Political Coercion and the Scope of Distributive Justice

A prominent position in the global justice literature holds that claims of distributive justice are only 'activated' by the densely coercive institutional apparatus of states. I dispute this view in three ways. First, I argue that coercion is either justified by its results and rationale or it cannot be justified at all; as a result, coercive institutions do not demand an independent justification via distributive justice. Second, I contend that because the shape of coercive institutions is the result of political choices that have distributive implications, one cannot make normative judgements without asking why coercive institutions have the shape that they do. Third, even accepting (for the sake of argument) the claim that coercive institutions must be justified by a special focus on distributive justice among those subject to them, I argue that the resulting position does not justify restricting distributive justice to state borders. If (any of) these arguments are correct, it is a mistake to think that a concern with the coercive nature of political institutions legitimates restricting claims of distributive justice to compatriots.     

Rawls's Difference Principle as Compensation for Social Immobility

Outside academia, John Rawls's theory of justice—justice as fairness—has had little impact. This article is part of a broader project to rectify this. I offer a distinctive, second‐best, argument for Rawls's difference principle. The difference principle requires that inequalities in income and wealth are justified only if they benefit society's least‐advantaged citizens. My paper argues that, slightly‐modified, the difference principle is an excellent principle of redress in light of the UK's continued failure to give all citizens fair career chances. I show how we might realize the difference principle at the level of policy through tax rate reductions or negative tax rates. I conclude that if you don't want to accept the second‐best argument for the difference principle you must get serious about giving all citizens fair career chances. As I suggest, this task is extremely difficult.     

Deliberation, Legitimacy, and Multilateral Democracy

Is deliberation essential to legitimate democratic governance? Deliberation may have epistemic value, improving the quality of information and arguments. Deliberation may be transformative, shaping beliefs and opinions. Or deliberation may be part of a conception of justice that constrains authority, by requiring that procedures be justified in terms of reasons acceptable to those burdened by authoritative decisions. Although appealing, the epistemic and transformative arguments are limited by the scale and complexity of many problems for which democratic solutions are sought. But the reason–giving argument is persuasive whenever collective decisions allow burdens to be imposed on others.     

What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection

Abstract

As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. Reports of abuse at detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the ever increasing use of technological surveillance, and the increased attention on the use of torture for intelligence collection purposes have all highlighted a need to make an explicit statement about what is and what is not permissible intelligence practice. In this article an ethical framework will be established which will outline under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible. This ethical framework will first underline what it is about intelligence collection that is ‘harmful’ and, therefore, should be prohibited under normal circumstances. The ethical framework then outlines a set of ‘just intelligence principles’, based on the just war tradition, which delineate when the harm caused can be justified. As a result, this article outlines a systemic ethical framework that makes it possible to understand when intelligence collection is prohibited and when it is permissible.     

By-elections,changing fortunes,uncertainty and the mid-term blues

If voters care about the size of the government's majority, then by-election votes should exaggerate national swings. Moreover, if there is uncertainty about the outcome of the general election and if voters” preferences are skewed in such a way as to give more weight to the “downside” outcome (least favourite party wins) than the “upside” (favoured party wins with a larger than preferred majority), then there will be a systematic tendency for governments to lose by-elections, regardless of any changes in national support. These predictions go beyond those generated by conventional explanations. The theory is successfully tested against data from 383 post-War elections.     

A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so-called "duty of civility" ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the "duty of civility," which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.     

To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting

One paradox of voting states that, in a general election, in which many citizens vote, the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting. However, if all citizens accept this reasoning, then none will vote, and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome. Hence all should vote after all. The adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox: if each citizen adopts a certain (small) probability of voting, then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens' while to vote. A Nash equilibrium point thus occurs. Here we compute Nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting; for the more complicated case of composite voting (for example, as in a presidential election), we draw certain qualitative inferences.     

Is epistemic accessibility enough? Same-sex marriage,tradition, and the Bible

ABSTRACT

In Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde argues that a liberal state has to be a justifiable state: state action can only be legitimate if it is publicly justified, that is, if it is based on accessible reasons. These accessible reasons, she argues, are reasons that can be understood by all citizens. She defends a purely epistemic conception of accessibility. On Laborde’s account, accessible reasons are identified by particular epistemic features, and not by their substantive content. In this paper, I argue that Laborde’s account of epistemic accessibility cannot deliver on its promise of public justification. To illustrate this argument, I examine the case of the prohibition of same-sex marriage and look at two potential reasons that could be used to justify this prohibition: the non-accessible reference to the Bible and the accessible appeal to the value of tradition.     

Toleration,neutrality, and exemption

ABSTRACT

I focus on some controversial features of Peter Balint’s stimulating and provocative reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary diverse societies. First, I question his argument that we must enlarge the concept of toleration to include indifference and approval if toleration is to be compatible with state neutrality. Secondly, I suggest that his idea of active neutrality of intent risks encountering the same difficulties as neutrality of outcome, although these will be mitigated the more the state’s neutrality takes a ‘hands-off’ form. Thirdly, while accepting his claim that exemptions depart from neutrality insofar as they attribute a significance to religious and conscientious convictions that they deny to mere preferences, I argue that that departure is not arbitrary and remains within the spirit of neutrality of intent.     

Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of Persecution

According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter . Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument . He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.     

Comfortably inhabiting reality: justifying and denouncing arguments in a development dispute in the post-industrial gentrified inner-city

This article seeks to understand the ‘critical capacities’ of actors involved in public disputes by focussing on one such case in Melbourne, Australia. The dispute centred on a non-government school's proposal to develop classrooms in a heritage listed building on public land sublet from a charitable foundation. Following local council's rejection of the original proposal, the school successfully appealed to the Victorian Planning Minister. After introducing a critical pragmatic analytic framework, five accounts of the dispute given by key actors are examined, uncovering similarities in the arguments used by each. Then, in the same accounts, analysis identifies differences in how the pro- and anti-development groups justified their own and denounced their opponents' positions. Both groups recognised formal rules as the best means for preserving equal citizens' access to public space, yet the pro-development group justified their argument by reference to local community benefit, in contrast with the anti-development group, who adopted an abstract argument concerning the privatisation of public space. Understood as mobilising different ‘models of justice’, the groups are regarded as appealing to a ‘real’ order, an implicit politicised hierarchy that situates winners in relation to losers. In effect, the pro-development group justified its position by representing it as congruent with, rather than disrupting, the real order encompassing the situation. In conclusion, the paper discusses the usefulness of the critical pragmatic analytic framework for understanding governmental power relations and assemblages, as actors demonstrate their critical capacities in contexts where erstwhile formal equality obscures the presence of hierarchical order.     

The fact remains: Party ID moderates how voters respond to economic change

Recent research suggests that party identification biases voters' economic perceptions in general, but that all voters respond to economic change at the same rate. This implies that voters update their economic perceptions in parallel and are able to hold governments to account. But this has two problems. First, it contradicts evidence of partisan-motivated information processing. Second, parallel-updating does not imply unbiased information processing and is normatively less appealing than if partisans' economic perceptions were to converge at economic extremes. In this article, I argue instead that party identification does moderate how voters' economic perceptions respond to economic change. I test my argument on data from one ordinary and one extraordinary period in Britain's recent economic history using competing Bayesian multilevel ordered-logit models. I show that economic change does lead to changes in voters' economic perceptions. But I also show that party identification moderates this process. As such, voters update their economic perceptions along separate, not parallel, paths.     

Enfranchising the Youth

ABSTRACT

Democratic theorists tend to assume, without a great deal of argument, that age-based discrimination in access to the franchise is justified. In this paper, I challenge the orthodoxy. I argue that all major, plausible accounts of the justification of democracy converge upon a requirement to enfranchise a substantial proportion of the child population. Along the way, I consider and respond to several challenges that have been raised to child enfranchisement.     

National Minorities and the International System

National minorities are collectivities who possess that trait which is the current normative underpinning of states, namely nationhood, and yet for practical purposes cannot enjoy outright political independence. Because national minorities bear these normatively significant characteristics they may be deemed to have legitimate international claims to certain special rights even if these fall short of statehood. Yet although this rationale may be logically sound and morally justified, pursuing it nevertheless raises serious problems with regard to state sovereignty.     

Policy analytic implications for a theory of prediction and decision

Decision theory developed to prescribe the consistent choice behavior under uncertainty of an ideal individual. The policy analysis context of organizational decision-making, however, necessitates certain modifications to the fundamental decision theory in order to deal with the problems of group consensus, ill-defined objectives and disparate information sources. The argument is presented that more attention must be given to the explicit formulation of judgment and that, in particular, there has to be an integration of the methodology of forecasting into the decision-analytic framework. A consequence of adopting a decision-theoretic approach to forecasting is the apparent need to develop ways of synthesizing the set of available predictive methods in order to satisfy the subjectivist principle of total evidence utilization. The synthetic approach to forecasting is in contrast to the conventional selective method. A brief review of some operational methods of pursuing the synthetic approach is given.     

Does it matter whether people will know that I did not vote? The role of social norms and visibility

People behave in accordance with social norms when they feel observed or when they know their behaviour is monitored or could be disclosed. Get-Out-The-Vote experiments show that individuals are more likely to vote when told that their behaviour will be disclosed. In everyday life, however, there is much uncertainty about whether people will indeed know if one turns out to vote. I argue that fear of disapproval should only mobilize citizens to vote when they expect that their (non-)voting will be visible to others. Using original survey data from Canada, I measure expectations about whether others will vote, would disapprove if the person abstains, and will know whether they have voted or not. Furthermore, I distinguish between expectations concerning the partner, family, friends, and neighbours. Results suggest that respondents who expect others to vote are themselves more likely to vote, but I find no evidence that disapproval and visibility are related to turnout in everyday life.     

The Methodology of Contractarianism in Economics

The paper explores the methodology of hypotheticalcontractarianism as a means of justifyingrules of social conduct. Formally, thecontractarian argument has the logicalstructure of a familiardeductive-nomological (rational choice)explanation. It necessarily requires,however, that at least some premises usedin its explanans be empiricallyfalse. It is argued that, in contrast toordinary explanatory arguments, thecontractarian thought experiment would bepointless if all assumptions wereempirically true. As a consequence, even inthe case that a given contract theory canbe proven to be logically consistent, itfails to justify binding obligations ofreal individuals due to an insurmountablelogical problem of induction.     

Can parity of self-esteem serve as the basis of the principle of linguistic territoriality?

In this paper, I argue that Philippe Van Parijs’ argument for the principle of linguistic territoriality rests upon an unexamined and unvindicated assumption, to the effect that most situations in which smaller languages are threatened by larger ones can be assimilated to ‘colonial cases’, that is to cases in which there is injustice as between the two linguistic groups, as opposed to ‘mere number cases’, that is cases in which linguistic groups of different sizes coexist in the absence of injustice. Moreover, I argue that Van Parijs underestimates the amount of coercion that will have to be applied even within linguistically defined territories in order to avoid the erosion of the smaller language.     

Republican Freedom,Popular Control,and Collective Action

Republicans hold that people are dominated merely in virtue of others' having unconstrained abilities to frustrate their choices. They argue further that public officials may dominate citizens unless subject to popular control. Critics identify a dilemma. To maintain the possibility of popular control, republicans must attribute to the people an ability to control public officials merely in virtue of the possibility that they might coordinate their actions. But if the possibility of coordination suffices for attributing abilities to groups, then, even in the best case, countless groups will be dominating because it will be possible for their members to coordinate their actions with the aim of frustrating others' choices. We argue the dilemma is apparent only. To make our argument, we present a novel interpretation of the republican concept of domination with the help of a game‐theoretic model that clarifies the significance of collective action problems for republican theory.