Rational choice theory,public policy and the liberal state

Liberalism requires a high order of responsible behaviour from its citizens in order to be sustainable. Yet when the modern liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped economic man, driven by self-interest and influenced only by carrots and sticks, who occupies center stage. This regulatory approach to public policy can be shown theoretically to give rise to a paradox — the greater the need for regulation, the less likely, because of compliance problems, it is to succeed. It is contended that an alternative approach which explicitly focuses on a broader behavioral understanding of citizens' attitudes and motivations provides a rationale for the use of a much wider range of policy instruments than does the regulatory framework, and is also more in keeping with those values necessary to the sustainability of the liberal state.     

An organizational analysis of political action committees

As the number and putative importance of political action committees have grown, so too has scholarly attention to this new breed of political organization. Yet this attention has been uneven. Although much is now known about the aggregate spending patterns of PACs, much less is known about their internal lives. The present study attempts to open the PAC black box to empirical inquiry. Drawing on interviews with the managers of 70 Washington-based political action committees, we suggest how theoretical perspectives about formal voluntary associations may be usefully applied in explaining the behavior of PACs. After examining the relationships among several variables — organizational goals, constituency relations and decision making, strategy, and interorganizational relations — we show how these forces affect the behavior of corporate, trade/membership, labor, and nonconnected PACS.     

Voter turnout at the British General Election of 1992: Rational choice,social standing or political efficacy?

Abstract. Analyses of turnout in British general elections fall broadly into two camps: those based on constituency–level data, and those based on survey data. The former stress the importance of local context, while the latter stress personal characteristics and viewpoints. Underlying both are a range of theories purporting to explain turnout. However, to date, there has been little systematic attempt to analyse turnout in the round. In this paper, we combine survey and constituency data to study the individual and contextual correlates of turnout at the British general election and 1992. Constituency level analyses seem to confirm the importance of local context, though it declined during the 1980s. However, and contrary to analyses which employ constituency data only, while individual electors' decisions on whether or not to turn out are influenced by their personal circumstances, they are not influenced by local context.     

Instrument choice,political reform and economic welfare

The purpose of this paper is to formally examine the effect of placing constraints, such as the line-item veto or a balanced budget amendment, on legislative behavior. There are two basic findings that emerge from the analysis. First, constraints on one type of instrument, such as spending, will in general result in more widespread use of other kinds of instruments, such as regulation. Second, it is naive to conclude that constraints on legislative behavior will promote economic efficiency and/or reduce the growth of government. The primary contribution of the paper is to suggest how changes in the political environment can affect instrument choice, economic welfare, and the size of government.This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk and Management Science Program. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Ed Campos and Allan Meltzer. The views in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council.     

Rational voting applied to choice of taxes

Fulton County (Atlanta, Georgia) conducted a referendum on a local option sales tax. The referendum offered voters an opportunity to substitute a 1% sales tax for an equal amount of property taxes. The precinct level voting patterns of the referendum are analyzed using a rational voter framework. The regression results generally support the implication of the model.     

Game theory and the study of American political development

Game theoretic analyses of American institutions and American political development largely are disconnected enterprises, yet they share many points of contact and thus opportunities for fruitful exchange. In this essay I discuss the value and limits of formalization for the enterprise of institutional analysis that those fields have in common. I conceptualize two broad approaches that formal modelers have taken to study institutions—institutions as game forms, and institutions as equilibria—that have been relatively successful for understanding institutional choice and stability. At the same time, formal modelers have been less successful in addressing institutional change and development, topics about which APD has much to offer. Overall, I contend that crosstalk between the two fields can benefit them both.

     

The place of political science in public choice

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.     

A contribution to the conceptualization of political resources utilized in corporate political action

• This paper is an attempt at improving existing conceptualizations of corporate political resources. I contend that existing typologies are too vague, simplistic and incomplete on several points. This is why I firstly suggest a new typology and then offer some thoughts on the main characteristics of these resources. Lastly, I apply the idea of resource combination (or bundle) to political resources, showing that they can play three different roles in implementing two generic political strategies.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Planning theory as political practice

Howell S. Baum is associate professor, teaching planning theory, social planning, and organizational behavior at the University of Maryland Institute for Urban Studies and School of Social Work and Community Planning. He has done research on planning in bureaucratic organizations and is author of Planners and Public Expectationsand The Invisible Bureaucracy.He is completing a book on the experience of working in bureaucracy, Membership Without Intimacy.     

Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

A political theory of intergovernmental grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).     

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.