Stochastic models of the Social Security trust funds

Each year in March, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security trust funds reports on the current and projected financial condition of the Social Security programs. Those programs, which pay monthly benefits to retired workers and their families, to the survivors of deceased workers, and to disabled workers and their families, are financed through the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds. In their 2003 report, the Trustees present, for the first time, results from a stochastic model of the combined OASDI trust funds. Stochastic modeling is an important new tool for Social Security policy analysis and offers the promise of valuable new insights into the financial status of the OASDI trust funds and the effects of policy changes. The results presented in this article demonstrate that several stochastic models deliver broadly consistent results even though they use very different approaches and assumptions. However, they also show that the variation in trust fund outcomes differs as the approach and assumptions are varied. Which approach and assumptions are best suited for Social Security policy analysis remains an open question. Further research is needed before the promise of stochastic modeling is fully realized. For example, neither parameter uncertainty nor variability in ultimate assumption values is recognized explicitly in the analyses. Despite this caveat, stochastic modeling results are already shedding new light on the range and distribution of trust fund outcomes that might occur in the future.     

Early retirees under Social Security: health status and economic resources

Some proposals to change the Social Security program to ensure long-run solvency would reduce or eliminate benefits for early retirees. This article documents the health and financial resources of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneficiaries aged 62-64. It identifies a substantial minority of early retirees who might be economically vulnerable if either the early eligibility age or normal retirement age was raised. Attention is directed at the extent to which poor health limits work in this age group and the extent to which curtailment of early OASI benefits might lead to increases in the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls. Using a set of comprehensive health measures, we estimate that over 20 percent of OASI beneficiaries aged 62-64 have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. This finding implies that in this age range, as many severely disabled persons receive OASI benefits as disability benefits. In fact, 12 percent of early beneficiaries would meet a more stringent criterion for being classified "disabled"--SSA's medical standard for disability benefits. The evidence therefore indicates that OASI functions as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for early retirees. Compared with those who have no health problems or are less severely impaired, early OASI beneficiaries who meet the medical criteria for disability benefits are more likely to be living alone and more likely to be poor or "near poor." The great majority of the group--almost 80 percent--are women. Analysis of their earnings histories suggests that most of these beneficiaries do not satisfy the insured-status requirements for Disability Insurance benefits. The article considers the different roles of the OASI program and the DI program for health-impaired individuals aged 62-64. Disability modelers sometimes overlook an important aspect of program administration. Under customary screening procedures implemented in Social Security field offices, applicants for early OASI benefits who appear to be severely impaired simultaneously apply for DI benefits if they are disability insured. If they are found eligible for DI benefits, those applicants become DI beneficiaries. The implication is that raising the earliest entitlement age would have little impact on the DI rolls. Unless there are changes in eligibility criteria, the DI program would not serve as a safety net for many of the most severely disabled early retirees.     

Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

Social choice and economic growth

Optimal economic growth deals with the problem of how societies make tradeoffs between current and future consumption, or equivalently, how societies make decisions about investment rates. Until now, theorists have simply assumed that there is some societal utility function which planners can maximize. Social choice theorists have thrown doubt upon the concept of a societal utility function. We treat optimal economic growth as a problem in social choice theory. Assume that citizens have preferences over the various growth plans. Under what conditions will a majority rule equilibrium exist? We show that such an equilibrium can exist for a Ramsey type problem. We then briefly consider social choice in the so-called “labor surplus” economy.     

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model.     

Reforming Social Security and Medicare

Books reviewed:
Sheila Burke, Eric Kingson and Uwe Reinhardt, (eds.) Social Security and Medicare, Individual versus Collective Risk and Responsibility     

Military veterans and Social Security

There are 9.4 million military veterans receiving Social Security benefits, which means that almost one out of every four adult Social Security beneficiaries has served in the United States military. In addition, veterans and their families make up almost 40 percent of the adult Social Security beneficiary population. Policymakers are particularly interested in military veterans and their families and have provided them with benefits through several government programs, including Social Security credits, home loan guarantees, and compensation and pension payments through the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is therefore important to understand the economic and demographic characteristics of this population. Information in this article is based on data from the March 2004 Current Population Survey, a large, nationally representative survey of U.S. households. Veterans are overwhelmingly male compared with all adult Social Security beneficiaries who are more evenly split between males and females. Military veterans receiving Social Security are more likely to be married and to have finished high school compared with all adult Social Security beneficiaries, and they are less likely to be poor or near poor than the overall beneficiary population. Fourteen percent of veterans receiving Social Security benefits have income below 150 percent of poverty, while 25 percent of all adult Social Security beneficiaries are below this level. The higher economic status among veterans is also reflected in the relatively high Social Security benefits they receive. The number of military veterans receiving Social Security benefits will remain high over the next few decades, while their make-up and characteristics will change. In particular, the number of Vietnam War veterans who receive Social Security will increase in the coming decades, while the number of veterans from World War II and the Korean War will decline.     

Hispanics, Social Security, and Supplemental Security Income

The U.S. Census Bureau reports that Hispanics are the country's largest and fastest growing minority, representing about 14.4 percent of the population in 2005 (Census Bureau 2006b). By 2050, Hispanics will account for an estimated 24.4 percent of the population--or 1 in every 4 persons in the United States (Census Bureau 2004, Table 1 a). The Hispanic population tends to be younger than the overall population and currently represents a relatively small but growing fraction of the Social Security beneficiary population. The representation of Hispanics in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, however, approximates that of their representation in the overall population. This article compares the Hispanic population with the overall population along several dimensions, with a particular focus on the Social Security beneficiary and SSI recipient populations. Data are drawn mainly from the 2005 Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey (ACS PUMS), a relatively new data source with a rich set of economic and demographic variables. Fully implemented nationwide for the first time in 2005, the ACS became the largest household survey in the United States with a sample of almost 3 million addresses. The analysis using the ACS finds that the Hispanic population is significantly different from the general population, particularly in the areas of age distribution, educational attainment, and economic well-being. Compared with the general population, the Hispanic segment is younger and is characterized by lower levels of educational attainment and a higher rate of poverty. The Hispanic Social Security beneficiary population also differs significantly from the general beneficiary population in the same areas. In contrast, the Hispanic and general SSI populations are more comparable with regard to age and economic status and differ significantly only with regard to education.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

论内保工作发展趋势——走社会保安服务之路

传统内保工作体制受到市场经济的挑战,改革这种体制是大势新趋.本文认为内保工作走社会保安服务之路是社会化分工的需要,是经济发展的趋势,是西方发达国家政府鼓励发展的方向,它比传统的内保工作具有明显的优势,走社会保安服务之路是今后内保工作发展的趋势.     

Productivity Growth and the Political Economy of Social Security

The present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social securityas the outcome of a public decision making process in an endogenousgrowth economy. It employs a model in which there is a non-monotonic relationship beween productivity growth and the scale ofpublic intergenerational redistribution. The paper shows thatalthough unfunded social security need not harm growth in general,it is likely to harm growth in a democracy. This effect isreinforced by population aging.     

Disabled workers and the indexing of Social Security benefits

We examine how benefit amounts and family income would change in response to changing the Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, OASDI) benefit indexing scheme. We are interested in a class of reform options designed to gradually slow the growth of benefits across the board. These options include the "price indexing" and "longevity indexing" proposals that have been part of the recent Social Security reform debate in the United States as well as a range of proposals developed in Europe. In this article, we focus on the distributional effects on the disabled. This focus leads to two comparisons. First, we compare disabled-worker beneficiaries to another group that would be affected by the changes, retired-worker beneficiaries. Second, we examine relative changes for particularly vulnerable subgroups of disabled workers. In the empirical analysis, we use two illustrative examples of potential indexing changes: Shifting from wage indexing to price indexing of the initial level of OASDI benefits; and Adjusting the initial benefit level for changes in life expectancy at retirement, that is, longevity indexing. We employ a historical counterfactual simulation to evaluate outcomes that would have resulted from changing the indexing scheme at one particular point in time. The hypothetical implementation period begins with the historical start of the current regime of indexing in 1979 and ends with one of the reference periods of the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a 17-year period. However, we briefly assess the extent to which the results would be applicable to other time horizons. The analysis uses a cross-sectional sample of OASDI beneficiaries from the 1996 SIPP matched to Social Security administrative records. Further, we use total income from the SIPP (as adjusted to correspond to the calculated OASDI benefit amounts) to simulate eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and SSI benefit amounts. Our overall findings pertain to three outcomes: (1) effects on OASDI benefits viewed in isolation, (2) the offsetting role of SSI, and (3) the diluting effect of other sources of family income. We find that a broader perspective incorporating all three measures is necessary to obtain an appropriate picture of distributional outcomes. Even though the proposals were designed to have proportional effects, differences between groups--such as disabled and retired workers--can arise from differences in the timing of benefit claiming, mortality, and other factors. Specifically, our cross-sectional estimates suggest that the average change in OASDI benefit levels would be higher for disabled-worker beneficiaries than for retired-worker beneficiaries. These differences are attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of the stock of disabled beneficiaries have been on the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls for a relatively short period of time and therefore have been affected by the shift in indexing scheme for a longer period of time. These results must be interpreted within the context of the methodology that was used. Further, other methodologies may lead to different results. For example, in previous studies that restricted the sample to a particular birth cohort, a higher proportion of disabled workers than retired workers were observed to have been on the DI program rolls for a relatively long period of time. Longer time on the beneficiary rolls corresponds to less exposure to the new indexing scheme and smaller estimated benefit changes. Thus, the same underlying factor-the timing of benefit claiming-influences both results. When the offsetting role of SSI benefits is also considered, we estimate smaller overall changes, especially for those at the bottom of the income distribution. When OASDI and SSI are considered together, differences in average benefit changes between disabled and retired workers are removed. This is due to a higher rate of SSI program participation among disabled workers than among retired workers. In addition, including SSI substantially reduces the proportion of disabled workers that have large simulated changes in benefit amounts. The estimated effects of changing the indexing scheme are further muted when total family income is considered. This occurs on a roughly equivalent scale for disabled and retired workers. As a result, changing the indexing scheme would produce little change in the status quo differences in poverty status between disabled and retired workers. Finally, we examine the most economically vulnerable subgroups of OASDI beneficiaries. Within the general group of beneficiaries, we find that the most vulnerable would be less affected than average, primarily as a result of the mitigating effect of SSI benefits. Further, within the population of disabled-worker beneficiaries, we examine economically vulnerable subgroups including those in the lowest primary insurance amount quartile, with less than a high school education, with an early onset of disability, or a primary mental impairment. These groups would also be less affected than average.     

Social Security Privatization and Market Risk

Under Social Security privatization, workers would be allowed to divert some of the money that currently goes to Social Security into private accounts. This would expose them to market risk, that is, the risk of a substantial drop in equity prices or of a prolonged bear market. This could result in generations of workers with less money than they thought they would have for retirement. Depending on a worker's birth date, if the privatization approach proposed by President Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security had been enacted at the start of the Social Security program, the retirement benefits generated from putting 10% of earnings in a private account for 35 years would have ranged from 100% to less than 20% relative to pre‐retirement earnings. The extraordinarily high retirement income generated from the booming 1990s stock market was the equivalent of winning the generational lottery—unlikely to be repeated regularly. Even under these beneficial circumstances, a privatized system could have cost the government more than $1 trillion in today's dollars over the past 3 decades if the government decided to help out those who accumulated too little for retirement. The primary alternative to a government bailout of the Social Security system, older workers working longer, would likely not generate the desired results. Workers wanting to work longer would create labor market pressures typically at times when unemployment is already high.     

Research and Social Security policy in the United States

This article is adapted from a paper presented at a conference that investigated the role of policy research in shaping public policy. The conference focused on how studies of economic and social forces and their relationship with public problems and programs affect the decisions of public policymakers. The author contends that research has the potential to inform policy-making in any of its five stages: problem identification, option development, passage of new laws or development of new procedures, implementation, and evaluation. She notes that different players in the policy-making process use research differently, from the senior government official who needs a quick review of what is known relating to a "hot" issue to the interest group lobbyist who wants access to raw data. The article concludes that research can best achieve its potential when (1) it anticipates policymakers' information needs, (2) it is disseminated in an accessible form understandable to nonresearchers, and (3) the policy analyst is willing to engage in the policy process as an advocate for efficiency.