Ministerial Advisers and the Politics of Policy‐Making: Bureaucratic Permanence and Popular Control

The advent of ministerial advisers of the partisan variety – a third element interposing itself into Westminster's bilateral monopoly – has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of ministerial advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s – and in particular machinery of government design – was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of ministerial advisers in the policy‐making process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the ‘politics of policy‐making’. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of ministerial advisers to policy‐making in executive government.     

Too Many or Too Few? The Increase in Federal Ministerial Advisers 1972–1999

This paper examines recently published figures that show the increase in ministerial staff between 1972 and 1996 (Dunn 1997). A careful examination of the table in Dunn's book reveals it gives a misleading impression of the number of ministerial staff; the number of advisory staff to ministers; and the growth in advisory resources over the Hawke–Keating period. By re-analysing the figures the paper reveals the reality of the growth in advisory staff to ministers in 1972–1999. It provides an account of the number of staff providing policy and political advice to ministers in ministerial offices, rather than total staff numbers. It reveals advisory resources to ministers have grown significantly since the introduction of ministerial advisers in 1972. However, the growth in adviser numbers over the Hawke–Keating period was more modest than is suggested by Dunn's table. The paper provides the base data needed for a discussion of the increase in ministerial staff and whether there are too few or too many federal ministerial advisers.     

THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT A PARTICIPANT'S PERSECTIVE*

Hasluck is unusual in the lengths he went to the define the responsibilities of the various offices in which he was involved. Many of the functions and processes of government have changed since Hasluck was an active participant in the political process. Interest groups have increasingly influenced political decision-making, organisations external to the public service now play a greater role in influencing the development of public policy, the operation of a number of areas of the public service has become more visible and open to external scrutiny, there has been a constant trend towards political appointments within the public service, and it appears unlikely that the emphasis on public relations and marketing techniques as an integral feature of government communication will diminish. Likewise, the demands on ministers' time have increased and, while it is questionable whether ministers now handle a larger ministerial workload than Hasluck did, it is doubtful whether very many then or since have had his capacity for hard work or for handing the matters which cross their desk without the support of a professional advisory staff. The functions and operations of government evolve and the adaptation of roles and functions may not necessarily weaken the effectiveness of government administration. However, the fundamental tenet of Hasluck's writings on the roles of government remains compelling: the participants in the various areas of government should have an appreciation of the constitutional responsibilities of their position, its relationship to other areas of government and the fundamental principles which are required to maintain the credentials of the office into the future.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF IN AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This study examines the ministerial staff in Australian commonwealth government to discover what they do and how they assist ministers in achieving political control of departments. The data consist of interviews with ministers, departmental secretaries and ministerial staff. The study finds that ministerial staff offer policy advice in much the same way as found by James Walter in his study almost a decade before this one. But there does appear to be more emphasis on monitoring departmental implementation of policy and brokering positions within government than was the case in the earlier study. The study concludes that the relationship between ministers and their offices and the departmental secretaries is characterised by a conditionally cooperative approach, which is similar to that recommended by several public administration scholars.     

LET THE MANAGERS GOVERN: MINISTER-BUREAUCRAT RELATIONSHIPS IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Abstract: This article considers the relationships between ministers and chief executives in the New South Wales Liberal-National government. It looks at how ministers have set about taking charge of the public service against the background of the new political and economic realities confronting the state government. Senior ministers have consciously sought to limit their dependence on public servants and they have used a range of strategies to do so. They have remoulded the public service in a new "managerialised" form. Policy-making has been further internalised into ministerial offices and party circles and away from departments. The role of cabinet has been strengthened to impose a new corporate purpose as a counterbalance to traditional departmental interests. New incentive systems, based on contract employment and performance agreements, have been introduced to focus public service loyalties on the goals of the government. Advocates of managerialism, usually career public servants, have been appointed to key positions. Ministerial advisers have been used as countervailing sources of advice and as extensions of ministerial authority. Many ministers themselves have assumed an involved style of ministerial management of departments.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF UNDER HAWKE

Abstract: The establishment by the present Labor government of an advisory panel on ministerial staff appointments is discussed. It is suggested that this procedure had political benefits, but did not significantly influence the composition of the ministerial staff group. The ministerial staff of the ALP government are described and compared with those of the previous ALP government 1972-75, and of the Liberal-National Party coalition government 1975-83. It is found that there has been a weakening of the bureaucratic element in this government's private offices compared with both the coalition government and the previous Labor government. The ascendance of "political types" is matched by a commitment to the party program and a high estimate among staffers of their contribution to the policy-making process. In other respects this group shares with its predecessors the characteristics of being mostly male, relatively young, highly educated and disproportionately from non-government schools. About half are from inside and half from outside the public service.     

Australian Ministerial Advisers and the Royal Commission on Government Administration

The role of the ministerial office was one of the key issues investigated by the Royal Commission on Australian Gvoernment Administration (RCAGA) in 1976. At the time the ministerial office was undergoing new and controversial developments. In the 25 years since the Royal Commission the new ministerial office has become a permanent and accepted part of our machinery of government. This paper reviews RCAGA’s analysis of ministerial advisers and uses research on the Keating advisers in 1995–96 to track how the institution of the ministerial office has developed since the time of the Royal Commission.     

A signal failure: Sports grants,public servants,and traffic lights

The Auditor General's performance audit into the failings of the Community Sport Infrastructure Grant Program has led to a ministerial resignation and a parliamentary inquiry. The media melee prompted by the ‘sports rorts’ affair has focussed on political corruption of process, with a concentration on the role of ministerial advisers. This is only part of the story. This article argues that on this occasion the Australian Public Service (APS) did not acquit itself well, and that the affair was triggered by an administrative failure to advise on threshold legal and procedural issues: what is termed the ‘traffic light’ role of a professional public service. The article considers how such policy advice failings may have occurred, and whether APS performance in this instance is an indicator of declining institutional capacity.     

Advisers and Decisions 1976*

On 13 December 1975 the Liberal‐Country party coalition led by Malcolm Fraser conclusively won a double dissolution election with large majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. The following year, 1976, was a year of policy debates – debates about economic policy, foreign policy, family policy, health policy (especially Medibank), uranium and the environment, human rights and Aboriginal land policy in particular. They were, in reality, political struggles over the direction of the country and the ideas and philosophy that would govern the course of policy. At the core of government there was an epic battle between the Prime Minister and the government's senior advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Significant battles over foreign policy were modest compared with struggles over economic policy and the quest to control inflation. Debate came to a head with a devaluation of the dollar in the face of official advice. Among the consequences were division of the Treasury and creation of the Department of Finance, greater independence of the Reserve Bank and a confirmation of the need for elected leaders to have their own political staffs.     

The politics of government reorganizations: Evidence from 30 OECD countries, 1980–2014

Revisiting the seminal study of March and Olson (1983), this article aimed to empirically test whether or not government reorganizations at the ministerial level can be better explained by political factors than administrative and functional rhetoric. Government reorganizations have often been understood as functional adaptations to increase organizational efficiency and effectiveness, but little empirical research has been conducted on their political context. By analyzing pooled‐time series data from 30 OECD countries from 1980–2014 taken from the Statesman's Yearbook, this article sought to examine whether changes in political power are associated with government reorganizations and whether their intensity is affected by the country's political system (parliamentarism or presidentialism), transitions of administrative power, and political cycles of the top executive's tenure. The results suggested that government reorganizations are more likely to occur in parliamentary systems, after transitions of political power, and at the beginning of the top executive's tenure.     

PUBLIC SERVANTS AND THE BRIEFING OF PARTY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Politicians need information. In recent years the practice of public servants briefing party committees has been expanded to help fill that need. In part this was due to the increased influence of caucus committees under the Labor government, but the practice has continued. Public servants provide information and explanations of policy to government and opposition members, although in the latter case public servants have to tread carefully. In December 1976 the Prime Minister tabled guidelines to govern these briefings. This innovation has implications for the doctrines of public service neutrality, for ministerial responsibility and for the capacity of the opposition to develop workable policy. Despite the potential problems that may arise, it is a practice that, if used effectively, can only assist in the improvement of political debate.     

Policy preferences and ministerial structures: Immigrant integration governance in Western Europe, 1997–2017

This article tests an often‐stated assumption in the “machinery of government” literature: that government parties’ issue and policy preferences affect the ministerial structure. Using a new Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG) that documents the ministerial structure of immigrant integration in 16 Western European countries during 1997–2017, the analysis finds that divergence and change characterize the ministerial structure. The analysis finds that right‐oriented governments are more inclined to couple integration with immigration and justice than are left‐oriented governments, indicating different policy preferences. However, it does not find that governments with radical parties are more inclined to signal “integration” in ministerial titles. The study's comparative approach challenges the generalizability of existing knowledge on drivers of ministerial changes. Additionally, it fills a gap in current immigrant integration literature: the study of the horizontal governance structure.     

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

While all government portfolios used to be the purview of men exclusively, more and more women are selected to sit around the cabinet table. But under which circumstances do women get appointed to different ministerial portfolios? This article, proposes a theoretical framework to consider how party leaders’ attitudes and motivations influence the allocation of portfolios to male and female ministers. These propositions are tested empirically by bringing together data on 7,005 cabinet appointments across 29 European countries from the late 1980s until 2014. Considering the key partisan dynamics of the ministerial selection process, it is found that women are significantly less likely to be appointed to the ‘core’ offices of state, and ‘masculine’ and ‘neutral’ policy areas. However, these gender differences are moderated by the ideology of the party that allocates them. Women are more likely to be appointed to ‘masculine’ portfolios when a party's voters have more progressive gender attitudes. This theoretical framework and analysis enhances our understanding of women's access to the government, which has important implications for how ministers are selected, as well as how women are represented in the most powerful policy-making positions in Europe.     

The Long March Through Whitehall: A Comment on Lowe and Pemberton,The Official History of the British Civil Service,Volume II: 1982–1997

The Thatcher‐Major ‘permanent revolution’ massively changed the British civil service and Whitehall. The political clout provided by strong prime ministerial backing was a key factor in sustaining the momentum of change over the 1980s and 1990s. The process of change developed piecemeal, in a step‐by‐step and, in some ways, even haphazard fashion, with ‘New Right’ ideology just one factor. Economic and financial constraints were important in driving and sustaining the Whitehall efficiency drives and managerial reforms of the period. Support from managerially minded insiders and skilful prime ministerial businessmen advisers brought in from outside were also crucial. In contrast, the Johnson government's approach to civil service reform may be self‐defeating if it creates too much instability and needless strife, rather than building on ideas and building up support at different levels from within Whitehall itself.     

Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives

According to the literature on parliamentary government, legislatures provide political parties with veto and amendment rights, which counterbalance executive power. This institutional feature is also said to help overcome ministerial “drift” within coalition governments. While this literature has focused on the situation of an unconstrained environment of parliamentary government, the European Union’s Member States continuously delegate policy competencies to Brussels, whose directives must in turn be transposed into national law to take effect. Because the minister in charge enjoys informational advantages and has the sole right to begin the process of implementing directives, he can completely control the agenda in this constrained environment. We evaluate the empirical implications of a ministerial gatekeeping model by investigating the (in)activities of 15 countries with respect to 2,756 EU directives adopted between December 1978 and November 2009. Our findings show that partisan ministerial approval is necessary to start the implementation process which conditions the counterbalancing response of parliaments. Accordingly, the delegation of policy competencies to the European Union changes the power relationship in parliamentary governments and increases the risk of partisan ministerial drift.     

Portfolio allocation patterns and policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments

Although minority coalition has become a relatively frequent form of governance, it is often considered politically ineffective in policy making. To obtain sufficient support in parliament, government bills must go through the scrutiny activities initiated by coalition partners and overcome the concerns of external support parties in opposition. By examining parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, this paper explains the surprising policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments. Specifically, we argue and show that different patterns of portfolio allocation with the specific ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external supporter, structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament, and therefore, the effectiveness of the minority coalition on managing and implementing policies. We empirically examine bills initiated by 256 ministries in 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015, and we reveal robust evidence that corroborates our argument.     

Sudpolitik: the political economy of Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia

Abstract

In December 1993 the Taiwan government adopted a policy called nanjin zhengce or sudpolitik, a policy aimed at diverting part of Taiwan's trade and investment flows from China to Southeast Asia. This paper addresses the following questions: what is sudpolitik? why adopt such a policy? what are the economic, political, and strategic considerations in the pursuit of this policy? which countries are its specific targets? how do the countries directly affected by this policy respond to it? The paper also discusses the issue of Taiwan's aid in connection with sudpolitik. While the effectiveness of the policy is far from clear at present, the paper concludes with four observations: Taiwan's trade and aid are beginning to intertwine; Taiwan's diplomacy is largely economically or commercially led; Taiwan has achieved some positive results in improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries; and, Taiwan has reached a new stage in its economic development whereby it needs to invest overseas in order to sustain its economic growth. Overall, sudpolitik represents a novel step in Taiwan's diplomatic practice.     

Infrastructure and the Vision Thing

Australia faces a transport infrastructure problem requiring complex policy formulation and imaginative problem solving. In opposition, Kevin Rudd committed to improving the nation's infrastructure and addressing the ‘infrastructure bottlenecks’. This task is made more urgent by the Reserve Bank's concern that the infrastructure restraints are causing inflationary pressure. In the short term however, increased Commonwealth infrastructure expenditure would add to the pressure on interest rates. Consequently, the Commonwealth must work with industry and the states on improving operational efficiency in the short term, while planning for infrastructure investments in the longer term. With the political limitations of federalism, a shortage of skilled policy advice, and ministerial inexperience, the Rudd government must set a broad agenda to guide all infrastructure stakeholders.     

Ideology and Ministerial Allocation in the Major Government 1992–1997

This article evaluates the allocation of ministerial portfolios according to ideological disposition within the Major government of 1992–1997. By examining the ideological attitudes of Conservative parliamentarians towards three ideological variables – economic policy, European policy and social, sexual and moral policy – it will analyse the ideological balance of the government vis-à-vis the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP); the ideological disposition of those departing and entering government; and the ideological profile of the ministers appointed to the 'key' ministerial positions. The article will demonstrate the following: first, the Thatcherite 'right' were underrepresented at ministerial level, whilst the Tory 'left' secured a level of ministerial representation disproportionate to their numerical strength within the PCP; second, this was despite the fact that the process of ministerial appointments and departures gradually enhanced the representation of the Thatcherite 'right' of the PCP at the expense of the Tory 'left'; and finally, the 'perception' amongst the Thatcherite 'right' was that they were being marginalised in terms of the key ministries of state.     

Bureaucratic dilemmas: Civil servants between political responsiveness and normative constraints

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.