The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of international life

The climate of post-Cold-War interactions remains uncertain. Rather than a transitory stage, the resilience of the pervasive randomness of international life has challenged the dominant frameworks for the study of world politics. Some commentators have therefore advocated the infusion of international relations theory with the conjectures of complexity theory. This article brings together the claims of the different proponents of such intersection and suggests the emergence of complex international relations theory. Although it requires further critical elaboration, the claim here is that this theory outlines the fifth debate in the study of international life and proffers intriguing heuristic devices that both challenge conventional wisdom and provoke analytical imaginations.

It is also possible that hard imaginative thinking has not increased so as to keep pace with the expansion and complication of human societies and organisations. That is the darkest shadow upon the hopes of mankind.     

A 'visionary hope' frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo-American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

A Leap of Faith: When and How Ex-Combatants Resort to Violence

Previous research has given scant attention to the issue of how and when ex-combatants resort to organized violence. This article fills this research gap by comparing ex-fighters in the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. It holds that ex-combatant violence is the result of interaction between entrepreneurs of violence, military affinities, intermediaries, and selective incentives. Ex-combatants take to arms when they have access to entrepreneurs of violence. By offering selective incentives and utilizing existing military affinities, entrepreneurs can generate the enticements and trust needed to convince ex-combatants to resort to arms. However, as entrepreneurs have limited contact with ex-fighters, they are dependent on intermediaries to do the actual recruiting for them. Contrary to previous assumptions, this article finds that ex-fighters are largely risk-averse individuals and that ex-combatant violence is seldom triggered by the mere presence of small arms, lack of economic opportunities, or experiences of insecurity.     

A sub-national approach to state-building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia's DDR process

The Mayoral Offices of the two most important cities in Colombia— Bogotá and Medellín—played a key role in implementing the national policy of DDR that took place under the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe. Both Mayors developed municipal policies to provide services to ex-combatants from paramilitary and guerrilla groups. The analysis of these policies contributes to the understanding of the role that municipal authorities play in underpinning and redefining national policies of security and reintegration of ex-combatants. The dichotomy between military security and human security presents a theoretical framework to study how national and sub-national authorities interact on the basis of their different security needs. Municipal authorities had to address three main challenges in the reintegration of ex-combatants: first, the consequences of a sudden increase in population and the subsequent pressure on security and coexistence; second, the resistance from the recipient communities and having to achieve a balance in the services provided to victims and demobilised; third, how to establish effective collaboration between municipal and national authorities. The DDR was nationally built, but it was consolidated at the sub-national level.