The Coalition and the Decline of Majoritarianism in the UK

The United Kingdom has traditionally featured many aspects of the majoritarian model of democracy: its first‐past‐the‐post electoral system tends towards producing single‐party majorities, while its legislative decision rules concentrate policy‐making power in the hands of the resulting single‐party governments. However, in an unprecedented break with the UK's postwar conventions, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a coalition following the general election of 2010. In this article, we examine some of the Coalition's impacts on governing and constitutional conventions, placing them in a comparative European context. We conclude that the Coalition reflects a shift towards the less majoritarian forms of politics prevalent in continental Europe, and that some of these changes are likely to persist even after the end of the current government.     

Do Child Development Accounts Promote Account Holding,Saving, and Asset Accumulation for Children's Future? Evidence from a Statewide Randomized Experiment

This study examines the impacts of Child Development Accounts (CDAs) on account holding, saving, and asset accumulation for children, using data from the SEED for Oklahoma Kids experiment (SEED OK). SEED OK, a policy test of universal and progressive CDAs, provides a 529 college savings plan account to every infant in the treatment group with automatic account opening and an initial deposit. SEED OK also encourages treatment participants to open their own 529 accounts with an account opening incentive and a savings match. Using a sample of infants randomly selected from birth records (N = 2,670) and randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, this study runs probit and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Analyses show significant differences between treatment and control groups in all outcome measures in the targeted accounts. Nearly 100 percent of the treatment group accepted the automatically opened state‐owned account. Compared to 1 percent of the control group, 16 percent of the treatment group hold a participant‐owned account. On average, the treatment group has saved significantly larger amounts in participant‐owned accounts, although a difference in savings amount is modest between the two groups ($47 vs. $13). A difference in total 529 assets of $1,040 is estimated between the treatment and control groups. These early findings from SEED OK suggest that CDAs have positive effects on savings and asset accumulation for children's future development. Further research is required to test long‐term cost effectiveness of CDAs.     

Democratization,civil society,and women's organizing in post-revolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua

Mozambique and Nicaragua have each experienced a transition from a Marxist–Leninist, revolutionary state to a liberal–democratic–capitalist, multi-party state in the 1990s. However, in Mozambique, the historic party of the revolution, FRELIMO, remains the party in power, whil in Nicaragua the Sandinistas have been the opposition party since 1990. What impact have these transitions had on democracy, civil society, and the nature of women's organizing in the post-revolutionary period in each country? This article offers a critical examination of the notions of “democratization” and “civil society” by assessing the gains and losses that each country has experienced in terms of political, economic, and participatory democracy in the post-revolutionary period. Then, using the example of contemporary women's movements and current constructions of “feminism” emerging in each country, this article attempts to show the potential of autonomous women's organizing in civil society today.     

Some Lessons of the SDP for Labour's Present Predicament

Jeremy Corbyn's election and re‐election as Labour leader, together with the emergence of a new Conservative Prime Minister committed to Brexit, has led to renewed speculation about the possibility of a new party appealing to the ‘politically homeless’ in the centre and centre‐left of British politics. This article draws lessons from the SDP experience in the early 1980s. Are the structural conditions more favourable to the progressive centre‐left now than they were then? Is there the sociological, electoral and ideological space for a new party? Does first past the post remain an insuperable barrier to an electoral breakthrough? From whom and in what circumstances might the leadership for a new party come? For all the depth of Labour's current problems, a new party seems an unlikely immediate prospect. In 1981, the SDP made a major miscalculation about the irreversibility of Labour's decline. However, the process of fragmentation in British politics seems set to continue.     

Labouring in the Shadow of the British Political Tradition: The Dilemma of ‘One Nation’ Politics in an Age of Disunification

The British state is in flux and the Labour party is struggling to shape an effective response to the politics of disunification. This article reflects on the nature of Labour's governing project and its conception of modern statecraft which has evolved since the party became a serious contender for power in the aftermath of the First World War. We argue that Labour's initially pluralising instincts cultivated in opposition have been checked by the ongoing reality of a state‐centric mode of governing, in which the party continued to robustly defend the Westminster model operating within the parameters established by the British Political Tradition (BPT). Ed Miliband's conception of ‘One Nation’ Labour threatens to reinforce this historical pattern of reversion to the Westminster model, at precisely the moment when devolutionary forces are destabilising the existing political settlement. To break out of this impasse, Labour must look elsewhere in its ideological lexicon for inspiration, chiefly to the tradition of socialist pluralism and associationalism.     

Political brand experience and voting intention: Is there a relation?

The current study reveals that Indian voters' political brand experiences positively influence their engagement and trust in a political party. Voters' addiction to political parties mediates the relationship between their party engagement and voting intentions. Thus, political marketers should increase voters' party brand addiction for proper conversion of party engagement in the ballot box. Although voters' political brand trust directly influences their voting intentions, interestingly, their political brand addictions indirectly influence the relationship between brand trust and voting intentions. The findings advocate that political marketers should ensure positive political party experiences to ensure voters' engagement with the party. Positive party experiences increase voters' trust in the party further. Another critical input for political marketers is the role of political brand addiction, which the study findings corroborate. Political brand addiction develops a set of loyal voters for a party and guarantees those voters' support for the party.     

War Chests as Precautionary Savings

I present a model of campaign spending and saving in repeated elections which yields empirical implications on the creation of war chests. As previous studies disagree whether war chests deter potential challengers from running against incumbents, I present an alternative model that intentionally excludes deterrence as a motivation and formalizes under what circumstances (if any) a war chest would be created for savings. The model predicts that an incumbent creates a war chest when she faces a weaker challenger, i.e. as precautionary savings for future elections. The model yields several other predictions of incumbent fund-raising, spending, and saving behavior. Using incumbents from 1982–1998 U.S. House elections, I find strong empirical support for the predictions of the model.     

The Crisis of German Social Democracy Revisited

This article analyses the dramatic electoral decline of German social democracy since 2003. It argues that the SPD's decision, under the leadership of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, to engage in welfare state retrenchment and labour market deregulation during the ‘Hartz reforms’ (2003–05) demoralised the SPD electorate. The SPD subsequently lost half of its former electoral coalition, namely blue‐collar voters and socially disadvantaged groups, while efforts to gain access to centrist and middle‐class voters have failed to produce any compensating gains. While the SPD's decline from a large to a mid‐sized party is part of a larger transformation of the German party system, no political recovery is possible for social democracy without a fundamental change of strategy, namely efforts to regain former voters by offering credible social welfare and redistributive policies. The SPD will not be able to delegate such policies in a ‘convoy model’ to other parties, such as the Left Party; nor will a modest ‘correction’ of the earlier course, such as has been attempted since 2009 under the leadership of current party chairman Sigmar Gabriel, be sufficient to recover lost electoral ground.     

Bidding behavior in the department of defense's commercial activities competitions

From 1978 to 1994, the Department of Defense conducted more than 2,000 competitions in which private contractors and the government's in‐house team bid to provide a service performed in‐house before the competition. A three‐equation model is constructed, which is used to estimate the in‐house bid, the minimum contractor bid, and the in‐house team's baseline cost. The model accounts for the fact that the in‐house bid is constrained not to exceed its baseline cost. The estimates are used in simulations of the savings from the completed competitions ($1.55 billion annually, 35 percent of the baseline cost) as well as the savings from various alternative policies, including competitively tendering all the functions on the Department of Defense's list of potential candidates ($7.58 billion annually). © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Gamson rule not for all: Patterns of portfolio allocation among Italian party factions

This article investigates the dynamics of portfolio allocation within political parties to shed light on the patterns of conflict and cooperation between rival party factions. It provides a game‐theoretic model that helps in explaining differences in portfolio allocation due to alternative modes of party organisation or party system competitiveness. Focusing on party congresses to estimate the number, strength and policy positions of party factions, the Italian case is analysed by testing some hypotheses generated by the theoretical model. The results shown that, overall, spoils are shared in proportion to the strength of each faction, in line with the prediction of Gamson's Law. However, there are also some important deviations from this path. Rules that foster party leaders' autonomy in fact provide them with a higher degree of discretion that will be used to reward their followers and to ward off any credible and harmful threat to party unity. Indeed, strategic portfolio allocation might balance out a lower amount of policy payoffs and becomes a strategy to restrain minorities from breaking away, thus contributing to the preservation of party unity in highly competitive political systems.     

Explaining Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea, 1988–99

The current paper discusses Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea during the period 1988–99. These policies are discussed with reference to ‘realist’ and ‘non-realist’ theoretical approaches. The realist position regards Taiwan's South China Sea policies as an outcome of its relations with the People's Republic of China and the Southeast Asian countries. These policies are fashioned and implemented in a coherent way by a unitary state. Two ‘non-realist’ positions are identified. One focuses on influences from domestic political parties and party factions, bureaucratic segments and economic interests. The other emphasizes the impact of transnational alliances, mainly through oil business lobby groups allied with mainland Chinese partners. The investigation sustains much of the realist argument. It is, however, argued that party politics and bureaucratic infighting has had an independent effect on Taiwan's South China Sea policies, while the impact of oil business interests has been limited.     

Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third‐Party Influence on Protests and Repression

Ukraine's anti‐government protests in 2013–2014, and the ensuing removal of President Yanukovich, raised much speculation about Russia's role in the outcome of the crisis, as well as more general questions related to third‐party influence on domestic protests and repression. Does third‐party assistance to the government increase the level of government repression or deter protesters? Does the leader removal indicate that foreign involvement was a failure? Or can a third party gain from involvement, even if its protégé leader is removed from power? We model external influence on the onset of protests and repression as a game between the government, the protesters, and a third party that supports the government. The main finding is that a third party may “bankroll” repression against the protesters, even at the risk of the removal of their protégé leader, with the goal of deterring future protests within its sphere of interest.     

The more the better? Cumulative issue ownership and intra-campaign party switching

We contribute to the literature on short term changes in voters' party preferences (or intra-campaign party switching), by advancing a factor that has been neglected so far: Voters' perceptions about parties' issue competence. We develop a model of party switching that includes both classic predictors and issue ownership considerations. Moreover, in contrast to the usual single issue ownership conception focusing on the party deemed most competent to solve the most important problem, we argue that voters base their party choice on their perceptions of parties' competence on a variety of issues, i.e. on cumulative issue ownership. We test our model on panel data from the 2015 Swiss election study. The change in competence perceptions appears as a strong predictor of party switching: The higher the increase in the number of issues on which voters see a party as most competent during the campaign, the higher their likelihood to switch to that party.     

Political Brand Equity Model: The Integration of Political Brands in Voter Choice

The voters’ choices about political parties have many similarities with how they make their choices about commercial brands. Therefore, political parties are now constantly applying the concept and strategies of brand management to make the political product attractive, appealable, trustable, differentiable, a source of long-term relationships, and a decision-making driver. Furthermore, the political parties have to play an active role in the community's political socialization processes, which rely heavily on branding strategies. Because, the party equity is largely based on the community's social gregariousness that has profound effect on the electorates' propensity to participate in the politics. This study has deeply explored and broadened the concept of party equity analogous to commercial brand equity typology by developing a politics-specific brand equity model. This model demonstrates the integration of political brands in voter choice. Empirically, this model has been validated by collecting 550 valid responses from the constituency of District Gujrat, Pakistan. A careful analysis of these responses through structural equation modeling methodology has revealed that political parties vary according to the outcomes of their role in the political socialization process of the communities, loyalty, and voters’ attitude. Parties that have favorable role in the socialization process have strong party knowledge and thus have high party equity as compared to competing political parties, which have a weak position of party knowledge. Similarly, this study provides the roadmap and guidelines for the political parties to manage their party equity. Similarly, the model would be able to facilitate political parties in comparing different constituencies on the basis of their diversified social dynamics and political knowledge and in the development of a constituency-based manifesto, also termed “localized manifesto,” to further enhance their vote bank.     

Party registration and party self-identification: Exploring the role of electoral institutions in attitudes and behaviors

How do electoral institutions affect self-identified partisanship? I hypothesize that party registration acts to anchor a person's party identification, tying a person to a political party even when their underlying preferences may align them with the other party. Estimating a random effects multinomial logit model, I find individuals registered with a party are more likely to self-identify with that party and away from the other party. Party registration also affects voting in presidential elections but not in House elections, leading to greater defection in the former where voters have more information about the candidates. These insights illuminate varying rates of electoral realignment, particularly among southern states, and the makeup of primary electorates in states with and without party registration.     

The Renewal of the Local Conservative Party Campaign Capability: An Organizational Insight into Central Co-ordination

The importance of local campaigning for general election success is widely accepted. By focusing on the British Conservative Party, this article offers qualitative support through a research design in which interviews were conducted with local activists in four target constituencies and with regional officials; as a result, some understanding of the long campaign was also obtained. Embracing the contemporary view that campaigning effectiveness is a function of the party centre's ability to direct local parties, this study provides an organizational insight into how the centre was able to enhance its control, but also discusses the implications of this for local activists and for the local party organizational structure. The findings reveal that activist de-politicization and de-skilling, and a more formal and dismissive approach to party management, have undermined the local effort with the result that the party's local campaigning effort remains organizationally sub-optimal. The engagement of outside expertise and supporter networks has also changed the nature of the local party, so that it is moving towards a network of local political capabilities.     

The leadership dilemma: Examining the impact of strong leaders on parties

Party leaders are often regarded as crucial to a party's success. Successful leaders tend to be big personalities who dominate their party's organisation, policy development and electoral campaigns. But does that control come with a price? We test to see if such leaders damage their parties in the medium term. This happens because strong leaders might be ceded too much control of the party organisation, policy and electoral strategy. We specifically hypothesise that political parties will go through a period of leadership instability and electoral decline after strong leaders step down. Using a dataset with elections under party leaders in nine countries over a 25-year period, and a qualitative case study, we find some evidence for the theory, which should prompt further research of the question.     

It's all relative: Spatial positioning of parties and ideological shifts

The usefulness of the general class of spatial econometric models, which relaxes the assumption that the observations are independent, has only recently been realised. One particularly fruitful application includes models of parties' ideological change as well as the electoral consequences of party competition. In these studies, scholars can explicitly model the spatial interconnectedness of political parties in theoretically pleasing ways, producing inferences that are consistent with formal models of party competition, but are beyond the grasp of traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. To illustrate these benefits, this article replicates Adams and Somer‐Topcu's 2009 study of parties' responses to ideological shifts by rival parties to show that appropriately modeling patterns of interconnectivity between parties via weights matrices provides more realistic inferences that are more consistent with formal models of party competition.     

Balancing district and party seats: The arithmetic of mixed-member proportional electoral systems

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMP) are widely praised because they combine the direct, personal election of MPs from single-seat constituencies with a proportional seat allocation. However, the size of the proportional tier matters for the question of whether the system's overall proportionality is preserved. Hence, a key challenge for constitution-makers and scholars is finding the right balance between district and proportional seats, so as to maximise district representation and guarantee proportional representation.This paper develops the first theoretical model that helps to locate this sweet spot for district and party seats. The novel solution builds on Taagepera's “logical models” about party sizes. The model is tested on 58 national parliamentary elections under MMP rules.     

The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments

To what extent do party labels influence individuals’ policy positions? Much research has examined this question in the United States, where party identification can generate both in‐group and out‐group pressures to conform to a party's position. However, relatively little research has considered the question's comparative generalizability. We explore the impact of party labels on attitudes in Brazil, a relatively new democracy with a fragmented party system. In such an environment, do parties function as in‐groups, out‐groups, or neither? We answer this question through two survey experiments, one conducted on a nationally representative sample and another on a convenience sample recruited via Facebook. We find that both in‐ and out‐group cues shape the opinions of identifiers of Brazil's two main parties but that cues have no effect on nonpartisans. Results suggest that party identification can structure attitudes and behavior even in “party‐averse” electoral environments.