The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests

The participation of non-state actors in international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no longer discussed in single isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organizations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as ‘regime complexes’. This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it with the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found to be insignificant, political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found to be real, demanding a certain type of material and organizational resources in order for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, non-governmental organizations being dominant with respect to business groups.     

Parallel authoritarian powers: an explanation of Mexico’s authoritarian regime breakdown

Regional multilateral regimes have become important instruments for promoting and defending democracy around the world. The novel nature of these regional instruments has generated a cottage industry in social science scholarship. Yet, none of these works compare the democracy promotion and defence regimes of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU). This article is designed to fill this gap. We argue that the unique constellation of actors that are members of each respective organization have reinforced two distinct democracy promotion and defence paths. The state-driven regime evolution characteristic of the Americas contrasts with Africa's expert-driven process of regime construction. The state-centric process of the OAS regime has bolstered a narrow interstate multilateralism that upholds traditional sovereign state prerogatives and minimizes the role for non-state actors in the promotion and defence of democracy in the Americas. The expert-driven process of AU's regime construction has fostered a legalistic approach to democratic promotion and defence in Africa and opened up space for non-state actors to play a central role in the development of regional democracy promotion and defence norms.     

Non-strategic nuclear weapons as a ‘Trojan horse’: explaining Germany's ambivalent attitude

Germany's ambivalent attitude toward nuclear weapons is the result of an intricate rivalry between competing principles and goals of foreign and security policy-making. A deeply engrained strategic culture of anti-nuclearism and anti-militarism competes with a belief in collective defense and alliance cohesion. Similarly, the long-held belief in multilateralism is time and again challenged by newly emerging claims for leadership within multilateral institutions. The strategically rather insignificant non-strategic nuclear weapons issue provides a nodal point around which these conflicting principles came to the fore.     

Invest,Hold Up,or Accept?China in Multilateral Governance

China has played an inconsistent role in multilateral governance, sometimes contributing to the creation and maintenance of international regimes, sometimes free riding or even threatening to undermine multilateral regimes to improve its position. We show that the strategic context of a particular issue of international concern affects China's approach to multilateralism and argue that our approach adds additional leverage to existing theories that rely on assumptions about its inherent disposition or socialization processes. An emerging global power will be willing to invest more in supporting a regime when its outside options are relatively poor. When its outside options are good, it will free ride on the efforts of more established states if it is not a necessary player in maintaining regimes, and if it is seen as indispensable it will threaten to hold up regime support as a way to win concessions. We show that these two factors, outside options and indispensability, can help explain changes in China's strategy with respect to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the regulation of international finance.     

印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁与重构

21世纪以来,印度洋安全治理制度进入了一个新发展阶段,在此过程中,既创建了新的制度,也有一些旧的制度被改建或者重建。例如,在海盗问题治理领域,就形成了一系列"多层次、多主体"的新制度安排。尽管这些层次不同、范围各异的制度安排大多是非正式的,但新制度安排的出现在某种程度上反映了印度洋安全治理方式的演变。印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁受到多重因素驱动,包括外部环境变迁、制度学习和不同制度间的竞争、重要的利益攸关国家对制度建设的重视与推动以及非国家行为体积极参与相关治理实践等。由于各种原因,目前制度发展依然面临诸多困境。未来,相关治理主体在制度发展与重构过程中应该继续发挥能动性,在参与治理实践过程中从观念层面和具体操作层面不断推动制度优化发展。     

The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?

In recent years, questions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have developed into a global policy issue. Multinational corporations, as high-profile representatives of economic transnationalisation and globalisation, have come under ever closer scrutiny in regard to their actual development impact, especially in Third World countries. The UN Global Compact as an example for evolving “complex multilateralism on a global level” aims at solving two problems at once, namely the implementation of minimum standards of “good corporate conduct” and socio-economic development, especially of poor countries. In a paradigmatic policy shift, the United Nations has fostered close partnerships with global business to promote CSR and socio-economic development, thereby opening the UN system to private business interests. This shift has been criticised by many civil society actors. Despite its remarkable achievements, the Global Compact reveals many problems of contemporary global governance related to its understanding of globalisation, the implementation and control of its core norms and rules as well as in regard to issues of transparency and democratic legitimacy. Finally, the Global Compact serves to illustrate how international institutions try to adapt to the growing complexity of development and economic governance issues and the larger influence of non-state actors in the global political economy.     

Conflict dynamics in post-2011 Libya: a political economy perspective

After the fall of the Qadhafi regime Libya has become a theatre of conflict and violence. In the midst of the vacuum left by the sudden collapse of the old regime, various groups have come to contest their role in a new Libya. Illicit trafficking and the exploitation of oil resources have contributed to this struggle by empowering certain actors over others and by exhausting the capacity of the state. This article investigates the derailing of the Libyan transition and the opening of a new phase of conflict from a political economy perspective. It engages with key arguments developed in the literature on the economic causes of war and shows that the conflict in Libya challenges some of their conclusions. The establishment of areas of de facto sovereignty—warlordism—suggests two key factors explaining the discrepancy between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence: the problematic and contested definition of state and non-state actors in Libya; and an emerging political economy which is best described as an overproduction of governance rather than a lack of it.     

Responses to Financial Crises: An Evolutionary Perspective

As the world currently faces the ever-deepening sub-prime crisis, we are reminded that the process of globalisation can cause significant disruptions in global markets and political systems. This article focuses on the evolution of financial crisis responses to gain a better understanding of the dynamics affecting current responses. By using a focused comparison of case studies it argues that the development of crisis response and the dominance of the current multilateral actors is a result of an evolutionary process. This process privileges learning and innovation within a complex political economic system. The crises of each era, born of many of the same problems, generate a variety of responding actors, a few of which are adopted. These actors help to address the immediate problems and even work well for a while. Eventually, they are overwhelmed by the tendency of financial interactions to grow. Another set of crises generates another round of actors and mechanisms. As time goes on, crisis response requires more formal institutions that can deal with more complex systems. The article concludes that response actors are becoming more public, multilateral and global in scope. Understanding this pattern of response should help to shed light on the potential for reform of the financial architecture and help to explain the dominance of multilateralism as a crisis response.     

The politics of preventing violent extremism: the case of Uganda*

Multilateral development actors have recently embraced the ‘PVE’ (preventing violent extremism) agenda. This includes consideration of PVE measures in countries like Uganda, where interpretations of non-state violence are contested and where the government has a history of strategic rent-seeking behaviour regarding counter-terrorism assistance. This article assesses the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Uganda. We argue against a strategic reorientation towards PVE among development actors. Current and emerging threats do not justify a departure from existing development priorities. Importantly, consideration of the political context pertaining to PVE in Uganda commends a cautious approach.     

Arms Transfers beyond the State-to-State Realm

Arms transfers beyond the state-to-state realm can have harmful effects for international security dramatically affecting the relations and behavior of states. This article examines why an emerging international norm on "prohibiting states to transfer arms to nonstate groups" has failed to diffuse at the international level. It discusses the already available international law framework existing at the regional and international levels upon which the potential norm could be built. The failure of the norm to diffuse at the international level can be primarily explained by the existence of a long-consolidated norm: the customary practice of states to transfer weapons to nonstate actors, that is, groups they deem legitimate to, without any interference or constraint. ¹ The unrestrained transfer of weapons is an established foreign-policy practice. It is the way states form, uphold alliances, extend friendships, and build spheres of influence ( Sorokin 1994 ). Clearly, no state willingly wants to give this up. Therefore, the multilateral agreement on a norm barring most or all transfers of weapons to nonstate actors would curtail the freedom of action to build spheres of influence as states please. There are genuine ethical and moral dilemmas in this discussion, a nonstate actor may be a freedom fighter or a terrorist depending on different perspectives. The distinction between the categories "state" and "nonstate" actors may risk classifying actors in two camps: the good and the bad, respectively. This is problematic as a few states are known to be the most brutal perpetrators of egregious violations against their own citizens, whereas certain nonstate actors are legitimately fighting for the protection of vulnerable populations.     

Orchestration and transnational climate governance

With multilateral efforts to mitigate climate change in gridlock, attention has turned to transnational climate governance initiatives, through which sub- and non-state actors seek to reduce greenhouse gases. These initiatives include networks of cities committed to lowering their carbon footprints, voluntary corporate reduction targets and disclosure processes, and many of the rules that govern carbon markets. The paper considers the role of “traditional” actors in world politics—states and intergovernmental organizations—in orchestrating such initiatives. This strategy accounts for nearly a third of transnational climate governance initiatives, we find, and upends the conventional dichotomy between “top down” and “bottom up” solutions to global collective action problems. We develop a theory to explain when states and intergovernmental organizations are likely to engage in orchestration, and we provide initial support for this theory with a new dataset of transnational climate governance initiatives and case studies of two of the most active orchestrators, the World Bank and the United Kingdom.     

Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism

This article investigates the notion of ‘lateralisms’ and how various modes of engagement (namely bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism) relate to one another. It begins with a careful analysis of the evolution of ‘lateralisms’ and their (in)compatibility at the global level, building on the existing literature from multiple research disciplines. The second part of this article focuses specifically on the European Union's (EU's) foreign policy approach. The author puts forward two main hypotheses. First, the EU has performed a rebalancing act between bilateralism and regionalism/multilateralism over the last decade in favour of the former, notably through the deepening of its so-called ‘strategic partnerships’. Second, this enhanced bilateralism is not necessarily compatible with other ‘lateralisms’, as it can at times undermine regional integration processes or the building of an effective multilateral order. The author eventually formulates some recommendations to ensure that bilateral partnerships are geared towards the strengthening of the multilateral fabric which remains the EU's fundamental and long-term objective.     

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

The leadership deficit in Europe

The emerging global order is challenging multilateralism in the sense that power is becoming situational: centres of gravity are overlapping and transient, and the transnational interdependence that characterises this ‘polypolar’ world challenges small and great powers alike. Emerging powers are forming a ‘new middle', straddling the North-South divide with dynamic new multilateral formations, and prioritising economic self-interest. South Africa is at risk of being relegated to a new global periphery if it gives priority to political solidarity with the global South rather than economic pragmatism in its multilateral strategies. Its comparative advantage in the diplomatic arena is its middle power credentials. If it rationalizes its multilateralism to focus on diplomatic niche areas it can enhance its political influence in global governance institutions, despite its small economic stature.     

The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy

Why do governments choose multilateralism? We examine a principal-agent model in which states trade some control over the policy for greater burden sharing. The theory generates observable hypotheses regarding the reasons for and the patterns of support and opposition to multilateralism. To focus our study, we analyze support for bilateral and multilateral foreign aid giving in the US. Using new survey data, we provide evidence about the correlates of public and elite support for multilateral engagement. We find weak support for multilateralism and deep partisan divisions. Reflecting elite discourse, public opinion divides over two competing rationales—burden sharing and control—when faced with the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. As domestic groups’ preferences over aid policy diverge from those of the multilateral institution, maintaining control over aid policy becomes more salient and support for multilateralism falls.     

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia

This article argues that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from “economics in command” to “security in command.” The article concludes with a prediction that “A coordinated approach to combining alliances and quasi-alliances exclusive of China with multilateralism inclusive of it will best test China's intentions during this decade.”     

Mark S. Hamm. Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Few issues are more important to scholars of security studies than understanding the impact of state sponsorship on the capabilities of non-state armed actors. The subject of our study—Lebanon's Hezbollah—was selected based on its reputation amongst scholars and policymakers alike as an exceptionally capable organization. In our inquiry, we seek to answer the following questions about Hezbollah's rapid emergence during the 1980s as one of the world's premier armed non-state actors: (a) how did Iranian sponsorship contribute to Hezbollah's effectiveness?; and (b) to what extent did Hezbollah's success depend on characteristics endogenous to the organization itself? To preview our conclusions, state sponsorship can contribute markedly to non-state actors' capabilities by providing resources and sanctuary. However, the ultimate effectiveness of non-state armed groups depends heavily on such internal characteristics as their decision-making processes and members' backgrounds. Thus, while state support may be necessary for non-state actors to achieve their goals, it is insufficient as a guarantee of their effectiveness.     

What determines earmarked funding to international development organizations? Evidence from the new multi-bi aid data

Earmarked aid to international organizations has quadrupled over the last two decades and now represents almost 20% of total aid. This paper introduces a new dataset on earmarked aid, which alternatively has been referred to as multi-bi, restricted, non-core or trust fund aid. The data make it possible to track the rise of the new aid channel over an extended time period and in greater detail regarding, e.g., the implementing multilateral organizations. The data include more than 100,000 earmarked projects of 23 OECD donors to 290 multilateral institutions from 1990 to 2012. We graphically illustrate the patterns in earmarked aid for all actors: donor governments and their aid-providing agencies, multilateral organizations, and recipient countries. We also highlight promising research questions that can be analyzed with the multi-bi data. In a first empirical application of the data, we analyze four suggested donor motives for earmarked aid at the donor-recipient level. Contrary to donor claims, we find that earmarked aid and bilateral aid target the same recipients. We also find evidence that some donors use earmarked aid to bypass recipient countries with weak governance. Overall, our explorative analysis suggests that earmarked aid serves many purposes and that donors use it in different ways. This calls for more fine-grained research on the reasons and implications for earmarked aid.     

Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1

This article analyzes systemically the understudied topic of why and how the nuclear non-proliferation regime has remained a sustainable, even expanding entity, despite the unequal status of its members, and the fragility of international regimes as a species. The author argues that the convergence of two sets of distinct interests derived from the systemic roles and preferences of nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' has determined the creation and sustenance of the regime. For the nuclear-armed major powers the key factors that facilitate cooperation are the preservation of monopoly rights to possess nuclear weapons and the denial of similar rights to non-major power states. For most non-nuclear states, the regime's norms and principles render an important constraint against nuclear acquisition by their neighbors and a powerful normative restraint against nuclear use by the nuclear weapon states. This unique combination of interests and norms explains why the regime has persisted despite predictions of its demise. The larger theoretical implication is that favorable systemic conditions and system-induced interests have to be present in order for a multilateral security regime to emerge and persist. Conversely, when these favorable systemic conditions change, the regime is likely to weaken or dissipate.