Congressional Use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This paper seeks to advance knowledge about congressional use of the program assessment rating tool (PART) in the 109th Congress. The research suggest that both congressional chambers use PART on a limited basis; affirms that congressional committees are exposed to PART scores through congressional budget justification score inclusion and in federal agency testimony; and that use was primarily driven by non‐congressional actors.     

Preparing members of congress to make binary decisions on complex policy issues: The 1986 tax reform bill

Throughout 1985 and 1986, the House Committee on Ways and Means undertook a major revision of the federal income tax law. The product was the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986. Because of the magnitude of the changes contained in this bill, the committee sought new ways of obtaining and disseminating necessary information. This article discusses the congressional policy-making process, the different kinds of information used in congressional decision making, and some new procedures employed by the committee during House action on the 1986 tax reform legislation.     

Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue Attention in Congress

This article explores how the congressional committee system shapes the dynamics of issue attention. Consisting of what is referred to as a congressional opportunity structure, it describes how committee jurisdictions provide an important institutional context for the attention paid to new issues in congressional hearings. This is illustrated through an examination of congressional attention to biotechnology over a 30-year period. This article finds that committees with broader jurisdictions were more active in biotechnology than committees with a narrow policy remit. However, these institutional effects varied widely, even within a single policy domain. This variation suggests that issue attention depends on the degree of fit between issue characteristics and the congressional opportunity structure. More broadly, the findings here illustrate the virtues of public policy research in studies of Congress.     

Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork

Journalistic and academic accounts of Congress suggest that important committee positions allow members to procure more federal funds for their constituents, but existing evidence on this topic is limited in scope and has failed to distinguish the effects of committee membership from selection onto committees. We bring together decades of data on federal outlays and congressional committee and subcommittee assignments to provide a comprehensive analysis of committee positions and distributive politics across all policy domains. Using a within‐member research design, we find that seats on key committees produce little additional spending. The chairs of the Appropriations subcommittees—the so called “cardinals” of Congress—are an exception to the rule. These leadership positions do generate more funding for constituents, but only from programs under the jurisdiction of their subcommittee. Our results paint a new picture of distributive politics and call for a reexamination of its canonical theories.     

The congressional veto: Shifting the balance of administrative control

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.     

Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.     

Congressional Activism in the Foreign Policy Arena: A Case Study of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

This article analyzes congressional activism during an international crisis. Using the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a case, this study explores executive–congressional relations during a time when immediate policy responses are needed. A content analysis of policy statements made during committees, on the House floor, and on the Senate floor is used to investigate the specific policy ideas proposed by members of Congress. The models presented pay particular attention to the actions of Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) members, in relation to other more common predictors of congressional activism. In addition to the results for CBC members, other conclusions indicate that foreign policy leaders in Congress are international affairs policy experts without serious concerns of being defeated in their next election.     

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, included in the controversial and comprehensive budget legislation passed by Congress in October, makes a number of significant changes in federal budgeting. It shifts the focus of the budget process from deficit reduction to spending control, provides five-year spending totals and mini-sequesters for defense, international and domestic appropriations, and puts entitlements and revenue expenditures on a pay-as-you-go basis. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets have been raised substantially, Social Security surpluses taken out of the deficit calculation and allowance made for further adjustments for inflation, Operation Desert Shield, and other emergency spending, minimizing the prospect for general sequestration. OMB has been given important new estimating authority and the roles of the congressional committees involved in budgeting have been altered.     

The Budget Enforcement Act and Its Survival: Congress Hears from Experts

The unpopularity of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 grew in light of the recession, recent international events, and continuing record budget deficits. This prompted many Congress members and congressional committees to consider the future of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Two hearings, held in October and November of 1991, exemplify the kinds of choices facing the Congress and the type of advice that Congress has been receiving. This article reviews the testimony given at the hearings by experts with established knowledge of federal budgeting.     

Does the Federal Government Learn from the States? Medicaid and the Limits of Expertise in the Intergovernmental Lobby

State programmatic expertise is an important asset to federalsystems, but this expertise is not always informative to federaldecision-makers. I argue the degree to which state expertiseis informative to federal decision-makers depends on how wellthe policy interests of state and federal levels are aligned.I illustrate variation in these conditions using case studiesof congressional politics over the Medicaid program. I thenapply a statistical test, which demonstrates that states’programmatic expertise regarding Medicaid is less persuasiveto congressional committee members compared to other witnesseswho are equally knowledgeable. The results suggest a "failureof federalism," where the public good potential of state programmaticexpertise often is not realized in the federal system.     

The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits

Whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending. We investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all United States House and Senate members who entered Congress between the 94th and 102nd Congresses (1975–1992). As our measure of congressional spending we use the National Taxpayers Union's Congressional Spending Scores. Our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen. We then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending. No single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results. Nevertheless, the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending – at least via the “moral hazard” mechanisms described in this paper.     

Implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Government Performance and Results Act in the Federal Government

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, along with other legislation passed by Congress, are stimulating major financial management reform in the federal government. This article evaluates reform implementation against nine criteria developed in previous research on this topic. The criteria are accounting system adequacy, congressional intent, ability of Congress to use financial statement data, executive branch implementation incentives, capability of the Office of Management and Budget, utility of financial statements for decision making, use of performance measures in budgeting, coordination of federal organizations charged with implementation responsibility, and executive and congressional support for reform.     

Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes

It is not efficient for a budget system either to enable excessively frequent changes in programs and tax policies or to be rigid and unresponsive. Program durability is one measure of how a budget system weighs the competing goals of resoluteness and responsiveness. The federal budget has different processes—mandatory and discretionary spending and tax expenditures—each based in separate congressional committees and relying on separate procedures. This article examines the budget systems' durability. One finding is that mandatory spending programs and tax expenditures are more durable than programs backed by discretionary spending. However, while programs targeted to vulnerable populations and supporting long‐term planning, such as in income support and health, might benefit from durability, these programs display shorter durability, not longer. While displaying greater durability, tax expenditures do respond to changes in different economic sectors, based on the changes in spending of other budget systems.     

Technical Management in an Age of Openness: The Political,Public, and Environmental Forest Ranger

Modern bureaucracy faces trade‐offs between public and congressional input and agency expertise. The U.S. Forest Service offers an opportunity to quantitatively analyze whether an agency that is required to be more open to the public and congressional input will be forced to ignore its technical expertise in managing resources. This study uses data on 83,000 hazardous fuels reduction activities conducted by the Forest Service from 2001 to 2011. Although the results show that managers are responsive to public and congressional considerations, this has not prevented them from utilizing their technical knowledge to restore lands most deviated from natural conditions. This suggests that managers can balance responsiveness to public and political principals with technically sound management.     

Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House

Models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re-election interests of incumbent legislators. Attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the notion lives on, nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system. In the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents. Contrary to this simplifying characterization, the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress. Some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences. Jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions. We suggest here that these realities warrant a re-opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics. Our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member's vote share, and that assignment to a narrowly focused (specialized) committee does not.     

The impact of complexity and reform on congressional committee output

Some investigators argue that recent reforms in Congress have made it more difficult for Congress to do its job, while others contend that growing complexity in the larger congressional environment has had this result. We test these competing explanations using selected measures of congressional committee inputs and outputs over a period of eight Congresses, 1961–1975. Analysis based on pooled time-series and cross-section data reveals that reform had no direct impact on our measures of committee inputs and outputs once the effects of underlying trends attributable to complexity in the external environment are controlled. Similar conclusions emerge when we compare committees in complex and noncomplex environments and also when we compare committees differentially affected by reform. We discuss methodological and policy implications of our findings.     

Congressional voting on Superfund: Self-interest or ideology?

Many allege that Superfund is a pork-barrel program that serves self-interested federal legislators. An earlier empirical study found that Superfund cleanup priorities and expenditures were not dictated by congressional committee influence, but rather largely by public interest concerns. Despite this apparent denial of classic distributive politics, it is important to recognize that pork also can arise from legislators voting to expand programs when their constituents stand to benefit disproportionately. This study examines important House and Senate votes on Superfund for their correspondence to theories of congressional self-interest and ideology. On the whole, and despite its theoretical appeal as a potentially-classic pork-barrel program, congressional voting on Superfund is found to represent legislator's environmental and liberal ideologies as much as (if not more than) narrowly-defined self-interest. Along with the results of a previous study, this should be taken as evidence that Superfund has not consistently been a typical pork-barrel program, and that its rapid expansion and legislative support must be explained by other factors, including its symbolic environmental appeal.This research was funded in part by a Faculty Research Grant from the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.     

Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance

States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953–1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. We cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district- specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation.     

PART in Retrospect: An Examination of Legislators' Attitudes Toward PART

This research adds insight into the congressional reaction to the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) by exploring the influence of individual legislators' personal experiences and ideological position on their attitude toward PART. Specifically, the factors explored include ideological position held by legislators, level of business experience, level of campaign financing received from political action committees (PACs), years spent in Congress, seniority, and congressional chamber. The results indicate that legislators with higher levels of business experience generally were more supportive of PART and that the length of time they had served in Congress and the amount of campaign contributions they had received from PACs were negatively related to PART support. The study also provides insights into legislators' overall exposure and sentiment toward PART. The data indicates that only a small proportion of legislators clearly expressed positive or negative opinions toward PART, despite widespread exposure to the tool. These findings are important in that they contribute toward a more comprehensive understanding of the congressional reaction to PART and offer further insights into the challenges of securing congressional buy‐in for executive performance budgeting initiatives.     

An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power

This essay investigates the relationship between congressional committees, information, and gatekeeping power. It shows that the power to obstruct legislation increases the amount of information transmitted by committees in equilibrium. As a consequence, rational floor actors will make it somewhat difficult, but not impossible, to discharge committees. Some committees will have effective gatekeeping power under the optimal rule, while others will not. The only committees that will be discharged are those which cannot credibly transmit any information to the parent body.