Nome law: Deleuze & Guattari on the emergence of law

This article orientates Deleuze & Guattari’s pragmatic semiotics towards a semiotics of law. This pragmatic semiotics is explored, and directly related to the theory of emergence and complexity that is also a key feature of Deleuze & Guattari’s work. It is suggested that the development of these aspects of Deleuze & Guattari’s thought in relation to law allows the contours of a noological legal theory to be sketched out. Noology is the study of images of thought, their emergence, their genealogy, and their creation. A first exploration of this noological legal theory is then carried out by the conceptualisation of nome law as the first emergence of law as theorised by Deleuze & Guattari in the plateau “1837: Of the Refrain” from “A Thousand Plateaus”. This is a conceptualisation of law’s emergence in a far-from-equilibrium palaeolithic hunter-gatherer pack, and contrasts to accounts of law’s origin in a founding violence or mythical contract. It is the ‘big bang’ of legality, and the opening up of a first image of legality, problematic of social organisation, and anthropomorphic knowledge space.     

A Retributive Argument Against Punishment

This paper proposes a retributive argument against punishment, where punishment is understood as going beyond condemnation or censure, and requiring hard treatment. The argument sets out to show that punishment cannot be justified. The argument does not target any particular attempts to justify punishment, retributive or otherwise. Clearly, however, if it succeeds, all such attempts fail. No argument for punishment is immune from the argument against punishment proposed here. The argument does not purport to be an argument only against retributive justifications of punishment, and so leave open the possibility of a sound non-retributive justification of punishment. Punishment cannot be justified, the paper argues, because it cannot be demonstrated that any punishment, no matter how minimal, is not a disproportionate retributive response to criminal wrongdoing. If we are to hold onto proportionality—that is, proportionality as setting a limit to morally permissible punishment—then punishment is morally impermissible. The argument is a retributive argument against punishment insofar as a just retributive response to wrongdoing must be proportionate to the wrongdoing. The argument, that is, is concerned with proportionality as a retributive requirement. The argument against punishment is set out on the basis of a familiar version of the ‘anchoring problem’, according to which it is the problem of determining the most severe punishment to anchor or ground the punishment scale. To meet the possible criticism that we have chosen a version of the anchoring problem particularly favourable to our argument, various alternative statements of the anchoring problem are considered. Considering such statements also provides a more rounded view of the anchoring problem. One such alternative holds that the punishment scale must be anchored not just in the most severe punishment, but in the least severe punishment as well. Other alternatives hold that it is necessary and sufficient to anchor the punishment scale in any two punishments, neither of which needs to be the most or least severe punishment. A further suggestion is that one anchoring point anywhere along the punishment scale is sufficient, because it is possible to ‘project’ from such a point, so as to determine the correlative punishments for all other crimes, and so derive a complete punishment scale. Finally, the suggestion is considered that one can approach the issue of a punishment scale ‘holistically’, denying any distinction between anchoring and derived (or ‘projected’) punishments.     

If error rate is such a simple concept,why don’t I have one for my forensic tool yet?

The Daubert decision motivates attempts to establish error rates for digital forensic tools. Many scientific procedures have been devised that can answer simple questions. For example, does a soil sample contain component X? A procedure can be followed that gives an answer with known rates of error. Usually the error rate of a process that tries to detect something is associated with a random component of some measurement. Typically there are two types of error, type I, also called a false positive (detecting it when it is not really there), and type II, also called a false negative (missing it when it really is there). At first thought, an error rate for a forensic acquisition tool or a write blocking tool is a simple concept. An obvious possibility for the error rate of an acquisition is k/n, where n is the total number of bits acquired and k is the number of incorrectly acquired bits. However, the kinds of errors in the soil test and in digital acquisition are fundamentally different. The errors in the soil test can be modeled with a random distribution that can be treated statistically, but the errors that occur in a digital acquisition are systematic and triggered by specific conditions. The purpose of this paper is not to define any error rates for forensic tools, but identification of some of the basic issues to stimulate discussion and further work on the topic.     

Requirement‐Sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment

Requirement‐sensitive legal moralism is a species of legal moralism in which the legitimacy of turning moral into legal demands depends on the existence of a legitimate moral requirement, producing a legitimate social requirement, which can then ground a legitimate legal requirement. Crucially, each step is defeasible by contingent or instrumental, but not intrinsic moral factors. There is no genuinely moral sphere (e.g., a private sphere) in which the law is not to interfere; only contingent, non‐moral factors can defeat this. Using William A. Edmundson's Three Anarchical Fallacies as a foil, this idea is spelled out; it is shown why considerations based on the harm principle, consent, and the fact of pluralism do not immediately defeat it, but several problems with Edmundson's account are examined to point out where the idea could be further developed.     

An Analysis of Consequentialism and Deontology in the Normative Ethics of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhagavadgītā</Emphasis>

This paper identifies the different normative ethical arguments stated and suggested by Arjuna and Krishna in the Gītā, analyzes those arguments, examines the interrelations between those arguments, and demonstrates that, contrary to a common view, both Arjuna and Krishna advance ethical theories of a broad consequentialist nature. It is shown that Krishna’s ethical theory, in particular, is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically valuable the twin consequences of mokṣa and lokasaṃgraha. It is also argued that Krishna’s teachings in the Gītā gain in depth, coherence, and critical relevance what they lose in simplicity when the ethical theory underlying those teachings is understood as a consequentialism of this kind rather than as a deontology.     

A Timely Jurisprudence for a Changing World

This article is an innovative piece and at the same time—a timely piece, in a world of global warming. A time in which fierce scientific debates are being fought over anthropogenic impact. Yet the general public would appear to ‘feel’ the change, without any need for measurement and contesting of findings. This ‘feeling’ is manifest in the Earth Hour. It is this collective act which I would argue is borne out of feelings for the earth. Feelings which tell people instinctively a change in behaviour is needed. This article therefore examines the semiotics of a jurisprudence which is premised on feelings. Feelings towards the Djang—a primordial force expounded by the Australian Aboriginal Senior Law Man Bill Neidjie of the world heritage listed—Kakadu National Park, Australia. He foresaw the climatic shifts and wanted to assist European Australians—Balanda to help avert the possible consequence.     

Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law

Non-refoulement is a principle of international law that precludesstates from returning a person to a place where he or she mightbe tortured or face persecution. The principle, codified inArticle 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, is subject to a numberof exceptions. This article examines the status of non-refoulementin international law in respect to three key areas: refugeelaw, human rights law and international customary law. The findingssuggest that while a prohibition on refoulement is part of internationalhuman rights law and international customary law, the evidencethat non-refoulement has acquired the status of a jus cogensnorm is less than convincing.     

Metaphorical Use of Algorithm in Legal Reasoning

The current use of big data in the legal framework suggests the idea of algorithm as a new topos of the legal rhetoric. Indeed, in addition to the “rhetoric of algorithm”, an “algorithm of rhetoric” may also exist, in strict connection with an anthropological structure. Even leaving aside its epistemic value, the algorithm is in fact always experienced by the jurist through a metaphorical process, in a very similar way, for instance, to the metaphorical use of graphs in economics (McCloskey). That said, the reasoning about big data is metaphorical as well, and this allows us to believe that there is still a role for pathos and ethos within the legal reasoning. Moreover, and most importantly, the ideal to which the data-based knowledge (the so called dataism) aims—that is, the pretension of being able to map all that there is to know—is metaphorical, too. In this paper I will discuss algorithms and big data in the guise of new topoi. The aim of this paper is therefore to imagine a philosophical-juridical semiotic by means of which it is possible to highlight the persistent difference between reasonableness and reason in the judge’s work. Vis-à-vis algorithms and big data, as well as the rules of law, the judge does not act as bouche de la loi, but rather practices a reason which is irreducibly rhetoric and related to the humanities.

     

General systems theory and criminal justice

Criminal justice agencies are organized sequentially — “output” from one agency is “input” to the next — but most scholars argue that criminal justice is not a system in a theoretical sense. In this article, it is argued that general systems theory (GST) reveals important insights into criminal justice structures and functions. Specifically, it is argued that the criminal justice system processes “cases” rather than people, and that the common goal of criminal justice processing is to “close cases so that they stay closed.” It also is argued that processing capacity progressively declines, in that at each system point the subsequent agency cannot input as many cases as the previous agency can output. Each agency therefore experiences “backward pressure” to close cases in order to reduce input to the next agency. Overall, this article highlights that criminal justice agents and agencies are best understood as operating in the context of the larger whole, thus it is concluded that criminal justice is a system in the sense of general systems theory.     

Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom

The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.     

Going for the throat: Carnivore in an Echelon World — Part I

Carnivore is a surveillance technology, a software program housed in a computer unit, which is installed by properly authorized FBI agents on a particular Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) network. The Carnivore software system is used together with a tap on the ISP’s network to “intercept, filter, seize and decipher digital communications on the Internet”. The system is described as a “specialized network analyzer” that works by “sniffing” a network and copying and storing a warranted subset of its traffic. In the FBI’s own words “Carnivore chews on all data on the network, but it only actually eats the information authorized by a court order”. This article, in two parts, will provide an overview of the FBI’s Carnivore electronic surveillance system. The Carnivore software’s evolution, its ‘prey’ and the system’s relationship with Internet Service Providers will be the focus of the study. (Although the FBI’s Carnivore surveillance system is now officially called DCS1000, as the surveillance system is more commonly referred to as “Carnivore”, that term will be used throughout). Also addressed in the article are misconceptions about Carnivore, publicly available sniffer programs, Carnivore’s functionality, methods to counter Carnivore as well as the software’s limitations. In addition, the pertinent American law allowing for wiretapping and electronic surveillance as well as programs and policies outside the United States regarding electronic surveillance are surveyed, and an overview of ECHELON, the global interception and relay system, is provided. The aim is to provide the paper’s readers with a better understanding of these surveillance systems: naturally, only through an in-depth knowledge can the benefits and dangers they present for the public (government), private (individual communications users) and technical industry (ISPs) be understood.     

The Event and the Subject: The (IM)Possible Rehabilitation of Carl Schmitt

The subject is the bearer of the sovereign decision, according to C. Schmitt. This decision grounds on certain situational pragmatics, yet mainly is born out of a ‘null’; as the decision forms the political normalcy that follows after, it displays its nature as an ‘event’. This subject is simultaneously a legal and a political one; it is the founder of the Nomos. This founding subject has been eclipsed in alignment with its post-modernly acclaimed ‘death’. The subject is deemed to have been inherently divided, as long as its identity steadily postpones itself, is incessantly ‘differing’, according to the deconstructionist approach; or it is considered as fundamentally ‘passive’, meaning not so much ‘weak’, but rather dethroning the Western preoccupation with the active autonomous individual; or, it is maintained but intrinsically reversed, now held either as part of a fundamental ontological order and indirectly of the nature (Agamben), or, opposite to Kantian assumptions, as primarily captured in a radical heteronomy, which constitutes it as a proper ethical subject (Levinas). Crucial is how to develop a concept taking into account the eventfulness of the constitution of the subject, without effacing the political character of such constitution by reducing it to non-political discourses, i.e., to metaphysics, morals or economics; how to conceive of Derrida’s ‘democracy to-come’ as political event, namely both as secular act and in the same time as referring to extramundane fundaments (to a ‘political theology’?); how to go beyond the linearity of the liberalist ideology by equating the political event with a messianic miracle ‘without messianism’; how to ‘salute’ democracy?     

论命题与经验证据和科学证据符合

在逻辑学上,证实与证明不同,证实只能显现一个命题之然,而证明则可以显现一个命题之所以然。法官要想获得一个完整的内心确信,不仅要知其然,而且必须知其所以然,因此,诉讼证明活动中,一个命题的核证性标准由真的证实标准和证明标准有机构成———命题与经验证据符合就是真的证实标准,命题与科学证据符合就是真的证明标准。与保证性标准意义下的真不同,这里的真总是自以为真,是感觉为真,具有相对性,是可错的。     

Towards the Law &; Economics of development: Ragnar Nurkse (1907–1959)

The purpose of this essay is, first, to suggest Ragnar Nurkse as a Law & Economics thinker, and second, yet more importantly, to demonstrate the possibility and desirability of a Law & Economics of Development along Nurksean lines. Ragnar Nurkse (1907–1959), whose 100th birthday is celebrated in 2007, is one of the founding fathers of classic development economics. Given the recent interest in the Law & Economics of development, showing how a classic figure in the field successfully used such an approach might be of considerable interest, especially as development economics is a very emotional field which may well profit from the ‘objectivizing’ function of Law & Economics. Nurkse’s economics-based realism, his focus on what effect a program really has, rather than what it is supposed to have, and on what a policy can steer or change and what not, based on a typically Stiglerian attention to aggregate welfare, seem especially productive. Finally, the essay suggests a set of Nurkse-based principles or theses for a Law & Economics of Development.

The Gender Gap among Teen Survey Respondents: Why are Boys more Likely to Report a Gun in the Home than Girls?

It is a reliable though unexplained feature of national surveys that include items on gun ownership that wives are less likely to report a gun in the home than husbands. In this article we extend the inquiry regarding this gender gap in reporting of household guns to include adolescent children (age 12–17 years). The California Health Interview Survey of 2001, the largest-ever state survey of its kind, includes over 4000 marital households in which both a parent and adolescent child were interviewed and asked whether there was a gun in the home. There is little “age gap” in reporting—California teens are almost as likely to say that there is a gun as are their parents—but there is a gender gap among both the teens and their parents. We also find a large gap in personal experience with guns—boys are three times as likely to report hunting or shooting with a family member than girls. This difference in experience fully accounts for the gender gap in reporting. The relevance of these findings for the interpretation of survey data is clear. Whether there is a gun reported in a home depends to a remarkable extent on which member of the household is asked the question. Hence, the method of selection of respondent(s) from within a household will affect estimates of the patterns and prevalence of gun ownership, and, potentially, the accuracy of case–control studies that use self-report information about guns in the home.

A Dilemma for Protected Reasons

Joseph Raz’s account of norms provides that a norm requiring an agent to φ is a reason to φ protected by an exclusionary reason not to act on some other reasons. I present a dilemma concerning the determination of the contents of this set of excluded reasons. The question is whether or not the set includes reasons that count in favour of φing. If the answer is yes, the account is committed to a picture of norms that seems inconsistent with the phenomenology, in that it rules out acting on the very reasons on which the norm is based. If the answer is no, the account licenses a problematic form of double counting of reasons. I conclude that Raz’s protected reasons account of norms must be rejected, and tentatively suggest a solution to the problem posed by the dilemma.     

Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination

Two recent books, Joseph Weiler's The Constitution of Europe and Larry Siedentop's Democracy in Europe, seek to address one of the defining issues in contemporary European legal studies; the search for a European public philosophy. Both site their critiques within a particular jurisprudential tradition, the modernist; one that is bound up with anxieties about legitimacy and constitutionalism. This review article suggests that the ‘new’ Europe has been too easily distracted by the lures of constitutionalism, and more particularly by the temptations of Treaties. Public philosophies are not found in Treaty articles. Rather, a public philosophy is a state of mind, a product of the political imagination. And it is the absence of such an imagination which lies at the root of contemporary concerns regarding constitutionalism and legitimacy; the concerns which underpin Weiler's and Siedentop's books. A discussion of these books, in the first two parts of this article, is followed by a discussion of Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz's ‘universal’ jurisprudence. It is suggested that such a jurisprudence is better able to furnish a public philosophy for the ‘new’ Europe; just as, indeed, it was for the ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, such a jurisprudence is far more than a mere theory of laws and constitutions. Leibniz's jurisprudence requires that we think, not merely ‘beyond’ sovereignty, or even beyond democracy, but beyond constitutionalism.     

The A Simili Argument: An Inferentialist Setting

The A Simili Argument draws the conclusion that a target case has a normative property Q since it shares a relevant property P with a source case. It can be seen as a complex inference constituted by three inferential steps: An abduction of the relevant property P, an induction of the class having that property, and a deduction of the target's having property Q. A major problem of this argument is the characterization of the property relevance. The standard answer refers to the notion of ratio: It is the ratio that fixes what is relevant for what. But the determination of the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. This issue is considered here from an inferentialist point of view, claiming that the ratio and relevance are determined by the normative statuses reciprocally attributed by the speakers in the context of legal argumentation.     

The law and the sublime: Rethinking the self and its boundaries

Christine Battersby has argued that it is Kant (and not Descartes) who provides the paradigm model of what it is to be a self in modernity. The Kantian self is established in opposition to its other. The body is commonly envisaged as a container, with selfhood as something that is defended against the outside. In contrast, she proposes a feminist reworking of such a model of selfhood, applicable to both men and women, in which the self and other emerge over time through patterns of relationality. This paper introduces Battersby’s work by focusing upon her early analysis of Kantian aesthetics, in particular the sublime. The aim is to draw out some of the legal and political implications of her work, particularly with regard to the common law’s developing conception of privacy. This is carried out by distinguishing her ontological position from the psychology of Carol Gilligan and then by considering the overlapping concerns of Jennifer Nedelsky in the area of legal theory.