Class voting in Western industrialized countries, 1945–1990: Systematizing and testing explanations

Abstract. Analyzing data obtained from the literature and our own calculations, significant differences were found among countries in their levels of class voting. The Scandinavian countries had the highest and Canada and the USA the lowest levels of class voting. Since the 1950s, there was a decline in almost all countries in the level of class voting. In this article, several hypotheses were deduced from a limited number of individual assumptions, each purporting to explain the differences among and declining trends within countries. Testing these hypotheses with multilevel techniques revealed that differences among countries can best be explained by their population's religious–ethnic–linguistic diversity, and by the union density within countries. The decline in most countries can best be explained by the rise in their standard of living. Furthermore, a rise in the percentage of union members, especially among the nonmanual classes, accelerated the decline in the level of class voting in some countries.     

The Enduring Scandinavian Party System

The frozen party hypothesis has been rejected in several contemporary studies. However, by conceptualizing the Scandinavian parties in three categories, and by focusing the study on the three pole parties originally emphasized by Stein Rokkan, the bulk of the Scandinavian party system is still frozen. Diminishing class voting and electoral instability are inefficient measures of how well cleavages structures are reflected in the party system. Cleavages must be understood in a broader context where the struggle between the three fronts to incorporate new categories of voters is the very essence of an enduring cleavage structure.     

Class voting and the differential role of political values: evidence from 12 West-European countries

Influential theories of class voting assume that the phenomenon occurs because classes hold different political values, which in turn affect their party preference. However, we do not know how important this mechanism is. Hence, this article uses high-quality survey data from 12 Western European countries to study the association between class and voting. The results suggest that political values – including non-economic values – play a central role in accounting for this association, although substantial class differences persist even when holding political values constant. I furthermore argue that the relevance of this mechanism should vary by party family. Political values should account for class voting to the extent that parties give the voters clear signals on issues of relevance to the value orientations. As such, party behaviour not only affects the level of class voting, but the very nature of the link between class and voting. This article contributes first by testing one of the most important theories of the mechanisms behind class voting, and second by demonstrating how the parties’ behaviour affects this mechanism.     

Social Class, Sector Employment, and Gender as Party Cleavages in the Scandinavian Countries: A Comparative Longitudinal Study, 1970–95

This article studies the changing impact of social class, sector employment, and gender with regard to party choice in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, from the 1970s to the 1990s, using election survey data. Political parties in the three countries are grouped into four party groups: left socialist, social democratic, centrist, and rightist parties.
Class voting has declined in all three countries. The focus on the four party groups shows that differences between the wage-earner classes have declined for the social democratic and rightist party groups. By contrast, 'class voting' has increased for the left socialist parties, which increasingly have concentrated their support among the new middle class.
Sector employment became an important party cleavage in all three countries in the 1990s. The impact of sector was generally largest in Denmark and Norway in the 1980s and 1990s. The sector cleavage also follows the left–right division of parties to a greater degree than previously. Sector differences in voting behaviour are most pronounced with regard to voting for the left socialist and the rightist parties.
Gender differences in voting behaviour have increased and changed character in all three countries. In the 1970s, men supported the socialist parties to a greater extent than women; in the 1990s men supported the rightist parties to a greater extent than women in all three countries, whereas women supported the left socialist parties and (in Sweden) the Green Party to a greater degree than men. The effects of gender are generally reduced when sector employment is introduced into the multivariate analysis, indicating that the different sector employment of men and of women explains part of the gender gap in voting behaviour.     

Class Dealignment in Britain Revisited

Recent tranformations in voting patterns have made Britain one of the best known examples of electoral dealignment in Western Europe. But recently Heath, Jowell and Curtice have defended older accounts of class voting by questioning whether there has been any change at all in relative class voting, as measured by a particular index, the odds ratio. This article first outlines the innovative elements in Heath el al.’s argument. Second, it demonstrates that the odds ratio is a highly volatile and hard‐to‐interpret statistic. Third, it shows that other elements of Heath el al.’s empirical analysis do not substantiate their case. Fourth, it disputes the strategy of focusing only upon ‘relative class voting’, and argues that the growth of third‐party voting is a symptom of class dealignment, rather than a factor which must be discounted in advance before assessing trends in class voting.     

Class voting, social changes and political changes in the Netherlands 1971–2006

To what extent can the decline of class voting in the Netherlands be explained by sociological factors (compositional changes, the evolution of the class structure and economic progressivism) and political factors (a party-merger and changing party positions)? Multinomial logit (MNP) and conditional logit (CL) are employed using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (1971–2006) and data of the Comparative Manifesto Project. We find that the rise of the class of social-cultural specialists is important for understanding changes in the class–vote relationship. Surprisingly, the impact of economic progressivism became more important for left-wing voting. Finally, although there seems to be a clear relation between party positions and the strength of class-based voting, the party positions hardly explain the assumed linear decline in class-based voting.     

Class,Party and Ideology: A Danish Case Study of Electoral Behaviour in Referendums*

In this paper elements of a theory of electoral behaviour in referendums are presented and tested on a theoretically important case. Among the main determining factors — social class, political party and ideological attitude — it is shown that on a relatively simple issue with low importance for the everyday life of the voters, ideological attitude is far more important than politicál party and social class in explaining referendum voting. On this basis a scheme of analysis and a number of hypotheses are suggested for further study.     

Class voting and left voting in Scandinavia

Abstract. This article examines the effects of different definitions of the working class on the measurement of class voting and left voting in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. First, the similarities and differences in how the working class has been operationalized in the three countries are summarized. To determine the effects of different operationalizations, Swedish election survey data are recoded to conform more closely to the classification procedures used in Danish and Norwegian studies. The analysis shows that if a similar operationalization is used, the level of left voting in both the Swedish working and middle classes increases and the Alford index of class voting declines. Class voting and left voting in the younger and older generations and among women and men are also discussed. Dissimilar patterns of class voting and left voting among women in the three countries are largely a product of different classification schemes. The concluding discussion points to a number of problems in using the Alford index as a summary statistic in cross-national comparisons.     

The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro‐scepticism a government‐opposition dynamic?

Scandinavian party competition has incorporated divisions over European integration to a greater degree than most West European party systems, but with considerable variation in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. From a comparative politics perspective this raises questions about the relatively high salience of Euro‐scepticism in Scandinavian politics, the differences between the three cases and changes over time. The central argument in this article is that Europeanisation of party politics ‐ the translation of issues related to European integration into domestic party politics ‐ is driven by the dynamics of long‐ and short‐term government‐opposition competition, and the key driver of change is party strategy. Whether at the centre or extremes of the party system, Euro‐scepticism is a product of party competition — and is, both in its origins and development, ‘the politics of opposition ‘.     

Electoral volatility: Issue effects and basic change in 23 post-war democracies

Growing differences between party votes in successive elections have raised the possibility that party systems are undergoing fundamental change. This cannot be settled until aggregate vote differences are separated into those normally produced by new issues and candidates, and those reflecting an erosion of core support. A saliency theory of party competition and electoral response is used to quantify net shifts in voting produced by issues identified on the basis of campaign reports. Estimates are validated by comparison with others produced on different assumptions and through their success in predicting election results in ten countries. By ‘controlling’ these issue effects we can estimate Basic Votes for each party and election and see whether they have changed.     

When Supply Creates Demand: Social Democratic Party Strategies and the Evolution of Class Voting

This paper focuses on the policy strategies adopted by social democratic parties and their impact on the class basis of their support. It is argued that political appeals matter for explaining the development of class voting. This argument is tested through a comparison of the policy strategies of social democratic parties in Austria and Switzerland and the evolving patterns of class voting in the two countries. Using election surveys and data on the policy positions and media representation of the political parties from the 1970s to the 2000s, the article finds that the Social Democratic Party in Austria maintained a strong working class base. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party in Switzerland facilitated a major transformation of the class basis of its support by emphasising new cultural issues. It became the party of the ‘new middle classes’, leaving the working class to realign in support of the Swiss People’s Party.     

Victorian Voting: The Origins of Party Orientation and Class Alignment

Much of what we know about the alignment of voters with parties comes from mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from aggregate electoral data. Using individual elector-level panel data from nineteenth-century United Kingdom poll books, we reassess the development of a party centered electorate. We show that (a) the electorate was party-centered by the time of the extension of the franchise in 1867, (b) a decline in candidate-centered voting is largely attributable to changes in the behavior of the working class, and (c) the enfranchised working class aligned with the Liberal left. This early alignment of the working class with the left cannot entirely be explained by a decrease in vote buying. The evidence suggests instead that the alignment was based on the programmatic appeal of the Liberals. We argue that these facts can plausibly explain the subsequent development of the party system.     

The sources of tactical voting in British parliamentary elections, 1983–1987

Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of different approaches to tactical voting. Specifically, we are concerned with how the competitive situation in each constituency affects voters' likelihood of voting tactically, as well as the role of voters' attitudes and personal characteristics. We find that voters are less sensitive to the actual marginality of a district than to whether or not their party has a chance of winning the seat. In addition, we find that party identification, and particularly intense loyalty, dampen the tendency to vote tactically, regardless of the type of district. We also consider differences in tactical voting between constituencies where Labour dominates vs. districts where the Conservatives are strongest. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these findings for the study of voting behavior.A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1991 meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, March 1991.     

Preference votes without preference? Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment

A classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.     

Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election

This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition.     

Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left,centre‐right and radical right

The rise of the radical right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western Europe. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as the two dominant party poles of the twentieth century – the left and the centre‐right – are challenged by a third pole of the radical right. Between 2000 and 2015, the radical right has secured more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries. This article shows how electoral competition between the three party poles plays out at the micro level of social classes. It presents a model of class voting that distinguishes between classes that are a party's preserve, classes that are contested strongholds of two parties and classes over which there is an open competition. Using seven rounds of the European Social Survey, it shows that sociocultural professionals form the party preserve of the left, and large employers and managers the preserve of the centre‐right. However, the radical right competes with the centre‐right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the left over its working‐class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the co‐existence of old and new patterns of class voting. Old patterns are structured by an economic conflict: Production workers vote for the left and small business owners for the centre‐right based on their economic attitudes. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the radical right and structured by a cultural conflict.     

Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments

Increasingly a case is being made that voting systems are highly manipulable —whether by strategic voting, agenda setting, or vote trading. Yet there exists little hard evidence on the actual extent of manipulation in real world settings¹ To a large degree this lack of evidence is a result of voting methods that allow only partial recovery of individual preferences over multiple alternatives and of a natural desire of legislators not to publicize misrepresentation of preferences or strategic agenda setting. Yet if we are to understand the empirical relevance of recent advances in the theory of voting, attempts must be made to apply new theoretical work to real world voting situations. In this paper we attempt to do this for voting in Scandinavian legislatures.
Our major concern is with effects of the order of voting on legislative proposals and with strategic voting that takes advantage of existing voting orders. Two distinct approaches are used. First, we present a detailed analysis of three situations in the Swedish parliament in which strategic voting was relevant. From these we conclude that when manipulation occurs in the Swedish context, it is not by altering the order of voting or by the creation of new, confounding alternatives, but by using strategic voting to take advantage of existing voting circumstances. Second, we take a more sweeping but less detailed look at voting in the Scandinavian legislatures. It appears from this analysis that the major way in which strategic voting is avoided is by limiting the number of alternatives to two.     

Feelings about party leaders as a voter's heuristic – what happens when the leaders change? A note

Recent analyses of voting at British general elections deploy a valence theory according to which electors evaluate each party's performance and policies and vote accordingly. Many voters, however, avoid at least some of the effort involved in assembling and assessing information about parties' policies and instead use heuristics such as their feelings about the party leaders as major determinants of their decisions. When party leaders are changed, therefore, differences in voters' feelings about predecessor and successor could lead to changes in party choice. That argument is tested for the 2015 and 2017 British general elections in England, between which all three largest parties changed their leader, with results entirely consistent with the argument. In addition, there were significant changes in feelings about the new party leaders during the six weeks of the 2017 campaign, and these too were linked to final voting choices in the expected directions.     

Uncovering the micro-foundations of turnout and electoral systems

This paper tackles the micro-foundations of voting and addresses why proportional representation systems (PR) are associated with higher turnout than majoritarian systems (SMD). I argue that individual evaluations of the differential benefit in the calculus of voting are affected by spatial party competition framed by electoral institutions. Unlike PR, SMD constrains the number of parties and creates large centripetal forces for party competition, which reduces the perceived benefits of voting. A citizen’s voting propensity is related to the distance between her preferred policy position and those of her most- and least-favored parties. I use multilevel modeling to analyze individual voting decisions structured by aggregate variables across 64 elections. The empirical findings confirm the argument and the mechanism holds both in established and non-established democracies.     

The calculus of dissent: Party discipline in the British Labour government, 1974–1979

The strength of political parties is taken to be one central difference between the political systems of the United States and the United Kingdom. We analyze defection from party line voting within the British Labour Party in the House of Commons between 1974 and 1979 to suggest that this dichotomy is overdrawn. In fact, the analysis shows that the dynamics of legislative behavior are quite similar in the two systems, notwithstanding the significant institutional differences between a separation of powers system and the West-minster model. Members of Parliament, like American Congressmen, balance the demands of their constituents, activists within their local party, and party leadership, as well as wage intraparty battles over the direction of policy.