Global inequality as one of the root causes of the financial crisis: a suggested explanation

Abstract

The global financial crisis was caused because the volume of toxic assets in the financial system had grown to the point where the system could no longer cope. The dominant view among heterodox economists is that this point of critical mass was reached because of various failures in the financial system. This paper puts the accompanying view that the toxic assets were created largely in response to external pressures, a principle source of which was global inequality: while income inequality was an important factor behind the supply of those assets, wealth concentration was a major factor behind the demand for them. The policy implications of this analysis are that income distribution and wealth ownership have to be more equitably structured if global financial crises are to be avoided in the future. This is not to exclude other proposals for making the financial system more transparent and accountable. The point, rather, is that these proposals are insufficient on their own. No matter how radical the re-structuring of the financial system, as long as there remain external pressures on it to create products or to indulge in practices that are harmful to it, such products and practices will continue to be introduced and financial crises will continue to occur.     

Risk and Financial Armageddon in Ireland: The Politics of the Galway Tent

This article examines Ireland's financial crisis. Thus far explanation has focused on individual or collective administrative failure: the office(r) of financial regulation singularly failed to scrutinise the banks sufficiently: it was a matter of poor risk management. While this article would agree that the (mis)management of risk was important to how the crisis unfolded, I argue that an explanation of why the crisis emerged demands an altogether different focus. Put simply, after financial regulatory reform, a reconfiguration of risk in politics took place as the locus of decision‐making about financial risk shifted from the realm of the political/legal (Cabinet/Central Bank/Department of Finance) to the economic/legal (retail banks, shareholders/consumers). It was a critical development, one that mirrored events taking place in the UK, upon which Ireland drew experience, for now assessments about risk undertaken by the banks demanded that intervention could be justified only on an ascertainable risk, not a theoretical uncertainty (or spurious fear). The evidentiary bar for intervention was therefore raised, removing the precautionary instinct implicit in the prudential governance of Central Banks.     

廉政文化学学科构建中的几个基本问题

廉政文化建设实践和理论研究的迅猛发展,反腐倡廉建设面临的诸多新特点、新要求,社会主义文化大发展大繁荣的新形势、新任务,催生着廉政文化学科的诞生。构建廉政文化学科体系,必须厘清廉政文化与廉政文化学的联系与区别;必须确立人学基础、研究人学内核、关注人化本质;必须汲取和借鉴相关人文社会学科以拓展自身的高度、深度及维度;必须在廉政文化建设实践中不断发展完善。     

新自由主义与阿根廷金融危机

本文重点分析了新自由主义的实质以及它对阿根廷经济所造成的危害,提出了必须从本国国情出发合理利用国家的经济职能,而不能完全听任市场和外资去主宰本国经济的中肯建议.     

Subprime catalyst: Financial regulatory reform and the strengthening of US carbon market governance

The 2008 financial crisis has had an important, but neglected, impact on carbon market governance in the United States. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a domestic coalition that drew upon the crisis experience to demand stronger regulation over carbon markets. The influence of this coalition was seen first in the changing content of draft climate change bills between 2008 and 2010. But the coalition's more lasting legacy was its role in shaping the content of, and supporting, the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) in July 2010. Although that bill was aimed primarily at bolstering financial stability, its derivatives provisions strengthened carbon market regulation in significant ways. This policy episode demonstrates new patterns of coalition building in carbon market politics as well as the growing links between climate governance and financial regulatory politics. At the same time, the significance of these developments should not be overstated because of various limitations in the content and implementation of the Dodd–Frank bill, as well as the waning support for carbon markets more generally within the US since the bill's passage.     

Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and accessibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues.     

“民主”反腐：惩治预防腐败的新治本之策

推进党的反腐败工作和反腐倡廉建设,必须将民主理念和民主手段引入其中,将民主提升为惩防腐败的新治本之策,着力建立健全“教育、制度、监督、民主”并重的惩治预防腐败体系。这就必须切实关注“民主”惩治预防腐败的四大基本要素,即“民主”惩治预防腐败的机理、“民主”惩治预防腐败的机制、“民主”惩治预防腐败的机遇、“民主”惩治预防腐败的机会。     

音乐教育价值研究的新进路——一种价值论的方法

对音乐教育价值的探寻，自古以来，众说纷纭，而且常说常新。笔者提出一种基于价值论的研究路径，即从实践价值哲学的视角，注入生存论的人性关怀，在汲取古今中外，尤其是中国古代的“天地人合一”的“和谐”智慧的基础上，反思当今音乐教育的价值理论，检视现实音乐教育的价值取向，重构音乐教育的价值观，以此指导音乐教育实践。也就是说，从价值论范畴针对音乐教育价值问题进行研究。当然，这一研究其理论贡献必巨，而工作任务也坚。     

Economic crises and augmenting financial bureaucratic power in South Korea

Despite negative public opinion, the role of the Korean government has expanded, while overcoming two rounds of global financial crises. The phenomenon of the re-swelling state is mainly attributed to the strengthening of the central bureaucracy, in particular the financial bureaucracy, rather than the whole central government or the state. The argument of the strengthening of the ‘state’ or the ‘government’ after economic crises might be subject to the error of generalization. Through the two rounds of economic crises, the financial bureaucracy succeeded in acquiring the authority of market supervision and industrial support. In consequence, the bureaucracy's institutional supremacy within the government grew less challenged. The central bureaucracy was no longer the loyal servant to the President. It has reinforced its institutional strength and autonomy vis-a-vis the President, the National Assembly, the Central Bank and civil society, under the pretext of building up the rational and autonomous market and democratic politics.     

Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture

Recent crises and disasters in regulated industries have renewed scholarly attention to regulatory capture. The present research incorporates and builds on these efforts by creating a typology to help researchers and practitioners organize the capture literature. The typology has two dimensions: the degree of coordination within the regulated industry, the agents of capture; and the scope of capture within the agency and elected officials, the targets of capture. I illustrate the utility of the typology by using a case study of banking regulation before the 2008 global financial crisis. The case study uses process‐tracing methodology to weigh evidence about the role and scope of capture in creating the crisis. The contributions of this research are twofold. First, for capture theory, the typology assists in organizing the disparate, multidisciplinary research on capture mechanisms and remedies. Second, for practice, this organization can lead to more accurate diagnoses about the scope of capture and suggest appropriately tailored remedies.     

Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking,offshore financial centers,and jurisdictional competition

A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.     

The Banking Crisis: Grid,Group and the State of the Debate

The banking crisis and the recession it induced provide a salient backdrop to domestic and international politics. ² The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) estimates that total banking losses between 2008 and 2010 exceeded US$2.3 trillion. This article uses grid‐group theory to review the existing literature on the causes of the banking crisis and, in doing so, distinguishes between hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalist accounts of what went wrong and of what needs to be done to prevent another crisis from occurring. It is argued that the existing reform agenda is underpinned by a hierarchical analysis of the causes of the crisis and that this risks narrowing the support base for the reform process.     

The 2019 Greek parliamentary election: retour à la normale

Abstract

The July 2019 parliamentary election was the first national election since Greece officially exited the eight-year bailout programmes in August 2018. It was preceded by three ballots on European Parliament, regional and municipal elections in May 2019, which served as a decompression valve for the electorate to punish the incumbent government and indicate a clear will for governmental change, since the conservative party ND won by a landslide. Whereas ND’s victory in the parliamentary election was anticipated, it was its scale that would define the shape of the new government. Increasing its score by 11.76 points since September 2015, ND won 39.85% of the vote, securing a comfortable majority of 158 out of 300 seats. This is the first majority government in Greece since 2011, marking the return of the country to a new normality. Even if SYRIZA failed to deliver the anti-bailout programme which had initially brought the party to the centre of electoral competition, it still gathered 31.53% of the vote, losing just 3.93 points since its last victory in 2015, hence securing its place as one of the two key actors in the new two-partyism. Party fragmentation was limited to six parliamentary parties instead of eight, with the neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, having lost its parliamentary representation.     

The Club Rules in Global Financial Governance

Though the list of reforms following the onset of the financial crisis is long, we should resist the temptation to view the emerging regulatory framework in terms of a paradigm shift. Many key features of the system, including the privileged position of financial institutions, remain unchanged. This is not merely due to obstruction or capacity shortcomings but can be explained by considering the sources of ideas and the governance setting. Ideas and policy programmes for reform were generated by a policy community also responsible for shaping the pre‐crisis governance framework. Moreover, the ideas and preferences of these players are moulded by their transnational interactions and the club‐like mechanisms in place for determining what (and who) is to be included in discussions. These settings have produced policy programmes that helped address the immediate, ‘fast‐burning’ elements of the crisis, but have so far failed to put together a comprehensive reform programme.     

The Asian financial crisis and financial reforms in China

Abstract

Although China has avoided the direct attack of the Asian financial crisis, it has suffered secondary consequences leading to an economic slowdown. More importantly, the plight of its neighboring countries has driven home the urgency of financial reforms as China shares many of the problems at the root of the crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea. This article reviews the reform measures adopted by the Chinese government since the crisis. It analyzes the political dynamics of financial reforms in terms of state preferences and state capacities. In retrospect, the Asian financial crisis may well be seen as a turning point in reforming China's financial system.     

确立并践行新理念是形式主义问题的治本之策——以新冠肺炎疫情防控为例

形式主义是个老大难问题,治理起来相当困难。在新冠肺炎疫情防控过程中,尤其是在初期和一些地方,形式主义问题不仅存在还比较严重。在防控疫情这一“准战时”状态下,形式主义问题危害性更大。形式主义问题的根源是官僚主义,而官僚主义的形成有体制和思想两个层面的原因。从这两个层面施治,都属于治本之策,其中思想或理念层面的引领尤为重要。党的十八大以来,习近平总书记倡导并形成了三大新理念,即问题导向、结果导向和民意导向。与新理念相对立的旧理念正是形式主义问题的思想根源。新理念不只是理念,还是一套行动指南。只要确立并践行新理念,就能有效抑制形式主义问题的滋生,从而起到重要的治本作用。     

理性认识金融危机下我国中间阶层的作用

在全球性金融危机中,中国承受着巨大压力,一部分人认为,作为社会中流砥柱的中间阶层能够以其强劲的消费拉动中国经济,从而维护社会的稳定与发展。文章认为,在金融危机下,这不是一种理性的对待中间阶的态度,并从经济、政治和社会责任感三个角度,分析了在当前环境下这种观点是值得商榷的,随后,从不能正视中间阶层的现状,忽略中国社会发展的实情以及对中间阶层理解的偏差性等方面分析了持这种观点的原因。     

Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: the post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US

Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.     

China in the era of globalization: the emergence of the discourse on economic security

Abstract

This article looks at the Chinese debate on economic security during the period between 1997 and 2004. The contemporary concept of economic security (jingji anquan, 经济安全) was first raised in the Chinese academic literature in 1997, partly as a reaction to the Asian financial crisis and partly due to the increasing role China began to play in globalization, the effects of which it increasingly felt as its economy became more integrated with that of the world. This article examines the emergence of the discourse on economic security within Chinese academic circles, and identifies the development of this concept in China between 1997 and 2004 prior to the ascendancy of the ‘fourth-generation’ leadership.     

Federal dynamics in times of economic and financial crisis

The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments, but particularly for federal states because divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy making. This article explores the effects of the ongoing crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems that may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts are evoked: opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation and erosion of solidarity among members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of 11 federations between 2007 and the present reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent‐seeking in equalisation payments, and over‐borrowing and over‐spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent‐seeking and over‐borrowing and over‐spending led to a reduction of solidarity among subgovernments and to increased regulation of the fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased – although only in one case did this challenged the federal order.