Financing Transport Infrastructure: The Effects of Institutional Durability in French and American Policymaking

This article compares the finance of transportation infrastructure in France and the United States in order to test the concept of institutional durability as an intervening variable that can account for different patterns of industrial development. Institutional durability is defined as the degree to which the fiscal norms and principles established in agreements between government, industry, and financial investors go on to exert influence over subsequent attempts to reorder the allocation of collective economic burdens and benefits. Two historical episodes of infrastructure development, mid-19th century railroad construction and the creation of inter-city highways between the First and Second World Wars, will be evaluated to identify and differentiate the effect of institutional durability upon American and French transportation policy.
French infrastructure finance is shown to exhibit a limited institutional durability which has facilitated the historical adjustment of both rail and road infrastructure along convergent fiscal terms. US infrastructure development is seen to possess a much greater institutional durability which has encouraged the divergence of fiscal arrangements set up at different periods of time. The resulting accumulation of incompatible and often competitive arrangements appears to have locked the US into conflicting means of transport development that make a fiscally coherent transportation policy very difficult to achieve. No such institutional obstacle emerges in French transport policy where the terms of macroeconomic decision-making are seen to be integrated.     

The Weary Customer: Choosing Not to Choose Among Unfair ‘Choices’

Critics concerned with the effect of public utility companies' market practices have primarily focused on issues of disconnection and inequality. This article goes further, challenging the very premise on which the model is based: the principle of individual choice. The article focuses on the French gas, electricity and telephone sectors, developing two points. The first is the declining trust in public utility companies and a certain choice‐averseness. The second point addresses the experience of the ‘customer’, pressured to make the ‘right’ choice through manipulation and misinformation on the part of competing suppliers. Thus, instead of ‘active customers’ directing markets through their ‘choices’, what is seen is the disaffection or weariness of customers in the face of what they perceive as an unfair situation.     

Federalism and nuclear waste disposal: The struggle over shared decision making

Traditionally the domain of federal agencies, authority to select sites for the disposal of commercial high-level nuclear wastes has recently been expanded to include a role for host states. State opposition to earlier siting efforts had demonstrated the dificulties federal agencies faced in resolving conflict between the local population bearing the costs and the dispersed population receiving the benefits. The new model defines the agency and the state as adversarial representatives of these competing interests. An outstanding weakness, however, is that it does not clearly specify who should speak for the state, and may actually promote intrastate conflict. The adversarial approach does not provide a generic solution to the problem of federalism, but it may prove useful at the state level for selecting disposal sites for low-level radioactive wastes and hazardous chemical wastes.     

Incentives for pollution abatement: Regulation,regulatory threats,and non‐governmental pressures

In the last decade, voluntary efforts by firms to reduce their environmental impacts have received increasing attention from both policymakers and scholars. This article discusses polluters' incentives to reduce their releases. In particular, using data from Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory, it examines the impacts of conventional regulation, threats of regulation, and non‐governmental pressures facilitated by public dissemination of information about pollutant releases. The vast majority of reductions reported to the inventory to date were found not to be voluntary, as has often been assumed, but are, rather, the result of direct regulation of a relatively small number of polluters. Strong effects of federal regulation were found among other sources, as well, with much weaker responses to the mere threat of regulation. However, of concern are the growth of less visible waste streams—such as land disposal and underground injection—as well as transfers of wastes to other communities. Finally, evidence is reported that some waste streams are increasing in toxicity, an effect that may outweigh the benefits of reductions in releases. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Choosing between the government and the regions: An empirical analysis of the Italian constitutional court decisions

In this article the extent to which political variables can explain the behaviour of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions is explored. Two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis argues that one should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The other hypothesis suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government. Unlike previous literature, the empirical results presented in this article seem to confirm that when the Rapporteur and the court's majority are allegedly affiliated with the Prime Minister's coalition, the odds of success of the Prime Minister go up.     

Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost‐Sharing

Before this study, much of the research on interlocal collaboration has focused broadly on interlocal service agreements, of which interlocal cost‐sharing is but one dimension. This study is one of the first to examine the nature of interlocal cost‐sharing agreements for a specific (and critically important) functional area. A mail survey of Florida city and county finance officers finds that the most common interlocal cost‐sharing partnership is between local general purpose governments rather than with local special purpose governments. The strongest incentives for interlocal cost‐sharing are (1) inadequate funding for emergency management in a jurisdiction's capital budget, (2) the perceived inadequacy of federal and/or state homeland security funding, and (3) greater faith in horizontal (local‐to‐local) than vertical (federal‐state‐local) intergovernmental agreements. The research also highlights the importance of asking fiscal condition survey questions in a more functionally specific manner rather than as an “overall fiscal condition” question.     

Financing multifamily rental housing: The changing role of lenders and investors

Abstract

A broad consensus exists that there are significant barriers to accessing capital markets for multifamily rental housing, particularly for housing targeted at low‐and moderate‐income households. While there is a growing secondary market for multifamily mortgages, the market is in the early stages of development and remains quite small. Expanding this market requires increasing standardization of mortgages, increasing credit quality with better underwriting and credit enhancement, and educating investors as to the risks and returns of multifamily investments. In addition, dramatically improved data collection on the performance of multifamily investments and analysis on the determinants of success are needed.