Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional Limits

This article explores several constitutional bases for questioningthe federal government's use of unfunded mandates and otherforms of coercive intergovernmental regulation. The "anti-coercion"and "anti-commandeering" principles of the Tenth Amendment areproposed as general arguments against these forms of regulation.The constitutional requirement of "uniformity" attached to indirecttaxation, the "anti-discrimination rule" in the area of intergovernmentaltax immunity, and the "equality rule", which stems from theunwritten tradition of maintaining equality among the states,are developed as additional bases for striking down federallaws that distribute mandate burdens disproportionately amongthe states.     

Federalism and The Politics of Tobacco

Late in 1998, the United States acquired a new regime of tobaccocontrol engineered by the states' attorneys general. Nearlyall of them had filed lawsuits against the major cigarette manufacturers,allegedly with the aim of recouping Medicaid costs attributableto smoking. Despite latent differences of culture and interestin regard to tobacco control, all of the states eventually joinedin settlements with the industry that exacted large paymentsand restricted the industry's advertising and marketing practices.This article explains how it was possible for many differentpolities to agree on the settlement terms, and asks what thecase shows about the impact of federalism on tobacco policymaking.It concludes that tobacco policymaking in the 30 years priorto the lawsuits (1964–1994) was more consonant with constitutionalprinciples and not ineffective in achieving control.     

The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era

During the period of the Bush Presidency, the federal governmentproceeded to centralize and nationalize policy in major areasformerly controlled by states and localities. The extensionof federal goals and standards to such areas as education testing,sales tax collection, emergency management, infrastructure,and elections administration were among the areas of significantmandates and preemptions. The continuation of policy centralizationin areas under a conservative and unified political regime showshow strong and deep the roots are for centralizing policy actionsin our intergovernmental system.     

Federalism Revised: The Promise and Challenge of the No Child Left Behind Act

Federalism in education has undergone significant changes since the Winter Commission. During the early 1990s, federal policy makers faced the challenge of organizational fragmentation and policy incoherence in public education. In the last 15 years, the intergovernmental system has evolved from one that is predominantly compliance‐driven to one that is performance based, as suggested by the congressional adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001. While the former is often characterized by images of “picket fence” federalism and administrative silos, the latter remains very much a work in progress, with the promise of raising academic proficiency. This paper first examines the paradigm shift and then considers emerging politics in intergovernmental relations. The author explores the ways in which state and local policy makers are altering the rules governing education service provision in response to performance‐based federal expectations.     

The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States

According to the literature on secession, the most importantdeterminant of secessionist sentiment is a high level of grievanceexperienced by the would-be secessionist group. However, therationale behind using secession (as opposed to another strategy)as a grievance-amelioration strategy remains almost completelyunexplained. This article contends that the institutional settingin which political conflict and grievance are experienced playsa crucial role in whether secession is conceived of as a viableoption. This contention is tested by examining the institutionalenvironment of federalism and the role it played in secessionin the United States in 1860 and 1861. The United States wasuniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures—as are allfederal states, potentially—because of institutional structuresthat gave constituent states a high level of institutional authorityand capacity; this, in turn, contributed to a discourse of states'rights that included the contested right to secede.     

Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of Mandate Reform in the 104th Congress

This article examines the politics and substance of mandatereform in the 104th Congress. It briefly describes the evolutionof the mandate issue, examines the process by which the issuewas placed on the national agenda, and traces the formulationof a legislative response. It analyzes in detail the politicsof enacting mandate-reform legislation, paying particular attentionto patterns of support and opposition and to changes in thesepatterns over time. It concludes by examining the prospectsfor successful implementation of the legislation and its likelyconsequences for the intergovernmental system.     

The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control

In this article, we seek to advance scholarship on the origins and consequences of policy devolution by analyzing state decisions to give local authorities control over welfare policy. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. In this context, we propose a general Racial Classification Model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings support this model as well as social control perspectives on welfare provision. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward neoliberal and paternalist policies in American poverty governance.     

The Politics of Indian Gaming: Tribe/State Relations and American Federalism

Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988,gambling on reservations has become a multibillion dollar industry.The act, however, has led to jurisdictional conflicts betweentribes and states. These conflicts are redefining the positionand role of Indian tribes in American federalism. As the tribeshave gained autonomy, states have lost jurisdictional powerand control. The federal government has become the arbiter inthe disputes and, as such, has continued to maintain its positionof supremacy and power over both tribes and states.     

The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis

The "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.     

Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics

The relationship between intergovernmental relations and theformulation and implementation of public policies is not wellunderstood by scholars. Borrowing from the advocacy coalitionframework, this study contends that public policies reflectthe strategic choices of federal, state, and local actors operatingwithin policy subsystems. The success of various governmentalpolicy strategies is dependent on the autonomy of each actorand the level of policy fragmentation within the subsystem.These variables are defined, operationalized, and examined withinthe context of intergovernmental relations in Denver water politics.     

TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism

This article examines ISTEA's impact on intergovernmental relationsin transportation policy over the past six years and providesan overview of the political maneuvering that took place duringits reauthorization. ISTEA had a significant, decentralizingimpact on transportation policy, but its 1997–1998 reauthorizationwas driven by electoral concerns that transcended congressionalviews on American federalism. These electoral concerns helpto explain why ISTEA's reauthorization process took so long,why the decentralization in transportation policy that tookplace in 1991 was not broadened by TEA-21, and why it is unlikelythat transportation policy will ever be fully devolved to thestates and localities.     

Public Sector Politics, Modernization, and Federalism: The Canadian and American Experiences

The focus of this analysis is an attempt to compare Canadianand American federalism in terms of Samuel Beer's modernizationtheory. In Canada, it is argued that modernization had led tothe enhancement of provincial power rather than the centralizationof the federal system. The Westminster model of parliamentarygovernment contributed to these developments, although the wayin which power is organized in government has been even moreimportant in determining the directions taken by Canadian federalism.     

Federalism and Institutional Design: The Perils and Politics of a Triple-E Senate in Canada

Since the proposal was put forward by a subcommittee of theAlberta legislature, most western Canadian political leadershave advocated a U.S.-style Triple-E (elected, effective, andequal) Senate. Superficially compatible with western Canada'sstated constitutional and public policy agenda, the Triple-Eproposal has broad elite and popular appeal in the West. However,such an institution will be unlikely to satisfy western demandsfor more effective representation in the federal Parliament,and will prove antithetical to another key western objective:significant reduction of public spending in Ottawa. Insteadof pursuing a Triple-E Senate, the West's constitutional andpolicy objectives could focus on seeking greater devolutionof power to the provinces. Such a strategy would have the addedadvantage of facilitating a constitutional alliance with theprovince of Quebec, thereby enhancing the likelihood of success.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

American Federalism on the Horizon

The American federal system took some unpredictable twists andturns during the twentieth century. As a new century—indeed,a new millennium—begins, which trends are likely to continue,which are likely to dissipate? What issues pose the greatestchallenges for the intergovernmental system? This article plotsseveral possible paths along which the federal system couldtravel over the next decade. The fundamental issue in Americanfederalism is a perennial one: How will the balance of powerbetween the federal government and the states change? Otherkey issues facing American federalism are identified and theirlikely impacts examined. The article concludes with an assessmentthat the next decade in American federalism may be surprisinglyrobust.