<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

Is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Viveka</Emphasis> a Unique <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇa</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vivekacūḍāmaṇi</Emphasis>?

This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacū?āma?i (VC), the primary focus of which is to present viveka (discrimination) along with its three catalysts, namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramā?a of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramā?as of Advaita Vedānta (AV) and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramā?as have merely a provisional value (vyāvahārika). In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that ?ruti and tarka, culminating in anubhava (trans-empirical insight sans experience) are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka (discrimination) for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramā?a of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman.     

Freedom of association in labour relations in the context of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Maqasid</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">al</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Shari’ah</Emphasis> principles

Labour relations are an important chapter in economic and industrial development. Labour relations are divided into personal employer-employer relationship and collective relationship between employer and trade union. The collective relationship forms the core of the employees’ right to freedom of association. This article discusses the right of employees to freedom of association including the right to strike from the Islamic perspective. The Islamic principles applicable in this context are Maqasid-al-Shari’ah (the higher objective of Islamic law), Haqq and Jama’ah (the functional concepts in Islamic law). Freedom of association in labour relations which is basically a western concept suits the three Islamic principles and the Islamic principles are in line with the ILO standards and European law. This article is written by using pure legal research method, i.e. adopting a content analysis approach with the Islamic sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith as a point of reference.     

“<Emphasis Type="Italic">Peer effects</Emphasis>” or “<Emphasis Type="Italic">quasi</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">peer effects</Emphasis>” in Spanish labour court rulings

The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by incumbent judges in Spanish labour courts are influenced by whether they are acting alone in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. We consider that a court is treated when more than one judge rules in it. Then, an analysis is conducted so as to determine the effect of such a treatment on the percentage of cases ruled in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2888 observations were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012. As regards the findings, it may be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone in their court, particularly when the incumbent judge solves cases together with another professional judge.     

Self-Awareness (<Emphasis Type="Italic">svasaṃvedana</Emphasis>) in Dignāga’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇasamuccaya</Emphasis> and -<Emphasis Type="Italic">vṛtti</Emphasis>: A Close Reading

The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.     

Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Miranda</Emphasis> Rights

Seventy-five psychiatric inpatients were evaluated with respect to their Miranda-related abilities using Grisso’s (1998, Instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press) instruments and Goldstein’s (2002, Revised instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights) revision to determine: whether different versions of Miranda warnings translate into differences in understanding; the influence of psychiatric symptoms, diagnostic categories, and IQ upon Miranda comprehension; and the relative performance of persons with psychiatric impairment on Miranda-relevant abilities. Results indicated that although the Miranda language used in Goldstein’s revision generally showed lower grade reading levels and higher reading ease scores than Grisso’s original instruments, this did not translate into improved understanding. In addition, psychiatric symptoms were negatively correlated with Miranda comprehension, even after controlling for IQ. Finally, results revealed that psychiatric patients’ understanding and appreciation was substantially impaired compared to Grisso’s adult validation samples, and was roughly comparable to Grisso’s juvenile validation sample. Implications of these results for policy reform are discussed.

The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ārṣajñāna</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Praśastapādabhāṣya</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nyāyakandalī</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vyomavatī</Emphasis>

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vai?e?ika, the cognitive category of ār?ajñāna (??i cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vai?e?ika texts. This article deals with how ār?ajñāna is conceptualized in Pra?astapādabhā?ya (PBh), ?rīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyoma?iva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ??i cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ??i cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vai?e?ika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyak?a) and siddhic vision (siddhadar?ana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Anyathākhyāti</Emphasis>: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Parimala</Emphasis>

In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīk?ita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīk?ita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalak?a?apratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.     

Reply to Five Critics of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why Tolerate Religion?</Emphasis>

This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider (Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which some religious beliefs are “insulated from reasons and evidence” in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from, respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the “No Exemptions” approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different from that of Jones.     

‘We the People of the United States…’: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Matrix</Emphasis> and the Realisation of Constitutional Sovereignty

In its enunciation of “We the people,” the Constitution of the United States of America becomes a constitution of the flesh as it simultaneously invokes a constitution, a nation and a people. Correspondingly, its amendments as a list of rights pertaining to sex and race discrimination, and freedoms of bodily movement and action, assert the Constitution’s authority through the evocation of “natural” human bodies. In this article, I explore the way in which a sovereignty of the United States’ Constitution is realised in the particularlised bodies of its citizens. The fundamental and foundational laws of the United States, and the narratives and myths used to interpret them, are in part rendered legitimate by the Constitution’s embodiment, which extends from its physical manifestation in written documents into the flesh of its citizens. In order to make this argument, I turn to the film The Matrix (1999), the success of which relies on an investment in bodies and the United States’ Constitution as matter through its interwoven narrative themes of human slavery and emancipation, reality and computer-generated simulation. At the same time, The Matrix extends its ideological play into the bodies of its audience, who experience the film’s thrillingly sensorial fantasies of constitutional rights while enjoying its affective special effects. Thus, the sovereign authority of United States constitutional law is experienced as “natural” through the phenomenological experience of cinema.     

A critique of the Global Pact for the environment: a stillborn initiative or the foundation for <Emphasis Type="Italic">Lex Anthropocenae</Emphasis>?

In May 2018, the process which may ultimately lead to the negotiation of a legally binding Global Pact for the environment formally commenced under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly. Expectations for the Pact are high, evidenced in particular by its multiple and overlapping objectives: to serve as a generic binding instrument of international environmental law (IEL) principles; to integrate, consolidate, unify and ultimately entrench many of the fragmented principles of IEL; and to constitute the first global environmental human rights instrument. In the wake of the impending intergovernmental process, the paper offers a thorough critique of the draft Pact in its present iteration. We do so with the aim of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the present draft Pact by interrogating: (a) its diplomatic and symbolic relevance and possible unique contribution at the policy level to global environmental law and governance, and (b) its potential at the operational level of IEL and global environmental governance, focusing on the extent to which the draft Pact accommodates both existing and more recent rules and principles for environmental protection. As the Pact’s primary ambition is to become a universally binding global treaty, it would be churlish not to recognise its potential for innovation, as well as the considerable opportunity that the negotiation of the Pact will have to generate broad-sweeping and positive impacts. However, our central thesis is that only if the Global Pact were to incorporate ambitious normative provisions to strengthen those public and private global governance efforts that aim to halt the deterioration of Earth system integrity, as well as to maintain and improve integrity, will it be able to offer a firm foundation of the type of Anthropocene Law, termed here as the Lex Anthropocenae, required to confront head-on the deep socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene.     

Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">Plato’s Pharmacy</Emphasis>

In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and hospitality.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cultural Criminology: An Invitation</Emphasis>… to What?

Since the mid 1990s, a strand of criminology emerged that is concerned with the co-constitution of crime and culture under the general rubric of ‘cultural criminology’. In the titles Cultural Criminology Unleashed and Cultural Criminology: An Invitation, criminologists spearheading this brand of criminology make claims for its originality and its status as a subversive alternative to conventional criminological approaches to studies of crime and deviance. The basis for the ‘new’ cultural criminology is its ostensible ability to account for the culture and subcultures of crime, the criminalization of cultural and subcultural activities, and the politics of criminalization. This paper offers a comparison of cultural criminology to 1960s and 1970s labeling theory to assess whether or not cultural criminology has developed a grammar of critique capable of resolving fundamental contradictions that haunt critical criminology and contesting contemporary administrative criminology. Points of comparison are made through ontological categories of power and criminal identity and a consideration of the epistemological categories of the respective bodies of literature.