti of Jerusalem, who had collaborated with Hitler during the Second World War.