Embedding the 'new economy' in Europe: a study in the institutional specificities of knowledge-based growth

Aspirations for a 'new economy' currently feature prominently in the economic policy debate within the EU. So pronounced is elite interest in the 'new economy' that the issue of knowledge-based growth dominated the Special European Council organized for Lisbon in May 2000. However, the Presidential Conclusions to that Council failed to address the question of whether the European economy is institutionally compatible with knowledge-based growth. The 'new economy' is currently most developed within the United States, and the institutional specificities of the American high-tech sector suggest that it may be impossible simply to import the 'new economy' into Europe. The EU may lack both the labour market and the capital market conditions necessary for successfully embedding the 'new economy' in Europe.     

Conceptualizing Islamic banking and finance: a comparison of its development and governance in Malaysia and Singapore

In response to the limited engagement with critical social science concerning the governance of Islamic banking and finance (IBF), this paper compares and conceptualizes the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore. We argue that IBF governance in Malaysia and Singapore can be distinguished on the basis of ethnic politics, moral suasion, product demand, product innovation, and the character of state practices. Concerning the latter, we contend that the political economy of both countries can be characterized as broadly involving a ‘neoliberal-developmentalism’, but we nuance this by positing a transition in Malaysia from a ‘semi-developmentalism’ in the 1980s to what we call an ‘Islamic and internationalising ordoliberalism’ beginning in the 2000s. In turn, the governance of IBF in Singapore involves a combination of neoliberal developmentalism, which nonetheless also entails some form of Islamic ordoliberalism.     

Nations or Sectors in the Age of Globalization: China's Policy Toward Foreign Direct Investment in Telecommunications

Scholars debate whether states or markets drive economic policy in the context of internationalization. Unpacking the market–state dichotomy, liberal pluralists and institutionalists alike conduct sectoral analysis to examine economic policies and outcomes. They debate the relative importance of sectors versus factors and the impact of sectoral coalitions, structural characteristics, and institutional trajectories. Building on previous scholarship, this article argues that state imperatives, such as national security and technological advancement, are an important guide to understanding dominant patterns of economic policy, defined as state goals, government–business relations, and state methods. Beyond that, the organization of institutions and structural sectoral attributes influence the ways in which actual policy outcomes vary across sectors and time. Case studies of the liberalization and subsequent reregulation of foreign direct investment across subsectors of telecommunications in China substantiate this argument. Evidence from other industries further validates this explanatory model.     

Globalization,International Organizations,and Telecommunications

Since the 1990s over 158 countries established pro‐market reforms in telecommunications—a fast pace for such a drastic change. For example, Sweden and Botswana, two nations vastly different across multiple dimensions, both liberalized their telecom sectors. Why did so many countries adopt liberal reforms in such a short period of time? Conventional wisdom highlights the role of global markets and technology, powerful states, global diffusion, and domestic politics. I argue that contrary to these claims, diffusion through key international organizations is the critical and overlooked factor in explaining rapid global convergence of pro‐market telecom reforms. Using an original dataset for 189 countries between 1970 and 2003 and event history analysis, I demonstrate that membership in key liberal trading organizations, especially the WTO and the OECD, increases the likelihood that countries will adopt liberal pro‐market reforms in telecommunications. These results speak directly to current public policy debates about the reregulation of global markets and bridges the literatures of policy diffusion, institutional design, and regulatory regimes.     

Eyes wide shut? Reforming and defusing checks and balances in Argentina

How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinising government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.