An analysis of the goals of lottery managers: implications for developments in the operation of Canadian lotteries

Abstract. Government lotteries were introduced in Canada in 1970 and during the past eight years have increased greatly in number and in size. Lotteries have generated a great deal of public interest but the goals of lottery managers have received little attention. The purposes of this paper are to examine some objectives which could be achieved in the operation of lotteries and to use the results of this analysis, along with the experience of foreign lotteries, to make some tentative predictions about changes in Canadian lotteries over the next five years. The first part of the paper discusses the role of government in lottery operation and argues that government-run lotteries are preferable to privately run lotteries, even if government-regulated. The second section of the paper examines various goals which may be important to lottery managers and concludes that revenue maximization is likely to be more important than goals like minimizing the regressivity of a lottery ‘tax’ or achieving the price and output which would occur in pure competition. In the last section, suggestions for increasing lottery revenues are examined and it is judged that more frequent draws, special prizes and increased advertising are more likely to occur than changes in ticket prices, prize structures and payout ratios. Lottery profits could also be increased by eliminating the competition between the federal and provincial offerings and it is likely that further conflicts will be resolved by a joint operation or in favour of the provinces.     

Understanding third‐party advertising: An analysis of the 2004, 2006 and 2008 Canadian elections

For approximately two decades, the federal regulation for third‐party election spending was the focus of repeated constitutional debate. However, with the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Harper v. Canada, a relative level of policy stability has been established. This stability permits us to evaluate the performance of spending limits according to the principles of the egalitarian model on which it is based. Using an original data set compiled from third‐party election advertising reports from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections, this article offers the first empirical analysis of this important election policy. A number of observations can be offered. First, third parties are not spending large amounts relative to spending limits. Second, despite legislative changes in 2006 banning all federal party contributions except those from individuals, there appears little strategic action by third parties in spending “around” contribution limits. During this three‐election cycle, third parties quite simply did not spend significant amounts. Current third‐party spending limits therefore appear to be situated comfortably within the expectations of the egalitarian model, though why third parties of all types spend so little remains in question.     

A lesson in bureaucratic persistence: the provision of rehabilitation and resource management services in the Maritimes, 1943–81

Abstract One of the most interesting yet seldom analysed organizational phenomena concerns ‘bureaucratic persistence.’ It speaks to the uncanny capacity of some organizations to meet the requirements of survival over long periods of time. They do so typically through adaptive adjustments in their internal and external relations. This paper provides one of the first analyses of bureaucratic persistence in the Canadian system. It records the staying power of a Nova Scotia-based agency, the Maritime Marshlands Rehabilitation Administration (MMRA). Conceived in 1943 as an emergency repair project on one dyke in Amherst, it survived, grew and eventually underwent a metamorphosis to become the Maritime Resource Management Service (MSMS), providing sophisticated interdisciplinary resource management and information services to private and public users. As such, the MMRA-MRMS experience provides a convincing confirmation of bureaucratic persistence in Canada. It does more, however. The analysis shows that the specific dynamics of bureaucratic persistence owe much to the particular character of the regime within which it is found. In the case of MMRA-MRMK, the pre-eminence of cabinet in the legislative process and regional dynamics within the federal system were central. What is more, it becomes apparent that the continuation of a valid or a politically salient function must be a core element in bureaucratic persistence. Sommaire. La persistance bureaucratique est l'un des phénomènes organisationnels les plus fascinants mais il a pourtant été rarement analysé. II s'agit de l'étrange pouvoir qu'ont certaines organisations de satisfaire am exigences de survie pendant de longues périodes. Elles y arrivent habituellement grâce à des adaptations dans Ieurs relations internes et externes. Cet article présente l'une des premières analyses de persistance bureaucratique dans le système canadien. Il décrit comment s'est perpétuée une agence de Amherst en Nouvelle-Ecosse, connue sous le nom de Maritime Marshlands Rehabilitation Administration (MMRA). Conçu en 1943 comme un projet de réparation d'urgence d'une digue, cet organisme a surVécu, s'est élargi et s'est finalement transformé en Maritime Resource Management Service (MRMS); il a procuré au secteur public et privé d'excellents services interdisciplinaires d'information et de gestion de ressources. Le cas MMRA-MRMS foumit donc une confirmation convaincante de la persistance bureaucratique au Canada. Mais il ne s'arrête pas là. L'analyse démontre que la dynamique particulière de persistance bureaucratique dépend beaucoup du caractère spécifique du régime dans lequel elle se développe. Dans le cas du MMRA-MRMS, la prééminence du cabinet dans le processus légidatif et la dynamique régionale au sein du système fédéral étaient très importantes. Par ailleurs, il va sans dire qu'il est indispensable au phénomène de persistance bureaucratique que la fonction soit valide et politiquement importante.     

The Economic Council of Canada: Its establishment,structure, and role in the Canadian policy-making system, 1963–74

Abstract. This is the first of three articles on the Economic Council of Canada. It attempts to cover the establishment, structure, and functioning of the Council between 1963 and 1974 in a consistent and comprehensive manner. It also deals with the approaches and influence of three chairmen of the Council. The ‘primary tasks’ of the agency influence the selection of its senior personnel. Each chairman has influenced the performance of the Council in a manner consistent with his previous research and policy-making experiences. Given the lack of clarity in defining the Council's role at its establishment, this study of career development within the system has been most helpful in deducing the primary roles performed by the Council. The second article deals at greater length with the Council's roles in relation to external research and policy-making agencies. It is a more analytical paper than the first and isolates several potential roles which the Council was expected to perform. It shows how effective performance of these roles has required different interorganizational strategies with respect to the Council's relationship with various influential organizations and governmental agencies including the cabinet and Parliament. The third article deals with the problem of goals-formulation, given the fact that the Council at different points in time has grappled with the problem of articulating or quantifying ‘performance goals,’‘achievement goals,’ and ‘performance indicators.’ All three articles deal with different aspects of the Council's role in the Canadian policy-making system. They present important perspectives on comparative public-policy-making. Sommaire. Cet article est le premier d'une série de trois sur le Conseil économique du Canada. Il essaie de traiter de façon complète et logique de la création de la structure et du fonctionnement du Conseil entre 1963 et 1974. Il s'occupe également des attitudes et de l'influence des trois présidents du Conseil. Les responsabilités premières de l'agence ont un effet sur le choix des cadres supérieurs. Chaque président a influencé les performances du Conseil dans le sens de ses recherches et de ses choix de politiques antérieures. Le rôle du Conseil ayant été défini peu clairement à sa création, cette étude du développement des carrières au sein du système est très utile pour en dégager les rôes principaux. Le second article traite plus en détail des rôles jouks par le Conseil vis à vis de la recherche extérieure et des organismes qui déterminent les politiques. C'est un exposé plus analytique que le premier qui dégage différents rôles potentiels que l'on attendait du Conseil. Il montre comment leur exécution efficace demandait des stratégies inter-organisationnelles différentes, quant au rapport du Conseil avec des organisations influentes et des organismes gouvernementaux, dont le Cabinet et le Parlement. Le troisième article s'occupe du problème de la formulation des objectifs étant donné que le Conseil, à différentes époques, s'est attaqué au problème de l'élaboration de la quantification des « buts de performance «, des « objectifs à réaliser « et des « indicateurs de performance «. Ces trois articles traitent de différents aspects du rôle du Conseil dans le système canadien de détermination des politiques. Ils presentent des perspectives interessantes sur la prise de decision de politique publique de façon comparative.     

When markets fail to deliver: An examination of the privatization and de‐privatization of water and wastewater services delivery in Hamilton,Canada

Abstract: The emergence of the “New Public Management” (NPM) and its faith in markets led governments to search for alternative methods in the delivery of public services. One of the most popular methods was privatization. The rationale behind the choice of privatization is based on what Charles Wolf describes as “non‐market failure.” This article argues that the market may not be as efficient as its proponents have asserted, especially when there is a monopoly over service delivery. This has been the case in many municipalities, in some developed countries, where privatization of water service delivery has reverted to public delivery. Using the City of Hamilton's experience with its water and wastewater services as an example, the authors' finding is that the nature of the good to be delivered is essential in determining whether the “market” or the “public” provides the best method of service delivery. Sommaire : L'émergence de la Nouvelle gestion publique (NGP) et sa foi dans les marchés ont conduit les gouvernements à rechercher des méthodes de rechange pour la prestation des services publics. L'une des méthodes les plus populaires est la privatisation. La justification du choix de la privatisation est fondée sur ce que Charles Wolf décrit comme un ≪“échec du non marché”≫. L'article fait valoir que le marché pourrait ne pas être aussi efficace que ses adeptes l'ont prétendu, en particulier lorsqu'il existe un monopole dans la prestation des services. Cela fut le cas dans de nombreuses municipalités de certains pays développés, où la privatisation de la prestation de leurs services en eau est repassée à la prestation publique. En prenant comme exemple l'expérience de la ville d'Hamilton concernant ses services d'approvisionnement en eau et d'évacuation des eaux usées, l'article conclut que la nature du produit à livrer est déterminante pour savoir si c'est le “marché” ou le “public” qui fournit la meilleure méthode de prestation de services.