Looking for a smoking gun: Committee jurisdictions and congressional voting decisions

The nature of jurisdictional boundaries of committees in the House of Representatives has received little scholarly attention. Recently, however, LaRue and Rothenberg (1992) focused specifically on this topic and concluded that for some legislators — namely, those involved in a jurisdictional dispute — jurisdictional issues were an important influence, above and beyond policy preferences, in determining votes. I expand on their analysis in an attempt to discover whether members who are not involved in such a dispute also seek to protect jurisdictional property rights. I find that these non-involved members werenot affected by the jurisdictional considerations.     

ii. In Austria's penal code

An Allensbach Institute survey reveals different attitudes to violence among young extremists.     

The war on solicitation and intersectional subjection: quality-of-life policing as a tool to control transgender populations

Abstract

The selective enforcement of solicitation laws on transgender individuals—often referred to as “walking while trans”—has an especially pernicious effect on transgender people of color, immigrants, and the poor. Intersectional subjection—the interaction between multiple categories of identity and diffuse power and sources of authority within contemporary American society—facilitates processes of governmentality and makes some transgender individuals more vulnerable to forms of social control such as trans-profiling. Using intersectional subjection to analyze the selective enforcement of solicitation laws exposes how trans-profiling (1) works to marginalize and remove transgender people of color and transgender immigrants from public spaces; and (2) enforces raced and classed gender norms and reifies white cis-heteronormative privilege. The concepts of intersectionality, subjection, and governmentality elucidate the mutually constitutive relationships among informal and formal actors and institutions in sanctioning the profiling of individuals for “walking while trans” as a tool for mitigating the threat transgender people of color and trans-immigrants pose to dominant power structures and narratives.     

Marx,Engels, and Ecology*

The following is a brief survey of Marx and Engels’ views on ecology, from the viewpoint of their relevance for 21th-century ecosocialism. While there are some serious limitations in the way both consider the “development of productive forces,” there are powerful insights in their discussion of the destructive consequences of capitalist expansion for the environment—an expansion that generates a disastrous metabolic rift in the exchanges between human societies and nature. Some ecological Marxists distinguish between “first stage ecosocialists”—who believe that Marx analyses on ecological issues are too incomplete and dated to be of real relevance today—and “second stage ecosocialists,” who emphasize the contemporary methodological significance of Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism. This paper tries to argue for a third position (which probably could be accepted by several people of the two groups above): Marx and Engels’ discussion on ecological issues is incomplete and dated but despite these shortcomings it does have real relevance and methodological significance today.     

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling–Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.     

The advisory commission on regulatory barriers to affordable housing: Its behavior and accomplishments

Abstract

In March 1990, Secretary Jack Kemp of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) appointed a 22‐member commission to investigate the nature and extent of regulatory barriers to affordable housing, as well as what to do about them. Chaired by Thomas Keane, ex‐Republican governor of New Jersey, the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing grappled with this issue for over a year, releasing its final report in early July 1991.¹ As a commission member, I had an unusual opportunity to observe just how the commission worked and what it accomplished. This paper tries to put those two subjects in perspective. It has been written from the viewpoint of a longtime specialist on housing, who also served on the very first urban commission—the Douglas commission—23 years ago.²     

Do local leaders know their voters? A test of guessability in India

Prominent theories of clientelism—the exchange of benefits for political support—depend on the assumption that politicians, through local agents immersed in local social networks, possess detailed information on voters’ political preferences prior to targeting. This article provides the first direct test of this assumption. It develops a behavioral measure, guessability, which gauges the ability of elected village leaders, who often function as brokers and prominent vote mobilizers, to correctly identify the partisan vote intentions of voters in their locality. It then develops a method to estimate added informational value, which compares the performance of local leaders to low-information benchmarks that capture guessability rates that can feasibly be achieved by outsiders. Original data from surveys of voters and elected village politicians across 96 village councils in Rajasthan, India indicate that while these village leaders out-perform low-information benchmarks with respect to co-partisans, they perform no better than this baseline vis-à-vis non-co-partisans.     

Caricatures,cartoons, spoofs and satires: political brands as butts

• A theory of caricature is used to analyse and explain the nature of—and reactions to—a controversial political cartoon depicting Jacob Zuma, the highly publicized president of South Africa, and how the cartoon both played on and affected his political image and brand. Jacob Zuma has crafted his image as a person who has overcome insurmountable injustices to lead his nation. The cartoon directly questioned Zuma's claims of discrimination by the justice system. The cartoonist (Zapiro) was able to use the cartoon to further solidify Zuma's image as an embattled yet contentious and divisive leader. The framework that follows depicts the spoofing of a political brand, in a marketing environment in which parody and spoofing of more conventional products and services are increasingly common.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Citizenship Debates in the New Germany

Nowhere is the fear, guilt, and pain of Germany’s dreadful past more evident that in contemporary debates over immigration policy. This debate has pit successive Christian Democratic Union politicians, who define Germany in ethno-nationalist terms, against the German left, which seeks to replace the volkish national tradition with a post-national multicultural identity. Ethno-nationalists and multicultural post-nationalists speak powerful, but mutually exclusive, moral languages that galvanize large segments of the German public. At the national level, extremists rarely succeed in Germany’s immigration debates, and the legislation that prevails represents a chaotic mix of liberal and nationalist policies.

Polarizing without legitimizing: The effect of lead candidates’ campaigns on perceptions of the EU democracy

Has the presence of Spitzenkandidaten—“lead-candidates”—in the 2014 European parliamentary election mobilized citizens in support of the EU? A core goal of this innovation was to bring the EU closer to its citizens and to boost turnout. We therefore examine how the presence of leading candidates affects perceptions of the EU democracy. Contrary to what innovators had hoped for, we find that the presence of lead candidates has polarized the European public. Those who support the EU believe the EU has become more democratic as a result of the leading candidates. But those who generally view the EU skeptically oppose it even more when they are aware of the presence of pro-EU candidates.     

Enoch Powell's appeal to the left

The campaign against the so‐called ‘ritual slaughter’ of animals has been hijacked by right‐wing extremists, including members of the National Front, in a bid to incite racial intolerance of Muslims and Jews. The arguments and the terminology used by some animal rights supporters, including the well‐known national organization, Compassion in World Farming, tend to encourage xenophobia and racism, engendering an ‘us’ and ‘them’ approach to the animal rights debate.     

A psycho‐political profile of party activists and left‐wing and right‐wing extremists

Previous studies comparing ideological groups have been restricted to tests of between‐group differences in the means of relevant political psychological variables, thereby neglecting group differences in the variances, meanings and nomological networks of the tested variables. A first exploratory study used data from the European Social Survey (N = 7,314) comparing groups of political party members on the basis of their scores on a self‐placement left–right scale. The second study (N = 69) constituted an in‐depth test for the presence of differences between samples of political activists of moderate parties, communists, anarchists and right‐wing extremists. The results revealed that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity within left‐wing and right‐wing extremists, indicating a substantial amount of within‐group variance of social attitudes, values and prejudice. Moreover, the extremist ideologies are best approached as distinct ideologies that cannot be reduced to extreme versions of moderate ideology, and differences in the meanings and nomological networks of the various extremist ideologies were also obtained. It is erroneous to consider members of extremist groups as being ‘all alike’. The findings obtained from samples of political moderates are not a particularly solid basis for theories about extremism.     

Information,perceptions, and electoral behaviour of young voters: A randomised controlled experiment

The way people absorb and process politically relevant information is central to their subsequent political behaviour (in terms of turnout and vote choice). Nonetheless, little is known about how young voters – who might be more impressionable than more experienced voters – respond to the provision of such information. In this article, we design a between-subject randomised controlled trial that exposes a sample of university students to positive, neutral or negative information about central government performance before the 2017 Portuguese local elections. We find that young voters update their perceptions more when exposed to negative news. This negativity bias is stronger for first-time voters. We also find that negative information significantly affects turnout of initially undecided young voters. Our results imply that sensitivity to information is heterogeneous and that some young voters may be prone to manipulation through the provision of negative news.     

The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”

Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis.     

Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?

In campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. This paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns. It develops a model of candidate competition in which policy-motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters. It applies Eyster and Rabin’s (Econometrica 73(5):1623–1672, 2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type (policy preference) and strategy (whether to announce). If voters updated according to Bayes’ rule, they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference. In equilibrium, only the most extreme candidates, those located furthest from the median voter’s position, would choose to take no position. However, if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non-announcement, unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions.     

Benevolence,malevolence and economic theory

How selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.—Adam Smith inThe Theory of Moral Sentiments.     

Trust as an alternative to risk

Many students of trust see it as a way to mitigate risk through the development of strong institutions that create trust. I offer an alternative view of trust, moralistic or generalized trust, that depends upon a psychological foundation of optimism and control. This form of trust, in contrast to arguments by Paldam and others, has “value” independent of experience. Using data from a survey of metropolitan Philadelphia in 1996, I show that if you believe that “most people can be trusted,” you are substantially more likely to see your neighborhood as safe at night even controlling for both the objective level of crime as well having been the victim of a crime, having had parents who were the victims of crime, watching local television news (which exposes people to violent events), where you live (central city and suburb), and gender. Trust thus “reduces” perceptions of risk independently of personal experience.     

Common Sense 2.0

Common Sense 2.0 outlines a public philosophy of America that challenges both the Democratic and Republican parties. Appeals to voters who are not extremists but who cannot be regarded as moderates. Leverages the concept of uncertainty by drawing on the thought and practices of John Dewey and Abraham Lincoln. Addresses topics of ideology, attitude, citizenship and public policy. Independent thinking that could influence either major party or a Third Party. Inspired in part by Thomas Paine.     

Treated politicians,treated voters: A natural experiment on political budget cycles

Although pre-electoral political manipulation of the budget — the political budget cycle (PBC) — has been long investigated by scholars, empirical findings are mixed at best. This is partly because of the non-random nature of election timing. There also exist ongoing debates over how the budget is manipulated for electoral purposes. We address these issues by exploiting a natural experiment in Japan, where the timing of both executive and legislative elections in municipalities is fixed, staggered, and as good as random, and by using the detailed items of the municipal budget. We find that total and capital expenditures follow the PBC, but tax revenue does not. We also find that executive elections are associated with the PBC, but legislative elections are not. Against the conventional wisdom that democratic or developed countries are free from the PBC, our case of Japan offers an intriguing exception.