Controllership in the public sector.

Ineffective or incompetent controllership is, perhaps, the most common managerial failure found in the public sector. This failure affects outcomes and achievements in every area of public policy--often profoundly. Controllers design and operate management control systems. The effectiveness of alternative control system designs depends upon the cost and production behavior of the good or service in question. But control strategies are seldom consciously or effectively matched to circumstances. As a consequence, public programs are too often simultaneously overcontrolled and out of control.     

The provocative public sector: Domestic political protest and public sector growth in the OECD, 1965–1982

The results shown in Tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that %GG is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross-national comparisons of DPP or predicting intra-national variations over time. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed. The confirmation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that, taking into account public sector size, government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio-economic change (i.e., where the public sector is small). Government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long-established (i.e., where the public sector is large).Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that average and annual rates of economic growth would be inversely associated with domestic protest. These hypotheses, too, were confirmed. The belief that economic growth rates would clearly provide the margin of affordability for public sector growth was not confirmed, as the coefficient of the interaction term (%GG*%GDP) was not statistically significant.     

Explaining the size of the public sector

This paper aims at providing an explanation for the size of the public sector based on the idea of “social insurance”. The main assumption made is that the public sector is less efficient but also less volatile than the private sector. The “demand-driven” level of the public sector that is derived as the one that maximizes the utility of the representative employed consumer depends positively on the variance of private output. An increase in the size of the public sector has a positive effect on expected employment and a negative effect on expected consumption. The size of the public sector set by the government which maximizes the probability of being re-elected will be higher than the “demand-driven” level if voters' preferences for employment is higher than the consumption loss associated with public employment.     

Public sector unions and public spending

This study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public sector. Based on public goods theory, our paper models how unions influence the supply of and demand for public sector activities. On the demand side, public sector unions are special interests which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers; on the supply side, they exert pressure to maintain and expand monopoly powers. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending.     

The meaning of strategy in the public sector

Strategic management remains under-theorised in the public sector, because the issues it raises straddle three distinct but related fields of analysis—the political, the policy-related and the managerial. At the theoretical level, making progress requires teasing out all three potential dimensions of the term. In the practical sense, there is a need to define a roomier organisational 'space' (and time frame) within which strategy can be formulated.
The article argues for a more ambitious conceptualisation of the place of strategic thinking in the public sector, one that combines the agency's need to sustain its position in its bureaucratic and political environment, with the 'strategic conversation' that is needed to link the political and the bureaucratic executives.     

Public employees and public sector reform implementation

Conventional wisdom says that reforms that aim at improving the productivity of the public sector face opposition from public sector employees, and for this reason, tend to be poorly implemented. These claims are not backed by much hard evidence. This paper seeks to fill some of that gap by investigating why an educational reform containing explicit accountability elements is poorly implemented across Norwegian municipalities about four years after the reform has passed the parliament. The empirical analyses provide evidence that municipalities with a large share of public employees are less likely to implement the reform. The relationship seems to be causal. A reduced-form approach is applied, which prevents conclusions about the mechanisms through which the public employees exercise their influence. However, some preliminary analyses indicate that school leaders hold more negative attitudes towards the reform in municipalities with a large share of public employees, potentially indicating that regulatory capture is an issue: school leaders tend to sympathize more strongly with teachers in such environments.     

Regulatory reform in the era of new technological development: The role of organizational factors in the public sector

What is the role of organizational factors in fostering regulatory reform in response to new technological development? Existing studies provide useful frameworks to understand regulatory reform in rapidly changing circumstances but still lack a systematic analysis of how organizational factors affect regulatory reform in the public sector. To fill this gap, we examine the impact of several institutional elements that are central to defining organizational characteristics, such as job tasks, bureaucratic autonomy, and organizational culture. We theorize that regulatory reform is more likely when public sector organizations are more receptive to external changes, which are determined by these characteristics. We leverage original surveys from over 1,000 civil servants in Korea, one of the front runners in new technological development, and find support for our prediction. We find that the implementation of regulatory reforms is more likely when (i) organizational tasks are relevant to scientific and technological development, (ii) higher levels of bureaucratic autonomy are granted, (iii) agency heads demonstrate stronger leadership, and (iv) organizational culture is less authoritarian. Our study makes clear contributions to the literature on public management and regulation theory, and has important implications for regulatory reform in the face of new technological development.     

Deteriorating public and private sector relations in Central America

The Central American countries are divided by profound political differences. Yet surprising similarities exist in the changing relations between the public and private sectors. Throughout the region, public and private sectors lock into a vicious circle. The inability of the state to provide order and social harmony creates disincentives for the private sector to invest or even to continue existing levels of production. The government responds by increasing its responsibilities at the expense of the private sector. In doing so it assumes risks the private sector refuses, but further alienates the private sector nonetheless.     

Ethnic politics and public sector management in Trinidad and Guyana

Representativeness and diversity in public institutions are among the principles of good and democratic governance, but a commitment to achieving ‘balance’ is far easier said than done, particularly in the context of small, ethnically divided societies in which political mobilization is based on ethnic identity. Trinidad and Guyana are two such societies in which political power was held for a long time by a dominant ethnic group and has recently been transferred to the former ‘out group’. Specifically, politics in both territories was dominated by parties that are identified with the urban African populations, whereas the main opposition parties drew their electoral support almost exclusively from rural Indian groups. In both cases the Indian ‘out group’ accused the African ‘in group’ of favouring members of the latter group—and, conversely, of discriminating against the Indians—in the allocation of resources which are in the gift of the state. Also in both countries, democratic elections have resulted in regime changes after three decades of near one‐party rule. The issue of employment in the public service has become critical as the two groups battle for scarce resources, and the public service is described as a ‘theatre of inter‐ethnic drama’. The article takes the view that managing ethnic and cultural diversity is tantamount to managing unproductive tensions that threaten to undermine confidence and morale among public officials. This impacts negatively on their levels of job satisfaction, the quality of the work environment and, ultimately, on performance and output. It breeds suspicion among co‐workers and has the potential to degenerate into ethnic strife that can cripple the public sector and affect the overall goal of national development. The article examines existing legal/constitutional and institutional provisions for conflict management and resolution, but ultimately suggests the need for well‐conceived confidence‐building measures such as public scrutiny of the personnel function and the reintroduction of ethnicity as a category on official government personnel records. The main theoretical conclusion is that while equality of opportunity must be guaranteed, the notion of a representative bureaucracy has many practical limitations that make it unworkable in Trinidad and Guyana. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Freedom of information acts and public sector corruption

Various countries have recently implemented Freedom of Information acts believing that greater transparency can reduce public sector corruption. To test this, we analyze annual data on 128 countries between 1984 and 2003 using a variety of propensity score matching techniques and overall find no significant relationship with one exception: In the developing world, FOI acts are significantly associated with rising levels of corruption. Further investigation suggests this may be due to the fact that the effectiveness of FOI acts appears to be conditioned by a country’s institutional arrangements.     

Linking strategy and performance: Developments in the New Zealand public sector

In recent decades, many governments have sought to improve their systems of strategic management and priority setting. Few of these attempts have met with unequivocal success. In particular, the systems for “whole-of-government strategizing” have not been well integrated into the ongoing budgetary processes and departmental performance management systems. In 1993—1994, as part of its comprehensive reforms of the public sector, the New Zealand government instituted a new system of strategic management. The new approach—which in part grew out of the National government's attempt to outline its long-term vision in a document titled Path to 2010—involves the ministers specifying a series of medium-term policy goals, referred to as “strategic result areas” (SRAs), and then translating these into more detailed departmental objectives, known as “key result areas” (KRAs). More specific “milestones” are subsequently identified to serve as benchmarks against which the achievement of departmental KRAs can be assessed. This article describes and evaluates this new approach and considers its possible application in other countries.     

Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems

We use the principal‐agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawing primarily on examples from performance measurement systems in public education and social welfare programs. We also describe a dynamic framework for performance measurement systems that takes into account strategic behavior of individuals over time, learning about production functions and individual responses, accountability pressures, and the use of information about the relationship of measured performance to value added. Implications are discussed and recommendations derived for improving public sector performance measurement systems. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

The twin faces of public sector design

Design thinking has become a popular approach for governments around the world seeking to address complex governance challenges. It offers novel techniques and speaks to broader questions of who governs, how they govern, and the limits of rational instrumentalism in policy making. Juxtaposing design thinking with an older tradition of policy design, this article offers the first critical analysis of the application of design thinking to policy making. It argues that design thinking does not sufficiently account for the political and organizational contexts of policy work. Design thinking also errs in universally privileging one particular policy style over others, and fails to account for the reality of policy mixes. Despite these deficiencies, it is argued that design thinking can inform and enrich governance by helping policy designers produce more adaptable designs, better appreciate the behavioral dynamics of public sector design, and leverage networked approaches to social problem solving.     

Leadership and the public sector: an internationally comparative benchmarking analysis

In this article the concept of leadership is explored. Particular attention is given to examining the dynamics of individual and team leadership, as it is postulated that the impact of top people and top teams is crucial to the running of today's organizations. The results of an extensive survey conducted across the departments of the Civil Service of a European country government will be presented. These results will be benchmarked against the results of a worldwide survey of business leaders, spanning 12 countries and the responses of top managers in National Health Service (HNS) Trusts, UK. Emphasis will be given to the necessity of conducting effective team leadership through high quality dialogue and through cabinet responsibility in order to successfully lead and maintain the organization on its agreed path. Finally, approaches to the development of leadership for those already in top positions and for those entering into such challenging positions, will be discussed.     

The effects of fiscal contraction on innovation in the public sector

Beginning in the mid-1970s, fiscal limitation laws, shrinking revenue bases in older cities, and reductions in state and federal grants all have reduced the resources available to carry out the functions of local government. What do these changes portend for the amount of innovation in local government, the types of innovations that are introduced, and the processes of introduction? This paper examines these questions by reviewing the literature on factors related to innovation in public service agencies and reorienting its implications in the new fiscal environment. We conclude that on the whole the innovative process in the public sector has fallen on hard times. Yet, we identify those factors that a creative, innovative administrator can use to advantage in a period of fiscal constraints to bring about innovation. We also identify types of innovations that are likely to succeed.     

Institutions,distributional concerns,and public sector reform

Abstract. As in otherWestern countries, a wave of reform has swept the Danish public sector. The record of these reforms is mixed and paradoxical; an ambiguous delegation of executive authority and radical privatization have been successfully implemented, while other measures, especially contracting out and user democracy or the introduction of greater choice, turn out to have failed. The paper argues that this experience offers two general lessons. First, shortterm costs and benefits are decisive to those who enact and implement public sector reform. Second, institutional factors specific to each type of reorganization have a major impact on the political distribution of costs and benefits.