Negative governmentality through fundamental rights: The far side of the European Convention on Human Rights

This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protection ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as negative governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of negative governmentality by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency (Section 2 ). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to them (Section 3 ). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4 ). Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5 ). The essay concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6 ).     

Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?

A convergence of forces and judicial decisions is narrowing the broad safe harbor of immunity that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has provided during the Internet's growth. This immunity protected online computer services from almost all liability for content posted by third parties. But some influential federal judges argue that such broad immunity turns the Communications Decency Act into a communications indecency act. The trend of narrowing Section 230 is reinforced by instances of Internet abuse that have grabbed headlines and escaped legal consequences—cyberbullying of teens, the humiliation of women, racially discriminatory housing postings, ubiquitous pornography and Web sites that solicit unchecked gossip. The debate about the scope of Section 230 involves a clash among important values of free expression, tolerance, civility, privacy and equality. This article argues that Section 230's broad safe harbor is consistent with the constitutional architecture of free expression.     

Towards European Procedural Primacy in National Legal Systems

Abstract: In the polycentric judicial architecture of the Community, there is a rich, constant interplay between national procedural rules and European interventions. In the making of the European legal order, EC law depends on national procedural law and therefore, substantive EC supremacy depends, existentially, on procedure. In this context, the author argues that the traditional sharply defined dichotomy of national procedural autonomy versus Community law effectiveness no longer reflects the implicit course of action laid down by the Court of Justice. Instead, the European legal order has moved, as a praxis, from national procedural autonomy to a more subtle combination of national procedural competence and European procedural primacy. The rationale behind this trend testifies both to the importance of the interrelationship between procedure and substantive law in the making of Europe and to the flexibility of procedural law; EC law depends on procedural law and procedure readily submits to the demands of a new legal order. In doing so, it also creates new choices and venues for European supremacy.     

The legal constitution: United Kingdom parliament and European court of justice

Membership of the EC has transformed the legal status of the UK parliament. Prior to British accession, Acts of Parliament were the supreme law of the land, unchallengeable in any court. This paper argues that EC membership raised the courts ‐ national as well as European ‐ above parliament and that at the time of accession parliamentarians were almost wholly unaware of this fundamental change. The author links MPs’ ignorance to the highly political, rather than legal, nature of the British constitution and traces the evolution of their constitutional understandings. Identifying a new dynamic interplay between British judiciary and parliament, the study argues that the creeping hegemony of law within constitutional politics merits continuing analysis by legislative scholars.     

The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers, McCarthyism, and the Civil Rights Era

This paper considers the political role of the organized bar from three perspectives: the historical question of the stance taken by bar associations during the major civil rights debates of the post-World War II period; the sociological question of the extent to which legal associations can act collectively on highly contentious political issues; and the legal question concerning the implications of legal formalism for the politics of the bar. Contrary to the belief that legalism is an inherently conservative means of justifying professional inaction on fundamental issues, the paper argues that in fact legalism may well be the most important basis of intra-professional consensus on those issues as well as the most powerful means by which the profession can influence state and national governments. Legalism can be understood as a common professional idiom which allows mobilization on divisive issues. It can be used in support of both liberal and conservative causes. In this sense, within certain limits, legalism is neutral–an expedient which enables the profession to act politically in circumstances which otherwise would effectively immobilize its collegial associations.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Some Supplementations to Mattias Kumm

Abstract:  Mattias Kumm has developed a jurisprudence of constitutionalism beyond the State (CBS) proposing principles, to be applied by courts of both the Community and the municipal levels, about how to deal with constitutional conflicts. This CBS is supposed to be part of neither the Community nor the municipal legal systems but to emerge from a legal practice comprising the whole of Community and municipal laws. Preliminarily Kumm claims, situating himself, for argument's sake, within the framework of analytical jurisprudence, that there is no legal reason for a court not to choose a different ultimate legal rule than the one it used to adhere to. These supplementations argue that Kumm's preliminary claim is erroneous. If accepted, this argument eliminates one of the reasons for the development of CBS. Concerning Kumm's main claim, these supplementations argue that the substantive content of CBS—its principles—may well be, and indeed largely already are, accommodated within the traditional structure of legal systems founded on ultimate legal rules, and that the structure proposed by Kumm would make impossible any distinction between general and legal discourses, thereby seriously undermining the determinacy of law. It also argues that Kumm's CBS can be reconstructed, within the analytical framework, only as outright supremacy of EC law.     

Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law—the Changing Relationship of EU and National Law

The article focuses on damages liability between private parties—referred to as horizontal liability—that is based on EU law. Generally, this kind of liability may be based on EU secondary legislation or be derived from substantive EU law and legal principles. The article seeks to analyse the latter: liability in an area of EU law where so‐called procedural autonomy still, at least apparently, prevails. Special attention is paid to the lively interface between EU law and national remedies and to the increasing EU law requirements for the enforcement of EU law in national courts. Recent case‐law on private liability for damages caused by competition infringements is discussed as part of a more general question concerning the ways in which the relationship of EU law and national enforcement frameworks is developing.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

A Selection of Empirical Socio-Economic Research with Respect to the Functioning of Legal Rules and Institutions in Belgium and the Netherlands

In this paper some studies with respect to empirical socio-economic research which has been undertaken in Belgium and the Netherlands concerning the functioning of legal rules and institutions are discussed. The paper focuses on the domains of criminal law, civil procedure, liability and insurance. The paper argues that contrary to the overwhelming economic literature on liability and insurance, the empirical results in that domain are poor. More research is undertaken in the area of criminal law and apparently it is overwhelming in the area of civil procedure. The latter studies are, however, mainly undertaken by socio-legal scholars and less by economists. The general conclusion of the empirical studies discussed seems to be that while the empirical literature on the effect of changes in the decision making environment on rational actions in the legal system is rich and provocative, there is much less empirical testing of the effects of legal rules as such on allocational outcomes. The paper argues that much more effort should be devoted to the latter issue.     

The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective

If private law is defined simply as a matter of core areas such as substantive contract, torts, property or family law, it may be doubted whether European law has significantly affected national private law systems; or conversely, whether national private law is relevant to European integration. However, this paper argues that such conclusions are misleading: while there have been very few European interventions into the core areas of civil codes or the common law, the integration process has impacted forcefully upon deeper structures of national legal systems. Challenging the institutional embeddedness of national private law, European primary and regulatory law has remodelled (public) concepts of private autonomy, the realm of private governance and the social responsibility of private actors. How then to present and evaluate this indirect impact? Drawing upon concrete examples, this paper seeks first to understand this European challenge to the interdependence of national private law, borrowing from political science's analytical tool of multi-level governance to highlight the complex interrelations between European rights and regulatory law and national private law; and secondly attempts actively to assess the legitimacy of the impact of integration upon private law with the aid of the explicitly normative theory of deliberative supranationalism. However, precisely because Europe remains in a state of flux, and dependent upon contingent political processes, no final conclusions are drawn: as is the case with so many areas subject to integrationist logic, the contours of the ‘new European private law’ cannot be laid down in advance, and are instead a long and weary matter of cooperation and fine-tuning between national and European judiciaries.     

The European legal framework on cybercrime: striving for an effective implementation

This article analyzes the European legal framework on cybercrime. Initially, it argues the challenges of cybercrime to traditional criminal justice systems. Subsequently, it focuses on the criminal law framework on cybercrime with a mainly European perspective. The European legal framework provides a three-path solution: the reduction of frictions among national legislations, the introduction of new investigative powers and the facilitation of international cooperation. The article presents and discusses each solution. Further, it argues that the effective implementation of the main legal instruments does not seem to depend on the legal enforceability of these international measures. Contrarily, other, non legal, factors such as national security, politics, the economy and the public opinion appear to stimulate the spontaneous implementation of the European legal framework. In this context, the added value of the EU action is rather low, although the Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme may improve this situation in the long term.     

Cross-border public care and adoption proceedings in the European Union

The free movement of persons within the EU has meant that children at risk of harm from family members may be living in a Member State of which they are not a national. The child may be made subject to legal measures under the national law of the host State for the protection of their welfare. This article explores the competence of the EU to protect children in these circumstances, and the scope of the Brussels IIa Regulation in governing jurisdiction over child protection proceedings. It discusses the difference between national child protection systems and the political controversy surrounding English law on adoption following care proceedings issued over a child who is a national of a different Member State. It suggests that further information sharing on national systems and cooperation between courts is necessary for the effectiveness of the law and to encourage understanding of legitimate variation in Member State national family law.     

The 'Checks and Balances' Doctrine in Member States as a Rule of EC Law: The Cases of France and Germany

Abstract: Though the impact of EC law on the legal status of national powers has been fairly well examined, little attention has been paid to the overall evaluation of the relations developed between national authorities. The paper argues that the mutation of the Judiciary and the Executive role vis‐à‐vis the Legislature appears to be an application of an emerging doctrine in EC public law that conspicuously resembles the ‘Checks and Balances’ theory of American constitutionalism. The action of one public authority is—or must be—countered by the reaction of another for the benefit of EC law. Apart from identifying the features of this ‘principle’ in comparison to its equivalent American doctrine, the paper deals with the question of a possible coexistence of this new model of governance with the traditional one. The comparative perspective is necessary here. Whereas in Germany the constitutional model appears to cope with European demands, in France it seems largely opposed to such a dynamic conception of the separation of powers.     

Section 1983 litigation: An effective remedy to police misconduct or an insidious federalism?

In recent years the federal courts have experienced a dramatic increase in civil suits alleging police misconduct under the federal provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which was originally enactd as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1983, presently the second most litigated provision of the United States Code, grants a private right of action for redressing violations of federal and Constitutional rights committed by persons (including municipalities) acting under color of state law. The recent development of Section 1983 as a mechanism for controlling police misconduct has profound implications for New Federalism, public official conduct and traditional legal doctrines (such as the exclusionary rule). This study reviews the legal basis for civil liability remedies, examines the impact of recent developments on police behavior, and explores the policy considerations underlying an assessment of this expanding legal remedy as a viable option in preventing police misconduct.     

Neighborhood Effects and Compensation for Property Value Diminution

This paper analyzes the legal issues surrounding defendants' liability for property value diminution caused by stigma from environmental contamination. The courts, law review articles, and public policy analyses are in disagreement over how to handle stigma damages. This paper argues that a reasonable risk of contamination is not required for a nuisance claim if community effects, which were caused by the contamination, are present. The authors then turn to issues regarding the level of damages and propose a methodology for measuring compensation that is based on a guaranteed sales price. This methodology is applied to the RSR smelter in Dallas, Texas.     

An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law

The international law of state responsibility determines whenstates are liable for international law violations. States aregenerally liable when they have control over the actions ofwrongdoers; thus, the actions of state officials can implicatestate responsibility whereas the acts of private citizens usuallydo not. We argue that the rules of state responsibility havean economic logic similar to that of vicarious liability indomestic law: the law in both cases provides third parties withincentives to control the behavior of wrongdoers whom they canmonitor and influence. We also discuss international legal remediesand individual liability under international criminal law.     

'Innocent infringement' and the Community unregistered design right: the position in the UK and Ireland

Legal context and Key Points: This article systematically examines ‘innocent infringement’—highlightsits non-uniform nature and summarizes defence it offers as toliability and/or remedies across a range of national UK andIrish IP rights—particularly copyright and design. It considers ‘innocent infringement’ in contextof community unregistered design right (directly applicablein all EC member states under EC Reg 6/2002) and assesses ifit affords defence to liability or financial remedies—suggestsanswer depends on meaning and effect of Article 19 (2), Article89 (Reg 6/2002) and consideration of; the harmonizing effectof the Enforcement Directive (2004/48/EC); the ensuing respectiveUK and Irish IP Enforcement Regulations 2006; the UK's CommunityDesign Regulations.2005. It concludes: limited scope of Reg 6/2002 indicates ‘innocentinfringement’ affords neither defence to liability nora limited defence to damages, but contrasts the role of discretionaryremedy of account of profits, and nevertheless predicts UK andIrish Design Courts may seek to justify ‘innocent infringement’offers limited defence to damages. Practical significance: Given that the community unregistered design right, applicableEC wide, is useful and of interest in many commercial fields(eg fashion, furnishings, etc.), which require short-term protectionagainst copying by over enthusiastic competitors, understandingthe status and effect of ‘innocent infringement’on liability and financial remedies is important.     

A Paradox in the Making: Detecting Something Positive in UPA Under the Ten Kate Effect

Abstract:  The European Court of Justice has persisted in adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of Article 230(4) EC and that persistence has reached its apogee in the UPA decision, while at the same time it was mirrored in the relevant provisions of the draft Constitution. Therefore, it is surprising to see that in the aftermath of UPA , there can be something positive that can be explored further and that can be tested in order to establish whether any indirect, alas limited, liberalisation of the standing criteria is possible. The Ten Kate case established that, in principle, a Member State could be under an obligation under domestic law to challenge the validity of Community legislation. If the state, in all of its different manifestations, fails to challenge the validity of a Community measure when such an obligation arises under municipal law, then the citizen could be in a position to claim compensation. Therefore, the case introduces the doctrine of state liability and the agency analogy (with the state representing the individual or as parens patriae) as connected paths trying to circumvent the standing restrictions. The advantage is that the proceedings would take place under national law and would be detached from the Plaumann conditions. It is proposed that constitutionally entrenched human rights, like effective judicial protection, combined with the principle of legitimate expectation, could create the legal basis for an obligation of the state under national law to challenge the validity of Community norms. The paradox is that effective judicial protection was the exact argument that the European Court of Justice sidelined in UPA .     

Rules as Icons: Wittgenstein's Paradox and the Law

In this paper Section 1 distinguishes between two modes of interpreting legal rules: rehearsal and discourse, arguing that the former takes priority over the latter in law, as in many other contexts. Section 2 offers two arguments that following a legal rule in the rehearsing mode presents a riddle. The first argument develops from law, and submits that legal rules do not tell us anything, because they are tautological. The second one develops from philosophy (Wittgenstein's later works), confronting us with the paradox that incompatible courses of action may be derived from any rule. My solution presents a theory of rules as icons (Section 3 ). I use “icon” rather than “picture,” partly to avoid confusion with what is known among philosophers as “the picture theory of meaning.” Interpretation in the rehearsing mode hinges on imagination: imagining oneself in the space of reasons for action rather than reasoning oneself. In this act of imagination, we project ourselves into the rule in ways that are similar to the way we grasp the sense of paintings, music, stories, or poems. Finally (Section 4 ) I will defend the position that my view solves the puzzles in the second section, by arguing (a) that it is a better account of what Wittgenstein wrote than two competing theories (intuitionism and conventionalism), and (b) that it provides a more satisfactory account of how lawyers deal with legal rules in actual practice.     

Damaska and the Faces of International Criminal Justice

Mirjan Damaka 's scholarly publications provide important insightsfor the analysis of systems of criminal justice at the internationallevel. This is particularly true for his major book: The Facesof Justice and State Authority – A Comparative Approachto the Legal Process. The book develops ideal types, or models,of the structure and the function of government. As far as thestructure of government, the ideal types of hierarchical andcoordinate officialdom are contrasted with one another. Withregard to the function of government in society, two other mutuallyexclusive ideal types are developed: the ideal type of the purelyreactive state and that of the purely activist state. In thepurely reactive state all state activities are essentially aform of dispute resolution between individual citizens. Consequently,all proceedings take the shape of a contest between two parties.In the reactive state, on the other hand, all law is an expressionof state policies. This entails that all proceedings are essentiallyan official inquiry enabling the state to implement its policies.The four ideal types call for several observations, one of thembeing that, at the international level, there is no authoritythat can be compared to a state. Setting up international criminal courts requires choices withregard to the structure and function of authority. Internationalhuman rights instruments provide no guidance as to the natureof the choices to be made. In particular, they do not indicatewhether the legal process should be structured as a contestbetween two parties or as an official inquiry. The same is truefor empirical evidence. An analysis of the structures of authority in internationalcriminal courts reveal that they represent hybrids of the hierarchicaland the coordinate ideal types of officialdom. The fact thatthese courts are unitary courts has a profound effect on evidentiaryarrangements. The most important issue raised by the exposition of ideal typesof The Faces of Justice concerns the relationship between thegoals of international criminal justice and the appropriatelegal process to serve their realization. Goals of a conflict-solvingnature are best served by a legal process structured as a contestbetween two parties and goals related to the implementationof policies by a legal process structured as an official inquiry.It is therefore essential to determine what goals are beingpursed by international criminal courts. One may distinguishhere between goals that international systems of justice mayor may not have in common with national systems of criminaljustice. The pursuit of the traditional goals of criminal justicecommon to international and national systems of justice doesnot provide compelling reasons to prefer either a contest modelor an inquest model of the legal process. This is different,however, for the idiosyncratic goals of international criminaljustice that set apart international systems of criminal justicefrom national systems. The pursuit of these goals makes it desirablethat historical facts are established as accurately as is possiblein the given circumstances. They are, therefore, best servedby a legal process that takes the shape of an official inquiry.In the hybrid type of procedure adopted by the ICTY there isinsufficient clarity about the procedural status of the peculiargoals of international criminal justice as well as about theuse of procedural means to pursue them. This entails that itis not really possible to determine whether this hybrid representsa success. Hybrid types of procedure cannot truly exist withoutadopting a view with regard to the impartiality of judges thatis inspired by standards enshrined in international human rightsinstrument rather than those that are characteristic for thelegal process shaped as a contest between two parties.