“No Hints,No Forecasts,No Previews”: An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Nominee Candor from Harlan to Kagan

Criticism of Supreme Court confirmation hearings has intensified considerably over the past two decades. In particular, there is a growing sense that nominees are now less forthcoming and that the hearings have suffered as a result. In this article, we challenge that conventional wisdom. Based on a comprehensive content analysis of every question and answer in all of the modern confirmation hearings—nearly 11,000 in total—we find only a mild decline in the candor of recent nominees. Moreover, we find that senators ask more probing questions than in the past, and that nominees are now more explicit about their reasons when they choose not to respond—two factors that may be fueling the perception that evasiveness has increased in recent years. We close with a discussion of the normative implications of our findings as well as an outline for future research into this issue.     

Young people who sexually abuse: the Scottish context

This paper describes the policy and legal context in Scotland in respect of alleged young sexual abusers and considers the challenges encountered by decision-makers, particularly reporters operating in the Scottish children's hearings system. These include the nature of the problem, resources, child witnesses and corroboration. It is argued that reporters, in considering whether or not to refer an alleged young sexual abuser to a children's hearing or to take no action, encounter influences in both directions, but on balance there appear to be more obstacles in the way of a referral to a hearing.     

“I (can) see myself… But what for?” On Live Camera Feeds in Courtrooms (from the Perspective of Witnesses)

The paper’s aim is to present and critically discuss a peculiar practice noticed and studied in courtrooms in the Lower Court in Kraków, Poland. In courtrooms where different hearings take place, two cameras are installed on the wall or on the stand near the judge’s bench. One camera is aimed at the center of the courtroom, where non-professional participants such as witnesses or plaintiffs stand while being questioned by judge. The second camera’s view is more general—it covers the rest of the courtroom, including the benches for plaintiffs, claimants, defendants, and their legal representatives, and most notably the general public. Naturally, the mere presence of cameras in the modern courtroom is not surprising. What raises some questions is the presence of TV screens in the Kraków Lower Court’s courtrooms (and in Poland’s courts in general), which display the feed from both cameras during the hearing. Consequently, people gathered in the courtroom, especially people questioned by the judge (such as witnesses), can see themselves “live” in the TV screen. Even without raising the subtle details and differences between individual courtrooms, the system of displaying, in real time, live video feeds from a courtroom into the same courtroom begs for more detailed, critical analysis. For instance, one should address the system’s (presumably intended) functions (e.g. transparency, behavior control, and correction of time perception) and the real consequences for the dynamics during hearings, which are not assumptions or hypotheticals. The paper distinguishes the issues connected with the system and addressees them through the perspective of witnesses who participate in the hearings, using the collected opinions of witnesses.

     

The “Golden Age” Senate And Floor Debate in the Antebellum Congress

An image of an antebellum “golden age” of Senate debate and deliberation has passed virtually unblemished from one generation of historians and political analysts to the next. In what ways, if any, is the image of a more deliberative Senate evident in the realities of antebellum House and Senate debates? In this article, I present a series of case studies to examine elements of the quantity and quality of floor debate in each chamber. By providing comparative evidence about House and Senate debate during the antebellum period, I offer an assessment and critique of the bicameral implications of the largely untested “golden age” understanding of the Senate and join other recent efforts to reassess the nature of the early Senate and its relation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.     

Democracy out of Reason? Comment on Rainer Forst's “The Rule of Reasons”

In my paper, I comment on Rainer Forst's paper in this issue. I raise doubts as to whether the justification of democracy emerges from a fundamental moral right to reciprocal and general justification, as Forst claims. His basic argument appears questionable because democracy is different from a "hypothetical-consent-conception" of moral legitimacy, which limits as well as enables democratic legitimacy. The former cannot, however, justify the latter through an argument centered on self-government: Such an argument relies heavily on the possibility of consensus, thus neglecting the crucial phenomenon of disagreement or dissent. As a result of not adequately dealing with this phenomenon, the argument is unable to account for the basic democratic principle of majority rule as the remedy at hand.     

Libertarian Paternalism,Externalities, and the “Spirit of Liberty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an “Overlapping Consensus”

In their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”     

Psychopathy,expert testimony,and indeterminate sentences: Exploring the relationship between Psychopathy Checklist‐Revised testimony and trial outcome in Canada

Purpose. Psychopathy, as measured by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist‐Revised (PCL‐R), has the potential to inform judges attempting to preventatively detain Canada's highest risk offenders. However, studies examining the stigma of the psychopathy label give reason to exercise caution when expert witnesses introduce PCL‐R scores into their testimony. Methods. Judges' written or oral judgments were gathered from a publically available database in Canada. Dangerous offender hearings (N = 136) were examined to determine how factors within expert witness testimony were related to sentences of indeterminate or determinate length. Results. Results show a trend for PCL‐R scores to be related to trial outcome. Specifically, psychopathy diagnoses were correlated to experts' ratings of treatment amenability which were in turn related to trial outcome. In addition, experts tended to show partisan allegiance in the way they scored offenders on the PCL‐R. Conclusion. Discussion advocates a measure of caution when using PCL‐R testimony in an adversarial court context. Further research clarifying the role psychopathy plays in court decisions is also encouraged.     

A Lab Experiment on Committee Hearings: Preferences,Power, and a Quest for Information

In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game‐theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts.     

In the Fair Hearing Room: Resistance and Confrontation in the Welfare Bureaucracy

This article explores how welfare clients use and experience the fair hearing system, the administrative mechanism for challenging denials or reductions of aid in public welfare bureaucracies. Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with clients, it explores how old-style procedural protections like fair hearings are being used to challenge new-style welfare reforms. This research found that clients use fair hearings as a form of resistance and self-assertion, hoping that it will protect them from a bureaucracy perceived as arbitrary and capricious. Like many citizens, they are as concerned with being heard by their governmental institutions as they are with the outcome of their case and want to find within the machinery of government a forum where they can obtain recompense and respect. However, the legalistic and rule-bound nature of hearings makes it difficult for clients to present their claims, and meaningful participation is often denied them.     

Depoliticizing Democracy

Abstract. It is now widely accepted as an ideal that democracy should be as deliberative as possible. Democracy should not involve a tussle between different interest groups or lobbies in which the numbers matter more than the arguments. And it should not be a system in which the only arguments that matter are those that voters conduct in an attempt to determine where their private or sectional advantage lies. Democracy, it is said, should promote public deliberation among citizens and authorities as to what does best for the society as a whole and should elicit decision‐making on that basis. But the ideal of deliberative democracy has two components—the deliberative and the democratic—and often they pull apart. In this paper I look in the first section at a series of problems that arise on the deliberative front, arguing that their resolution requires various degrees of depoliticization. And then I ask in the second whether the depoliticizing responses that those problems require are antithetical to the ideal of democracy. I argue that they are not in tension with the ideal, if that ideal is cast in the relatively revisionary, two‐dimensional form that I favour.¹     

Congressional Oversight Hearings and Policy Control

Oversight hearings should be an important congressional tool for controlling recalcitrant agencies, but it is not clear that this should always be equally true. The logic of principal‐agent models of legislative policy control implies that oversight might sometimes, but not always, be superfluous to said control. Here, I reintroduce oversight hearings to theories of policy control and argue that congressional committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have different policy preferences from them and as a function of their capacity to conduct hearings cheaply. I test these hypotheses using committee hearings data (Policy Agendas Project) from both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate from 1947 to 2006 and provide support for theoretical arguments about the institutional nature of legislative policymaking strategies and ultimately help clarify the role of oversight in legislative‐executive relations.     

Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy

Nowadays democratic liberal societies face a rising challenge in terms of fragmentation and erosion of shared values and ethical pluralism. Democracy is not anymore grounded in the possibility of a common understanding and interpretation of the same values. Neverthless, legal and political philosophy continue to focus on how to reach consensus, especially through monist, objectualist, contractualist, discursive and deliberative approaches, rather than openly affording the issue of disagreement. Far from being just a disruptive force, disagreement and conflict are matters of fact that no reflection on democracy can underevaluate. They are the major issues through which to look at the intersection of law, politics and morals. The inclusion of dissent is a powerful tool for moral recognition of different understandings of justice. That is where legal procedures become crucial. Law is a fundamental element in the building of a democracy. But it is also particularly exposed to disagreement. Language indeterminacy, dogmatic concepts and value pluralism constitute the main elements that lead to alternative and conflicting interpretations of law in a democratic framework. Major legal progress in the past has come from different understandings of the same legal materials. In this article I argue that respect for disagreement should be a moral principle in democracy and that the role of legal disagreement is essential to understand the evolution and the future directions of democracy as the government of a political community. To do so, a link between respect for disagreement and legal interpretation and argumentation must be established in order to make room for reason and avoid extreme skepticism on the contribution of law to the enforcement of democracy.     

Legitimacy is Not Authority

The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, I believe they both misunderstand the nature of legitimacy. In this essay I argue that the legitimacy of a law is neither necessary nor sufficient for its normative authority, and I argue further that the need for legitimacy in law arises regardless of whether the law is coercively enforced. I thus articulate a new understanding of the legitimacy and authority of law.     

Non-biased lineup instructions do matter – a problem for older witnesses

Abstract

From the limited literature on older witnesses’ identification performance it is known that they are less accurate on lineups compared to younger witnesses. What is less certain is why they show this age deficit and what can be done to aid their performance. Witnesses forgot being given non-biased lineup instructions informing witnesses that the perpetrator may or may not be present. More older witnesses than younger witnesses forgot and witnesses who failed to report remembering these instructions were significantly less accurate on the lineups. In addition, the current study investigated the use of sequential lineup presentation and stringent decision criteria to aid the performance of older witnesses. Sequential presentation was beneficial to both younger and older adults when the lineup was target absent (TA) but was detrimental when the lineup was target present (TP). Stringent decision criteria had no significant beneficial effect. Future directions for aiding older witnesses’ performance are discussed.     

The Neuropsychologist as Expert Witness: Testimony in Civil and Criminal Settings

The niche of forensic neuropsychology and use of neuropsychologists as expert witnesses has proliferated over the past two decades. Neuropsychologists conduct evaluations or provide consultation to assist triers of fact in both civil and criminal arenas. This article delivers a succinct overview of an array of factors that warrant consideration from the time of referral for a neuropsychological evaluation through the delivery of a verdict or settlement and receipt of payment for services. Readers are offered a primer on relevant legal criteria, distinctions between court settings, and applicable ethical standards and guidelines. Suggestions are made regarding the expert witness retention agreement and strategies for direct and cross examination are reviewed. Logistical and liability considerations are also explored. Real world examples are included to illustrate some of the obstacles that neuropsychologist expert witnesses may encounter.     

Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation

Victims in common law jurisdictions have traditionally been unable to participate in criminal trials for a number of structural and normative reasons. They are widely perceived as 'private parties' whose role should be confined to that of witnesses, and participatory rights for such third parties are rejected as a threat to the objective and public nature of the criminal justice system. However, recent years have witnessed both a major shift in attitude in relation to the role of victims within the criminal justice system and a breakdown in the public/ private divide in criminal justice discourse. This article considers the standing of the victim within the criminal trial against the backdrop of such changes, and examines the arguments for a more radical course of reform that would allow victims to participate actively in criminal hearings as they are able to do in many European jurisdictions.     

The effect of witnesses, attorneys, and judges on civil commitment in North Carolina: a prospective study

A total of 388 commitment hearings were observed and analyzed for demographic information on patients, name of judge, duration of hearing, identities of those present and those actually testifying, outcome of any procedural challenges, and concurrence of the judges with attorney and physician recommendations. Age, race, and gender of the patient were found to have no significant effect on the outcome of the cases. Disposition of the cases correlated with recommendations by physicians, witnesses, and state attorneys in an overwhelming number of cases. Possible harmful influences of plea-bargaining in commitment hearings are discussed.     

Confronting Government After Welfare Reform: Moralists, Reformers, and Narratives of (Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair Hearings

Almost 40 years ago, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) , provided welfare participants with a potentially potent tool for challenging the government welfare bureaucracy by requiring pre-termination hearings before welfare benefits were discontinued or reduced. In 1996, with the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) , the rights talk of Kelly was officially replaced with the discourse of individual responsibility. Using observational data of administrative hearings and interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this study explores how fair hearings have been affected by this official reconceptualization of rights. I find that hearings are not a panacea for challenging the more punitive aspects of welfare reform, but nor are they devoid of the possibility of justice. While hearings can replicate in style and substance the inequities, rigid adherence to rules, and moral judgments that characterize welfare relationships under the PRWORA, they can also be used as a mechanism for creating counternarratives to the dominant discourse about welfare. This study identifies two types of judges—moralist judges and reformer judges—and examines how their differing approaches determine which narrative emerges in the hearing room.     

Public Eyewitness Confidence Can Be Influenced by the Presence of Other Witnesses

Four experiments were conducted to examine whether witnesses' public confidence ratings differ from their private ratings when there are social pressures to use confidence as an impression-management tool. In all four experiments, participants answered questions about a source event (a series of faces in the first three experiments and a simulated crime scene in the fourth). Half of the responses and confidence ratings were given privately and anonymously, and half were given publicly in front of one or more mock jurors. Two central findings emerged from the results. First, public confidence differed from private confidence only when there was more than one witness; when there were no other witnesses, public and private confidence were the same. Second, the direction of the change in public confidence in the multiple-witness settings was influenced by whether or not there was a possibility of being contradicted by the other witnesses. When there was no chance that the participants' responses could be contradicted, they raised their confidence ratings in public; when there was a chance that the other witnesses might contradict them, the participants lowered their public confidence ratings. The results are discussed in terms of self-presentation theory and implications for the legal system.