Reason of State and Public Reason

“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the common good); an “ironical” usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions.     

Breaking the Principle of Secrecy: An Examination of Judicial Dissent in the European Constitutional Courts

As “oracles of the law,” judges are trained to provide certainty and guidance within an often‐uncertain legal landscape. Nowhere is this statement truer than in the civil law tradition, where the idea of legal certainty has been prized as a “supreme value.” Despite this tradition, dissenting opinions are now quite common within most European constitutional courts. Using new data from five countries and interviews with constitutional court judges and clerks, I investigate factors that contribute to dissent on constitutional courts. Results indicate that legal and policy characteristics matter, but so do judicial backgrounds and the issues reviewed.     

Family law

In response to the Legal Education Training Review (LETR) the professional bodies have revisited the competencies required for legal practice. The SRA has prepared a draft competency statement for day one solicitors which focuses on the “key activities required for effective performance as a solicitor”. The impact of this more comprehensive competency statement on legal education is not yet clear, but one option is that it opens up a route to qualification where competency is achieved in the workplace or other non-academic settings and assessed outside the educational establishments. This article considers how to assess competency in legal education in both educational and work based settings. It charts the development of an outcomes orthodoxy in legal education in England and Wales and in other jurisdictions and draws on research in medical education to identify key principles in the design of an assessment methodology for professional education. The article takes a broad “view from the bridge” and reviews a range of assessment methods already in use in legal education and in other professions such as accountancy, medicine and conservator restorers. It argues that a move to a complex competency orientated training system will require a different approach to both the method of assessment and its programming.     

One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the “Thin” View of Legal Positivism

Much controversy has emerged on the demarcation between legal positivism and non‐legal positivism with some authors calling for a ban on the ‐as they see it‐ nonsensical labelling of legal philosophical debates. We agree with these critics; simplistic labelling cannot replace the work of sophisticated and sound argumentation. In this paper we do not use the term ‘legal positivism’ as a simplistic label but identify a specific position which we consider to be the most appealing and plausible view on legal positivism. This is the view advocated by Gardner in his paper 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (Gardner 2001 , 199), where he carefully scrutinises the most convincing and unifying postulates of legal positivism, which he calls “the thin view”. The study shows that this thin view presupposes an empirical conception of action that is untenable and implausible since it makes acts of engagement with the law unintelligible to an observer of such acts.     

The Legality of Self‐Constitution

An influential strand in recent action‐theory employs constitutivist arguments in order to present accounts of individual agency and practical identity (and of the normative requirements that are constitutive of these phenomena). I argue for an extension of this framework into the interpersonal realm, and suggest using it to reassess issues in jurisprudence. A legal system is an instantiation of the solution to the inescapable tasks of self‐constituting action and identity‐formation in the presence of other agents. Law's validity and normativity can be enlightened when the constitutivist approach considers the external prerequisites of individuals' self‐conceptions qua agents. More specifically, this argumentative strategy allows a reassessment of Fuller's “internal morality of law.” Whereas, pace Fuller, morally substantive conclusions cannot be derived from formal criteria of legality, there are unconditional normative requirements that constrain law.     

Epistemological Perspectives in Legal Theory

Abstract The authors deal with several important epistemological problems in legal theory. The Nineteenth century background is analyzed from the emergence of legal science freed from the constraints of natural law and built on the model of the empirical sciences. The authors show how this science of law has been influenced by the social sciences and trends in ideological criticism throughout the Twentieth century. The epistemological question central to legal science is tackled, i.e., what kind of “epistemological break” should there be with regard to the object studied? To answer this question, the authors plead for the adoption of a “moderate external point of view” which bears in mind lawyers' “internal point of view.”     

Legal Statements and Normative Language

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one.     

Threats to internationalised legal education in the twenty-first century UK

What are the prospects for internationalised legal education in the contemporary UK? Our reflections on this question were prompted by three relatively recent publications dealing with a variety of aspects of the internationalisation of legal education, as well as discussions in and outputs from “Brexit and the Law School” events in Liverpool Law School, Keele University, Strathclyde University, and Northumbria University during 2017. We argue that, although law is often assumed to be state based and jurisdiction specific, there are significant reasons to internationalise legal education but that in the current climate of Brexit, marketisation of higher education and the Solicitors Qualifying Examination such internationalisation is under threat.     

社会规则理论与作为制度事实的法律

哈特的社会规则理论直接应对的是如何解释法律约束或法律义务的来源问题。他虽然在聚合行为和批判反思态度的基础上界定法律的约束力,但《法律的概念》实际上并没有阐明其中的内在机理。哈特的理论与约翰·塞尔有关制度事实理论之间存在密切的关联。在塞尔的理论中,制度事实因集体意向性、功能归属和构成性规则而产生,无论其原始材料为何。作为一种特殊的存在,制度事实及其逻辑结构本身就已经证明相关权力的存在。借助这一思路,法律也可以被视为制度事实,这种制度事实的原始材料是各种言行行为,而哈特的承认规则相当于构成性规则。如此一来,套用塞尔的理论,社会规则理论对法律的约束力解释力便可获得深化和加强。     

Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship

Can Hart's non‐cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction‐based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non‐cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non‐cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary model of acceptance explains actions in terms of other actions and in terms of reasons for actions that are both presented as good‐making characteristics and transparent to the agent. If Hart's internal point of view is able to work as the key argument to reject predictive and sanction‐based explanations of law, it needs to make the outward approach of intentional action basic or primary rather than rely on an inward approach such as the one advanced by non‐cognitivism.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses

Although US political discourse suggests otherwise, no simple dichotomy separates “documented” from “undocumented” immigrants. By examining the integration prospects of immigrants in “liminal” legal standings beyond undocumented status but short of permanent residency, we demonstrate that even when they are legally present, the implementation practices of a multilayered immigration policy regime may cause them harm. Our analyses draw on 108 qualitative interviews with immigrants who have been granted humanitarian relief, including U Visa holders, beneficiaries of the Violence against Women Act provisions, political asylees, and Temporary Protected Status recipients. As a result of “legal violence,” these legally present immigrants remain vulnerable to blocked mobility, persistent fear of deportation, and instability, confusion, and self‐blame.     

Mobilizing the Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment" and the Development of Legal Consciousness

This article critically examines the development of legal consciousness among legal aid plaintiffs in Shanghai. It is based on 16 months of research at a large legal aid center and in‐depth interviews with 50 plaintiffs. Chinese legal aid plaintiffs come to the legal process with high expectations about the possibility of protecting their rights; however, they also have only a vague and imprecise knowledge of legal procedure and their actual codified rights. Through this process of legal mobilization, plaintiffs' legal consciousness changes in two separate dimensions: changes in one's feelings of efficacy and competency vis‐à‐vis the law, and changes in one's perception/evaluation of the legal system. Put another way, the first dimension is “How well can I work the law?” and the second is “How well does the law work?” In this study I observe positive changes in feelings of individual efficacy and competency that are combined with more negative evaluations/perceptions of the legal system in terms of its fairness and effectiveness. The positive feelings of efficacy and voice provided by the legal process encourage labor dispute plaintiffs in the post‐dispute period to plan new lawsuits and to help friends and relatives with their legal problems. Disenchantment with the promises of the legal system does not lead to despondency, but to more critical, informed action. This study provides new evidence on the nature of China's developing legal system with a focus on the social response to the state‐led “rule of law” project.