Criminal Justice Models As A Function of Ideological Images: A Social Learning Alternative To Packer

A theoretical anlaysis demonstrates that the crime control and due process models or perspectives (Packer, 1968) can be derived from the dominant images of persons that are embedded in ideological belief systems. The images are of the criminal and the citizen. The analysis represents a further application of a social learning model (Reed & Gaines, 1979, 1981) that conceptualizes ideological images as discriminative stimuli with drive and cue properties. Theoretically, these stimulus properties elicit and shape individual and system responses as a function of prior and preferred outcomes. Within the model a third image, persons-with-needs, helps to explain a number of practices that lie barely within or beyond the domain of Packer's perspectives. Discussion suggests that the three images provide a more comprehensive and heuristic approach to understanding and evaluating the criminal process than is afforded by Packer's relatively atheoretical formulation that is limited to two ideological belief systems.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Writing Human Rights History—And Social Science Encounters

This review essay on Aryeh Neier's The International Human Rights Movement: A History (Princeton University Press, 2012) discusses Neier's central themes: the origins and maturation of the movement and its effects, including the expansion of human rights and humanitarian law, enhanced criminal accountability for human rights crimes, and the appearance of criminal tribunals, culminating in the International Criminal Court. An overview is interspersed by imaginary conversations between Neier and scholars who speak to his themes, especially legal scholar Jenny Martinez, political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, historians Devin Pendas and Tomaz Jardim, and sociologists John Hagan, Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, Joachim Savelsberg, and Ryan D. King. Linking a practitioner's account with scholarly analyses yields some benefits of “Pasteur's Quadrant.”     

Citizen Led Policing in the Digital Realm: Paedophile Hunters and Article 8 in the case of Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate

In Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal which argued that the use of communications obtained by a paedophile hunter group as evidence in criminal prosecution was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case raises fundamental questions of the scope of the right to private life as regards to the content of communications and the role played by private actors in the criminal justice process. This note argues that by limiting the protection of Article 8 to private communications which satisfy a contents-based test, the Court has bypassed the Article 8(2) balancing test to the detriment of the due process rights of the accused. The note concludes that the decision opens up the prospect of the state circumventing the accused's Article 8 privacy rights by lending tacit approval to the proactive investigations of these private ‘paedophile hunter’ groups.     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

Queer Legal History: A Field Grows Up and Comes Out

This essay examines recent scholarship on the legal history of sexuality in the United States. It focuses on Margot Canaday's The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Modern America (2009) and Marc Stein's Sexual Injustice: Supreme Court Decisions from Griswold to Roe (2010). It also reviews recent work on the history of marriage, including Sarah Barringer Gordon's The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern America (2010) and George Chauncey's Why Marriage? The History Shaping Today's Debate Over Gay Equality (2004), and the history of military law Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold‐War Court Martial (2005), by Elizabeth Lutes Hillman. The essay argues that this scholarship is significant because it offers a different view of sex and power than the one derived from the early writing of Michel Foucault. “Queer legal history” treats the liberalism of the 1960s‐1970s as sexually discriminatory as well as liberatory. It underlines the exclusions that were part of public policy under the federal G.I. Bill and the New Deal welfare state.     

Crawford v. Washington One Year Later: Its Practical Effects in Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Cases

A year after the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the maelstrom that many legal scholars anticipated has failed to materialize. Crawford's abrogation of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its articulation of the new standard for determining when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies to out‐of‐court statements, has had less effect than some predicted, regarding which statements are admissible and which are excluded. This article explores Crawford's practical effect as courts around the country have applied it, particularly in the context of child abuse and domestic violence cases.     

Liability for sexual harassment in criminal justice agencies

This article focuses on sexual harassment in criminal justice agencies from a legal perspective. The article briefly describes sexual harassment cases that address agency liability decided by the United States Supreme Court, discussing the standards of liability articulated in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth (1998), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986). A more precise understanding of when agencies are liable for the actions of their subordinates is developed through an examination of lower federal court decisions. Trends in the law are identified, as case law is categorized according to harassment by supervisors and co-workers. The article concludes by exploring the policy implications flowing from court decisions and by calling for further research on this troubling aspect of the criminal justice workplace.     

Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles,Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement

This essay reviews two recent works in political science on the American conservative legal movement: Steven M. Teles's The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008) and Ann Southworth's Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the Conservative Coalition (2008). It examines these books in the context of a larger debate over the variables that best explain constitutional change in general and the recent “conservative counterrevolution” in Supreme Court jurisprudence in particular. It shows how these studies build on the scholarship of Charles Epp, who argued in The Rights Revolution (1998) that serious constitutional change requires not only the right cast of characters on the court, but also a strong “support structure” in the legal profession and civil society. Finally, it draws on the author's own research on the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy to illustrate some important avenues for further inquiry.     

The Heathrow Case in the Supreme Court: Climate Change Legislation and Administrative Adjudication

In R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd the UK Supreme Court allowed an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision that there had been a series of legal errors in the designation of the Airport National Policy Statement. This case note analyses the case from an ‘internal’ doctrinal perspective and argues that the Supreme Court could have engaged more explicitly with the legal issues that arise from climate change legislation for administrative law adjudication. For courts to adjudicate well in such circumstances they need to be prepared to develop administrative law doctrine, particularly in light of the issues of integrating climate change into public decision-making and of scientific/policy uncertainty which lie in the background of climate change legislation.     

Antinomies and the Automobile: A New Approach to Criminal Justice Histories

In the twentieth century, the antinomy of freedom and coercion served as the dominant paradigm for understanding issues of crime and punishment. Roscoe Pound in Criminal Justice in America (1930) and Herbert Packer in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) described a tension between the values of individual liberty and general security to explain the problems with the justice system and the public's disagreements over their solution. Historians of twentieth‐century criminal law have also adopted this framework to explain causation and change. This essay argues that an antinomic perspective of criminal justice history, while useful, has obscured important historical questions. A focus on social changes, such as the transformations that the automobile brought about in the commission of crimes and police practices, instead of on contrasting values, offers a different account of how proceduralism became inextricably tied to notions of American freedom in the twentieth century. This approach also historicizes the “paradigm of antinomies” and shows how people in the past, like Pound and Packer, mobilized dualistic thinking, which shaped a criminal legal culture based on an antagonism—both real and perceived—between citizens and law enforcement.     

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

Argumentation and Legal Interpretation in the Criminal Decisions of the Polish Supreme Court and the German Federal Court of Justice: A Comparative View

The subject of this study are the argumentation strategies applied by the Polish and German apex courts competent in criminal matters, namely the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Justice, respectively. The investigation encompasses a total of 200 rulings issued by the criminal panels of these bodies. Particular focus was put on examining which arguments both courts apply to solve interpretation problems, and secondly, how these courts systematize the interpretation process. Methodologically, the examination utilizes, inter alia, the principles of qualitative research, without neglecting the legal dogmatic perspective. A crucial theoretical foundation underlying this study is the distinction between formalistic and substantive legal cultures. The examination reveals that neither the Polish nor the German legal culture is purely formalistic or value-oriented. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Poland shows greater affinity for formalistic arguments, whereas the substantive interpretation methods are more widespread in the judicature of the German Federal Court of Justice. In particular, the Polish Court prefers the linguistic interpretation, whereas the German Court favours the purposive approach.

     

Kids are Different: The United States Supreme Court Reforms Youth Sentencing Practices for Youth Prosecuted in the Criminal Justice System

In a series of decisions issued between 2005‐2016, the United States Supreme Court relied on emerging scientific research detailing the developmental differences between children and adults to revamp its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment. The research established that youth’s developmental immaturity reduces their culpability for their criminal conduct, while also demonstrating their heightened capacity for change and rehabilitation. The Court focused on the most extreme sentences for youth, banning the imposition of the death penalty on youth under the age of eighteen in Roper v. Simmons (2005), and severely limiting the availability of life without parole sentences even for youth convicted of murder, in Graham v Florida (2010) and Miller v Alabama (2012). This article traces the Court’s evolution in reviewing sentences for youth in our justice system, and considers how the Court’s reasoning in these cases may influence further reforms in the justice system’s treatment of youth looking ahead.     

How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

This review essay analyses two significant recent contributions to the debate over the reasoning of the Court of Justice (CJ). These contributions highlight the impossibility of a wholly scientific and deductive approach to attributing ‘correct’ outcomes to the Court's case‐law. At the same time, their analysis adds significant findings for the debate over the Court's possible ‘activist’ or political role. Following from these contributions, this essay makes two arguments: firstly, that the inability of the Court to anchor its reasoning solely in a deductive form of legal reasoning should encourage the CJ to engage in a more advanced ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the EU's political institutions; and secondly, that truly understanding the Court's reasoning involves a closer analysis of the institutional and personal dynamics influencing Court decisions. Understanding European judicial reasoning may require a closer look at the social and political—as well as doctrinal—context within which European judges act.     

Hearsay and Human Rights: Al‐Khawaja in the Grand Chamber

This note analyses the European Court of Human Rights' Grand Chamber judgment in Al‐Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom, and gives it a cautious welcome. The note suggests how English Courts might respond to the judgment and concludes by assessing justifications for strong confrontation rights and the wider political context of the Grand Chamber's decision.     

Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases*

The Supreme Court early took note of extralegal, “social science” materials in Muller v. Oregon (1908), and a half-century later made specific reference to social science authorities in the famous footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Since Brown, much has been written about the Supreme Court's use of social science research evidence, but there has been little systematic study of that use. Those writing on the subject commonly focus on areas of law such as jury size, where social science has been used, and have generally assumed that social science information has been utilized in Supreme Court decisions with increasing regularity. Surprisingly little is known, however, about either the justices' baseline use of social science authorities, or many other aspects of their uses of social science information. The focus here is on the citation of social science research evidence in a sample of 240 criminal cases decided during the 30 years between the Supreme Court's 1958 and 1987 Terms. The resulting portrait contributes to a fuller understanding of the justices' use of social science materials, and may ultimately help promote more effective utilization of social science research evidence in Supreme Court decisions.     

The Hermeneutics of the Concept of Misrepresentation: Addressing the Quagmire of Damages and Compensation in Cases of Misrepresentation in Formation of a Contract Under Indian and English Law

In England, fraudulent misrepresentation is governed by English common law and damages are provided under the Tort of Deceit whereas negligent and innocent misrepresentation is governed by the Misrepresentation Act, 1967. In India, fraud is governed by s 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) and misrepresentation by s 18 of the ICA. Notably, unlike in England where the remedies for fraud and misrepresentation are provided at separate avenues, in India, the relief to the innocent party in both cases is provided under s 19 of the ICA. This article discusses fraudulent misrepresentation & negligent/innocent misrepresentation and the quantification of damages thereof in contracts under the two legal regimes mentioned above. To that extent, the authors attempt to illustrate certain nuanced differences between the two legal regimes while also highlighting the similarities between English law and Indian law. For the purposes of this article, the authors refer to the Misrepresentation Act, 1967 and the seminal judgments of Derry v Peek, Doyle v Olby, East v Maurer and Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v Scrimgeour Vickers and discuss the “date of transaction rule” as enunciated by Lord Steyn while juxtaposing it with the judgments of the High Court of Delhi, and the Supreme Court of India. In the Indian context, the authors highlight the position of law as is apparent from two recent judgments of the Delhi High Court in NHAI v Pune Sholapur Road Development and Daiichi Sankyo v Malvinder Mohan Singh and Ors and also focus on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Avitel Post Stuidoz v HSBC Holdings (Mauritius).

     

The ‘Heathrow’ Case: Polycentricity,Legislation, and the Standard of Review

The recent Court of Appeal decision in the ‘Heathrow’ case, Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport is an illustration of the challenges of reviewing polycentric and expert decision-making. The issues raised in the case concerning the Planning Act 2008 are an illustration of a court's expository role in such contexts. The Court tackled directly a series of interpretive questions concerning the Planning Act 2008's obligations regarding the consideration of climate change. The Habitats and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive issues raised in the appeal, in contrast, were presented with the question of the intensity of review foregrounded in legal argument. The Court therefore sought to articulate the ‘standard of review’ and to apply it to the government's decisions. This way of framing the issue unfortunately sidelined the courts’ expository role in relation to intepreting the Habitats and SEA Directives, leaving key provisions under-analysed.