Recovering,Restoring, and Renewing the Foundations of American Public Administration: The Contributions of Herbert J. Storing

Public administration continues to face an identity crisis that turns on the question of whether the animating principles of the discipline are to be discovered in the political foundations of a given regime, or whether they are to be found in more universal and transcendent principles of scientific management. Herbert J. Storing reframed the identity crisis as a problem arising from America’s constitutional system of governance. In doing so, he created an important role for public administration in democratic governance. This role took the form of “closet statesmanship” and, in practice, requires the exercise of prudential judgment that looks more like judicial decision making than scientific management. In summarizing Storing’s writings, the authors convincingly argue that he has much to teach us about the ongoing debate regarding the role of the bureaucracy within America’s 87,576 systems of government.     

The New Constitutionalism,Disciplinary Neoliberalism,and the 2015 Greek Election

This article is an effort to situate the conflict between the Syriza government, elected in 2015, and Greece’s creditors in the context of broader changes in the structure of European political economy over the past quarter of a century. It explains the dynamics by which the leftist government of Alexis Tsipras shed its commitment to ending austerity through the lens of Stephen Gill’s “new constitutionalism.” While sovereign power helps show why Tsipras was unable to negotiate a new deal for Greece, two mechanisms of disciplinary power clarify different aspects of crisis politics: market reification, which obscured the role of the European Central Bank, and the reconstitution of truth claims, which led to the attribution of responsibility for the crisis to Greece itself.     

On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public

Conventional wisdom says that individuals’ ideological preferences do not influence Supreme Court legitimacy orientations. Most work is based on the assumption that the contemporary Court is objectively conservative in its policymaking, meaning that ideological disagreement should come from liberals and agreement from conservatives. Our nuanced look at the Court's policymaking suggests rational bases for perceiving the Court's contemporary policymaking as conservative, moderate, and even liberal. We argue that subjective ideological disagreement—incongruence between one's ideological preferences and one's perception of the Court's ideological tenor—must be accounted for when explaining legitimacy. Analysis of a national survey shows that subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a potent, deleterious impact on legitimacy. Ideology exhibits sensible connections to legitimacy depending on how people perceive the Court's ideological tenor. Results from a survey experiment support our posited mechanism. Our work has implications for the public's view of the Court as a “political” institution.     

Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period 1947–2008, and test hypotheses linking separation‐of‐powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long‐run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.     

Constitutionalism,Division of Power and Transaction Costs

According to many democracytheorists, there is an unavoidabletrade-off between constitutionalism and theneed for political action. This papercriticizes that belief. Rather, it arguesthat a division of power, while sometimesentailing high political transaction costs,can nevertheless be beneficial andthat it is not necessarily the case that adivision of power does entail hightransaction costs. The analysis expands theframework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962).Constitutionalism is thus defended againstone of its main perceived deficiencies: itsbringing about gridlock. This does notalways happen, and when it does, it isoften a good thing.