State,democracy, socialism: introduction

This paper argues that comtemporary developments in democratic politics mark the emergence of a new type of representative government. Current trends such as the weakening of party identification, the decline of political platforms or the increasing role of an élite of media experts may be regarded as undermining the principle of popular government. The paper demonstrates, however, that representative government was not invented as an indirect form of government by the people, but as a wholly original political system resting on principles different from those which organize democracy. Moreover, a number of institutional arrangements were established at the origins of representative government which have been virtually unquestioned since. Political representation has changed much less than is generally assumed. It is true, on the other hand, that the constant principles of representative government have had different consequences depending on the circumstance in which they were implemented. Such differences have generated various forms of political representation. The paper constructs three ideal-types of representative government. It shows that the current situation is best conceived as the rise of a new type of representation.     

Capitalism, socialism, and democracy: An empirical inquiry

Abstract. Some prominent economists have argued that the structure of a nation's economic life – capitalist or socialist - helps to shape its political institutions. Though its importance seems self-evident, scholars have not yet integrated this idea into the literature of empirical democratic theory. Drawing on previous work, we formulate four propositions about the relationship between economic structure and political democracy. Economic structure does in fact mould political forms, but not in a simple, linear fashion. Rather, it does so in a more complex, non-linear manner, a relationship we label the 'mixed-economy' model. This relationship survives and flourishes in the face of extensive challenges. Its implication is simple: democratic political practice reaches a maximum under moderate amounts of public direction of economic affairs, but suffers at the extremes of both unfettered capitalism and socialism.     

实质民主与形式民主之争——20世纪社会主义与自由主义关于民主问题的分歧之一

自由主义式民主是一种形式民主,这一特征体现在:民主必须受到自由原则的约束;自由主义争取的平等始终只是法律面前人人平等;自由主义把民主作为一种政治方法与手段.可见,民主在自由主义理论中只是一个工具性的角色.社会主义诉求的实质性民主与自由主义建构的彤式民主有所不同:社会主义民主是日的与手段的统一;社会主义民主追求的是实际民主权利的平等.从实质民主与形式民主之争可以得出以下结论:民主与自由是社会主义民主与自由主义民主的不同的价值诉求.     

推进管理民主建设社会主义新农村

“生产发展、生活宽裕、乡风文明、村容整洁、管理民主”是社会主义新农村建设的重大战略任务,新农村建设是一个系统化的工程,是一个集经济、政治、文化和社会建设为一体的综合化体系,它涵盖了农村物质文明、精神文明和政治文明建设。作为政治保证的“管理民主”,从制度层面上决定着新农村建设的各个目标的成功落实。对政府而言,尤其对乡镇基层政府而言,在新农村建设中应充当什么样的角色,发挥什么样的作用,如何发挥作用,都是值得认真思考的重要问题。     

Social security reform in Central and Eastern Europe: variations on a Latin American theme

After Chile reformed its social security system in 1981, several other Latin American countries and certain Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries implemented the Chilean model, with some variations: either a single- or multitier system, or with a period of transition to take care of those in the labor force at the time of the change. The single-tier version consists of individual accounts in pension fund management companies. Multi-tier systems retain some form of public program and add mandatory individual accounts. Most of the CEE countries did not want to incur the high transition costs associated with the Chilean model. The switch to a market economy had already strained their economies. Also, the countries' desire to adopt the European Union's Euro as their currency--a move that required a specific debt ceiling--limited the amount of additional debt they could incur. This article describes the CEE reforms and makes some comparisons with the Latin American experience. Most of the CEE countries have chosen a mixed system and have restructured the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) tier, while the Latin American countries have both single- and multi-tier systems. Some CEE countries have set up notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes for the PAYGO tier in which each insured person has a hypothetical account made up of all contributions during his or her working life. Survivors and disability programs in CEE have remained in the public tier, but in most of the Latin American programs the insured must purchase a separate insurance policy. Issues common to both regions include: Administrative costs are high and competition is keen, which has led to consolidation and mergers among the companies and a large market share controlled by a few companies. Benefits are proportionately lower for women than for men. A large, informal sector is not covered by social security. This sector is apparently much larger in Latin America than in the CEE countries. Issues that are unique to some of the CEE countries include: Individual accounts in Hungary and Poland have proved more attractive than originally anticipated. As a result, contributions to the public PAYGO system in Hungary and Poland fell short of expectations. In several countries, laws setting up the programs were enacted without all the details of providing benefits. For example, in some countries laws must now be drawn up for establishment of annuities because they do not yet exist. Setting up a coherent pension policy has been difficult in some countries because of frequent and significant changes in government. This situation has affected the progress of reform in various stages of development. In general, a definitive assessment of individual accounts in these countries will not be possible until a cohort of retirees has spent most of its career under the new system.     

Islam and democracy: a response

A debate has emerged whether countries with Muslim majorities are intrinsically more likely to be autocratic. Recent studies have traced this to the allegedly repressive nature of Islam. This article replicates the most recent study on this topic, published in Public Choice (Potrafke in Public Choice 151:185–192, 2012), and demonstrates that the effect is not robust to a number of sensible alterations to the statistical specification. The effect between Islam and democracy is spurious. There is no causal relationship between Islam and democracy.     

Liberalism,neo-liberalism and governmentality: introduction

This paper concerns the emergence of a specifically 'economic' way of governing poverty at the start of this century, an event which is to be accounted for, though by no means exhaustively, by the discovery of 'unemployment'. The latter will make it possible to relate the nineteenth-century 'problem of the unemployed' to an object domain that is primarily economic, rather than cultural or moral. A new object of regulation will emerge from this economic problematization of the 'social question': the labour market. The paper pays particular attention to the national labour exchange system, the political technology that will visibilize the labour market in new ways. Together with unemployment insurance, it will suggest new ways of governing poverty and a new course for social policy.     

Democracy,creeping socialism,and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies

Rent-seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives. Incentives to engage in distributional struggles, to seek contrived transfers are strong, but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak. Stagnation and some unemployment should be expected. Long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent-seeking. The provision of rents very much depends on government. The stronger the governmental involvement in the economy, the higher social security spending, the more rents the government is likely to generate. Therefore, creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent-seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment. Whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment. These ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies, using data from the sixties and seventies. By and large, the rent-seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates, but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment. Olson's (1982, 1983) proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth-retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are.     

Foucault and Liberalism: Rationality,Revolution, Resistance

Abstract

In 1978 and 1979, the concept of governmentality was introduced by Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France. Foucault finds the genealogical origin of this concept in the Christian figure of the shepherd. From this starting-point, he then embarks on a eulogy of liberalism, in stark contrast to the Marxist critique of political economy. These two grand narratives of modern liberalism differ markedly in their political and philosophical presuppositions. The latter, rooted in the tradition of natural law, is directed towards revolution. The former, rooted in the tradition of English radicalism, is directed towards resistance. Beyond their different reconstructions of liberalism, however, the article concludes by showing how these two narratives, can in fact be combined in a politically fruitful way.     

Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality

Many recent liberal theorists have argued that state neutrality is supported by a metaphysical thesis about value, namely pluralism , which asserts that there are some conceptions of the good life which neither form a hierarchy nor represent versions of a single good. It is however doubtful whether neutrality is supported by pluralism; indeed, it may in some cases be precluded by it. Arguments for pluralism can, in many cases, be reconciled with a monistic metaphysics of value, and pluralism itself fails to support neutrality. This is particularly true of traditional liberal policy positions such as religious toleration and opposition to censorship, where attention to diverse conceptions of the good may favour, or demand, non–neutral policies. The political problems which neutrality addresses arise before we accept the metaphysical 'truth' of pluralism, and often remain even if the parties to a political conflict have false conceptions of value. A sharp question for the pluralist neutralist is why conflicting conceptions of the political cannot themselves feature in plural conceptions of the good life. Dispensing with pluralism may not, however, be enough to rescue neutrality, since the disputes which neutrality was designed to deal with may not be resolvable neutrally; and more particularly, some of the traditional liberal policies may be incapable of neutral justification. If so, liberals may find a more traditional form of non–neutral liberalism more attractive.     

Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: a Critique

The idea of human rights has become one of the central moral notions of both the theory and practice of international politics. While its foundation and future in the practice of politics looks bright, it is an idea that still causes great trouble at the theoretical level. What are human rights? Why do we have them? To what should we attribute the authority of their moral claims? The theorist Michael Freeman has suggested one theory that by addressing such questions may serve as a foundation for human rights. His theory, however, ends by begging the questions it set out to answer.     

Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy

Gordon Tullock is one of the most important of the founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical ??Tullock Challenges.?? The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by governments to manipulate the policy outcomes. In general, ??What is important will be manipulated by the government.?? To restrain government manipulation, one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism or introduce random mechanisms.