The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization

The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of “creeping competences,” with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less “communitarian” methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission.     

Regulatory change and environmental protection in the British and German chemical industries

Abstract. Business interest associations in the European chemical industry have traditionally been well organized and enjoyed a harmonious relationship with governments of various complexions. This very favourable balance for the industry has been disturbed by the salience of the environmental issue. This has led to a certain deregulation, or breakdown of existing regulatory mechanisms. Increasing concentration on the European Community level as the locus of environmental policymaking has led to a dual response on the part of business interest associations, reflecting an older contrast between national styles of government/business relations. The British chemical industry has preferred the national route, is much more hostile to environmental regulation than its German counterpart, and often finds itself isolated, depending on the Department of Trade and Industry to ensure that its viewpoint is articulated by the British Government in EC negotiations. The German industry still clings to self-regulation, but, given the high level of environmental consciousness in the Federal Republic, has developed a reluctant preference for action at the European level. This has been manifested both in the Europeanisation of its links with the German Economics Ministry and in its support for the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers Associations; the latter is well placed to exert influence on both the EC Commission and the European Parliament.     

European Commission merger control: Combining competition and the creation of larger European firms

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the ‘neoliberal’ Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding ‘national champion’ firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a ‘merger‐constraining’ policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an ‘integrationist policy’ of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are ‘likely’ for the ‘merger‐constraining’ view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former ‘national champion’ firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the ‘industrial policy’ aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agricultural policy: A network approach

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The transnational dimension of the election

Direct elections to the European Parliament have a transnational as well as a national dimension. Up to the present, the national dimension clearly dominates, however. In the course of the 1984 election campaign, issues concerning the structure, functioning and development perspectives of the European Community's political system generally were of minor importance. The same can be stated for transnational actors and their activities. In spite of the various campaign activities of the Commission of the EC, the European Parliament with its political groups and the European party federations, the dominant part of the campaign was played by national actors. It is arguable that the 1984 election, compared to 1979, even saw an actual ‘renationalization’ of politics, a further diminution of the already modest importance of the transnational dimension.     

Competition policy and institutional politics in the European Community: State aid control and small business promotion

Abstract. The article examines EC competition policy from a political science perspective, analyzing the political and institutional considerations which inform the development of the Commission's controlling capacities in competition. It concentrates on policy towards small businesses in manufacturing. We argue that the Commission's general capacities in the formation and the administration of competition policy have been growing in both the merger-controlling aspects and in the control of state subsidization. Against this background, the handling of state aid to small businesses presents us with a paradox: the more developed the enforcement system in competition, the less the Commission applied it to national subsidization of small-scale production. The role of EC competition policy and particularly the subtle handling of state subsidies should be analyzed as part of the developing system of Community policy vis-à-vis small business, encompassing measures at the EC and national levels. Community policy has emerged as a result of an accommodation between different EC institutional and domestic political objectives, and to some extent this accommodation has been achieved at the expense of policy content. The article traces the development of Community policy in this area from the early 1970s to the adoption of the first-ever detailed policy guidelines in 1992, and suggests an analytical scheme for explaining the emergence of small business promotion as an issue in EC institutional politics.     

Bread-and-Butter Agreement and High Politics Disagreement Some Reflections on the Contextual Impact on Agricultural Interests in EC Policy-Making*

In public policy literature a classical argument is that the scope and content of decisions shape both the structure of the policy-making process and the configuration of actors involved. Recent studies have strongly emphasized that the patterns of segmentation and specialization found in national policy-making are also found in EC policy-making. Against this background, the present article discusses the conditions and impact of agricultural interests in EC policy-making in light of the economic crisis of recent years and the increasing budgetary problems faced by the EC. The article illustrates, especially with reference to the Danish case, the special importance of the national interest organization-government relationship for the strategies pursued by national agricultural interest organizations in influencing EC/CAP policy-making. Furthermore, the article indicates how policy-making concerning the CAP has become more complicated as a consequence of the general economic crisis and recent sharp fall in farmers' incomes. National governments are the central actors in the Community policy-making process, and their impulse to promote exclusive national interests in the Community policy-making process has increased. In addition, agriculture has been integrated in the overall Community ‘crisis’ policy, and this development has weakened the segmentation in relation to the CAP. However, because of the general problems of the EC, the national agricultural organizations of the various member states have a growing interest in emphasizing joint activities and mutual agreement with regard to fundamental agricultural issues on Community level. This may affect the role of COPA leaving it primarily as a coordinator and mediator among the various national agricultural organizations, because pressures are more likely to succeed at the national level than at the EC level. This is where ‘bread-and-butter’ agreement really counts in the future. The alternative is that COPA will lose its credibility in EC policy-making.     

European Union Institutions and French Political Careers

This article examines one aspect of the relationship between European Union institutions and the French political field: politicians' careers. What is the value of positions in the Commission and the European Parliament for French politicians in terms of career mobility? This study shows that the value of the Commission as a source of domestic political capital has risen since the 1950s, whereas the value of the European Parliament has remained relatively low. The position of Commissioner is now comparable to a ministerial-level position. Membership in the European Parliament has remained secondary to a national political career. Yet, as a result of the European Parliament's peripheral position in the French political field, new social groups, linking the regions to the European institutions or forming cross-partisan interest groups, have been created. Evidence shows that if the European Union institutions present an alternative type of political capital to national political capital, political careers and ambitions are still formed in national terms. National mechanisms for the formation of groups having a vested interest in the relative autonomy of supranational political institutions have not developed sufficiently. This inadequacy might be the single most important reason for the democratic deficit in the European Union. We are not in business at all; we are in politics. (Former President of the EC Commission Walter Hallstein, quoted in Swann 1990, vii)     

Towards an internal health market with the European court

This article examines the process through which a European healthcare dimension has been established and which has gradually extended the rights of European patients to cross-border healthcare. The integrative course has been charted by the legal activism of the European Court of Justice, whereas political voice has largely been absent. Judicial activism alone has applied the principle of the free movement of services to the policy field of healthcare, and thereby further energised the process. The political impact of this specific process of integration through law is, however, clear. The dynamic evolution of Community law has increasingly challenged the national instrument to retain health supply within own borders. Furthermore, the position of the European patient has been empowered by new individual rights, emanating from a supranational locus of rights against which the discretion exerted by national authorities can be challenged. Through the indeterminacy of European rules, open to continuous contestation and clarification, healthcare institutionalisation has proceeded and the European Union has extended into the core of the welfare state.     

Delegation and constraints in the national execution of the EC policies: A longitudinal and qualitative analysis

When it adopts an EC law, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the Community, decides on the extent to which implementing measures are taken by national administrations and the latitude of national executive action. This article reviews, across a data set of 158 major EC laws, the pattern of delegation of executive powers to national authorities and the statutory constraints employed by the Council to delimit the national execution of European policies. The study provides, first, a comparative assessment of the choices taken by Community legislators on issues of delegation and suggests an explanation to the relative stringency of European law. It then evaluates the long‐term trend towards more concise legislation and greater executive discretion of member states, but not necessarily of more legislative output, that emerges from the analysis of the data set. Finally, it explains how factors such as credibility of commitment, information asymmetries and the need for flexible, but controlled and credible, transition to European policies account for the use of 12 categories of constraints that the Council imposes on national administrations.     

Political leadership and European integration: The case of Jacques Delors

European Community politics created new opportunities for political leadership. Leadership of the integration process was provided first and foremost by national political leaders, with the EC's supranational institution — the Commission — playing a supporting role. Jacques Delors was the first Commission president (1985–1995) significantly to redefine his role, and consequently to create a model for European, supranational political leadership. Analysing Jacques Delors’ discourse provides us with a methodological tool for understanding how he politicised the leadership role of the Commission, and to what effect.     

Problems of transnational policymaking: Environmental policy in the European Community

Abstract. Environmental protection is inherently a cross-border issue, which might be thought to create opportunities for transnational regulation. This has significant potential consequences for European integration. However, two contrasting trends can be identified. On the one hand, the increasing magnitude of environmental problems, along with growing public and elite awareness of these issues, are generating responses which put the European Community at the centre of a process of 'regulation'. It is intended that this role should grow in the twin contexts of the Single Market and of increasing interaction with Eastern Europe with its vast pollution problems. On the other hand, however, the kind of 'political' policy intervention which environmental protection requires has not really developed. EC environmental policies have thus far been rather weak in both formulation and, especially, implementation, and even existing gains are likely to come under increasing pressure from the trend towards economic deregulation characteristic of the Single European Market project. Probably the most significant impact of Community efforts in the environmental field has been to encourage the convergence and strengthening of national regulation among member states, more than to create distinct European policy processes and institutions.     

Adapting Danish Interests to European Integration

When Denmark became a member of the European Community in 1973, political institutions as well as private business had to and did in fact make adaptations to the new and unaccustomed political environment. With the exception of the Common Market Committee of Folkelinget , however, the Danish polity did not change much with regard to the EC until the late 1980s when the Community gained new momentum. Now, traditionally corporatist patterns of decision-making are adapting to a European polity much more complex and pluralist by nature. Political and administrative institutions are developing new ways of influencing EC policies, though their lobbying activities still remain basically ad hoc and reactive. As to private interests, agriculture occupies a unique position with its long tradition of aggressive lobbying, while lobbying by manufacturing companies is still in the making. However, an overall weakening of national corporatist patterns of decision-making in response to the integration process, which one might perhaps have expected, has not taken place. Rather, we observe a strengthening. Thus, our case poses questions as to the relevance of existing corporatist notions for an understanding of the general nature of the policy-making process in the Community and the prospects for interest organizational centralization at the European level.     

The political economy of centralization and the European Community

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin (Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).     

Sharing sovereignty for global regulation: The cases of fuel economy and online gambling

Globalization is sometimes taken as a synonym for market liberalization, because it is claimed that power has flowed from states to markets. Whether happening as a result of undeniable “forces” or some hegemonic consensus, many on both the left and right of politics agree that this is a reality. However, this article argues that states which share sovereignty with market actors are able to influence outcomes beyond their borders. The cases of fuel economy and online gambling regulations are used to illustrate the point. In the former case, Japanese and European industry‐driven regulations are being “exported” in the attributes of the products of their car industries. In the latter, UK market‐friendly regulations are likely to be “exported” to the European region and beyond because of industry support, and market liberalization principles embodied in European Union institutions. Both cases indicate that sharing sovereignty in the process of making and implementing national regulations produces opportunities for global regulation.     

Information technology and economic recovery in Western Europe

This article sets out to analyse the response of West European governments and of the European Community to the challenge of information technology (IT). European countries have joined the race among industrial nations to restructure their economies around the industries of the future (micro-electronics, computers and advanced telecommunications). The race is currently led by Japan and the United States with Western Europe following a poor third. In order to catch up, West European governments have for some time pursued national strategies and are now attempting to develop a common approach with the assistance of the European Commission. This attempt has been bedevilled, however, not only by national chauvinism, but by conflict between the ambitions of governments and the goals of private sector strategies. Eureka - Europe's response to America's Strategic Defence Initiative - marks a step towards resolving such differences. But as this article suggests, it will not resolve the deeper tensions between the major aims of current policies: the concentration of research and production resources while also creating an open and fully competitive market for IT in Western Europe.This article is part of a wider project on new technology policies in Western Europe, funded by the Leverhulme Trust and directed by Professor J.J. Richardson. The main findings will be published in Information Technology and the State, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.     

‘Overcoming the divide’ between comparative politics and international relations approaches to the EC: What role for ‘post‐decisional politics'? 1

Political scientists have normally considered the European Community (EC) from the standpoint either of international relations or comparative politics/public policy. Although the division between the two sub‐disciplines of political science is well known and deeply rooted, it is now commonly viewed as a barrier to greater understanding of the neo‐state structure of the EC. Using a case study of the implementation of EC coastal‐bathing water policy in Britain over the last 20 years, this article argues that closer investigation of the long‐term outcome of individual policies at the national and sub‐national level provides a sounder basis upon which to adjudicate between the two main theories of integration, namely inter‐governmentalism and neo‐functionalism, than studies of short‐term policy outputs emanating from the Council of Ministers or the grand ‘history‐making’ bargains hammered out in the European Council.     

How online insourcing might improve EU policy development—the view from inside the European Commission

Perhaps policy‐makers are not the most progressive of actors when it comes to incorporating online technologies in their everyday workflow, but they are certainly not dismissive of the Internet and its potential for policy‐making (e.g. European Commission, 2011 , 2012 ). Could online insourcing, for example, be a way to improve the quality of new legislation? This article presents the current view from the European Commission (‘EC’). We have found that many of its Directorates‐General (‘DG’) are actively investigating into the possibilities of insourcing more and better policy contributors at the pre‐legislative stage, by means of online technology. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Second-order elections

Abstract The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the 'real' balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems' respective 'electoral cycles'. Such a relationship between a second-order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second-order political arena is related to nine different first-order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption mat European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections.