Models of liberty: Berlins's ‘Two Concepts’

According To Sir Isaiah Berlin; (a) freedom is an essentially ‘negative’ concept; (b) one's freedom can only be limited deliberately, by another person or persons; (c) the impersonal operation of a natural force, such as gravity, cannot be said to limit freedom; (d) the impersonal operation of a market force cannot be said to limit freedom. I argue that all four claims are false and that (b), (c), and (d) are logically incornsistent with (a). There would be less point to inevitably somewhat ‘picky’ exercise were it not for the fact that Berlin's account of freedom exemplifies a well-entrenched and influential orthodoxy. The fact is made particularly apparent by the prominent role played by assumption (d) in defences of the ‘free market’. I go on to discus this.     

Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition

Abstract

This paper examines the theme of recognition in Hegel's account of self-consciousness, suggesting that there are unresolved difficulties with the relationship between the normative sense of mutual recognition and phenomenological cases of unequal recognition. Recent readings of Hegel deal with this problem by positing an implicit distinction between an ‘ontological’ sense of recognition as a precondition for autonomous subjectivity, and a ‘normative’ sense of recognition as embodied in rational social and political institutions. Drawing on recent work by Robert Pippin and Axel Honneth, I argue that Hegel's conception of rational freedom provides the key to grasping the relationship between the ontological and normative senses of recognition. Recognitive freedom provides a way of appropriating Hegel's theory of recognition for contemporary social philosophy.     

The Ethics of Immigration

This review essay examines recent work in political theory on the ethics of immigration admissions. It considers arguments put forward by Michael Walzer, Peter Meilaender and David Miller, among others, for state control of borders. Such arguments tend to appeal to the value of political communities and/or the exclusion rights of democratic associations, and I argue that neither of these are successful. Turning to work by Joseph Carens, Phillip Cole, Michael Dummett and others who advocate open or much more open borders, the article considers various arguments that would support this stance, including appeals to freedom of movement, utilitarianism and social justice. I argue that rights to immigration need embedding in global principles of resource redistribution. In the conclusion I sketch a cosmopolitan approach to immigration by which impartial criteria such as population density and gross domestic product would determine how many migrants states have a duty to admit.     

Theorising Power and Resistance among “Travellers”

This paper (re-)examines the literature on Traveller communities in the United Kingdom by combining parts of Michel Foucault's and Michel de Certeau's theoretical legacies. Following an ethnographic summary, I demonstrate the relevance of Foucault and Certeau for a critical understanding of the Travellers’ structural predicaments and ideological resistance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I argue that Foucault's outline of modern power, surveillance and classification sheds new light on the impact of social control agencies and the implementation of legislative changes, such as the 1968 Caravan Sites Act, on (semi-)nomadic and/or self-employed groups. The implications of more recent legal developments are discussed as symptoms of postmodernity and the further ideological marginalisation of “non-consuming nomads”. I then argue that some of Certeau's key concepts, including the “strategies/tactics” distinction, illuminate the Travellers’ modalities of resistance and symbolisms of difference. Completing a two-way dynamic between theory and data, the article also shows that existing empirical material on Travellers highlights some of the weaknesses in Foucault's and Certeau's respective thought. Finally, I turn to Foucault's “analytics” to account for intra-group power and resistance, and hence to challenge the common portrayal of Foucault as a “theorist of domination” in juxtaposition to Certeau as a “theorist of subversion”.     

Interpretation after Kant

Abstract

After tracing the rise in interest in the phenomenon of interpretation to events in the early post-Kantian period, I argue that this development is highly relevant to understanding contemporary philosophy's methodological status and its relation to fields such as science and literature. I argue that much of recent philosophy is best understood in terms of an "interpretive turn" that has now provided philosophy with a modest but valuable and distinctive role. I illustrate the procedure of philosophy in this key by critically appropriating ideas about interpretation advanced by Harold Bloom and Richard Rorty, and by using hints about the role of history that arise from discussions of Kant's notion of genius.     

Accounting for Future Generations: Intergenerational Equity in Australia1

Australian governments have published three intergenerational reports since 2002. In line with a general international trend these reports pointed to a problem said to arise from an ageing population which exposes Australia to the risk of a future major fiscal crisis. In this article we argue that by failing to use a generational accounting framework, the reports privilege the elderly at the expense of young people. Added to this, they fail to engage any discussion of intergenerational equity defined as distributive fairness and justice. In this article we explore the value of various approaches to intergenerational justice, focusing on the Principle of Intergenerational Neutrality derived from Rawls' theory of justice. We argue that this does not work as well from a policy point of view as Sen's freedom‐as‐capabilities approach. We conclude that linking Sen's approach to justice to a generational accounting will enable governments to address future issues of equity.     

Gay fathers,gay citizenship: on the power of reproductive futurism and assimilation

Edelman's new ethics of queer theory is focussed on the all-pervasive image of the child, which he argues provides the foundation for the hegemonic politics of ‘reproductive futurism’ (L. Edelman, 2004. No future: queer theory and the death drive. Durham, NC: Duke University Press). His searing criticism raises important questions for sexual citizenship, and particularly for the gay parent as citizen. Edelman's argument that queers should abandon accommodation and instead embrace their position as the figure of negativity offers a challenge to all those gay men that seek to be fathers. In this article, I critically engage with Edelman's arguments and explore the implications of a queer rejection of reproductive futurism and parental privilege through an empirical investigation of young gay men's stories about the possibility of becoming fathers. I argue that whilst Edelman's uncompromising stance serves to open a space for gay men embracing the jouissance that is increasingly being abandoned through an assimilationist desire for citizenship, it also, more problematically, closes down possibilities for gay men and thus further reinforces present inequalities in citizenship. Is negativity the only option in the face of the onslaught of reproductive futurism or might there be a dialectical solution that is at once radically queer but also reflective of the variety of claims for sexual citizenship?     

The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics

Abstract

The central claim of this essay is that Habermas' pro gram of discourse ethics fails to establish the necessary immanent connection between the universality of discourse ethics and the quasi-transcendentalism, which is supposed to provide its ground. Habermas' attempt to avoid the spectre of subjectivism leads him to develop an understanding of universalism that hinges on a critical error, the confusion of subjectivity with ethical sub stance. Using Castoriadis' theory of the imagination to illuminate this failure, I demonstrate the way in which Habermas' moral theory of discourse inadvertently harbours a moral-imaginary horizon, a pre-political kernel which undercuts its capacity to serve as a universalist ethic.     

What's so special aout coercion?

There is a certain form of libertarian argument accordingj to which there is something essentially uncoercive and therefore freedom-respecting about the ‘free market’. The most obvious way to counter this is to meet it head on, to try to show that the market is, on the contrafy, coercive.

But I do not think the obvious approach is the right approach here. The trouble with this particular libertarian view is that it expects the concept is loose enouth to permit a number of interpretations, and I concentrate mainly on Robert Nozick's article, ‘Coercion’, which is is unusual for being an attempt by a political philosopher to come to grips with the concept in detail. In the first section, I consider the broken-backed relationship between Nozick' main guiding assumptions, and the consequent possibility of pursing different ‘strategies ’ when trying to explicate coercion. In the second, I explore some of the implications of this for the libertarian view. In the third, I argue that the pursuit of a ‘baseline’ dividing cases of coercion from others is futile. In conclusion, I suggest that if we really want to understand the relation between capitalism and freedom (or its lack) it is a mistake to focus too closely on coercion alone.     

Television TV by Barney Daniels Tjungurrayi

This paper examines the alliance that Derrida makes between his notion of justice as undeconstructible and a certain spirit of Marx's emancipatory promise. By following some of the precautions that Derrida undertakes in distinguishing the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructible justice should not be viewed as a contradiction in terms. I also argue that while the themes of justice, ethics, and politics can be rendered self‐present. Rather, Derrida's response to the injunctions of Marx suggests that it is precisely because justice and the emancipatory promise cannot be given over to the present that they are situated as undeconstructible. As such, taking responsibility for the heritage of Marxism involves working and sorting through the many spectres of Marx that inhabit the same injunction, where the promise remains as that yet to come.     

Public support for electoral reform: The role of electoral system experience

What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people's willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.     

The death of scientific knowledge in [South] Africa: An Afrocentric response to M. P. Sebola

On the basis of the Afrocentric perspective, this article uses South Africa as a test case to critique Mokoko Piet Sebola's piece titled “Peer review, scholarship and editors of scientific publications: the death of scientific knowledge in Africa,” which appeared in Koers ‐ Bulletin for Christian Scholarship, Volume 83 (1): 1–13. I argue that Sebola's piece provides a partial guide to understanding the state of the knowledge industry in Africa, particularly in South Africa. Safe to say that Sebola's work deepens scholarly and public discourse on the politics of scholarship in Africa and the world at large. However, I do not intend to blatantly praise Sebola's contribution to this academic area, which remains under researched due to the reasons that are beyond the scope of this article. In particular, the current article aspires to identify scholarly weaknesses in Sebola's work with a view to correcting them by offering an alternative view. This correction deserves the attention of all scholars and practitioners especially because it is interdisciplinary in nature, and it is poised to undo the misinformation disseminated in Sebola's piece. Such misinformation has a potential to overshadow the few truths advanced in his article. Methodologically, this article is based on document review, conversations, and interdisciplinary discourse analysis in its broadest form.     

Becoming Who We Are: Democracy and the Political Problem of Hope

Abstract

In this article I argue that hope is rightly numbered by Hesiod among the evils, as hope cannot be separated from an awareness of the inadequacy of one's current state. Political hope for democrats in particular is tied to the awareness that we have not yet realized ourselves, that, to paraphrase Pindar, we have not yet become who we are. I argue that, although Rorty comes close to articulating this in his book Achieving Our Country, his emphasis on pride ultimately obscures more than it reveals. I conclude that Thoreau's anguished reflection in Walden on the failures of his fellow citizens is a better place to look for instruction on the question of political hope.     

One Concept of Liberty

In this paper I argue in favour of a single conception of liberty, that picked out by Berlin as negative liberty. However, Berlin's defence of liberty so understood seems to rest on a view not open to the moral realist.
The first half of the paper explains this and suggests an alternative defence compatible with such a moral position. The defence rests on an account of why we value freedom. In the second half of the paper this negative conception is defended against recent criticism from Charles Taylor. His appeal to qualitative distinctions within freedom is queried, as is the conception of the self that seems required for his outlook.     

John Dewey on experience: a critical resource for the theory and practice of youth civic engagement

Research on youth civic engagement often sees the everyday lives of young people as barriers to civic engagement. Recent qualitative approaches have drawn attention to the civic and political dimensions of young people's everyday lives. This is a crucial insight, but cannot – by itself – answer a key question: just how is it that everyday experience can be transformed into civic engagement? I argue that John Dewey's theory of experience makes two key contributions toward answering this question. First, Dewey's situational understanding of experience directs us to the concrete conditions of everyday life as the necessary groundwork and starting point for civic engagement. Second, his concept of reflective experience helps us understand how taken for granted assumptions about political and social life can be transformed into more active forms of engagement. I illustrate this argument by drawing on selected findings from a qualitative study of young people's experience in Public Achievement, a civic engagement initiative.     

‘A willing Odysseus’: The life and times of Albert O. Hirschman

Abstract

In this review essay of Jeremy Adelman's biography of Albert O. Hirschman, A worldly philosopher, supplemented by references to other secondary works on Hirschman, I take the opportunity to discuss the relationship between the economist's life and his main publications. I argue that in times of crisis more attempts like Hirschman's political economy are needed. I further argue that Hirschman has given us a good idea of what a new moral economy, which really deserves this name, would look like.     

Orchestrating silence,winning the votes: Explaining variation in media freedom during elections

Restrictions on media freedom play a prominent role in the survival of incumbents in hybrid regimes. But while scholars agree that governments limit media freedom to punish opponents and mobilize supporters, less is known about the electoral incentives that explain the timing and location of restrictions. Using original microdata on government attempts to prevent the dissemination of information from Venezuela (2002–2015), I show that electoral competition at the local and national levels shape patterns of government-led restrictions on media freedom. At the local level, I find that differences in the opposition's strength incentivize governments to use restrictions to demobilize opponents where they are strongest, target marginal districts during local elections, and maintain dominance in their strongholds. At the national level, I show that as threats to the government party's primacy increase, so does the effect of local electoral competition on the hazard of restrictions.     

Respecting multiculturalism? Respecting religion?

ABSTRACT

This response to Balint focuses on his stance towards minority cultural and religious practices where he is in general sceptical of special accommodation. I argue that there are grounds to grant special rights and other accommodative measures towards such minorities on the basis of freedom and citizenship (both values Balint endorses), and appraisal respect, a value he rejects. The upshot is more support for a hands-on, active state than the hands-off state that Balint favours.     

Reining in the Bureaucrats: Democratic Transition and Administrative Procedural Reform in Korea

How do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a “reining in” theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intrabranch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint—and dismiss—freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents change policy. Building on the delegation literature from economics, my theory represents a more general argument than prior theories for why presidents support APAs. I test the theory through a case study of South Korea's first civilian government (post‐1961), under President Kim Young Sam. Kim initiated an APA to rein in a professionalized civil service that opposed his policy preferences. Strict procedural requirements designed to keep tabs on bureaucratic activities enhanced Kim's control over his bureaucracy.     

The Political Significance of the Face: Deleuze's Critique of Levinas

While Levinas famously claims that ethics precedes ontology and emanates from the concrete experience of the other's face, it is often forgotten that Deleuze also discusses the face in numerous writings. The purpose of this paper is to briefly outline Levinas's arguments regarding the constitution of the face to chart its ethical importance, before engaging with Deleuze's critique of Levinas's position. I show that, by distinguishing between two systems of signification – the head-body system and the face system – Deleuze agrees with Levinas that the face is an important signifier delineating the other, but destructs the notion of face to show that it: (1) is more complex and multi-dimensional than Levinas realizes; (2) emanates from a specific semiotic relationship; and (3) emanates from specific socio-historical circumstances. Showing the face is a semiotic construct based in and emanating from a specific socio-historical configuration allows Deleuze not only to conclude that the face is related to politics not ethics as Levinas claims, but also to claim that it entails the inhuman in the human. This clarifies the nature of the face in Deleuze, offers a critique of Levinas's influential thinking on ethics, brings us to a discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics and reveals what Deleuze takes the political to entail.