Political Marketing

ABSTRACT

Political marketing is a relatively new approach to analysing political activity that draws upon management marketing assumptions to describe political behaviour. These assumptions are explicitly grounded in neoclassical economic assertions about behaviour. In political science these assumptions are utilised by orthodox rational choice theory. Thus, political marketing can be located within this perspective. Rational choice provides a series of analytic models through which ontological implications can be derived, and predictions made. Yet, the political marketing approach seeks to build upon orthodox rational choice accounts, by introducing a normative element to this perspective, prescribing the internalisation of these assumptions in order to achieve the desired objective. Further, this normative aspect claims that the adoption of marketing improves the democratic process. However, rational choice is an analytical ‘toolkit’ which does not seek to make normative claims. Indeed, normative arguments are inconsistent with rational choice, which seeks to provide a scientific, value-free approach to political analysis, and, consequently, the analytical and normative aspects of political marketing need to be rendered explicit and such normative aspects challenged.     

The Regulatory Gift: Politics,regulation and governance

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.     

Modes of regulatory governance: A political economy perspective

This article introduces the special issue by presenting a framework for the study of regulatory politics using the analytical tools and approaches of comparative political economy. Having traced the evolution of studies on regulation, it argues that scholars should pay more attention to the systemic features affecting regulation and to the relationship between regulatory policies and their outcomes. The article presents the foundations of an analytical framework based on the “regulatory policy process,” a comprehensive approach that links inputs, outputs, and outcomes. The review of the contributions to this special issue shows that regulatory regimes can be better understood by placing them within the broader political economy of a state or region. A renewed focus on regulatory outcomes can help foresee what one should expect from the impact of a certain regulatory regime on a political‐economic system.     

Should moral sentiments be incorporated into benefit-cost analysis? An example of long-term discounting

There are currently debates both about the ability to measure the value of moral sentiments and the nature of benefit-cost analysis. Moral sentiments can be reasonably measured in many situations and their consideration can improve benefit-cost analysis in any case. This argument is presented by briefly considering measurement issues and the example of discount rates for long-term projects in the context of a benefit-cost analysis. The suggestion has been made that it is immoral and unethical to undervalue future generations by discounting, and recently the federal government has recognized these moral concerns about discounting. Yet, the logic of wealth maximization requires discounting. This dilemma may be resolved by realizing that the problem is one of larger concern over missing values that arise from the general tendency of benefit-cost analyses to ignore ethical values. This deficiency is overcome by a modification to benefit-cost analysis (called KHM, for Kaldor-Hicks-Moral) that incorporates moral values directly into the benefit-cost analysis and, inter alia, recognizes all values for which there is a willingness to pay. Insofar as the current generation is willing to pay to avoid future moral harm, this is incorporated into the KHM approach. This article illustrates how KHM incorporates missing values and shows how compensation and mitigation can eliminate or reduce the concern over moral harm to future generations. Thus it is not necessary to use lower discount rates to recognize moral harm.     

Can the hidden hand of the market be an effective and legitimate regulator? The case of animal welfare under a labeling for consumer choice policy approach

In Australia, labeling for consumer choice, rather than higher government regulation, has become an important strand of the policy approach to addressing food animal welfare. This paper illustrates the usefulness of “regulatory network analysis” to uncover the potentials and limitations of market‐based governance to address contentious yet significant issues like animal welfare. We analyzed the content of newspaper articles from major Australian newspapers and official policy documents between 1990 and 2014 to show how the regulatory network influenced the framing of the regulatory problem, and the capacity and legitimacy of different regulatory actors at three “flashpoints” of decisionmaking about layer hen welfare in egg production. We suggest that the government policy of offering consumers the choice to buy cage free in the market allowed large‐scale industry to continue the egg laying business as usual with incremental innovation and adjustment. These incremental improvements only apply to the 20 percent or so of hens producing “free‐range” eggs. We conclude with a discussion of when and how labeling for consumer choice might create markets and public discourses that make possible more effective and legitimate regulation of issues such as layer hen welfare.     

Sharing natural resource management responsibility: Examining the New Zealand rock lobster co-management experience

Co-management, in which government and resource users share responsibility for managing a natural resource, is attracting considerable attention in both public policy and common pool resource research. However, little is understood about how this approach arises in a mature regulatory setting, or about its strengths and weaknesses. This study uses the experience of the New Zealand rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii and Sagmariasus verreauxi) industry to illustrate what co-management is and how it develops. This is followed by an assessment of co-management in this regime. Development of co-management is an evolutionary process that requires commitment from both government and industry. Strengthened property rights and management expertise provide the incentives and tools to develop a robust co-management regime. However the characteristics of the property rights bundle must be carefully matched to the regime’s biological, social, and regulatory setting.     

Preferences,beliefs, and values in negotiations concerning aid to Nicaragua

The paper argues that in the context of public choice for non-market goods, two assumptions of the simple model of the rational economic actor may not hold. The assumptions are that there is a direct connection between choice and outcome, and that preferences are not affected by the act of making a choice. Consequently, to understand people's preferences for public goods, it is important to measure their beliefs and values separately rather than simply to observe their choice behavior or to ask them what they would be willing to pay for the public good. In an example study, people's preferences for U.S. policies toward Nicaragua were measured and further analyzed into their beliefs about the effects of those policies on Nicaraguan outcomes, and their evaluations of the Nicaraguan outcomes. It was shown that the process of making a two-person choice changed the preferences, and that the separate measures or beliefs and values gave insight into the process of the change that would not have been available had only the preferences been measured. Implications for the contingent valuation method are explored and an alternative approach is proposed.     

Cambodia's uncertain future

Japanese government interests in Southeast Asia continue to expand. Official speeches refer to the growth of a ‘community that acts together’, while institutional linkages have been strengthened with the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three process and by a proliferation of bilateral arrangements. These developing networks raise questions about Japan’s future orientation towards its wider region. This article assesses recent developments, by challenging some of the fundamental assumptions about Japan’s regional behaviour. First, it examines how a tendency to render mutually exclusive bilateral and multilateral forms of behaviour serves to obfuscate a focus on the fundamental processes of regional engagement. Second, this article delineates Japan’s changing orientation towards the region as part of a process of ‘complex regional multilateralism’, in which a range of often ad hoc engagements have resulted in a loose framework for interaction. In so doing, it suggests that Japan’s current policy-making approach towards Southeast Asia may be regarded as a continuation of policy that is, nevertheless, being buffeted by a range of – primarily regional – external influences. The resulting set of perceived strategies demonstrates not an either/or approach to regional engagement but, rather, shows how the Japanese government manages changing circumstances to carve out a new role for itself in Southeast Asia.     

Subnational Responses to Fracking in Canada: Explaining Saskatchewan's “Wild West” Regulatory Approach

This article assesses the regulatory response to fracking by Saskatchewan, Canada's second largest oil‐producing province. Public officials and industry representatives claim fracking regulations are “comprehensive” and “robust”; however, there has been no comparative assessment of this claim. To address this gap, we outline the dominant regulatory pathways of U.S. states and Canadian provinces, ranging from applying existing regulations with minimal revisions, to enacting broader revisions or bans. We account for this variation using a framework from Davis ( 2012 ) emphasizing governments’ dependence on the oil sector, the level of support for fracking among elected officials and policy makers, and the influence of key “constituencies.” The article then traces the growth and impact of fracking in Saskatchewan and analyzes new trends in the province's regulation of fracking. Given the province's application of existing regulations with minimal revisions and active weakening of enforcement, we identify Saskatchewan as taking Rabe and Borick's ( 2013 ) “conventional” regulatory approach, typical of Davis's “energy dominant” states.     

Issue Voting as a Constrained Choice Problem

Prevalent models of issue voting view vote choice as a choice among party policies. Choice sets are implicitly assumed to be the same for all voters, and their composition is left to researchers' discretion. This article aims to relax such assumptions by presenting a model with a varying probability of inclusion in the choice set. We apply the “constrained choice conditional logistic regression” to survey data from the 1989 parliamentary election in Norway to examine the effects of party identification of voters and electoral viability and policy extremity of parties on individual voters' choice set compositions. Further, we look into the effect of parties' policy positions on their electoral fates under alternative assumptions about the composition of voters' choice sets. We find that voters' choice set composition conditions both the effects of their policy considerations on vote choice and those of parties' policy offerings on their electoral fates.     

Governance and transnational civil society: the problem of transnational rent-seeking

The expansion of transnational civil society challenges the regulatory reach of nation-states, both individually and collectively. One regulatory challenge is that transnational civil society organizations (TCSOs) can avail of opportunities to engage in, or facilitate, transnational rent-seeking in ways which benefit a small group of organizations or individuals but which impose significant social costs. This article suggests that certain roles played by TCSOs lend themselves to rent-seeking behaviour and it explores the hypothesis that TCSOs can engage in, or facilitate, transnational rent-seeking where they constitute transnational special interests and/or private transnational authorities. To this end, the article outlines a brief theoretical framework and applies it to case studies of two TCSOs, representing transnational trade associations and industry lobbies, and sports associations and regulators. While the conclusions here are tentative, the article argues for further research including refinement of the theoretical framework and empirical testing.     

Courage,regulatory responsibility,and the challenge of higher‐order reflexivity

Contemporary regulators must respond to ever‐increasing societal demands in various domains. Regulators must cope with these demands under conditions of extreme epistemic scarcity and ideological divide. This leaves regulators perplexed about what action they should take. Regulatory praxis offers two primary responses to this moral and epistemic dilemma: technical canonization and reflexive regulation. While these two approaches represent contrary regulatory philosophies, they suffer from two common blind spots: (a) disregard of the critical role of discretionary judgment in regulatory action; and (b) disregard of the dilemma of higher‐order reflexivity. The article explores the idea of higher‐order reflexivity in the regulatory context. This exploration renders visible the abysses that are faced by regulators as they attempt to resolve regulatory dilemmas through a cognizant and introspective process. The article argues that the Socratic concept of courage and the idea of forward‐looking responsibility provide a plausible framework for thinking about the challenge of regulatory judgment. It concludes with a discussion of the legal and institutional mechanisms that could both facilitate and put to scrutiny the realization of this ideal (but noting also several features of the contemporary regulatory system which constitute potential barriers).     

Contested hybridization of regulation: Failure of the Dutch regulatory system to protect minors from harmful media

The hybridization of regulatory modes and instruments is currently a popular way to improve public regulation. However, it is still unclear whether combinations of hard law and soft law, co-regulation, and legally enforced self-regulation really make regulation more effective. Using the analytical framework of the “really responsive regulation” approach, in this article we explore effectiveness problems in a hybrid regulatory system that tries to protect minors from harmful media. In our analysis of low compliance rates in the context of system failures, we argue that effectiveness problems seem to arise from poorly informed staff members, lack of internal and external controls, low rule enforcement, insufficient overlap between public and private interests, poor social responsibility in the Dutch media sector, deficiencies in the institutional framework, an inconsistent regulatory strategy, and inadequate responses from responsible regulators. Furthermore, based on our case study we argue that institutional dynamics of standard-setting activities can be detrimental to regulatory goal achievement if there is no compensation at the systemic level. Ongoing “regulatory care” through control, corrective responses, and rule enforcement seems to be crucial for a hybrid regulatory system to perform well.     

Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and accessibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues.     

Process choice

Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how officials make regulatory decisions – process choice – remains in relative infancy. Notwithstanding the emphasis legal scholars and political economists have placed on administrative procedures, surprisingly little research has investigated why regulators choose among different process options or what value they and the public receive from different choices. In their book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak make a significant contribution by empirically and normatively examining regulators' choices between notice‐and‐comment rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and what they call “regulation by litigation.” This review article considers three central questions about regulation by litigation. First, how if at all does regulation by litigation differ from other uses of litigation to achieve policy goals? Second, why do regulators choose litigation over other process options? Third, is regulation by litigation as bad as Morriss, Yandle, and Dorchak say it is? By addressing these conceptual, empirical, and normative questions, this review article not only reveals the specific strengths and limitations of the book, Regulation by Litigation, but also highlights more general opportunities and challenges for future research on process choice.     

Building sustainable capacity in the public sector: What can be done?

Effective government performance is central to the creation of market-oriented economies, secure and productive populations, and democratic political systems in developing countries. Capacity building to improve public sector performance is thus an important focus of development initiatives. Several implicit assumptions underlie most such efforts: that organizations or training activities are the logical site for capacity-building interventions; that administrative structures and monetary rewards determine organizational and individual performance; that organizations work well when structures and control mechanisms are in place; and that individual performance improves as a result of skill and technology transfer through training activities. Each of these assumptions is called into question by the findings of research carried out in six developing countries and reported in this article. Our studies indicate designing interventions that most constructively address sources of poor performance must follow from an assessment of a relatively broad set of variables, including the action environment in which all such activities take place. We also found that effective public sector performance is more often driven by strong organizational cultures, good management practices, and effective communication networks than it is by rules and regulations or procedures and pay scales. Our case studies further indicate that individual performance is more affected by opportunities for meaningful work, shared professional norms, teamwork, and promotion based on performance rather than it is by training in specific skills. In this article, we describe a framework or conceptual map that emphasizes that training activities, organizational performance and administrative structures are embedded within complex environments that significantly constrain their success and that often account for training or organizational failure. When it was applied in the six case study countries, the framework proved useful in identifying capacity gaps and providing a tool for the strategic design of interventions that are sensitive to the roots of performance deficits. This allows us to conclude that the assumptions underlying many capacity-building initiatives may focus attention on interventions that do not generate the highest payoffs in terms of improved performance.     

Regulation as a political question

There are at least two frameworks within which the debate on proper institutional arrangements for regulation can be carried out. One rests on seeing the various possibilities as instruments and its central concern is with the most efficient means for achieving regulatory objectives. The second framework views regulation as an essentially political act. It focuses on adapting our choice of institutional alternatives to take account of valued features of our existing political world. It also involves an understanding of how our choice of institutional alternatives actively shapes that world and thus helps to form our regime or the way of life to which we aspire. These two frameworks are examined with special attention being given to the political view.     

Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story

Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.