Three-Fifths a Racist: A Typology for Analyzing Public Opinion About Race

Is race politics primarily about symbolic racism, principled conservatism, or group conflict? After almost three decades, this debate among some of our best scholars seems scarcely closer to resolution, yet the theoretical, empirical, and normative issues at stake remain enormous. All three parties to the debate falsely assume that the causal structure driving opinion about race policy is homogenous. I reorient and advance the debate by showing how a methodological shift to a data-driven taxonomy of subjects can elucidate how race politics really is complex. I use this taxonomy to run new analyses, and to explain and assess the seemingly contradictory results of previous contributions to the debate. Each of the major parties to the debate is partially right in their account of public opinion about race politics, but about independently identifiable sub-sets of subjects.     

Conflict, Fusion, or Coexistence? The Complexity of Contemporary American Conservatism

This paper draws on an original survey and on the 2004 NES to explore the complexity of contemporary American conservatism. In both datasets, we find evidence that economic and cultural conservatism stand as distinct strands of conservative attitudes. The original survey also allows us to further explore the role of beliefs about the market in economic conservatism. In the end, we find little support for either liberal hopes of fundamental ideological conflict among conservatives or conservative hopes of ideological fusion. Instead, our data suggests that a particular type of ideological coexistence among economic and cultural conservatives is the norm.

Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Local Gender‐Based Earnings Inequality and Women's Belief in the American Dream

This article ties together research on gender, income inequality, and political ideology, by exploring the effect of gender‐based earnings inequality on women's belief in a fundamental tenet of the “American Dream”—meritocracy. Focusing on gender‐based earnings inequality in women's local residential context, and drawing upon relative deprivation theory, this article argues that variation across local areas in the relative economic status of women should influence the ideological outlook of resident women. In contrast to relative deprivation theory, but consistent with rising expectations theory, I argue that ideological disillusionment should peak in contexts in which women's earnings fall closely behind men, and that ideological optimism should rebound in contexts in which women's earnings have achieved parity with that of men. Utilizing pooled survey data, I find strong evidence that individual women's belief in the American Dream varies according to whether local women's relative earnings indicate confrontation with or breaking of the “glass ceiling.”     

Policy attitudes, ideology and voting behavior in the 2008 Election

This article examines the impact of policy attitudes and ideology on voting behavior in the 2010 U.S. presidential election. The analysis uses data from the 2008 American National Election Study. The empirical results indicate that the 2008 election should not be regarded as a simple referendum on the George W. Bush presidency. At the same time, voting behavior was not particularly aligned along stark policy divisions; the direct effects of issue attitudes were confined largely to the most sophisticated stratum of the electorate. Finally, liberal-conservative orientations did affect citizens' political attitudes and candidate choices in ways that are fairly unique, compared to other recent elections.     

Information diffusion within the electorate:: the asymmetric transmission of political–economic information

This paper examines the connection between information and expectations. Drawing upon Lazarsfeld et al.'s (Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B., Gaudet, H., 1944. The People's Choice. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York) classic work on communication flows, we devise an asymmetric transmission model of expectation formation. This model assumes that the expectations of the less informed segments within the electorate are influenced by the expectations of more informed groups but that the opposite does not hold. We use educational differences as a proxy for information heterogeneity. A vector autoregression (VAR) analysis on monthly surveys of inflation expectations supports the asymmetric transmission hypothesis.     

关注个体自觉——部队思想政治教育的新视角

本文将启发个体自觉作为部队思想政治教育的新视角,在教育中,做到尊重人、理解人、关心入,通过增进先进理论的真理性与个体实践的效益性的内在统一,不断激发个体发展的动力,同时达成部队思想政治教育工作自身否定之否定的价值和效益的优化目的,促进部队思想政治教育地系统化和科学化。     

网络舆论与我国民主政治的良性化发展

互联网技术的普及运用带来显著的民主政治效应,表现为打破了信息垄断和旧的话语权力格局,为民意提供了一个自由表达的场所。以互联网为公共载体的网络舆论成为信息时代我国最活跃的民主政治场域。但技术是把双刃剑,网络也不例外。网络舆论的特性决定了它可能造就"优质"民主,也可能带来"劣质"民主。要使网络舆论促进民主政治良性发展,政府需要健全网络舆情监测预警机制,加强网络舆论监督的道德建设与法治建设,提高对网络舆论的回应能力,正确引导网络议题,培养公民精神。     

Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates

Conventional wisdom and scholarly research indicate that to win a policy debate political actors should frame the issue strategically—that is, selectively highlight considerations that mobilize public opinion behind their policy position. Engaging the opponent in a dialogue (i.e., focusing on the same considerations) is portrayed as a suboptimal strategy because political actors forfeit the ability to structure the debate. Using over 40 public opinion polls and a detailed content analysis of news stories, I examine the use of framing and engagement strategies during the 1993–94 debate over health care reform. The analysis shows that engagement was more effective at increasing support for reform than framing. This study is the first to document the role of engagement in a policy debate, and it extends work showing that this strategy is more common in election campaigns than scholars once suspected.

Examining the Link Between Issue Attitudes and News Source: The Case of Latinos and Immigration Reform

This paper explores whether an individual’s news source can explain their attitudes on immigration. We focus on the Spanish-speaking population in the U.S., since they have the option of accessing their news in English, Spanish or in both languages. Our audience influence hypothesis predicts that Spanish-language news will cover immigration in a more positive and informative manner than will English-language news. Thus, Latinos who use Spanish-language news may have a higher likelihood of possessing pro-immigrant sentiments than Latinos who only use English-language news. Content analysis of Spanish and English-language television news segments reveals variations in the tone and substance of these news outlets. Analysis of Latino survey respondents indicates that immigration attitudes vary by news source. Generational status also influences Latinos’ immigration attitudes, though its impact is not as great as one’s news source.

The power and limitations of televised presidential debates: Assessing the real impact of candidate performance on public opinion and vote choice

A growing literature establishes that presidential candidates can help and hurt themselves through their performance in televised debates. Debate performance, however, is a somewhat elusive concept. Voters' post-debate assessments of the participants may be heavily colored by pre-existing attitudes toward candidates, parties, and the incumbent president. This paper attempts to tease out the “true” impact of debate performance, i.e., those times in which the candidates' superiority or inferiority on stage breaks through voters' cognitive filters. We find that debate performance is responsible for only about half of the variance in viewers' assessments of winners and losers; that it is possible to be declared the winner in the post-debate polls based entirely on factors exogenous to the debate itself; and that even a highly successful performance might yield only a narrow win in the post-debate polls. We also present evidence that, when measured properly, debate performance can actually alter candidate preferences.     

Electoral institutions, partisan status, and political support in Lesotho

Does the introduction of proportionality in electoral systems help to boost popular evaluations of democracy? This article takes advantage of an electoral reform in Lesotho to conduct a natural experiment. We trace shifts over time in popular political support, using Afrobarometer data collected before and after reform to measure mass satisfaction with democracy and public trust in political institutions. We find both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's transition from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime. Importantly, however, formal institutions have only indirect effects at the individual level, where a person's informal partisan status – as a member of a winning majority or losing minority – mediates the impacts of institutional change.     

监督舆论与舆论监督:网络公民权利与公共权力的进退与平衡

监督舆论与舆论监督是话语干涉的两种形式,存在主体性、结果性、立场性、技术性的权力差异。监督舆论形成公共权力的积极进制、消极进制、无效进制,引导舆论朝着积极正向的方向发展,但也易造成舆论的说教化与虚假化。舆论监督形成公共权力的强制化、主动化、圈层化、边缘化的退制,适应公意的变化,提倡公民权利约束公共权力,保证权力运行的合法化与公开化,存在舆论控制权力的风险,出现群体审判与群氓政治的现象。监督舆论与舆论监督应达到有限性平衡、动态性平衡、有效性平衡、竞争性平衡,保证公共权力与公民权利的相互制衡,达到善治的目的,进而实现公共权力与舆论机制的优化,促进社会现代化的和谐发展。     

Public opinion, party messages, and responsibility for the financial crisis in Britain

The political consequences of the crisis in world financial markets are only beginning to be understood. In this article, we take up one of these many repercussions by examining public beliefs of who’s to blame for a complex and unparalleled set of events. Analyses of survey data from Britain find that while most assign responsibility for the crisis to market actors, the likelihood of blaming governments, as opposed to blaming banks and investors, is greater among low sophisticates and Conservative Party identifiers. We further show how elite messages from competing political elites evolved over-time and were reflected in mass beliefs about the crisis. Results highlight the centrality of partisan cues and, in particular, of political sophistication in understanding the dynamics of responsibility attributions. Lastly, we estimate the consequences of blaming the government for the crisis for voter choice.     

Detecting manipulation in authoritarian elections: Survey-based methods in Zimbabwe

This paper explores the feasibility of using social surveys to detect electoral manipulation in authoritarian regimes. It compares official results from the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe with findings from a nationally representative pre-election survey. The comparison confirms that the dominant incumbent party won the elections but by far smaller margins than officially reported. This discrepancy provides analytic leverage to identify the possible presence of coercive mobilization and vote suppression and to pinpoint their geographic location. The election results are re-estimated using a set of voting simulations based on novel proxy indicators and an original list experiment designed to reveal the political preferences of fearful voters. The paper concludes by discussing why autocrats manipulate elections and whether or not they succeed in their objectives.     

Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice

One of the most noted phenomena in social and political decision-making is the occurrence of a framing effect. For example, on problems involving risky choices, individuals tend to act risk-averse when the problem is framed in terms of gains (e.g., saving lives, making money) and risk-seeking when the same problem is instead framed in terms of losses (e.g., deaths, losing money). Scholars have begun to identify the processes underlying framing effects as well as the conditions under which framing effects occur. Yet, extant work focuses nearly exclusively on cognitive processes, despite growing recognition of the importance of emotion in general decision-making tasks. In this paper, we explore the impact of emotional states on risk attitudes and framing. We find that emotions significantly influence both individuals’ tendencies to take risks and the impact of a frame on risky choices (e.g., emotions amplify or depress a frame’s impact). The precise role of emotions depends on the problem domain (e.g., a life-death or a financial decision), and the specific type of emotion under study. Moreover, in contrast to much work in political science, we show that emotions need to be distinguished beyond their positive or negative valence, as different negative emotions exert opposite effects. Our results accentuate the importance of integrating emotions into research areas traditionally dominated by more cognitive perspectives.

The risks and opportunities of Europe: How issue yield explains (non-)reactions to the financial crisis

The financial crisis subjected the EU to its first truly serious stress test. A majority of citizens is now opposed to further integration. But party systems have barely adjusted, instead perpetuating traditional patterns of an evasive mainstream with Euroskeptic fringes. To explain this unexpected outcome we draw on issue yield (De Sio and Weber, 2014), a general model of political competition that unites public opinion, party unity and electoral support. Issue yield highlights how the crisis affected risks and opportunities differently for pro- and anti-integration parties. For such an asymmetric constellation, the model predicts the muffled choices supplied by most parties on EU matters. We use the European Election Studies 2009/2014 and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2010/2014 to document these patterns.     

On the Other Side of the Curtain: A Reassessment of Non-Elite Human Rights Experiences and Values in Poland

In this paper, I explore the formation of human rights attitudes among what I call the “silent majority” in the post-communist countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is the large, diverse group of people never directly confronted with harsh methods of repression under communism. I argue here that the foundations for conceptualizing human rights are based on the degree and saliency of exposure to rights violations and that, for many citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, life behind the “iron curtain” is associated with relatively fewer rights violations than life after the iron curtain’s fall. Comparative personal experiences will play a key role in explaining how these citizens conceptualize human rights. I test this argument by applying it to the cases of Poland, where I conducted a total of 68 randomly selected non-elite interviews in an effort to probe for key factors defining individuals’ conceptions of human rights.

Economic openness, policy uncertainty, and the dynamics of government support

Does globalization affect popular support for national governments? This article contends that exposure to the world economy obscures mass–elite linkages in developed democracies. Market interdependence, I argue, sends a signal to citizens that the policymaking environment has become more complex. As a consequence, publics are less certain of how to evaluate policymaker performance when exposure to the world economy increases. Informed by research on the role of uncertainty in public evaluations, I test this proposition by modeling the volatility of aggregate government popularity as a function of economic openness in four advanced industrial democracies. Results show that globalization increases the volatility—and, hence, the uncertainty—of public assessments of government performance. The implications for the political economy of advanced capitalist democracies and for models of collective public opinion are discussed.     

Nonparticipation as Self-Censorship: Publicly Observable Political Activity in a Polarized Opinion Climate

In a polarized opinion climate, people may refrain from participating in publicly observable political activities that make them vulnerable to scrutiny and criticism by others who hold opinions that differ from their own. We took a dispositional approach to testing this claim by determining whether people who are relatively more influenced by the climate of opinion when choosing whether or not to voice an opinion, measured with the Willingness to Self-Censor scale [Hayes et al. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 17 (2005) 298], are also relatively less likely to engage in public political activities. In a poll of residents of the United States, we found that even after controlling for interest in politics, political ideology, ideological extremity, political efficacy, attention to political news, dispositional shyness, frequency of political discussion, and demographics, dispositional self-censors reported having engaged in relatively fewer public political activities over the prior 2 years compared to those less willing to censor their own opinion expression. These results are consistent with our interpretation of political participation as a social process that is governed in part by the social psychological implications of participation to the person. At a larger theoretical level, our findings connect the literature on opinion perceptions and opinion expression with research on political participation.