State Policy and National Representation: Marijuana Politics in American Federalism

Members of Congress represent geographically demarcated districts embedded in subnational policy environments. Drawing on policy feedback literature and literature on congressional representation, I argue that, because of this institutional configuration, subnational policy adoption can affect national representation. More specifically, policy reforms in the states they represent can increase pressures members face from organized groups and individuals in their constituencies to promote aligned federal policies. Empirically, I examine the effects of state marijuana legalization. The inferential design leverages differences across the states in statewide citizen initiative institutions, which provides exogenous variation in legalization. Instrumental variables analysis indicates legalization influenced pro-marijuana bill sponsorship and roll calls in the 116th Congress. The evidence points to growing influence of industry in legalizing states—including the ability to mobilize employees and customers—as the key mechanism, thus underscoring the importance of a political economy perspective for studying interdependencies in American federalism.     

Presidential Campaigning in the 2002 Congressional Elections

Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self‐interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates' electoral prospects.     

Strategic Position Taking and Presidential Influence in Congress

The rise and fall of presidential success in Congress remains a central puzzle in the literature. We model success as two interrelated processes: presidential position taking and Congress's decision to support or oppose the president. The analysis emphasizes the importance of strategic position taking in determining presidential success. We show that presidential approval significantly influences success, not only because it affects congressional behavior, but also because it shapes presidential decisions to take positions. Moreover, we explain that legislative success during the honeymoon period is driven by presidential position taking. Our findings highlight the role of a president's strategic decisions for theories explaining congressional‐executive relations.     

Will She Stay or Will She Go? Career Ceilings and Women's Retirement from the U.S. Congress

This article offers the first broad‐based, systematic, times‐series assessment of the gender dynamics underlying congressional retirement. We extend the body of work on gender and representation by using the congressional retirement literature to develop an argument that accounts for the gender gap in the average length of congressional service. Our results indicate that women are less willing than men to remain in Congress when their ability to influence the legislative agenda stalls. Because of women's relatively early departures from the House of Representatives, our analysis suggests that prospects for women's representation are less promising than the conventional wisdom suggests.     

Congress, health care, and congressional caucuses: an examination of the Diabetes Caucus

Caucuses have become a critical feature of the congressional landscape, yet are neglected in the literature on health-policy making in Congress. The principal goal of the article is to use the Diabetes Caucus as a case study to highlight this significant yet underappreciated political actor in the health-policy realm in Congress. The exploration, which draws on information gathered from thirty-two interviews with members of the Diabetes Caucus and their staff, will contribute to an increased understanding of both Congress's operations in the health area and the potential impact of caucuses on health-policy making. The article emphasizes particular characteristics relating to the membership and objectives of the Diabetes Caucus. In addition, the study stresses that the group had the requisite political momentum to achieve legislative successes when a policy window opened in the 105th Congress because it served much like, in the terminology of John Kingdon, a "policy entrepreneur".     

Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court

Sparked by interest in game‐theoretic representations of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case‐specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress‐ and Court‐specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation‐of‐powers system.     

Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001

Through theoretically informed inquiry into congressional attitudes toward the Constitution and the courts as well as survey research of two modem Congresses, this study considers the prospects and implications of a more salient legislative role in constitutional affairs. By analyzing survey responses from the 86th (1959–61) and 106th (1999–2001) Congresses, and the political context in which these views were formed, this essay explores the legislature's evolving conception of its role and capacities as a constitutional interpreter. Among other findings, Congress demonstrates a persistent and somewhat surprising interest in asserting an independent, distinctive constitutional voice, although it has somewhat conflicted and underdeveloped views about how to achieve this objective. While this essay points to significant barriers to fostering a coherent and forceful congressional presence in constitutional decision making, it also suggests institutional organizations and strategies that may be promising bases for promoting this goal.     

Party Unity,Ideology, and Polarization in Primary Elections for the House of Representatives: 1956–2012

Increasing party polarization in Congress is a vexing phenomenon for political scientists, as it offers a theoretical conundrum. Members of Congress have become increasingly ideologically divided by party in recent years, which seems counterintuitive as the public electorally punishes representatives for excessive partisanship and ideological behavior. One explanation for this result is that members receive benefits for such behavior during primaries. This article examines the effect of ideological and partisan behavior on primary challenges and primary vote totals for incumbent House members. The results show that incumbents receive benefits in the primary from greater levels of partisanship but not greater levels of ideological extremity. This finding is substantively important as it provides further insight into the motivation of congressional incumbents and offers a partial explanation for the rise in congressional polarization.     

Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the US Senate

We examine congressional cue‐taking theory to determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US Senate. Using a novel data‐collection technique (timed C‐SPAN footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis. Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority generally predict cue‐giving, while other types of characteristics predict cue‐giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when studying congressional behavior.     

The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval

Abstract Models of congressional approval have, in both theory and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval. Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate‐level time‐series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven largely by sociotropic prospections, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.     

Whistle While You Work: Job Satisfaction and Retirement from the U.S. House

Abstract: The literature analyzing the effects of job satisfaction on congressional retirement has been inconclusive. The problem with this literature is its reliance on indirect measures of job satisfaction. We use a direct measure of job satisfaction to demonstrate that job satisfaction does have a significant independent effect on congressional retirement. The findings imply that the indirect measures of job satisfaction measure frustration as opposed to job dissatisfaction, a conceptually different variable. The fact that members' job satisfaction affects their career length suggests that a Congress that keeps its members happy will have greater retention and will, presumably, keep its best members.     

Do Women Representatives Regender Legislative Bureaucracy? Assessing the Effect of Representative Sex on Women's Presence among US Congressional Staff

Achieving greater female presence in influential positions is a commonly discussed strategy for gender reform in institutions such as the US Congress. Using theory adapted from research on gender in the workplace, this study examines whether women representatives, as ‘managers’ of congressional offices, alter patterns of gender representation in Congress by hiring and promoting more women staffers compared with men representatives. Cross-sectional logistic regression analyses of staffer sex during the 110th and 111th Congresses (2007–10) reveal a positive relationship between women representatives and female presence on congressional staffs. However, the relationship does not hold with respect to the most influential staff positions. These findings provide only limited support for theories that women representatives act as ‘change agents’ by directly facilitating opportunities for women, and highlight the importance of exploring alternative strategies for empowering women and regendering legislative institutions.     

From the Halls of Congress to K Street: Government Experience and its Value for Lobbying

Lobbying presents an attractive postcongressional career, with some former congressional members and staffers transitioning to lucrative lobbying careers. Precisely why congressional experience is valued is a matter of ongoing debate. Building on research positing a relationship between political uncertainty and demand for lobbyists, we examine conditions under which lobbyists with past congressional experience prove most valuable. To assess lobbyist earnings, we develop a new measure, Lobbyist Value Added, that reflects the marginal contribution of each lobbyist on a contract, and show that previous measures understate the value of high‐performing lobbyists. We find that former staffers earn revenues above their peers during times of uncertainty, and former members of Congress generate higher revenue overall, which we identify by comparing revenues generated by individuals who narrowly won election to those who narrowly lost. These findings help characterize when lobbyists with different skillsets prove most valuable and the value added by government experience.     

Ideological Distance from the Majority Party and Public Approval of Congress

Abstract: We analyze whether or not perceived ideological distance from the congressional majority party influences individuals' approval of the way Congress as a whole handles its job. We argue that, to the extent citizens see the majority party as representing an ideological stance that is distant from their own, they are unlikely to feel that Congress is representing them and therefore will be less supportive toward Congress. In contrast, when members of the public feel that the congressional majority is close to them ideologically, they are likely to feel well represented by and thereby approve of Congress. Using cross‐sectional data covering periods of Democratic, Republican, and split party control of Congress (1980–98), this analysis provides strong support for the ideological proximity argument.     

The rise and fall of legislative service organisations in the United States Congress

The abolition of Legislative Service Organisations by the 104th Congress (1995–96) constituted one of its earliest achievements. Although political dissensus had surrounded the role and activities of LSOs throughout their institutional existence, the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections was the critical factor prompting their abolition. Prior reform attempts had faltered upon the Democratic party's post‐1954 dominance of the House of Representatives and the diffuse representational and institutional benefits which LSOs conferred upon their members. However, when, under a new Republican majority, the perceived costs of LSOs were held to exceed their benefits, the organisations were rapidly terminated. The abolition of LSOs lends new and additional support to scholars who emphasise the continued salience of party to congressional politics in the United States.     

House Party Switchers and Committee Assignments: Who Gets “What,When, How?”

What are the political consequences for members of Congress who switch parties? Roll‐call and electoral consequences of congressional party switching have been studied, but other implications of party defections have yet to be systematically explored. In this article, I examine the committee assignments of House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee assignment data from the 94th House (1975–76) through the 107th House (2001–02), I show that party switchers are more likely than nonswitchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority norm. The findings from this article are of interest to students of political parties and legislative institutions, and fill a gap in the literature on party switching. When you joined the Republican Conference on August 6, 1995, the elected leadership …determined that your accumulated seniority in the Congress would be credited when you joined the Republican Conference…. Therefore, the Republican Steering Committee's Seniority List ranks you nineteenth in overall conference seniority and designates May 22, 1980, as the beginning of your tenure in the House for purposes of Republican seniority. Letter from Speaker Dennis Hastert to party switcher Billy Tauzin, April 4, 2000.¹     

Party,Policy, and the Ambition to Run for Higher Office

This article examines why some state legislators run for Congress and others do not. Our main argument is that there are differences in the expected value of a state legislative seat and the expected benefits of being a member of Congress. One key component of this value is how closely the candidate fits with her party. We find that the probability of seeking congressional office increases among state legislators who are distant from the state party and proximate to the congressional party and decreases among those who are distant from the congressional party and proximate to the state party.     

Don't Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees

In contrast to the dramatic growth in the size and influence of the executive branch over the past 40 years, congressional committee staffing levels are at an all‐time low. Faced with growing demands to produce legislation and to conduct oversight of executive branch policymaking, Congress can and does supplement its existing staff by borrowing personnel, known as detailees, from federal agencies. Using an original dataset of detailees from 1997 to 2015, we analyze the degree to which congressional committees rely on detailees to increase legislative capacity. We find that committees in the House and Senate use detailees in different ways to further both legislative and oversight initiatives.     

Knowledge,Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these traditional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress. Drawing on a mixed‐methods approach of interviews with congressional staff and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape the legislation that passes.     

Congressional Performance,Incumbent Behavior,and Voting in Senate Elections

Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state‐level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.