The rise of the constitutional regulatory state in Colombia: The case of water governance

This article interprets the regulatory state in Colombia as the result of a dialectic process between transnational knowledge and domestic politics, which influence, transform, and inspire each other. Such a process results in an interesting constitutional variant of the regulatory state, in which neo‐constitutionalism becomes a counterbalance to the unchecked expansion of neo‐liberal regulatory practices. I, therefore, distinguish between neoliberal and constitutional regulatory states. As a result of neo‐constitutionalism, the domestic judiciary is empowered, and becomes a crucial actor to understand both the specific traits of this regulatory experience, and its interaction with global centers of power.     

Regulatory mobilization and service delivery at the edge of the regulatory state

Where there is weak state capacity to carry out regulatory, redistributional, and developmental functions characterizing much of the developing world, the role of governance and service delivery is also performed by a myriad of private actors. Institutional reform in the utility sector in developing countries has often failed to distinguish between social and economic regulation. I show how private actors like NGOs and local community groups undertake what I term “regulatory mobilization” to influence the new rules of the service delivery game, as well as to deliver much‐needed basic services to urban poor communities. Based on extensive fieldwork carried out in the Philippines, this article reveals and explains the politics of the informal sector at the edge of the regulatory state. More than a decade since the privatization of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System in Metro Manila in 1997, water access for the urban poor remained limited as privatized water utilities faced difficulties in extending service provision. In the context of an unpredictable regulatory landscape and an oligarchic patrimonial state, unexpected collective action by organized urban poor communities and NGOs has taken place around water as a subsistence right. Combining hybrid mobilizations to obtain water as well as influencing the rules governing their provision, these forms of regulatory mobilization appear to be peripheral and episodic. However, depending on how local and sectoral politics are conflated, such regulatory mobilization may sometimes not only result in obtaining subsistence goods, but may also occasionally project countervailing power in the policy sector, and influence formal regulatory frameworks in surprising ways.     

Assessing the regulatory challenges of emerging disruptive technologies

The past decade has witnessed the emergence of many technologies that have the potential to fundamentally alter our economic, social, and indeed personal lives. The problems they pose are in many ways unprecedented, posing serious challenges for policymakers. How should governments respond to the challenges given that the technologies are still evolving with unclear trajectories? Are there general principles that can be developed to design governance arrangements for these technologies? These are questions confronting policymakers around the world and it is the objective of this special issue to offer insights into answering them both in general and with respect to specific emerging disruptive technologies. Our objectives are to help better understand the regulatory challenges posed by disruptive technologies and to develop generalizable propositions for governments' responses to them.     

Missing links between regulatory resources and risk concerns: Evidence from the case of food safety in China

Do resources available to regulatory agencies matter for public perceptions of social risks? In this paper we use the case of food safety in China to empirically examine the relationship between regulatory resources and risk concerns. The multilevel model estimates suggest that neither regulatory revenue nor personnel is significantly related to public concerns over food safety. There is also no significant interaction effect between regulatory resources and food scandals. Despite the fact that sufficient fiscal revenue and manpower are the prerequisites of effective food safety regulation, they do not elicit more favorable public perceptions. These are the two missing links leading to the insignificant effect of regulatory resource inputs. First, ineffective distribution and deployment of resources and the lack of external participation retard the growth of regulatory capacity. Second, underinvestment in risk communication and the amplification effect of risks undermine regulatory legitimacy. We discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the results, and conclude with research limitations and suggestions for future research.     

Hardening corporate accountability in commodity supply chains under the European Union Deforestation Regulation

The European Union (EU) has recently introduced the Deforestation Regulation to close regulatory gaps in the sustainability and legality of global forest and agricultural commodity supply chains. We analyze this regulatory policy change by drawing on accountability scholarship and institutionalist theories of regulation. Our results show that the Regulation aims to enhance corporate accountability mechanisms through mostly state-based hard regulation of commodity supply chains, reducing the role of market incentives and private regulation. This policy change is found to be the result of strategic policy-oriented learning from perceived accountability failures of existing soft market-based instruments, voluntary trade agreements, and experience with market-correcting EU timber legality trade rules in a politically favorable context. The institutionalization of new forest-risk commodity supply chain accountability norms in new EU trade rules would, by design, harden foreign corporate accountability for negative socio-environmental externalities. However, the de-facto hardening will depend on the final regulatory design, acceptance, compliance, implementation, enforcement improvements, and avoidance of leakage effects.     

Design determinism,post-meltdown: urban planners and the search for policy relevance

This commentary explores the roles of planning and urban design in contemporary US urbanization following the global financial crisis in Fall 2008. We focus on the tendency to discuss the planning profession in recovery metaphors – a perspective that has been emphasized in establishing how the profession's past and future relevance may be asserted. In the recent past the planning profession has sought to recover its standing and policy relevance through its contributions to real estate development. In doing so, the profession has gravitated toward design and determinism in order to satisfy pluralist demands within the loosely regulated political economy of neoliberal urban growth. But while design determinism offered numerous practical advantages to the planning profession for the short term, it also served to preclude the profession from engaging with social justice, the social construction of place, and civil society.     

城市积水考问政府公共服务能力

城市积水处理是城市基础设施建设的一部分,也是政府公共服务的一部分,更是对政府提供公共服务的能力和水平的考问和检验,面对严竣的积水现状,我国政府唯有强化公共服务能力,完善公共服务体系,才是治理之道。     

Stakeholder involvement in collaborative regulatory processes: Using automated coding to track attendance and actions

Regulation increasingly mandates collaborative approaches to increase stakeholder input and streamline approval processes. However, understanding how to maintain stakeholder involvement over the course of a long collaborative process is vital to optimize effectiveness. This paper observes more than 700 stakeholders involved in developing and implementing a dam operating license over 16 years. We use text mining and Bayesian hierarchical modeling to observe meeting attendance and recorded actions in meeting minutes. We find that involvement decreased after the initial planning phase, but steadily increased through license development and implementation. After the regulatory mandate to consult with external stakeholders dissolved, overall attendance declined while attendance stability increased, meaning that the non‐mandatory stage involved a smaller cadre of dedicated actors. This indicates that high‐performing mandated stakeholder involvement processes rely on a constrained group of conveners to sustain interaction and have less turnover than what might be expected given existing evidence from grassroots involvement; assumptions about group dynamics based on involvement in grassroots processes may lead to improper predictions about who will participate, and how, in processes where stakeholder involvement is mandated.     

On the value of formal assessment of uncertainty in regulatory analysis

The US Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2003 a new requirement for the treatment of uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of proposed regulations, requiring agencies to carry out a formal quantitative uncertainty assessment regarding a regulation’s benefits and costs if either is expected to reach $1 billion annually. Despite previous use in other contexts, such formal assessments of uncertainty have rarely been employed in RIAs or other regulatory analyses. We describe how formal quantitative assessments of uncertainty – in particular, Monte Carlo analyses – can be conducted, we examine the challenges and limitations of such analyses in the context of RIAs, and we assess how the resulting information can affect the evaluation of regulations. For illustrative purposes, we compare Monte Carlo analysis with methods typically used in RIAs to evaluate uncertainty in the context of economic analyses carried out for the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Nonroad Diesel Rule, which became effective in 2004.     

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.     

Regulating factory safety in the Bangladeshi garment industry

This paper examines how far the workplace inspection program established under the 2013 Accord on Fire and Building Safety has served to improve safety in Bangladesh garment factories, and the extent to which its operation has been influenced by factors that the literature suggests are important in shaping the outcomes of private regulatory initiatives. The findings suggest that such regulation can generate positive outcomes, even in the absence of strong public regulatory support. They also caution against discounting the role of compliance‐based enforcement strategies, while highlighting the importance of their adequate resourcing and transparency. Some support is also offered for the argument that such regulatory initiatives could directly influence the market dynamics that shape supplier working conditions.     

The challenge of accountability in complex regulatory networks: The case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory governance networks is how to balance the need for democratic accountability while increasingly facing demands from elected officials to optimize oversight of industry by utilizing the expertise of the private sector in developing risk‐based standards for compliance. The shift from traditional command and control oversight to process oriented regulatory regimes has been most pronounced in highly complex industries, such as aviation and deepwater oil drilling, where the intricate and technical nature of operations necessitates risk‐based regulatory networks based largely on voluntary compliance with mutually agreed upon standards. The question addressed in this paper is how the shift to process oriented regimes affects the trade‐offs between democratic, market, and administrative accountability frames, and what factors determine the dominant accountability frame within the network. Using post‐incident document analysis, this paper provides a case study of regulatory oversight of the deepwater oil drilling industry prior to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, to explore how the shift to a more networked risk‐based regulatory regime affects the trade‐offs and dominant accountability frames within the network. The results of this study indicate that a reliance on market‐based accountability mechanisms, along with the lack of a fully implemented process‐oriented regulatory regime, led to the largest oil spill in US history.     

Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.     

Assessing the role of regulatory quality,favouritism, administrative requirement and licencing restriction in curtailing carbon emissions

The urgent need to achieve the Paris Agreement has compelled countries to set mitigation targets to curtail carbon emissions. Notwithstanding, stakeholders' effort to implement emission-reduction policies is often constrained by institutional challenges. This study provides new evidence about the dynamic relationship between institutional quality and carbon emissions in 63 industrialised economies. Using a reduced-form energy emission model and the system GMM technique, we exploit four institutional quality measures—favouritism, administrative requirement, licencing restriction and regulatory quality—and analyse their impact on carbon emissions. The results show that institutions play a fundamental role in mitigating carbon emissions. However, the abatement effect depends on the regulatory quality, the extent of favouritism, licencing restrictions and administrative requirements. Our findings reveal that stringent regulations such as licencing restrictions reduce carbon emissions in the short and long run. Administrative requirement such as emission reporting inhibits carbon emission in the short and long run, whereas favouritism worsens it. The results are robust to alternative model specifications. The findings from this study highlight the need for policymakers to pay close attention to favouritism, as it tends to reduce the effectiveness of emission policy regulations. Additionally, we argue for the need for stringent administrative requirements given its critical role in internalising carbon emission intensity in industrialised economies.     

Conflict of interest regulation in European parliaments: Studying the evolution of complex regulatory regimes

The growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over the last decades makes the systematic examination of its nature and the rationales underpinning regulatory choices an important endeavor. In this paper we introduce conceptualizations and measurements of conflict of interest (COI) regulation directed toward assuring the impartial and unbiased decisionmaking of national parliamentarians. We distinguish the strictness of rules, the nature of enforcement, sanctions, and transparency requirements as core elements defining COI regimes. Applying our framework to 27 European democracies, we select two cases for in‐depth analysis in which legislators chose very different solutions in response to growing pressures to regulate themselves, to inductively explore the drivers underpinning the choice of COI mechanisms: the United Kingdom, which adopted a highly transparency‐oriented regime, and Belgium, which adopted a highly sanction‐oriented COI regime. Echoing neo‐institutionalist perspectives, the longitudinal analyses indicate how the two democracies’ different institutional environments shape distinct answers to similar functional pressures.     

The regulatory state and the UK Labour Government's re‐regulation of provision in the English National Health Service

Following its election in 1997, the UK Labour Government embarked upon a 10 year program of reform of the National Health Service (NHS). By 2005, Labour had doubled the NHS budget and dramatically transformed the shape of the Service. In England, a basic characteristic of the NHS is the organizational split between provider and commissioning agencies. In this article I argue that Labour's re‐regulation of NHS provision is a coherent representation of the influence of the “regulatory state” in restructuring arrangements between government, market, and society. The article offers an account of the regulatory state based on a discussion of five key theses: The Audit Society, Regulation Inside Government, The New Regulatory State, The British Regulatory State, and Regulatory Capitalism. The article unfolds Labour's program of reform across themes common to these accounts: the division of labor between state and society, the division of labor within the state, the formalization of previously informal controls, and the development of meta‐regulatory techniques of enforced self‐regulation. It concludes that the key themes of the regulatory state are at work in Labour's transformation of NHS provision and it offers a discussion of the implications for both scholars of regulation and the UK and European health policy literature.     

The Nordic governments' responses to the Covid-19 pandemic: A comparative study of variation in governance arrangements and regulatory instruments

Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Nordic states—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—exhibit similarities and differences. This article investigates the extent to which crisis policymaking diverges from normal policymaking within the Nordic countries and whether variations between the countries are associated with the role of expertise and the level of politicization. Government responses are analyzed in terms of governance arrangements and regulatory instruments. Findings demonstrate some deviation from normal policymaking within and considerable variation between the Nordic countries, as Denmark, Finland, and to some extent Norway exhibit similar patterns with hierarchical command and control governance arrangements, while Iceland, in some instances, resembles the case of Sweden, which has made use of network-based governance. The article shows that the higher the influence of experts, the more likely it is that the governance arrangement will be network-based.     

Measuring and explaining regulatory reform in the EU: A time‐series analysis of eight sectors, 1984–2012

Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) across eight different sectors is developed and the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU are analysed. Using time‐series analysis of count data, evidence is found that the number of winning coalitions in the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the EU. By contrast, the ideological composition of the EU's legislative bodies is not systematically related to regulatory reform.     

Managerial autonomy: does it matter for the performance of water utilities?

The public administration literature asserts that autonomy is central to performance. In this article we develop a managerial autonomy index, which we apply to 22 water utilities in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The 16 items that underlie our composite autonomy index display a high degree of internal consistency. This speaks for the validity of the autonomy concept. We find that the autonomy scores of the 22 utilities vary widely. We also find strong and positive associations between autonomy scores and six out of eight key performance indicators. Our results support the idea that autonomy is central to the performance of water service providers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pay to protect: Examining the factors of the use of market-based instruments for local water sustainability

Given the myriad of policy instruments aimed at enhancing water quantity conservation available to municipalities, what drives them to opt for a market-based instrument (MBI)? MBIs can be effective and efficient policy instruments to enhance water quantity conservation, but there is little known about why municipalities utilize them. This study hypothesizes that three contextual elements influence a municipality's use of an MBI: the natural, political, and structural environment. The results from two logistic regression models suggest that in a municipality suffering a higher drought level, both a conservative political environment and operating under a council-manager form of government (with the effect more pronounced under a non-council-manager form) will increase the likelihood that it will use an MBI to address water conservation.