Two Misunderstandings About Public Justification and Religious Reasons

Two important objections have been raised against exclusivist public reason (EPR). First, it has been argued that EPR entails an unjust burden for citizens who want to appeal to non-public reasons, especially religious reasons. Second, it has been argued that EPR is based on a problematic conception of religious reasons and that it ignores the fact that religious reasons can be public as well. I defend EPR against both objections. I show that the first objection conflates two ideas of public justification (public justification as a conception of political legitimacy and public justification as an ideal of civility) and that the second objection conflates two ways to understand and identify religious reasons. Ultimately, it turns out that those who defend such objections actually share the concerns that justified EPR in the first place. In other words, if we are clear about the idea of public justification and the kind of religious reasons that EPR is really about, it appears that justificatory liberals are in fact all exclusivists.     

The Mutability of Public Reason

Rawls's “public reason” has not been without its critics. One criticism is that public reason is “conservative.” Public reason must rely on those beliefs that are “widely shared” among citizens. But if public reason relies on widely shared beliefs, how can it change without departing from those beliefs, thus violating public reason? In part one of my essay, I introduce the conservatism objection and describe two unsatisfactory responses to it. Part two argues that there are aspects of public reason which diminish the force of the conservatism objection: first, that public reason is historical, and second, that it is mutable.     

论当前中国法律理论与民意的冲突——兼论现代性法律的局限性

法律理论与民意的冲突,目前成了一种不容忽视的冲突。泸州"二奶"遗赠案反映了自由权利与社会责任的冲突;"刘涌案"反映了程序正义与实体正义的冲突;"死刑存废之争"反映了法律理想图景与现实正义观念的冲突。冲突的根源在于:现代性法律以个人主义和自由主义为前提预设,把人视为独立自由的平等个体,把错综复杂多样的社会关系剪裁成单一片面的法律关系,要求尽可能地限制国家权力,甚至主张以"人道"规范一切;但是,社会中的人却不是独立自由的,而是受到多种社会伦理规范的制约;国家职能和社会规范都是多元的;民意具有现实性和综合性的特点。现代性法律与中国民意的冲突,本质上是两种不同的国家社会体制的冲撞。现代性法律只能调整特定的社会关系、满足中国的部分需求。     

公法法治论——公、私法定位的反思

本文以公法与私法的划分标准为突破口 ,通过反思私法优位论之是非 ,提出法治社会应当树立公法优位的观点 ,因为公法与法治的理念与构造完全吻合 ,反映了立法法治和司法法治的需要 ,能够对权力与权利之间以及权力内部的关系加以最合理的定位 ,有助于培育社会主体的法治信念     

Public Reason Between Ethics and Law

Rawls says that public reason is the reason of the citizens of a democratic state and takes the Supreme Court in the USA as the exemplar of public reason. It differs from non public reason, which is used e.g., in universities and academic institutions. Rawls contrasts with Kant, which opposes the public reason of the scholar??or the philosopher??, who speaks before the world, to the private reason of state or church officials. The later, once they accept an authority, cannot think by themselves (selbst denken). A closer examination shows that Rawls is not so far from Kant as it seems, because he takes the constitutional judges not as they are, but as they should be. However Rawls still apparently refuses Kant??s unity of reason. Further investigation of the relations between ethical reason, democratic reason and legal reason is needed. Democratic reason is tantamount both to public reason and to legal reason in a modern constitutional state. It is a requirement of ethics but still not identical with ethical reason, since it is possible to accept democratic reason and to argue against it from an ethical point of view. There is just one good way of reasoning, in spite of the constraints that the sources of law and the rules of procedure impose on legal reasoning, compared with ethics. Such constraints are based on the democratic principle, which is again based on ethical reason, which at last both grounds and limits the constraints that law imposes on reason.     

性别视角的转换和女性主体性的“滑落”——女性文学从小说到影视的文化反思

女性作家的小说改编成影视作品已经成为一个重要的文化现象.从小说到影视作品,前者通常有一个女性立场,表现出一种鲜明的女性意识.而后者则代之以或"隐"或"显"的男性视角,女性立场往往被消解了,具有时代进步色彩的女性意识被抹煞了.这一现象的出现有其必然性.以男权文化为底蕴的大众审美心理和接受视野的存在,是造成这一文化现象的根本原因.21世纪的中国影视创作,理应反映出时代的审美理想和女性意识的新的高度.     

Reason of State and Public Reason

“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the common good); an “ironical” usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions.     

协商民主能否成为可能——自由、平等与理性之于协商民主

20世纪最后20年,一种新型的民主理论——协商民主在西方政治学界开始兴起、发展,并成为人们讨论研究聚集的焦点。作为一种可能的新型民主,面临着许多挑战,何以成为可能或者说能否成为可能成为人们争论的焦点,这一问题值得我们认真思考。基于此,从一种自由、平等、理性分析的视角来看,协商民主能够化解自由与秩序的矛盾,维护社会的平等和正义,能够在公开的理性下实现政治的合法性,解决现有民主制度的困境与挑战,是确实能够实现的政治理想。     

土地征用公益目的性探讨——基于可操作性要求

公共利益既是土地征用的理由,亦是其限制.对公共利益这一内涵极不确定的概念,各国立法与判例都有不同之解读.认为基于可操作性要求,从实体上采列举方式界定公共利益的内涵有其必要性,但应明确赋予法院有公益目的的审查权力.鉴于公共利益是一变动不居的价值判断,从程序上增加公益目的听证程序限制公权力的滥用更具有现实意义.     

我国“公物”正当利用的法律保障

在我国，公共用物与行政用物都应纳入法治视野下的公物。在公物利用过程中，存在涉及公物设置、公物管理以及公物直接利用等问题，主要原因是公物理论的匮乏，制度缺失及意识形态上的偏误所造成。基于此，必需明确公物正当利用的一般要求，并在公物利用的机制和措施上予以健全和创新。     

融环境教育于生活世界之中

环境法治需要特定类型的文化作为根基，这种类型的文化特点是公泉有强烈的环境权利意识。能自觉遵守法律，并在环境立法、执法、司法过程中能够广泛地参与。只有公束参与，环境法律文化结构中的观念文化与制度文化才能和谐统一，环境法治才可以实现。公泉法律意识的提高需要大众化的环境教育，公泉认同是环境权的本原。法科大学生作为公粟内的一个群体，对其进行环境法学专业化教育要立足于公粟生活世界基础上。     

我国刑法对非公有制经济区别保护的原因探析——兼评平等保护观

侵犯公有制经济和非公有制经济的职务犯罪,其犯罪主体的身份是不同的,这种不同导致了刑法对两种经济成分的区别保护。对二者区别保护既是罪刑均衡原则的要求,又反映了人民群众的利益和价值取向,因而是合理的。     

The Idea of “Free Public Reason”

Abstract. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability.     

"公共利益"的界定是一个宪法分权问题--从Eminent Domain的主权属性谈起

宪法规定私人财产的征用须服从“公共利益” ,其目的是为了抵制个人财产由于政府的专断或不公正行为而丧失。与具有主权属性的征用权相关联的“公共利益”的界定是一个宪法分权问题 ,是由立法机关、行政机关和司法机关共同行使的 ,相互之间有一定制约。立法机关只能就“公共利益”确定概括标准 ,具体的判断标准由行政机关行使 ,只有出现争议时 ,司法机关才会介入     

Feminism,Religion, and Shared Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason

The idea of public reason is central to political liberalism’s aim to provide an account of the possibility of a just and stable democratic society comprised of free and equal citizens who nonetheless are deeply divided over fundamental values. This commitment to the idea of public reason reflects the normative core of political liberalism which is rooted in the principle of democratic legitimacy and the idea of reciprocity among citizens. Yet both critics and defenders of political liberalism disagree over whether or not the idea of public reason permits citizens to appeal to their comprehensive conceptions of the good in public deliberation over matters of basic justice. Our aim in this paper is to provide a defense of an exclusive idea of public reason, and at the same time we aim to dispel the underlying concerns of two prominent criticisms of the idea of public reason—the concern of alienation from the political process, as expressed by religiously oriented critics, and the concern over women’s equality, as expressed by feminist critics. We argue that inclusive accounts of the idea of public reason are not consistent with political liberalism’s core commitments. Further, we claim, inclusive accounts of the idea of public reason deepen feminist concerns. We think that, properly understood, an exclusive account of the idea of public reason can address feminist concerns about political liberalism and avoid alienating (reasonable) religious persons in an unacceptable way. Thus, we conclude that an exclusive account of the idea of public reason is our best hope for reconciliation. For comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper, we thank Andrew Altman, H.E. Baber, Andrew Jason Cohen, Steven Daskal, Peter Gratton, Blain Neufeld, Linda Peterson, Rodney Peffer, Kevin Timpe, Matt Zwolinski and David Cummiskey. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association; we thank audience participants for helpful feedback. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy, we believe the article is much improved as a result of his/her suggestions.     

论国外行政公诉的产生与发展

行政公诉是一种检察官针对侵犯公共利益的违法行政行为而提起的一种诉讼类型,从国外行政公诉的发展过程看,这种诉讼之所以由检察官提起,是基于其公益代表人角色的定位;行政公诉能够弥补传统行政诉讼仅仅由利害关系人发动的局限,从而更有利于公共利益的维护;同时,这一制度也填补了审判权监督行政权时"不告不理"的空白,有利于检察权配合审判权以实现对行政权的监督。     

Why Inconclusiveness is a Problem for Public Reason

Law and Philosophy - Most theorists of public reason, including both its proponents and critics, now accept that it is inconclusive, meaning that its correct application can result in a plurality...     

公安许可制度改革的系统思考

公安许可是公安机关为了防止危险而实施的一种事前控制机制,属于对社会干预程度较强的、成本较高的抑制性规制手段。对公安许可的过分依赖是形成公安被动型静态管理模式的主要原因,严峻的社会治安形势迫切要求改革现有公安管理模式,提高公安管理效能。因此,我们有必要对公安许可制度改革与公安行政管理以及刑事侦查之间的关系进行系统思考,客观分析公安许可的基本属性,探明公安许可制度改革的可行之路。     

理想、官方、民间——浅议舆论的三个层次

作为一个社会科学研究领域的逻辑起点,舆论概念本身的定义就有许多争议,这是由舆论学自身特点决定的.但无论差异多大,我们在理解"舆论"二字时,都应该认识到它是复杂的、多层次的,理想状态下的舆论指的是在诸多前提条件下的人们对全息信息的独立认识结果;官方控制下的舆论是政治舆论学设想的理想状态,也是现实生活中的常态舆论的主体;民间隐藏的舆论相对于官方控制舆论而言,官方控制越严,民间隐藏的舆论的存在形态和存在方式越多样.     

论民事检察监督的范围

在检察机关的各项职权中,行使最"杂"的莫过于民事检察权了。民事检察的范围,从现行法律的规定看仅是"生效的判决和部分裁定";从检察机关的宪法地位考察包括任何公权力机关对民事法律的适用范围;从法理上评析:检察监督职能的发挥必须规范在与其他国家机关的关系上,行使代表公共利益的国家公权力机关不正确实施国家民事法律,构成了民事检察监督的事实原因。民事检察权力运用是否正确依存于民事审判权力。民事检察监督的范围:在对象上,是代表公共利益的机关(包括事业单位和企业);在内容上,应当围绕民事法律在公权力机关的实施;在阶段上,包括诉前、诉中和诉后的任何阶段。