The participatory principle in development projects: the costs and benefits of cooperation

Many development theorists and practitioners, including those in key agencies like the World Bank and UNDP, now see participation as critical to successful project implementation, and strongly support cooperative organizational systems. This article cautions against undue optimism about such forms of organization, and attempts to explain their limited success when they compete with private firms by applying rational choice theory to behaviour in cooperative systems. It examines the relevance of assumptions of self interest, opportunism and bounded rationality in such solidaristic organizations, then uses them to calculate the costs and benefits of using participatory systems. It shows that these costs are likely to outweigh the benefits in large organizations unless participatory processes are effectively associated with managerial autonomy, appropriate incentives, sanctions and hierarchies. © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cracking the whip: the deliberative costs of strict party discipline

ABSTRACT

This article explores the deliberative costs incurred when political parties rely on strict discipline to attain unity. I begin with a brief discussion aimed at clarifying the notion of strict party discipline. The second section explores how such discipline affects the formation, expression and reception of dissenting views. In the third section, I go on to outline two approaches towards deliberation in Parliament: the epistemic approach and the political justification approach. I argue that the impact of strict party discipline on dissenting views entails costs on legislative deliberation conceptualised in either way. The fourth section highlights how intra-party deliberation could potentially mitigate the deliberative costs outlined in this article. Finally, I turn to the implications of my analysis for assessing party discipline, and then I take a closer look at the case of India’s anti-defection law, demonstrating why the deliberative costs outlined in this article are particularly severe there.     

Discounting the benefits and costs of environmental regulations

This paper develops a two-stage procedure for discounting the benefits and costs of environmental regulations that is a variant of the shadow price of capital approach. Under this approach, the capital costs imposed by a regulation are annualized using the marginal rate of return on capital and then both benefits and costs are discounted using the social rate of time preference. This approach yields results that differ significantly from those of conventional discounting when benefits occur with a substantial lag or when benefits are long term.     

Evaluating the benefits and costs of the job corps

Social programs have a wide variety of effects and often have the explicit objective of improving the economic status of the people they serve. In order to be useful to policymakers, benefit—cost analysis of social programs should explicitly take account of these two important program features. The approach used in this analysis of the benefits and costs of the Job Corps does this and provides a useful methodology for evaluating other social programs. According to the analysis, the program has substantial net value for society as a whole as well as for the average Corpsmember.     

Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1985

The 84.3 million workers protected by workers' compensation laws in 1985 represented 87 percent of all wage and salary workers in that year. Both the amount of benefits paid to workers and the cost of the program to employers rose substantially from 1984 to 1985. Benefit payments totaled $22.5 billion-14.1 percent higher than in 1984 and the largest annual increase since 1978-79. About two-thirds of the payments in 1985 were money payments ($15.1 billion) and the remainder ($7.4 billion) went for medical care for disabled workers. Private insurance companies made nearly three-fifths of these payments and State funds and self-insured employers each paid about one-fifth of the total benefit amount in 1985. For the first time since 1978, the annual growth in employer costs exceeded the growth in workers' benefits, resulting in a slight decrease in the loss ratio for 1984-85. Employer costs were up nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching an estimated $29.3 billion. Covered payrolls increased by 7 percent in that same period. Total benefit payments as a percent of payroll also increased noticeably in 1985.     

Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1982

Workers' compensation provides medical care and income maintenance protection to workers disabled from work-related injury or illness. This program is of considerable interest to the Social Security Administration (SSA) from several perspectives. For example, since 1965 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits and workers' compensation payments have been integrated. Information on the experience under workers' compensation provides a framework for examining questions concerning gaps and overlaps in the Nation's social insurance system. In addition, since December 1969 SSA has administered claims filed through 1973 under part B of the Black Lung program--the program providing income maintenance protection to coal miners disabled by pneumoconiosis. The workers' compensation experience reported here consists of information on benefits for work-related injury and disease, including data on the combined benefits paid under the entire Federal Black Lung program administered by the Labor Department and SSA.     

New party challenges and partisan change: The effects of party competition on party loyalty

It has long been established that changes in the electorate can have an impact on party systems, sometimes leading to the creation of new parties and the elimination of old ones. We contend, however, that changes in the party system may cause voters to reassess their party identification absent of any long-term change in the overall makeup or attitudes of the electorate. As a case in point, we demonstrate that changes in the Canadian party system in the late 1980s (specifically the advent of the right-wing Reform Party) led to a decline in party loyalty among supporters of the right-center Progressive Conservative Party. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of party systems and partisan change.     

Labor market policy: A comparative view on the costs and benefits of labor market flexibility

I review theories and evidence on wage‐setting institutions and labor market policies in an international comparative context. These include collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection laws, unemployment insurance (UI), mandated parental leave, and active labor market policies (ALMPs). Since it is unlikely that an unregulated private sector would provide the income insurance these institutions do, these policies may enhance economic efficiency. However, to the extent that unemployment or resource misallocation results from such measures, these efficiency gains may be offset. Overall, Scandinavia and Central Europe follow distinctively more interventionist policies than the English‐speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere. Possible explanations for such differences include vulnerability to external market forces and ethnic homogeneity. I then review evidence on the impacts of these policies and institutions. While the interventionist model appears to cause lower levels of wage inequality and high levels of job security to incumbent workers, it also in some cases leads to the relegation of new entrants (disproportionately women, youth, and immigrants) as well as the less skilled to temporary jobs or unemployment. Making labor markets more flexible could bring these groups into the regular labor market to a greater extent, at the expense of higher levels of economic insecurity for incumbents and higher levels of wage inequality. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The benefits and costs of the Section 8 housing subsidy program: A framework and estimates of first‐year effects

This paper provides estimates for a comprehensive set of social benefits and costs associated with the federal Housing Choice Voucher ( Section 8 ) program. The impact categories for which we provide empirical estimates include the value of the voucher to recipients; additional services and public benefits induced by voucher receipt; improvements in children's health, education, and criminal behaviors; the costs of voucher provision; the labor supply impacts on voucher recipients; and community effects. These estimates rest largely on empirical analyses of the effect of voucher receipt on several recipient and taxpayer behaviors and outcomes that occur in the first year of voucher receipt. The analysis distinguishes benefits and costs accruing to program participants, nonparticipants—including taxpayers and property owners—and society as a whole. Our analysis suggests that the program is likely to meet the efficiency standard of positive net social benefits. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Social movements and party systems: The French socialist party and new social movements

This article examines the apparent difficulty of various French ‘new social movements’ of the 1970s and 1980s to coalesce in the form of a ‘green’ or ‘new politics’ party. In addition to the nature of the French electoral system and dominant policy‐making apparatus, this article focuses upon relations between the Socialist Party and feminist and ecology movements. The major argument is that the Socialists, in their bid for hegemony among the left throughout the 1970s and 1980s, effectively undercut post‐material value‐oriented support for a ‘new politics’ party.     

The party road to representation: Unequal responsiveness in party platforms

This paper explores a major road to substantive representation in democracies, by clarifying whether demands of rich and poor citizens are taken up in the electoral platforms of political parties. Doing so constitutes a substantial broadening and deepening of our understanding of substantive representation – broadening the countries, issue-areas and years that form the empirical basis for judging whether democracies manifest unequal representation; and deepening the process of representation by clarifying a key pathway connecting societal demands to policy outcomes. The paper hypothesises that party systems in general will respond more strongly to wealthy than to poor segments of a polity. It also hypothesises that left parties will more faithfully represent poorer and less significantly represent richer citizens than do right parties. We find substantial support for these expectations in a new dataset that combines multi-country, multi-issue-area, multi-wave survey data with data on party platforms for 39 democracies.     

Toward the usable recognition of individual benefits and costs in regulatory analysis and governance

Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe have well‐deserved reputations for fixating on the total benefits and costs of proposed and final regulatory actions, without doing any more than anecdotally mentioning the subpopulations and individuals who may bear disproportionate costs or reap disproportionate benefits. This is especially true on the “cost” side of the cost–benefit ledger, where analysts exert little effort to even inform decisionmakers and the public that the costs of regulations might be distributed either regressively or progressively. Many scholars and advocates have observed that regulation can increase the efficiency of market outcomes, but caution about its untoward (or suboptimal) effects on equity. Here, we argue that without considering distributional information about costs and benefits, regulatory policies in fact can also cause violence to notions of efficiency, for two reasons: (i) society cannot hope to approach Pareto‐efficient outcomes without identifying those who must lose so that others can gain more; and (ii) because the harm experienced by involuntary risks and by imposed regulatory costs is likely non‐linear in its magnitude (at the individual level), efficiency is, in fact, a strong function of the shape of the distribution of these effects. This article reviews evidence about the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits, describes how agencies fail to incorporate readily available distributional information, and sketches a vision for how they could analyze costs and benefits to promote more efficient regulatory choices and outcomes.     

学习型党组织与执政党的社会知识管理能力

创新性地提出社会知识管理能力的新概念,分析了学习型党组织与社会知识管理能力之间的关系,阐述了提高执政党的社会知识管理能力的必要性,结合深圳经验就如何提高党的社会知识管理能力提出了建议。