Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues

In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies. These rescues were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive's freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international financial rescues. I argue that the interests of private actors (district constituencies and interest groups) have an important effect on member voting. Following Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, I find that a member is significantly more likely to favor (oppose) rescues as the proportion of high-skilled (low-skilled) workers in a district increases. In addition, I find that campaign contributions from international banks increase the probability that a member will vote in favor of rescues. Overall, the findings suggest that the distributional effects of rescues find expression in Congress and constrain U.S. international financial policymaking.     

Negotiating International Food Standards: The World Trade Organization's Impact on the Codex Alimentarius Commission

The article presents an empirical account of how the role, position, and perception of the intergovernmental food standardization body, Codex Alimentarius Commission, has changed after being referred to by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the "central reference point for the elaboration of international food standards." Both the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement include provisions that encourage WTO members to base their national regulations on international standards. The article focuses on key issues in the Codex that may have a significant impact on international food trade. The overall conclusion is that the WTO has contributed to constraining the activity and shaping the expectations of Codex members. Governments participating in Codex activities have changed their behavior after 1995 due to increased uncertainty with respect to how decisions in Codex may be binding for them under the WTO Agreements.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment

This paper examines state interest in the nine bases of congressional seat apportionment considered for the House of Representatives as part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. We ask, what if voters preferred apportionments that delivered larger vote shares to their state? We then show that among all states, one basis of apportionment was a weak Condorcet winner, while the others were in a vote cycle. In both chambers of Congress, however, pure majority voting created orderings of the nine bases and a different Condorcet winner. Ironically, Congress did not select either Condorcet winner. Instead, a population-based apportionment was reported out of committee and passed both chambers as a consequence of agenda control and lack of pairwise voting. Our analysis provides an example of how agenda setting with incomplete information unintentionally can produce undesirable outcomes for a legislature.

     

Policy Regimes for the International Waste Trade

Among the unforeseen problems of the new industrial age has been the disposal of increasing quantities of wastes—many hazardous and toxic. Industrial chemistry has produced numerous products that, while useful, are alien to nature and resistant to biodegradation or detoxification. Growing public awareness of the possible hazards and risks involved in disposal of the residuals of industrial activities is arousing a popular demand for environmental protection. But this popular awareness depends upon public information and a degree of scientific literacy—conditions which vary widely among nations. Initial consequences are environmental regulations and restrictions respecting waste disposal in scientifically developed countries, and vulnerability among less developed countries to the export of hazardous wastes from the countries of their origin. A secondary consequence is the emergence of international waste trade as a national and international multidimensional policy problem.     

Congressional rationality and spatial voting

It is very difficult to demonstrate that representatives employ sophisticated cost-benefit calculations in evaluating constituent benefits when making many legislative decisions. This is because most modern American legislation is ambiguous about which constituencies will receive particularized benefits. This paper examines a series of locational rollcall votes in which the benefits going to constituents were obvious. In such cases representatives balance increases in voter support within their congressional districts and potential increases in their political power within Congress to be gained by vote trading. If constituency benefits are great, representatives overwhelmingly support legislation to provide such benefits. As the benefits decline, vote trading increases.     

Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations

Three vote-share equations are estimated and analyzed in this article, one for presidential elections, one for on-term House elections, and one for midterm House elections. The sample period is 1916–2006. Considering the three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic variables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail possibilities. The main conclusions are (1) there is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways; (2) there is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on-term House elections; (3) there is positive serial correlation in the House vote, which likely reflects a positive incumbency effect for elected representatives; and (4) the presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next midterm House vote share, which is likely explained by a balance argument.     

Bureaucratic Professionalization and the Limits of the Political Control Thesis: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission

This article explores the political control thesis in light of the literature on bureaucratic politics and agency professionalization. It argues that existing studies of political control have been limited by a failure to analyze the impact of organizational factors on policy change. The article tests political-control and bureaucratic hypotheses through an analysis of changing enforcement priorities at the Federal Trade Commission, The results suggest that the growing role of economists in the agency, rather than congressional oversight or presidential appointments, is critical in explaining the changing antitrust priorities of the Federal Trade Commission.     

Congressional tenure: Myth and reality

Congressional tenure is longer now than in earlier times, but it is largely a myth that the era of the professional politician is a modern phenomenon. Here, tenure is compared between the 57th and 86th Congresses. Tenure is linked to a simple median voter model. Increased tenure is associated with an increased ability to transfer government expenditures to the political unit. The increased size of government at the time of the 86th Congress compared to the 57th Congress, largely explains the greater length of time in office. The higher tenure of southern legislators is linked to lower per capita incomes.     

Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays

The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated by “distributive” and “informational” theory. One important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization.     

Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance

States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953–1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. We cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district- specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation.     

Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions

Scholars who have sought to assess the consequences of the RehnquistCourt's federalism decisions have identified various means bywhich Congress can overcome the effects of these rulings, butthere have been few efforts to investigate the degree to whichCongress has employed these means. This study finds that Congresshas enjoyed limited success in responding to the Court's rulings.Significantly, though, the failure to overcome the effects ofthese decisions is rarely attributable to the fact that theCourt's constitutional doctrines have erected insurmountablebarriers to congressional action. Rather, the Court's decisionshave forced congressional supporters of the invalidated statutoryprovisions to build and hold political coalitions in supportof the repassage of these laws, and this has frequently provedto be difficult to accomplish, whether due to a lack of enthusiasmfor such efforts, conflicts with other policy goals, or oppositionfrom other groups.